BEYOND THE PASS

Economy, Ethnicity, and Empire in Qing Central Asia,
1759–1864

JAMES A. MILLWARD

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Stanford, California
1998
In his attempt to cross Xinjiang’s Taklamakan Desert in 1895, Sven Hedin found his men to be more of a liability than an asset. When sandstorms threatened and water grew low, he forged ahead while they lost hope, drank camel urine, and died in the sand.

My experience in writing this book could not have been more different—all the way, I have been borne along by the help and encouragement of others. This was especially the case in China, where I conducted the bulk of the research for this book in 1990 while affiliated with the Institute for Qing History Studies at People’s University in Beijing. I was extremely fortunate in having as my advisors Cheng Chongde and Hua Li, who on that and subsequent occasions have shared with me their deep knowledge of the Qing frontiers, steered me to the important literature, and introduced me to other scholars in the field of Xinjiang history. The sheaves of letters they wrote gained me a warm welcome among their colleagues in Mongolia, Ningxia, Gansu, and Xinjiang as well as around Beijing, and thus made this book possible. I am thankful as well to Dai Yi and Ma Ruheng at Renda and to Ma Dazheng and the staff of the Zhongguo Bianjian Shidi Yanjiu Zhongxin for similar help.

During my research year in China, the following scholars gave generously of their time and expertise: in Beijing, Chen Yongling, Lin Yongkuang, Wang Xi, Zhang Yuxin, and especially Wu Fengpei, who is truly a national treasure; Hao Weimin and Jin Feng (Altan Orqhil) in Hohhot; Chen Yuning, Lai Cunli, Ma Ping, and Yang Huazhong in Ningxia; Wang Xilong in Lanzhou; Ji Dachun, Feng Xisi, Li Sheng, Miao Pusheng, Pan Zhiping, Qi Qingshun, Xu Bofu, and Zhou Xuan in Urumchi. Qin Weixing spent the days of Qurban shepherding me around Urumchi, for which I am eternally in his debt. It is a pleasure also to thank Abdullahi, Chao-ge-tu, Kambil, Li Shoujun, Molliari, Xie Zhining, and Zhang Shiming for smoothing the way at various points. My friends Sun Hong, Wan Jun, Wang Hengjie, Wang Tong, Wang Yi, and Zhang Xuehui made Beijing seem like home; other friends and colleagues, Sabine Dabringhaus, Mark Elliott, Blaine Gaustad, John Herman,
Melissa Macauley, Nancy Park, Steven Shutt, and Paola Zamperini made even the Renda dorm feel homey—a considerably more difficult task—and taught me a great deal of history in the process.

While I made my first written reconnaissances of the material I brought back from China in a dissertation for Stanford University, the guidance of Albert Dien, Harold Kahn, and Lyman Van Slyke kept me on track. Hal Kahn’s thoughts have been particularly helpful in explaining to me what I was writing about; passages in his letters often described my work better than I could myself, and not a few terms first employed by him have found their way into my vocabulary. Pamela Crossley, Mark Elliott, James Hevia, Jonathan Lipman, Toby Meyer, Celia Millward, Sue Naquin, Peter Perdue, Evelyn Rawski, and Morris Rossabi have carefully read, corrected, and commented on all or portions of this book in various drafts. Their comments have been of great help, though I have probably implemented too few of their suggestions. I have also profited from discussions with Dorothy Borei, Alison Futrell and the Rome/Qing comparative imperialism seminar at Arizona, Kato Naoshi, Laura Newby, Shinmen Yasushi, Sugiwara Jun, and Nakami Tatsu. My editors at Stanford University Press, Pamela MacFarland Helward and Stacey Lynn, and my copy editor, Erin Milnes, have been both sharp-eyed and pleasant to work with. Muriel Bell offered support and encouragement for this project from its inception, for which I extend my gratitude. Others, too, have made important contributions to this project, whether they know it or not: Kahar Barat, Carol Benedict, Philippe Forêt, Gyu Renquan, Jake Haselkorn, John Olsen, Caroline Reeves, Joan and Daniel Sax, Jan Stuart, Kaneko Tamto, Hoyt Cleaveland Tillman, Mike Winter-Rouset, and Dick Wang. Meera and Sushma Sikka have kept me sustained at key stages with (aptly named) gobi paratha.

I am grateful for research access and assistance provided by the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing; Yin Shunji’s graceful approach to problems was always appreciated, and her good humor brightened many grim days otherwise illuminated only by the pallid glow of a microfilm reader. In Japan, Hamashita Takeshi welcomed me into his seminar and facilitated access to the collections of the Tōyō Bunka Kenkyūjo. I also consulted the collections of the Tōyō Bunko and Keio University, as well as the British Library, the library of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Stanford University Green Library and the Hoover Institution, Widener and Harvard-Yenching Libraries, the University of Arizona Oriental Library, Georgetown University Lauinger Library, and the Library of Congress, Asian Division. My thanks to the staffs of all these institutions for their patient help and, in a few cases, flexibility about overdue fees.

Two extended seminars have added vastly to my understanding of Xinjiang and the Qing dynasty. The first, a conference and field expedition in Xinjiang organized in 1992 by the Center for Research on Chinese Frontier History and Geography (Beijing) and the Sven Hedin Foundation (Sweden), gave me the chance to travel some of Altishahr’s desert roads myself. The second, a month-long summer institute on the Qing palace at Chengde, sponsored by the National Endowment for the Humanities and held on the campus of the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor in 1994, first brought many of the issues discussed in this book into focus for me. I hope the organizers of both events will find in this book some sign that their efforts have paid off.

The financial support that I have received for this project includes tuition remission from the Inter-University Program in Yokohama for language study and research in Japan, a National Program Fellowship of the Committee for Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China and a Fulbright-Hays Grant for Doctoral Dissertation Research for my year in China; and a China Times Young Scholar’s Fellowship, a Josephine de Karine Fellowship, and a Foreign Language and Area Studies Fellowship for completion of the dissertation. A grant from the Pacific Cultural Foundation provided partial support during a year spent finishing the manuscript. The University of Arizona provided me with a summer stipend for Li Hui-tzu, my highly efficient research assistant, and the Department of History there further facilitated work on this project by graciously granting me leaves during my first years of teaching.

My warmest thanks go to my wife, Madhulika Sikka, who has supported me patiently in all possible ways over these years, despite separation by oceans, continents, and the chasm that sometimes divides the historian from the journalist. I complete this book on the eve of our anniversary, and though I am tempted simply to offer the manuscript to her in lieu of a present, I will not. She deserves much better.

J. M.
## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PREFACE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>ABBREVIATIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Boundaries and Modern Chinese History, 4; Toward a Qing-Centered History of the Qing, 23;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qing Imperialism, 25; From Qing to China, 26.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td><strong>LANDMARKS</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Lay of the Land, 21; The Historical Terrain, 25; High Qing Xinjiang, 32; The Jiayu Guan,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qing Expansion, and “China,” 36; Literati Dissent, Imperial Response, 38; Justifying Empire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>at Home, 41.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><strong>FINANCING NEW DOMINION</strong></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Kazakh Trade, 45; The Kazakhs and the “Tribute System,” 48;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Planting the Frontier, 50; Local Sources of Revenue, 52; Merchant Loans and the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provisioning of the Qing Military, 57; Xinjiang’s Silver Lifeline, 58; Yambus for the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maharajah? 65; Two Metals, Three Currencies, 65; Pul-Tael Exchange Rates and Cotton Cloth,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71; Currency Troubles and Reform, 72.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td><strong>OFFICIAL COMMERCE AND COMMERCIAL TAXATION IN THE FAR WEST</strong></td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Xinjiang Military Deployment, 77; Tea and the Beginnings of Official Commerce in Xinjiang,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80; Formation of the Xinjiang Commissaries, 83; Xinjiang’s Official Commerce and China</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proper, 91; The Southern Commissaries, 92; The Qing and the “Silk Road,” 98; Tapping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private Commercial Wealth in Xinjiang, 101; San-cheng Goes Too Far, 105; Nayanceng’s Tea-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tax Plan, 206; The Fiscal Foundations of Empire, 209.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Maps, Figures, and Tables

Maps
1. Xinjiang in the Qing period (c. 1820) 22
2. The Yili military complex c. 1809 78
3. The Kalanggu karun and the route to Kokand 94
4. Hami and environs 128
5. The Ush citadel (Fuhua cheng) and environs 142
6. Trade routes of north bend traders (beitaoke) and west road traders (ziluake) 161

Figures
1. The raising of the siege at Blackwater Camp 32
2. Official silk shipments to Zungharia and Altishahr, 1765–1853 47
3. The Hami cantonment 128
4. Growth of commercial tax revenue in Urumchi, 1763–77 134
5. Plan of a typical ziluoke store 164
6. Jade boulder carved with a scene of jade quarrying, Qianlong period 181
7. Page from the multilingual gazetteer of the Western Regions (Xiyu tongzong zhi) 198
8. Cover illustration from John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order 200
9. Gaozong's vision of the empire, mid-Qianlong reign 201

Tables
1. Xixiayi Silver Quotas and Shipments to Xinjiang 60
2. Pul-Tael Market Exchange Rates in Altishahr, 1760–1847 68
3. Official Pul-Tael Exchange Rates in Altishahr 70
4. Qianlong-period Official and Military Personnel in Xinjiang 80
5. Official Qing Investments in Zungharia, 1770–1854 87
6. Capital and Annual Earnings of Urumchi Commissaries, c. 1796 90
7. Annual Expenditure of Urumchi Guanpu Revenues, c. 1796 90
“What do you want to study those frontier places for? All the history happened in China!” So a Chinese friend told me many years ago when I spoke of my growing interest in the Central Asian region known as Xinjiang—the Qing dynasty’s “New Dominion,” or the “Western Regions.” My experience during my first years in graduate school seemed to bear him out. Although teachers and classmates encouraged my pursuits, nothing on our reading lists seemed to apply to the far west. This bothered me, but I carried on, motivated (and funded) to a great degree by virtue of the unconventionality and, perhaps, exoticism of my topic. Eventually, my efforts to link my peripheral interests with what seemed to be the central concerns of the field led me to start on a basic, material level, examining the physical exchanges connecting China proper to Xinjiang, and investigating the travelers—mostly merchants—who frequented the routes between China and the new Qing acquisition. Thus began what started as a study of commercial relations between China proper and Xinjiang in the Qing period.

In the course of my reading in the Qing archives, annals, and gazetteers, however, I realized that in the eyes of Qing policy makers, Chinese commerce in Xinjiang was inextricably linked to issues of control. Whenever the activities of commoners became objects of state scrutiny (and on the frontier, that was often), Qing sources almost invariably took care to distinguish the type of merchant—or farmer or herdsman—involved, whether they were Han Chinese, Muslim Han, local Muslim, Oirat, Andijani, Kazakh, Kirghiz, or members of another of the groups the Qing carefully distinguished. Thus, I could not consider commerce without reference to this aspect of the Qing government in Xinjiang, an aspect I have called, for lack of a better term, ethnic policy.

Somewhat farther along, I discovered that the two issues I had singled out, the economics of empire and the interactions of people in an imperial context, comprised core concerns of the Qing imperial enterprise and that what I was working to uncover was nothing less than the mechanics and ethos of Qing imperialism. Moreover, during the span of time I chose to study, poli-
cies changed and ideologies shifted as events encroached and the dynasty’s circumstances worsened. My Chinese sources reflected a change in attitude toward Xinjiang: what was a Qing empire in the west at the beginning of my period began to sound more like a Chinese one by the end. And in pondering the differences between Qing and China, and why such a distinction seemed odd, I began to reflect again, this time with greater understanding, on why the empire in Xinjiang, a major preoccupation of the Qing court, has been of such little concern to historians in the twentieth century.

This is a study, then, of the workings and conception of Qing empire in Xinjiang during its first phase, from the initial conquest to the time of the mid-nineteenth-century Muslim uprisings that severed the region from control by Beijing for over a decade. Qing economic and ethnic policies in Xinjiang receive the most attention here, but in the course of examining these issues, I attempt also to shed light on a broader issue: the transition from a Qing dynastic empire to a Chinese nation-state.

The chapters below approach this subject according to the following plan. We begin at the Jiayu Guan, the western terminus of the Ming walled defense system, in the early nineteenth century. I consider the ambiguity and liminality of the Jiayu Guan (and Xinjiang) during the Qing and hazard some thoughts on why the historiography of early modern and modern China has paid so little attention to these issues. Chapter 1 then provides geographic and historical background to the region and introduces the discourse on Xinjiang’s place in the empire that carried through the 1759–1864 period. This discourse—the court and scholarly debates over imperial conception and implementation—the discussion of fiscal matters overlay deeper concerns about the proper limits and nature of the empire. In order to justify the conquest, the Qianlong emperor, who had pushed ahead with the conquest of Xinjiang in the face of domestic opposition from certain quarters in China, was concerned that imperial rule in Xinjiang be inexpensive to maintain. His court thus encouraged fiscal innovation in the new territory. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the fiscal foundations, and limitations, of Qing rule in Xinjiang, outlining the means by which the military government was maintained without an agricultural tax base like that in China proper. Despite the emperor’s hopes, the dynasty was forced to subsidize the Xinjiang garrisons in order to support its armies and officials there; these chapters quantify the extent of reliance on Chinese silver and examine the various means by which Xinjiang authorities attempted to reduce that reliance. Because many of these means involved the commercial economy, Chinese merchants in Xinjiang came to provide an in-

creasingly important safety margin to the tight budgets under which Qing authorities in Xinjiang operated.

The subsequent chapters examine these private merchants and the policies adopted by the Qing toward their activities in Xinjiang, especially in the south, where the population of native Muslims was highest. Chapter 4 outlines the process of Chinese commercial penetration of Xinjiang, Qing control measures, Chinese settlement patterns, and the extension of Chinese urban culture to parts of the New Dominion. One central problem explored here is the degree to which Qing authorities attempted to segregate Chinese traders from the natives of southern Xinjiang; I examine the construction and inhabitation of walled citadels in southern cities in an attempt to illuminate this question. Chapter 5 describes the experiences of Han, Tungan (Chinese Muslim, today’s Uyghur), and East Turkestan (today’s Uyghur) merchants trading between China and Xinjiang. Case studies of two major articles of trade, tea and jade, further highlight these groups’ activities and reveal that private commercial links between China proper and Xinjiang were segmented at gateway cities and functionally differentiated among distinct types of merchants plying different routes, including small-scale Chinese Muslim traders, representatives of Shanxi firms, and dealers in silk and jade from the Jiangnan region. Chapter 6 first considers ethnic policy in Xinjiang from a theoretical standpoint, contrasting the historiographical commonplace that the empire was Sinocentrically conceived with how the Qianlong emperor envisioned it. This chapter concludes with a case study of a grisly incident in Kashgar in 1830 that tested, and eventually led to the replacement of, the mid-Qing ethnic policy with one more favorable to Han Chinese. Analysis of this event suggests that part of the explanation to how a new, Greater China arose out of the Qing imperium lies in the convergence of Manchu and Chinese interests in Xinjiang. A concluding chapter traces the crumbling of Qing control in Xinjiang to the dual failure of silver stipends and the Xinjiang commercial economy and argues that the continuation of the debates over Xinjiang by statecraft writers in the first half of the nineteenth century—again, framed in economic terms—anticipated a more assimilationist Chinese model of empire that was to be implemented in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Chinese terms and names below are given in Hanyu pinyin and Manchu ones according to the Möllendorff system. For Mongolian terms, I use Antoine Mostaert’s scheme as adapted by Francis W. Cleaves, except that γ is here written “г” and “j” printed without the haček. However, for Mongol names I have sacrificed technical accuracy for recognizability and readers’ ease, and thus have Ṯorgut, Khoshuut, and Chinggis Khan instead of Ṯorgur, Qošut, and Činggis Qa’an. For romanization of Uyghur (Eastern Turkic) I follow the system used by Reinhard Hahn in his Spoken Uyghur, which is generally recognizable to Turkologists. For practical reasons, “ng” is substituted for Hahn’s ʡ (the eng). Foreign terms in the text are generally given in Chinese, unless otherwise noted. Where versions are given in more than one language or where confusion might be possible, the language is identified as follows: Ch. = Chinese; Ma. = Manchu; Mo. = Mongol; Tu. = Eastern Turkic; that is, Uyghur.

Researchers working on Qing Inner Asia often encounter non-Chinese personal names for which only the Chinese, and not the spelling in the original language, is available. It is inappropriate to write these as if they were Chinese names (that is, as “Fu Heng” or “Na Yancheng,” for example). For such names, I adopt the following convention: the Chinese characters are transliterated in pinyin and linked by hyphens. Another method, now common among scholars who use pinyin in preference to the Wade-Giles system, is to run the Chinese characters of transliterated non-Chinese (especially Manchu) names together. However, I believe Gen-chu-ke-ze-bang to be somewhat more manageable than Genchuokezhang. This convention also instantly distinguishes non-Han from Han personages, while preventing confusion in those occasional cases where a spelling might be a transliteration from either Chinese or an Altaic language (as with Fukanqan or Nayanqeng, for example). Of course, the best course of all is to provide both non-Chinese and Chinese spellings; unfortunately, this is not always feasible.

Where possible, names of major East Turkestani and Kokandi historical figures and some terms have been given in Arabic transcription, to conform
Note on Transliteration

to the precedents established by Joseph Fletcher and Saguchi Tōru. There are no universally accepted spellings for non-Chinese Xinjiang place-names, and, indeed, many of those names have been changed frequently over the past two centuries. After an analysis of the spellings in the Xiya tongren zhi and modern Uyghur-language maps of Xinjiang, I have determined that there is no strong linguistic or historical basis to adopt either of these sources as a standard for place-name spellings; today’s official Chinese versions (Kashi for Kashgar, Shache for Yarkand) are unfamiliar and not in popular use even in Xinjiang; some, like “Urumqi” for Urumchi, are based on a P.R.C. system for romanizing Uyghur that has now been abandoned. Thus, again for continuity, I follow Fletcher’s spellings in the Cambridge History of China, volume 10. It is hoped that these will in any case be the forms most familiar to readers.

I refer to Qing emperors primarily as the Qianlong emperor, the jiaqing emperor, the Daoguang emperor, and so on. When stylistic concerns require another name in order to avoid cumbersome repetition, I follow many Chinese scholars in employing the temple names Gaozong (for Qianlong), Renzong (for Jiaqing), and Xuanzong (for Daoguang).

Finally, a word on the terms “Inner Asia,” “Central Asia,” and “Xinjiang.” Once, Europeans referred to a geographic and cultural entity known as Tartary. Though few agreed on where Tartary began and ended, or whether it included Cathay or not, everyone knew where it was. Our terminology today is hardly more concrete; thus it is with a certain arbitrariness that I adopt the following usages. In this book, “Inner Asia” is used for those northern and western territories that the Qing dynasty, in building its empire, added to the lands of former Ming China. Thus, Inner Asia comprises Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet. I use the term “Central Asia” here to indicate the geographically central regions of the Eurasian continent, especially the Islamic lands once known by such names as Trans-Oxiana or Turkestan, including the former Soviet Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Afghanistan. In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the region known in Chinese as Xinjiang was commonly called Eastern Turkestan or Chinese Central Asia, and I therefore also include it within my definition of Central Asia. Xinjiang thus falls within a zone of overlap between Inner and Central Asia. I refer to Xinjiang in my title as “Central Asia” for the benefit of browsers or readers who are not China specialists; I intend no political message by this or any other terminological usages in this book.

ABBREVIATIONS

CZGS Caizheng guanshi (finance and customs). Subject category of archival holdings in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

GPSYSA “Gao Pu si yu: yushi an” (The case of Gao Pu’s illegal private jade sales). Shiliao zunkan (Historical materials trimonthly) nos. 19–28 (Feb. 1930 to March 1931).

GZSL Da Qing ilchao Gaozong shilu (Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Qianlong reign).


HJTZ He-ning, ed. Huijiaxing tongzhi (Comprehensive gazetteer of Alishaha). 1804.

HYXYTZ Fuheng et al., comp. (Qinding) huangyu Xiya tuzhi (Imperially commissioned gazetteer of the Western Regions of the imperial domain). 1782.

LFZZ Junjichu lufu zouzhe. Reference copy of palace memorial stored in the Grand Council; a class of document held in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

MZSW Minzu shiwu (Nationality affairs). Subject category of archival holdings in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

NWFLW Neiufu laiwén (Communications to the Imperial Household Agency). A class of document stored in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

NWYGZY Nayanceng (Na-yan-cheng). Naiwen yigong zouyi (Memorials of Nayanceng). Rong’an, ed. 1830.


QDDA Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan (Number One Historical
Abbreviations


RZSL Da Qing lichao Renzong shilu (Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Jiaqing reign).

SYMY Shangye maoyi (Trade and commerce). Subject category of archival holdings in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

SZJL He-ning, ed. Sanzhou jilu (Cursory record of three prefectures: Hami, Turfan, and Urumchi), Preface 1805.

WZSL Da Qing lichao Wenzong shilu (Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Xianfeng reign).

XCYL Qi Yunshi, comp. Xichui yaokue (Survey of the Western borders). 1807.

XJZL Song-yun et al. (Qinding) Xinjiang shilue (Imperially commissioned gazetteer of Xinjiang), Preface 1821.

XYWJL Qi-shi-yi (Chunyuan). Xiguo wenjian lu (Record of things heard and seen in the Western Regions). 1777.

XZSL Da Qing lichao Xianzong shilu (Veritable records of the successive reigns of the Qing dynasty—Daoguang reign).

YJHL Ge Beng’e. Yijiang hulan (Survey of the Yili River region). 1775.

YJZ Yijiang jizai (Record of the Yili River area). C. 1862.

ZPZZ Gongzhong zhupi zouzhe. Rescripted palace memorial; a class of document stored in the Number One Historical Archives of China.

Early in July 1865, Qi Yunshi traveled northwestward through the sere, sparsely populated landscape of the Gansu corridor on his way to exile in northern Xinjiang. His appointment to the Baoquan Ju Coinage Office in the capital the year before had not worked out well. When Qi took up his job as overseer, he had been able to check only the books, not the mint’s actual copper stocks, because audits of copper supplies were carried out only at fixed intervals. When the scheduled audit took place and a large shortfall left by his predecessor was discovered, the blame fell on Qi, and he was banished to Yili.

Not that this surprised Qi, particularly. In the uneasy years surrounding the death of the Qianlong emperor and the demise of the corrupt imperial favorite, Hešen (He-shen), it had been easy to make enemies in the bureaucracy, and Qi had not improved matters by publicly exposing malfeasance among officials administering the grain transport system. Now they were getting even.

Nor was Qi Yunshi completely unprepared for what lay before him. Before the Baoquan Ju appointment, as a Hanlin compiler he had assisted in a major study of the elite genealogies of Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the Waifan Menggu Huibu wangiōng biaozhuan, and this task had exposed him
These feelings warred confusedly within me for a moment while I beheld the landscape. Then, suddenly, I saw it all in a new light.

Qi does not share with us the exact nature of his epiphany, though he hints at it with the following, apparently matter-of-fact, observation: “What the ancients called Yumen Guan and Yang Guan are still several hundred li to the west, on the border of today’s Dunhuang County. So Jiayu Guan is in fact not really remote.”

Not really remote—it’s distance diminishes as Qi decides the Jiayu Guan is not one of those dangerous passes into wilderness and barbarism that the Tang poets sang of so emotively. Those lie further west, he reminds himself, apparently resolving the incongruity between image and reality that had puzzled him. But in fact, by Qi’s time, Yumen Guan and Yang Guan were no more than memories, ruins lost under the desert, and in any case, he knew he would not pass through them. He was already over the threshold; there would be no other, more definitive moment than this spasm of ambivalence to mark his entry to the Western Regions.

The idea of the boundary has recently been embraced by scholars in the humanities and social sciences as a powerful metaphor and hermeneutic device. At boundaries, differences are articulated and negotiated; decisions are made to include or exclude; categories are drawn up. Not only do boundaries distinguish two entities; they define the entities themselves: there can be no civilization without barbarism, no true religion without infidels, no Occident without the Orient, no Self without the Other. Yet boundaries are seldom rigid. Rather, they are porous surfaces where heterogeneous physical or conceptual zones come into contact and interpenetrate. Nor are they static, but change position, character, and meaning over time.

Jiayu Guan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a boundary in all these senses, operating on both physical and symbolic levels. It was a fort and a gate in a defensive wall, a military checkpoint that announced the border dividing the eighteen provinces of China proper, known in Qing sources as the “inner land,” from the territory “beyond the Pass.” (The paired terms, nei’di and guanwai, remain in common use today, guan referring both to the Jiayu Guan and the Shandai Guan, at the opposite end of the Ming wall, on the coast.) As suggested by Qi’s ruminations, it was also, for both educated Qing subjects and the imperial court, a point of contact between the past and the present. Yumen Guan and Yang Guan, gates in the Han Dynasty mural defense system in the northwest, are prominent landmarks in a frontier literature populated with soldiers on lonely borderland duty, exiles banished beyond the pale, and princesses married off to coarse
Introduction

barbarian chieftains. Verses in this genre employ description of a hostile natural environment to stress the moral and cultural gulf that was seen to separate China from lands outside the walls. These resonances, familiar from Tang poetry or the fictional Journey to the West (Xi you ji) and easily triggered by the invocation of Han and Tang period Western Regions place-names, attached themselves to the later Jiayu Guan as well. In the period of cultural and strategic retraction that followed the reign of the Ming emperor Yongle (1403–44), this frontier fortress near the northwestern terminus of the wall aptly marked, in Chinese eyes, a boundary between civilization and chaos.

By the high Qing, however, Jiayu Guan was in many ways an incongruous relic. It was not of real strategic significance. No threat lay on the other side, nor was “beyond the Pass” the exclusive domain of non-Chinese; in fact, by this time, it was impermissible to apply the term yi (foreign, nonsubjects) to Xinjiang peoples. Han Chinese and Muslims from the west had been traveling back and forth in increasing numbers for decades, and Chinese colonies in Xinjiang were thriving. The Pass did not correspond to any climatic zone or particular feature of the natural landscape: where the wall and Jiayu Guan cut across Gansu, one side looks pretty much like the other, and, literalist that he was, Qi Yunshi was quick to note the discrepancy between the “Pass” here and the dramatic topography in the idealized literary images of frontier portals. Jiayu Guan simply divided one part of the empire from another—a purpose that, upon reflection, is not simple at all.

Boundaries and Modern Chinese History

Until quite recently, few Western historians of Qing or Republican China have taken their research beyond Jiayu Guan, and fewer still have done so for the period before the 1860s. This is despite the fact that the Zunghar campaigns that ultimately resulted in the conquest of Xinjiang commanded the attention and strained the treasuries of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong emperors; despite the fact that two major institutional innovations of the Qing, the Ministry for Governing the Outer Domains (Lifan Yuan) and the Grand Council (Junji Chu), were deeply engaged in the business of acquiring and maintaining the territory; despite the fact that the dynasty chose to reconquer part or all of Xinjiang on several occasions in the nineteenth century, when most modern scholars believe (and many Qing ministers at the time agreed) that more critical problems required concentration of resources along the maritime frontier of China proper; and despite the fact that Mao Zedong and other leaders of the early Communist state likewise made reassertion of Beijing’s control over Xinjiang an early priority. Why have so few historians in the twentieth century expended a similar proportion of their efforts on the region and the issues it conquers raises: Why has Qing imperial expansion in Inner Asia not been considered important? When one considers the prominent place occupied by “Western history” or “frontier history” in the historiography of the United States, the almost absolute neglect of China’s eighteenth-century westward and northward expansion is all the more remarkable.

This elision of Qing Xinjiang and Inner Asia from the historiography of modern “China” is not accidental. To a great degree, it is the result of how the boundaries of modern Chinese history itself have been drawn by some of the field’s most influential historians.

One of the scholars responsible for this phenomenon is none other than Owen Lattimore. This is ironic, of course, because Lattimore, a great friend of the nomad, journeyed personally through Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang and left an important legacy of travel accounts and historical works focused on the people of these areas and their relations with China. But his best known and most read book, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, by the power of its highly original analysis and its stress on the Great Wall as the boundary par excellence defining the Chinese world, established a framework for understanding Inner Asia and China that few scholars have looked beyond.

In Inner Asian Frontiers, rather than survey Chinese–Inner Asian relations chronologically, Lattimore’s method was to seek “first principles” in ancient history and frontier geography itself. The bulk of his historical analysis thus concerns the interaction of Chinese and nomad states from before the Qin unification until the end of the Han dynasty in A.D. 220. Lattimore also devotes considerable space to the geographic, economic, and ecological differences between Inner Asian and Chinese areas. From these foundations, Lattimore draws a series of general conclusions: that the Great Wall line func-
tioned to delimit the "geographic field" of Chinese history; that the marginal zone along that frontier served as a reservoir where societies sharing qualities of both the steppe and China proper developed and eventually moved on to conquer China; and that Chinese and nomad history were characterized by interrelated cycles. He casts these observations as laws of history.

Hence for about two thousand years, from the time of the Earlier Han to the middle of the nineteenth century, the combined history of Inner Asia and China can be described in terms of two cycles, distinct from each other as patterns but always interacting on each other as historical processes—the cycle of tribal dispersion and unification in the steppe and the cycle of dynastic integration and collapse in China.

Lattimore's periodization here—the culmination in the nineteenth century—is significant. In his own travels he was struck by the effects of modern industrialism, particularly railroads, on Inner Asia, as well as the foreign presence in China in the 1920s and 1930s and imperialist incursions into China's frontier regions. He thus concluded that "it is the penetration of all Asia by the European and American industrialized order of society that is putting an end to the secular ebb and flow by making possible—indeed, imperative—a new general integration."

Lattimore believed that it was the advent of the West in China in the mid-nineteenth century that brought an end to the pattern of historical interaction along the Great Wall frontier he had identified. Accordingly, he dealt with early and mid-Qing involvement in Inner Asia in surprisingly cursory fashion. He devotes no more than twenty pages to direct discussion of Qing Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet: the century of Qing rule in Xinjiang before the Tungan (Hui) rebellions is covered in less than two paragraphs. Inner Asian Frontiers of China thus leaves readers with an impression of the absoluteness of the Great Wall frontier and its enduring role dividing historically antagonistic societies, the interactions of which follow a timeless pattern determined by the geological imperatives of climate and terrain. Only modernity (railways, firearms, Western and Japanese imperialism) could disrupt the age-old pattern and truly integrate China and Inner Asia. Such a view minimizes both the momentous changes in Inner Asia during the early and mid-Qing, and the changed significance of the Great Wall frontier in a Qing (not Chinese) empire that included both China and Inner Asia.7

The fundamental contributions of John King Fairbank have likewise served to deflect interest from Qing Inner Asia. Fairbank elaborated a complex of interconnected ideas that for a good part of the twentieth century have shaped understanding of China throughout, and often beyond, the English-speaking world. Some of these include the application of the tradition/modernity dyad to China; the Western impact/Chinese response paradigm; the notion of spontaneous sinicization through proximity to Chinese culture; and the use of the "tribute system" and "Chinese world order" as models of Chinese relations with non-Chinese. All have come under extensive reconsideration in recent years, and I will not reiterate these critiques.6 However, it is worth noting how these key organizing concepts serve to marginalize the story of Qing activity outside of China proper and to heavily veil those aspects of the Qing imperial order that do not fit within a Sinocentric depiction of Chinese history.

None of these concepts was invented, held, or propagated exclusively by Fairbank, of course. These ideas are rooted variously in the early nineteenth century writings of Western China hands and in late nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalistic Chinese interpretations of imperial history. However, it was Fairbank's influential survey textbooks and graduate pedagogy that amplified and entrenched these ideas within our understanding of modern China. Moreover, Fairbank assembled these concepts for a purpose: to explain what has generally been seen as the Chinese failure to respond adequately to the West in the nineteenth century.

Perhaps the mostbasic of these interdependent ideas is the tendency to view "traditional China" as essentially changeless, or at least incapable of meaningful "transformation." Paul Cohen has examined this approach and remarked upon its origins in the self-congratulatory outlook of the nineteenth-century industrializing West. Cohen did not note, however, how this view underpins one of Fairbank's major interpretive models, the tributary system. The paradigmatic expression of the tributary system model appeared as a chapter in Fairbank's Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast and, in more detailed form, as one of his and Ssu-yü Teng's three studies of Qing administration. Later, Fairbank developed the thesis further in "A Preliminary Framework" in the introduction to The Chinese World Order. There are slight differences of emphasis in these versions, but essential points of the theory remain consistent.

Briefly put, Fairbank argues that through centuries of interaction with non-Chinese "barbarians," especially nomadic tribes to the north, China developed and by Ming times institutionalized a "diplomatic medium" that enshrined Chinese cultural superiority over surrounding peoples and the myth of the Chinese emperor's sovereignty over all humankind. Diplomatic ritual and rhetoric expressed an ideology that recognized no boundedness to the Chinese state, only varying degrees of accommodation to Chinese custom as one moved outward from the Sinic center. The hierarchical con-
ception of domestic political and social relationships, so highly stressed in neo-Confucian thought, was thus extended to include foreign lands within a similar hierarchy that culminated in the Chinese Son of Heaven. In the Chinese view the imperial government's foreign relations were merely an outward extension of its administration of China proper. Foreign peoples who approached China seeking commercial or other relationships were perceived by the Chinese court—or at least described in court records—as "coming to be civilized." The formal presentation of "tribute" by these peoples, along with such ritual acts as the kowtow, comprised in Chinese eyes a foreign acknowledgment of the supreme virtue of the Son of Heaven, and the foreigners' own subordinate position in the hierarchy. Foreigners were required to go through these rituals, even if they sought only commerce; trade thus assumed the guise of tribute. Diplomatic and commercial partners with a military advantage could be accommodated as well, as long as China's appeasing payoffs could be treated as "gifts in return." As Fairbank described it, this idealized imperial cosmology as laid out in the Chinese classics more or less determined the form of Chinese relations with foreign peoples continuously until the late nineteenth century; the tribute rituals remained the sine qua non of diplomatic practice over that same period—this possible, of course, because of the essential changelessness of China prior to contact with the West ("change within tradition"). Moreover, Fairbank suggests, this Sinocentric worldview remained in force even when the ruling dynasty was not Chinese. This had to be so, otherwise the tribute system model would not explain the Qing dynasty's incompetence at diplomacy with the West in the nineteenth century. Thus the notion of "sotification" also plays a crucial role: because China spontaneously absorbed and culturally converted its conquerors, according to Fairbank, the Manchus, too, internalized the conceits of the tribute system and thus were unable to respond adequately to the arrival of European traders and emissaries on Chinese shores.

In this way, the master narrative of modern Chinese history precludes all possibility that the Qing might deviate from the worldview of the diplomatic and strategic practices of its predecessors. Because there is no real distinction in this account between "Qing" and "China," the Qing expansion into Inner Asia—an approach radically different from that of the later Ming—was a somewhat problematic issue for Fairbank, who at first tended to treat the Inner Asian subjects of the Qing as foreign. Following a bibliographic note in "On the Ch'ing Tribute System," for example, he and Ssu-yü Teng write: "This cursory survey reveals many lacunae in our knowledge of Ch'ing foreign relations: Manchu administration in Central Asia; Sino-Dutch relations in the seventeenth century; tributary relations with Siam, Laos, and Lishch'iü; the Chinese side of foreign trade in general" (my emphasis).11

Later, in the introduction to The Chinese World Order, Fairbank leaves the status of Qing Inner Asia ambiguous. Manchus, Mongols, Turkic peoples, and Tibetans do not appear on a table of "Ch'ing Tributaries as of 1828," although Fairbank's list of the practices that "constituted the tribute system" (granting of patents of appointment, official seals and noble ranks, use of the Ch'ing calendar, presentation of tribute memorials and local products, escort of envoys by official post, performance of the kowtow, receipt of imperial gifts in return, trade privileges at the frontier and in the capital) applies to the dynasty's Turkic officials in Xinjiang as well as it does to foreign rulers—indeed, even Han officials engaged in many of these practices. Fairbank does, however, include Inner Asians two pages later on a second table of "Aims and Means in China's Foreign Relations," where they are relegated to an "Inner Asian Zone"—outside the "Chinese Culture Area" occupied by Korea, Vietnam, the Ryukyu Islands, and Japan. This suggests, paradoxically, that the Inner Asians with whom the Qing imperial clan intermarried, worshiped, and hunted (among other interactions) were culturally more distant from the "center" than countries that merely sent embassies, or even than Japan, with whom the Qing had no official relations at all until the latter half of the nineteenth century.12

Fairbank recognizes a difficulty here when he points out that the "Sinocentric world order... was not coterminous with the Chinese culture area." Even though they were culturally non-Chinese, Inner Asians had to be included in the Chinese world order because of their military superiority. Moreover, in his "Aims and Means" table he indirectly acknowledges that Qing relations with Inner Asia involved something other than the tribute system: the table indicates that Qing foreign relations with Mongolia, Tibet, and Central Asia were conducted through some combination of military control, administrative control, cultural-ideological attraction, Tibetan Buddhist religious attraction, diplomatic manipulation, and/or pursuit of material interest. Of these types of relationships, only cultural and ideological attraction (which Fairbank glosses as seen and de) seems to fit within the tribute system model.13

Therefore, "A Preliminary Framework" leaves Qing Inner Asian areas in limbo: Though part of the Chinese world order, they are not tributaries; though not Chinese, they are not foreign either. Fairbank did not himself pursue the contradictions inherent in the attempt to fit Qing Inner Asia into his "comprehensive" model, despite the challenges raised in the same volume by David Farquhar's article on the influence of Mongol political culture on the
Qing regime and Joseph Fletcher’s revelations of decidedly nontribute system style Ming and Qing relations with Central Asian states. Fairbank’s interests, and those of many of his students, for the time being at least lay elsewhere: with the nineteenth-century impact of the West and “China’s” response.

Paul Cohen’s 1984 reflection on the state of American scholarship of China’s recent past identified and celebrated what was then a relatively new trend away from research driven by the paradigms of impact/response and tradition/modernity. This trend, Cohen writes, is characterized by an attempt to move beyond exclusive focus on the advent of the West and, instead, to “center Chinese history in China.” Among the scholars Cohen singles out for praise in this regard is G. William Skinner, whose regional systems approach, by substituting geographically and economically determined marketing systems for political units of analysis (counties, provinces), literally redraws the boundaries of modern Chinese history for many scholars.¹⁴

Without questioning the utility of Skinner’s approach to much of China proper, it is worth noting another of Skinner’s boundaries that has generally gone unremarked. In laying out his central-place theory and defining China’s eight physiographic macroregions, Skinner restricts his field of inquiry to a unit he calls “agrarian China minus Manchuria,” deliberately excluding Inner Asia. Skinner posits a ninth macroregion in Manchuria for the later nineteenth century, but excludes this region from his analysis of the relationship between urbanization and field administration because of the lateness of Han settlement in the northeast. Similarly, although Skinner’s Modern Chinese Society: An Analytical Bibliography defines “modern China” as “the territory of the present People’s Republic of China plus Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao, from 1644 to the present,” thus including Inner Asian lands, by design it excludes works concerning “non-Han peoples, whether natives of China or aliens.”¹⁵

These calculated omissions of territory and people should give us pause. Why are they made, and why are they so readily accepted? It is not so much that the millions of people labeled “minority nationalities” living in the P.R.C. ought to be represented in works purporting to encompass “Chinese society,” although that is perhaps a legitimate claim. (If not in some sense “Chinese,” what are such people?) Of greater concern is the way in which these boundary markers preclude inquiry into a range of important topics. For example, others have noted how Skinner’s scheme leaves little room for consideration of interregional trade. This is doubly true of trade between China proper and Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet, regions completely ignored by Skinner, although this commerce was of great cultural, political, and economic significance on frontier areas, as well as on communities in China proper that produced commodities, such as tea, silk, or rhubarb, destined for frontier markets or that specialized in moving goods and capital between Inner Asia and the Chinese heartland.

Another topic eluded by Skinner’s model is that of ethnic interaction. In applying central-place theory to China, Skinner takes as his point of departure “an isotropic plain on which resources of all kinds are uniformly distributed.”¹⁶ He then suggests how the irregularities of actual geography modify this ideal case. Less explicit in the model, however, is his working assumption that the regional systems are populated by “Han” sharing a single “Chinese” culture (albeit one characterized by class and occupational cleavages, differential distribution across the hierarchy of central places, and considerable variation among “little-local traditions”).¹⁷ Yet variations in local cultural or ethnic makeup, just like deviations from uniform topography, might dictate modifications of the central-place model. For example, what happens to the periodicity of market days (which Skinner suggests fit within a ten-day cycle in “traditional Chinese society”) where Han and Hui (Muslim) villages lay closely interspersed? Friday worship at mosques brought (and still brings) practicing Muslims to central places in large numbers every seven days. One could well ask similar questions for regions where the agrarian was juxtaposed with pastoral or slash-and-burn economies and the ebb and flow of trade followed other rhythms.

Skinner’s answer to ethnic difference is to point out that it lay primarily at the peripheries of regional systems and “the frontiers of the empire” (by which he means the internal borders of China proper with Qing Inner Asian territories as well as the southwestern and maritime frontiers). “Tribes of non-Han aborigines and pockets of incompletely sinicized groups” occupied such places along with “heterodox sodalities . . . religious sects . . . seditious secret societies . . . bands of bandits . . . [as well as] smugglers, outcasts, political exiles, sorcerers and other deviants.”¹⁸ Skinner here has adopted the perspective of the mandarinate, of course, and this suits his purposes in “Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems,” which include demonstrating that Qing field administration categories in China proper took account of special strategic needs in such frontier regions. But when calling on Skinner’s work in teaching or writing, it is important to remember that the frontier situation can be interpreted somewhat differently. Rather than argue that non-Han peoples, like “other deviants,” are concentrated in regional peripheries and leave it at that, might we not consider that it is precisely the occupancy of
core areas and adherence to state-sanctioned ecological, economic, and political forms that defines what is meant by "Chinese." Such a view allows for a more complex consideration of interactions on frontiers, what exactly distinguished political or religious deviancy from the ethnic difference implied by the phrase "incompletely sinicized groups"; and, indeed, what "sinicization" might entail and to what extent it was a reversible process.

There is a more concrete problem with Skinner's analysis of Qing territorial administration: he discusses only one of several Qing systems, that employed in China proper. In fact, the Qing developed other means of administering areas where non-Han population predominated. These included the tuji in southern and western China, as well as the khan and bey systems in Inner Asia (more about these systems below). Civilization did not taper off into chaos and lawlessness on all these frontiers, as Skinner implies; rather, in many areas, Chinese junxian administration governing the familiar territorial units of xian, fu, zhou, ting, and so forth, administered by magistrates simply gave way to one of the other systems.

It is noteworthy, too, that Skinner defines "China" in different ways for different purposes. While he chooses "agrarian China" with or without Manchuria for studies of marketing, social structure, and urbanization, his bibliography of Chinese society requires a definition inclusive of Inner Asia, even where it excludes non-Han peoples. While it is easy to accept this inconsistency as arising from the different practical concerns of each project, it nonetheless illustrates a common tendency of post-war American scholarship to alternate unwittingly between a definition of "China" based on Mongol territorial and ethnic boundaries and one based on those of the Qing empire (eventually recreated by the P.R.C.), without acknowledging that two very different quantities are involved and ignoring the process that led from one "China" to the other, along with all the ramifications of that change.

For all their importance, then, perspectives shaping the foundational work of Lattimore, Fairbank, and Skinner have contributed to a collective blindspot in the field of modern Chinese history not only toward Inner Asia, but toward the differences between Qing and China and the process by which one became the other. Similar tendencies could no doubt be traced in the work of other historians. As recent work by Pamela Crossley and Prasenjit Duara suggests, the source of these tendencies lies in the project of modern Chinese nationalism, which from its inception was plagued by contradictions inher-

* In Qing sources, the term used for such people seems more often to be the generic min ("populace") than the culturally and ethnically flavored han.

ent in the process of constructing a postimperial "Chinese" nation from the ruins of a non-Han dynastic polity. On the one hand, the cultural and territorial parameters of the late Ming, as defined by such figures as Gu Yanwu and Wang Fuzhi, inspired nineteenth- and twentieth-century Han activists opposing the Qing dynasty. On the other hand, the legacy of the Qing conquest was an empire of great geographical and ethnic diversity, twice the size of Ming China, whose Inner Asian territories, if not people, remained highly desirable additions to a new Chinese nation-state. Efforts to articulate an image of the postimperial nation were further complicated by the fact that early Han nationalists, including Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao, had like the Taipings before them exploited anti-Manchu racial animosity to stir up popular support for their cause. Although there were some, such as Zhang Binglin, who advocated abandonment of Inner Asian lands and the creation of a racially pure China within the old Manchu empire, the leaders of the Republic and People's Republic have generally sought to retain—and justify retention of—the Manchu empire while renouncing the Manchus. Besides recurrent military operations, this task has involved ideological contortion and historical legerdemain—Chiang Kai-shek's assertion that Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims are descended from the same original stock as the Han and are thus "true" Chinese:" and the current P.R.C. contention that Xinjiang and Tibet have been "Chinese" since ancient times are just two examples. These rationalizations are strained, perhaps, but have nevertheless been highly successful: for most Chinese today, the former Qing frontiers, and not the narrower boundaries of the Ming, make up the "natural" extent, or sacred space, of the Chinese nation. Historians, too, in our readiness to neglect what was non-Chinese about the Qing, have followed the ideological contours of Chinese nationalism. We have uncritically mimicked the nationalist tendency to treat the Qing dynasty as Chinese in its successes and alien in its failures.

**Toward a Qing-Centered History of the Qing**

In his state-of-the-field essays, Paul Cohen noted that in addition to deemphasizing Western impact and redirecting their attention away from maritime regions to the Chinese hinterland, growing numbers of American scholars were turning to the eighteenth century in search of the indigenous underpinnings of nineteenth-century history. This tendency has continued, aided in part by the increased accessibility of Qing archival records in both Beijing and Taiwan collections. Delving into the eighteenth century leaves a
very different impression than preoccupation with the disaster-ridden nineteenth: the high Qing was a confident, expansive, and, in many ways, well-run imperial power. Official documents illuminate in much greater detail than previously possible the quotidian concerns of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong courts and reveal a Manchu dynasty that had eliminated internal challenges to its supremacy; successfully coopted Han elites to help run the government apparatus in China proper; established a swift and effective network of imperial communications and intelligence; implemented systems of tax collection, local control, and famine relief on a vast scale, sponsored monumental works of scholarship; eliminated nomadic military threats; and doubled the size of the empire. This is a far cry from Lord Macartney’s rudderless man-of-war or Karl Marx’s crumbling mummy.21

And yet, although recent studies have followed the trends that Cohen hoped would lead to “a China-centered history of China,” scholars of the last dynasty are talking about “China,” or even “the Chinese empire,” less than they used to, preferring to discuss “the Qing” instead. Similarly, the old usage of “Chinese” as a primordial, fixed ethnic category has been shaken by new anthropological approaches that treat ethnicity not as an inherent trait but as a relational identity constructed in opposition to other groups, or, in response to state policies.24 Once modern Han-ness (itself not a monolithic or static category) is taken to be a quality defined even partially in relation to non-Han peoples and the Manchu state, it becomes impossible to continue entirely ignoring those non-Han peoples, or the Manchu-ness of the Qing.”

There has been some debate over the concept of ethnicity and its utility (or lack thereof) in the field of early modern Chinese history. Most notably, Crossley has attempted to head off confusion by arguing that both the term’s original sense (applying exclusively to politically marginalized groups) and its current “overtreached” popular and scholarly usage limit its applicability to China (“Thinking about Ethnicity”; see also “Manzhou yuanshu kao,” p. 762, n. 2). However, unlike those scholars for whom the nature of ethnic identity itself is a main focus (see works by Crossley, Elliott, Gladeny, and Lipman in the bibliography), for the most part in this book I am not concerned with the content of ethnic identity—whether it is cultural or linguistic or racial or national and so on—as with the recognition and manipulation of different groups of subjects, however constituted, by the Qing empire in its efforts to control Xinjiang. In other words, I devote more attention to external, state-imposed categories than to the dynamics of individual identity. In describing these categories in general terms, it is extremely convenient to have a single word for this sort of distinction. The term “ethnicity” in its most general sense, then, though it obscures the multifaceted and dynamic nature of identity formation as understood by anthropologists, is precisely what I need, stretchmarks and all.

In steering clear of debates over the nature of ethnicity in early modern China, however, I do not mean to embrace the primordialist approach of current P.R.C. “nationalities”

Thus it is simply too imprecise to conflate Qing and China, as has so often been the practice. Most writers on the eighteenth century (in China as well as the United States) now carefully distinguish the Qing dynasty and empire (including Inner Asia), from China proper (neidi). In referring to historical personages, they often specify Han, Manchu, Mongol, and so forth where “Chinese” might have sufficed in the past. It could even be said that a new, Qing-centered history is emerging, an approach more sensitive to ethnic considerations and the Altaic origins of the Qing. This trend is suggested, if anything, in the current writing of scholars who in one way or another take the nature of Qing imperium itself as their focus and address issues raised by the Inner Asian connections of the Qing. Many, following the lead of Joseph Fletcher, seek greater understanding of the dynasty in Inner Asian history and traditions and consult sources in Inner Asian languages. Most make ethnic or cultural difference an important concern of their work. All attempt to move beyond the Sinocentric model and other paradigms discussed above in order to refiguring the historian’s approach to the Qing and, by implication, to modern China.25

These new perspectives, then, provide the context for this study of Qing empire in Xinjiang. The themes of Qing-centered history will recur occasionally throughout this book, with, I hope, the lift of a catchy melody rather than the whine of a grinding axe.

Qing Imperialism

China’s recent past can be read as a palimpsest of imperialisms. The familiar history of Western and Japanese encroachment in China during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries forms the clearest, uppermost text. Below

policy, or to imply that Qing dynasts viewed “ethnicity” from perspectives at all similar to those of today’s Western social and political discourse. The interplay of political, racial, cultural, national, caste, and other elements in Chinese and Inner Asian thinking about social difference is a fascinating and lively subject with an important and growing literature, to which readers are referred frequently in the notes below.
Introduction

that, obscured by overwriting and erasures, is the story of Qing imperialism. When viewed in the right light, however, this story too is legible.

"Qing imperialism" is not a familiar formulation; the very application of the term "imperialist" to the Qing is controversial. Chinese scholars and laypersons alike will be perturbed by it, since China's victimization by imperialist powers is a central tenet of historical accounts and nationalist ideology embraced by Chinese across the political spectrum. Non-Chinese scholars, too, may question the accuracy of the term with regard to the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Qing, or doubt the utility of invoking such an inflammatory concept.

The controversy arises mostly because we tend to associate imperialism exclusively with the rapid European expansion in the late nineteenth century. Most fully elaborated theories of imperialism, beginning with Hobson's in 1902, were developed to explain this particular historical episode. Most famously, Lenin argued that imperialism represented competition among the advanced capitalist countries of the West to divide the undeveloped world into spheres of influence for the export of capital in search of greater profits. In this view, or its many variants, China emerges as victim of imperialism.

The exact extent and nature of imperialism in China, as thus defined, has sparked much debate, but I do not deny that China suffered from it. Nevertheless, the Qing was also itself an empire, and it is with Qing expansion that I am concerned here. While the modern Chinese term dìzuòzhùyì seems entirely restricted, in Chinese understanding, to the Leninist sense, there are alternative meanings of "imperialism" available in English. Historians refer to "Roman imperialism," for example, although attempts to explain the Roman expansion in Marxist-Leninist terms have not been widely embraced. Likewise, "Mongol imperialism" is occasionally used. Imperialisms of these earlier epochs are generally referred to as "old," in contrast to the "new imperialism" practiced by Europe, the United States, and Japan in the formation of their overseas, economically oriented empires during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Since the late 1970s, cultural historians and critics have begun reexamining Western imperialism, focusing less on economic, political, and military aspects and more on the language and cultural productions used to "represent" and control colonial societies. Edward Said's influential book Orientalism launched this trend, but, more recently, scholars (including Said himself) no longer view imperialism (or, "colonialism," the term now more widely used) from the Western side exclusively, but instead consider it a dialogue in which the voice of the colonized joins that of the colonizer. Lately, the "postcolonial" condition, too, has come under scrutiny.14

The student of Qing imperialism thus faces a terminological thicket here. "Old" and "new" imperialisms, theories by Hobson, Lenin, Schumpeter, Arendt, Eisenstadt, and others, not to mention analyses of colonialist, subaltern, and postcolonial discourse—all compete for attention. One might sift through old social science and new cultural studies literatures for applicable models and parallels; however, there exists no consensus on which model best fits nineteenth-century European expansion, let alone other imperialisms at other times. Moreover, we still know relatively little about the actual workings of Qing empire in Inner Asia, and to embrace an existing theoretical model or become preoccupied with parallels from the West may well be premature, if not ultimately misleading.40

More seriously, there is a basic dissonance when applying all such concepts to the Qing case: though they differ greatly from each other and employ competing terminologies, all involve an opposition between the European West and its colonial territories. To apply these concepts to seventeenth- through nineteenth-century China and Inner Asia, they would have to be radically refitted to include multiple players and two-way colonialist relationships. Manchu were the physical conquerors of China, to be sure, but were also themselves the objects of a cultural assault; moreover, Manchu ancestral lands were eventually colonized by Han Chinese. Mongols were simultaneously members of the Qing conquest elite ruling over China and victims of economic exploitation at the hands of Chinese merchants. Han Chinese were among the first to suffer from Qing imperialism, but later became its most vehement publicists and proud beneficiaries. Existing bilateral models are inadequate to encompass the Qing situation, which might be charted like this: An entity called Qing is in imperial command at the beginning of the story. Gradually, however, a cultural and political unit we call China usurps the controls and, after some near mishaps, by the mid-twentieth century sits securely in the driver's seat of what was formerly a Qing vehicle. No simplistic approach to "Chinese imperialism in Central Asia" could capture this dynamic.

Thus, though readers will note in the following chapters some resonances with the concerns of old imperialism, new imperialism, and postcolonial studies, my aim is to comprehend the evolving Qing imperialism in Xinjiang on its own terms. I will therefore proceed to examine "Qing imperialism" without further apology or reference to existing definitions, confident in the belief that where there is an empire, there must be imperialism—the dynamic set of motivations, ideologies, policies, and practices by which that empire is gained, maintained, and conceived. I will use "colonialism" in a more specific sense to refer to the actual establishment of Han migrant settle-
mements in Xinjiang, both agricultural and commercial. Regrettfully, my sources in this project—or at least my abilities in working with them—do not allow the Xinjiang subalterns much room to speak. This is thus a study from the perspective of the Manchu, Mongol, and Han imperialists of the Qing who wrote the documents and books on which the research is primarily based.

I have chosen to focus on two central aspects of the Qing enterprise in the far west: economic policy and ethnic policy. The fiscal demands of empire building and the commercial penetration of Turkic Xinjiang by Chinese merchants were complexly interrelated problems that underlay the entire course of Qing expansion in Xinjiang. How was empire in Xinjiang to be financed? How “Chinese” was that empire to be? Together, these questions (and their changing answers) informed the Qing discourse on empire in Xinjiang, and in the analysis and narrative that follows, I attempt to consider them together.

From Qing to China

A few pages above, I discussed how both the work of seminal historians of modern China and the tenets of Chinese nationalism itself conspire to obscure the significance of the Inner Asian elements of the Qing and the process by which a new notion of China arose from the ruins of that Inner Asian empire. My point is that we cannot take the meaning of “China” for granted. Like any modern nation-state, China has assumed its current sense and shape only after a process of invention, a process Benedict Anderson has memorably called “stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.” In China, this process was an extended one, the onset of which predates by decades, if not longer, the revolution that toppled the last imperial dynasty. To see this clearly, think of the different answers a scholar in the late Ming and an educated Chinese at the end of the twentieth century would give to the questions, “Where is China?” and “Who are the Chinese?” We can readily guess how each would respond: The Ming scholar would most likely exclude the lands and peoples of Inner Asia, and today’s Chinese include them (along with Taiwan, Hong Kong, and perhaps even overseas Chinese communities). These replies mark either end of the process that has created the ethnically and geographically diverse China of today.

But how would Qi Yunshi have responded to these questions in 1805? Did not his bemusement and ambivalence at passing through the Jiayu Guan arise from precisely these same concerns, from his difficulty in reconciling the sense of “China” bequeathed him by his knowledge of history and poetry

with the expansive Qing reality spread out before him? Standing there outside the Pass, Qi Yunshi confronted a world reshaped by Qing imperialism.

This study argues that the notion of China pertaining today did not arise in 1912, or even in the late nineteenth century, but was invented in the course of a gradual accommodation by Han Chinese since the mid-Qing to the idea of a Greater China with the physical and ethnic contours of the Qing Empire. This accommodation was possible because Han Chinese were not only the objects of Qing imperialism. They were also, increasingly through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, complicit in it as traders, homesteaders, farmers, prospectors, jade carvers, soldiers, militia, policemen, spies, historians, geographers, statecraft pundits, and eventually generals, administrators, and governors. Thus, as we investigate the workings of Qing imperialism in the Western Regions, we also learn something of how Qing became China.
Landmarks

The region lies beyond Suzhou and Jiayu Guan, and borders to the southeast on Suzhou, to the northeast with Khalkha, to the west with the Congling Mountains, to the north with Russia, and to the south with Tibet. It is 20,000 li in circumference. Zunghars live to the north of the Tianshan. To the south of the Tianshan reside the Muslim tribes. The Thirty-six Kingdoms referred to in the Han shu were all west of the Xingnun and south of the Wasun. To the north and south of the Thirty-six Kingdoms were great mountains: between them, a river. To the east, the kingdoms bordered Han, communicating via narrow passes at Yumen and Yangguan. To the west, they extended up to the Congling Mountains. Today, the Tianshan range extends unbroken from Zhenni prefecture westward to Yili, over 3,000 li. These are the “North Mountains” of the Han shu. The mountains to the west of Kashgar and Yarkand are the old “Congling” range. From beyond the Jiayu Guan, extending west to the Congling, lie the so-called “South Mountains.” And the central river is Lop Nor. The various cities of today’s Muslim Region are thus those same cities of the Thirty-six Kingdoms in the ancient Western Regions. This is certain without doubt. And the Zunghar barbarians lived north of the Tianshan, in the land of the Wasun. Their eastern frontier was Xingnun territory.

(Qingding) huangyu Xiyu tuzhi : 1 (rukao): 96-110

The “Western Regions” (Xiyu) is an ancient term for what came to be known increasingly after the Qing conquest in 1759 as the New Dominion (Ch. Xinjiang; Ma. ice tiktobuha jecen). The scholars who wrote the first Qing imperial gazetteer of this newly conquered territory preferred the older term, because for them the Western Regions landscape was strung with historical as well as geographical landmarks. In fact, in passages like the one above, the history and geography are virtually indistinguishable, as the writers shift seamlessly from physical description of the land in their own time into a “rectification” of Qing names with those of the illustrious past. The Han and Tang dynasty points of reference loomed as large for these practitioners of evidential scholarship (kaozheng) as did mere topography.

Still, there would be no empire without territory, and imperial maintenance requires concrete climatological, orological, and hydrological knowledge. What was the Qing faced with in its New Dominion?

The Lay of the Land

The Western Regions that Qing Gaozong, the Qianlong emperor, added to his empire consist of two vast basins surrounded and divided by towering mountain chains and comprise an area of 1,646,800 square kilometers. (Despite some encroachment by Russia in the nineteenth century, Xinjiang today remains larger than Alaska and over three times the size of France.) The basin and range structure of the area, which is duplicated by the Himalayas, Tibetan plateau, and Kunlun range to the south, is the product of tectonic activity that has turned regions periodically covered by ocean during Paleozoic times (600–230 million years ago) into landlocked deserts. Most recently, the uplift of the Tibetan plateau and penetration of the Indian continental mass into Asia ongoing since the Tertiary (65 to 2 million years ago) has cast a rain shadow that is responsible for the extreme aridity of Xinjiang today. The same geological processes that resulted in China’s southeastern incline and determined the drainages of the Yellow, Yangzi, Mekong, and other great Asian rivers thus left Xinjiang, for the most part, high and dry.

Zungharia, the triangular, northern part of Xinjiang, known to the Qing as the Zunghar region (zunhu) or Northern March (Tianshan belu), is separated from Mongolia on the east by the Altai mountains and from southern Xinjiang by the Tianshan range. To the west, communications with what was in mid-Qing times the Kazakh transhumance (now the Republic of Kazakhstan) were relatively unimpeded. Chinese scholars today claim that Qing territory in Zungharia extended westward along the fertile Yili River valley as far as Lake Balkash; however, these frontiers, while periodically patrolled in the eighteenth century, were never precisely demarcated. The border with Kazakhstan now lies not far west of the city of Huocheng, formerly Huiyuan, the headquarters of Xinjiang’s military government before 1884.

Although at its center the Zungharian Basin contains large tracts of semi-fixed dunes and scrubland good only as winter pasture for animals, agriculture can be very successful in river valleys and along the foot of the mountain ranges, where mountain run-off is available. The Zunghar khanate exploited
this potential by means of forced resettlement of farmers from the south, and
the Qing likewise made development of Zungharian agriculture a key ele-
ment in its imperial strategy. Zungharia's prime agricultural lands, where the
dynasty established its most fruitful colonies in the first years after the con-
quest, lay along the valley of the westward-flowing Yili river. Grain grown
here by Han Green Standard soldiers and resettled East Turkestanis supported
the Manchu garrisons and nomadic troops stationed in the Yili area.

Southern Xinjiang is an inland basin of still greater dimensions, defined by
the Tianshan on the north, the Pamirs to the west, Kunlun and Altun moun-
tains to the south, and the (somewhat lower) Kuruktagh range to the east. This
region is referred to in Qing sources generally as Huihu (Muslim tribes or re-
gion), Huijiang (Muslim frontier), or the Southern March (Tianshan nanlu).
It is also known variously in European and Central Asian sources as the
Tarim Basin (for the river that encircles and empties into it), Chinese Turke-
stan, Bukharia, Little Bukharia, Kashgar, and East Turkestan. Another term
is “Altishah,” a Turki (Uyghur) word meaning “six cities,” although the Qing
identified eight principal cities and further subdivided the region into "the
four western cities" (Khotan, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, Kashgar) and "the four
eastern cities" (Aksu, Ush [Ush Turfan in some sources], Kucha, Karashahr).

The Taklamakan Desert, at the center of the Tarim Basin, is one of the most
forbidding places on earth. The surrounding mountains, in many places over
5,000 meters high, block moisture-bearing air currents and allow little rain to
reach the interior. (Mean annual precipitation is less than 17 mm.) Irrigated
agriculture is possible, however, in Altishah’s river valleys and piedmont
zones. Poplar groves, hearty grasses, and tamarisk mounds colonize the desert
out to several miles around oases and river beds; further into the Taklamakan,
however, where no vegetation stabilizes the sand, loose dunes of 100 to 300
meters in height shift across the desert. In spring and summer, the severe
heat is accompanied by frequent sandstorms, known in Turki as qara borun,
“black winds.” It was while trying to cross such deep desert terrain north of
Khotan that the Swedish adventurer Sven Hedin nearly died in the spring of
1895, and all but one of his East Turkestan companions perished. Marco Polo
reports that travelers in the Lop Desert, at the eastern end of the Tarim Basin,
were often lured astray by ghostly voices and would erect signs before going
to sleep at night to remind them which direction to travel in the morning.

The Tarim is an entirely inland drainage. The waters of the Aksu and
Kongque (Kongqi) Rivers flow south from the Tianshan highlands; the Kash-
gar (Kizil) and Yarkand Rivers run northeastward; and the Khotan, Keriya,
and Cherchen Rivers flow northward from the Pamir and Kunlun ranges into
the Taklamakan. In spring flood, some of these rivers may join the Tarim system, which historically emptied into the eastern corner of the basin. Between the first century B.C. and the early fourth century A.D., the Tarim and Kongque river system fed the terminal lake known as Lop Nor. Around A.D. 330, these rivers shifted their channels southeastward and created a new lake, Qara Qoshun, contributing to the disappearance of the Loulan city-state and posing an intriguing problem for such nineteenth- and twentieth-century explorers and geographers as N. M. Przevalskii, Sven Hedin, and Ellsworth Huntington, who speculated on Lop Nor’s “wandering.” In 1922, human intervention caused the Tarim-Kongque system to flow once more into Lop Nor, creating a salt lake and marsh of 2,400 square kilometers. Isolated communities of farmers and fishermen still lived by the lake up to the mid-twentieth century, but in recent decades these Lopliks have been dislocated, not only by Chinese nuclear testing in the area but by increasing desertification. The continuous diversion of the Tarim Basin’s waters since the Qing initiated large-scale agricultural development of southern Xinjiang in the nineteenth century has shortened river courses; dramatically increased water use since the 1950s resulted in the total desiccation of Lop Nor and other desert lakes, with the consequent regional extinction of tigers, wolves, boars, and other fauna. (The Lop Region remains the last refuge of the wild camel.) Since 1972, the Tarim has flowed no further than the artificial Daixiazi Reservoir, which lies 120 kilometers south of Korla and twice that distance from the now dry bed of Lop Nor. The Qing imperial geographers’ conflation of the Tarim River with Lop Nor, evident in the quotation at the head of this chapter, would not be possible today.

The Eastern March (Tianshan douluo), vaguely defined as the region east of Urumchi and west of Jiayu Guan, is itself bisected by the Tianshan, and some sources treat the cities of Urumchi, Gucheng, Khotai, and Barkol as part of the Northern March: indeed, geographically they lie in Zungaria. Turfan, Pijan, and Hami, on the other hand, lie in the Turfan depression, a stark stretch of cobble desert and rocky passes. This easternmost region, locally known before the Qing conquest as Uyghuristan, is 300 feet below sea level at its lowest point. Hot weather and a long growing season make raising fruit and long-staple cotton here a particularly productive enterprise, though intensive irrigation is essential (accomplished around Turfan with underground aqueducts called karez). Melons, fruit jams, and raisins were among the "local products" regularly dispatched from the Eastern March to the Qing capital as tribute. Today, Turfan produces sweet wines, and Hami’s eponymous melons are so famous as to have disrupted truck traffic throughout northwest China when shipped by the ton to Beijing for the Asian Games in the autumn of 1990.

During the Qing, Zungharia communicated with China proper via the city of Gucheng and Inner Mongolia, and with southern Xinjiang via two principal passes. The city of Urumchi lies in the largest of these, a wide gap in the Tianshan range just west of the Boghda peak. Farther west, the high Muzart Pass through the Tianshan north of Bai linked the Yili region with Aksu and the Tarim Basin. It was through this pass that Manchu and Mongol troops, or bannermen, marched on campaigns to relieve besieged cities in southern Xinjiang. Travelers from China to Altishahr likewise came from Mongolia via Gucheng or along the Gansu corridor, passing through the Jiayu Guan, which the Qing maintained as a checkpoint. Central Asians reached Altishahr from passes in the Pamirs and the Kunlun Mountains above Kashgar and Yarkand. Because the Taklamakan was nearly impassable, in Qing times most official, military, and commercial traffic followed the "road system that ran around the rim of the Taklamakan like a loop of string, on which the oases hung like beads." 4

The Historical Terrain

The efforts of the Han and Tang dynasties to extend Chinese power into Central Asia were the historical milestones against which the Manchu Qianlong emperor measured his own progress. From his point of view, his conquests compared favorably with the expensive, ultimately frustrated endeavors of both earlier dynasties.

Despite Zhang Qian’s two famous journeys in search of Central Asian allies against the Xiongnu (c. 138–126 and c. 115 B.C.), and Han Wudi’s spectacular victory in Ferghana (Dayuan) in 73 B.C., the Han dynasty’s primary efforts in the Western Regions were focused closer to home, in what is now the western end of the Gansu Panhandle (which the Han colonized with Chinese settlers and defended with walls out to Yumen Guan and Yang Guan) and in the area around Hami (Yiwu) and Turfan (Jiaohe), which commanded Xiongnu access to the Tarim Basin. It was believed that establishing control over the Turfan depression and projecting influence further west could “break the right arm of the Xiongnu.” By around 60 B.C. the Han had accomplished this, with agricultural garrisons in Bugur (Luntai), Korla (Juli), Turfan (Cheshi), and at Miran and Loulan in the southeastern Tarim Basin. The western Tarim Basin city-states, too, had by this time entered into diplo-
matic relations with the Han, based on exchange of gifts, dispatch of hostages to the Han court, support of Han outposts, and acceptance of the authority of the protector-general, the Han military official based near modern Korla. In return, they received trade privileges, financial aid, credentials of rule, and protection against the Xiongnu. Han soldiers established military agricultural colonies in the Hami and Turfan regions, near modern Karashahr and Bugur, as well as in Miran in the southern Tarim. The Han position in the Western Regions was tenuous, however, and during the Wang Mang interregnum (A.D. 8–23), the Xiongnu retook Turfan and reasserted their influence in the area.

Monarchs of the Later (Eastern) Han balked at the great costs of administering, defending, and colonizing territory so far from China proper, and at the financial aid (almost 75 million strings of cash after A.D. 73) demanded by the Tarim city-states. They thus fell into a pattern of advance followed by retreat from the Western Regions. Although the Han recaptured Turfan from the Xiongnu in 74, reestablishing military colonies and the protectorate—general, the dynasty withdrew again three years later following a Xiongnu attack. Ban Chao consolidated Han rule in the region during his tenure as protector-general (91–105) but the court again abolished the protectorate—generalship in 107 and once more relinquished its forward position in Central Asia. Although Han relations with the states of the Western Regions were reestablished in 123, the office of protector-general was not restored, and the Han court thereafter maintained only limited influence in the west.¹

The Tang presence in Central Asia surpassed that of the Han insofar as it extended direct colonial rule over the Tarim Basin states and Zungaria and projected military influence more widely, into the area of modern Afghanistan, the Pamirs, and Ferghana. The stage for this expansion was set by Emperor Taizong's destruction of the khanate of the Eastern Turks (630) and the break-up of the Western Turk confederation. In the year 640, Karakhoja (Gaochang), a city-state in the Turfan area ruled for a century and a half by a Chinese or a Chinese-influenced house, was incorporated into the Tang empire as Xizhou. By 648, Tang armies under command of a Turkic general had subdued Karashahr and Kucha; the other Tarim cities submitted at this time and by 649 the local rulers of the "Pacificed West" (Anxi) were all under the jurisdiction of a Tang protector-general based in Kucha. Although Tang control over Central Asia was frequently challenged and even interrupted by Tibet and the Western Turks during the next few decades, generals serving the Tang emperor Gaozong (649–83) established further protectorates in Zungaria and beyond the Pamirs to Ferghana and the valley of the Oxus, extending Tang influence up to the borders of Persia. By the 680s, the dynasty maintained permanent border garrison armies in its Central Asian territories, and by the 730s the Tang further consolidated its control over the Tarim Basin and Zungaria with the creation of military governorships and garrison forces of 20,000 in each region. These armies grew in agricultural colonies and were financed by transit taxes levied on the merchants who plied the trade routes between China and Central Asia. In 750 the Tang general Gao Xianzhi (a Korean) was poised for further conquests in the west from a base in the Yili River valley, but a defeat by the Arabs near Talas the following year marked the watershed of Tang fortunes in Central Asia. Emperor Xuanzong's withdrawal of the main garrison forces from the northwest during the An Lushan rebellion (755–63) marked the end of Tang influence in the Tarim Basin and Zungaria.²

MÄNCHuS AND ZUNGHARS

As the Han had their Xiongnu and the Tang their Turks, the early Qing frontiers were troubled by the Zungars. The Qing conquest of Zungaria and Altishahr arose from the dynasty's response to that threat. The Zungars were a confederation of Oirat (Ch. Wala, Weilate, Elute) tribal groups; "Oirat" is a general term for the non-Chinggisids (their leaders not descended from Chinggis Khan), western Mongol groups who generally pastured west of the Altai Mountains. From late Ming times, the Oirat are conventionally understood to have comprised four principal tribes: the Choros, Torgut, Dörböt, and Eshen. The ruling clans of the Choros and Dörböt tribes traced their descent from Eshen, the self-proclaimed Mongol Khan who had threatened China and taken the Ming Zhengtong emperor captive in 1449. As the Choros became stronger in the early seventeenth century, it absorbed many of the Dörböt as well as another group, the Khot; the resulting confederation came to be called the Zunghar, or "left hand," Khanate. Other Oirats were forced to relocate: from the early 1600s through the 1630s, the Torguts and some Dörbötis migrated through Kazakh country to the Volga river, where they became known as Kalmucks.³ Around the same time, the Khoshut moved to Koko-nor (Ch. Qinghai; Amdo in Tibetan) and Khan (eastern Tibet). Meanwhile, back in Zungaria, by the 1630s the Zungars had built a capital city; they enjoyed the services of craftsmen and settled

¹ In English, the name is often spelled Eleuth, Old, Odor, and so forth. Zunghar appears as Junghar, Dzungar, Jügrn Gar, and other variations.
farmers; they recorded religious and secular literature in a script modified from Mongolian to suit the Oirat phonetic system; and they had begun to assert themselves geopolitically, extracting tribute from Central Asian cities, concluding agreements with Russia, and rendering assistance to the Dalai Lama in Tibet. In 1640, the Zhanghar Khan Ba’atur Khongtaiji convened a great assembly of western and eastern Mongols that composed a legal code and temporarily united the Oirat tribes with the Khalkhas of Outer Mongolia and the Kaimuks of the Volga under the banner of the bGe-lugs-pa (the so-called “yellow”) school of Tibetan Buddhism. This early act epitomizes the dangers the Zhanghars would pose to the Qing for more than a century: the Oirat confederation might have united peoples and lands in Tibet, Qinghai, Zungharia, and northern Mongolia into a pan-Buddhist, pan-Mongol front against a Manchu dynasty in China. The Qing was also concerned about the potential for a Zunghar-Russian alliance. The course of Inner Asian war and politics until the mid-eighteenth century was shaped by these threats and the Qing response to them.

The fate of Eastern Turkestan, too, hung on the Qing-Zunghar rivalry. In the oases of the Tarim Basin, the influence of the Moghul rulers, descendents of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan’s son Chagadhai, had been waning since the late sixteenth century. In their place, rival branches of a Central Asian Naqshbandi Sufi brotherhood descended from Makhmûd-i A’zam (whence their epithet, Makhûmdzadâ) enjoyed great prestige in Altishahr’s religious affairs and increasingly in secular matters as well. Until the middle of the seventeenth century the Ishaqiyya (also known as “Black Mountain” or “Black Hat”) branch of this lineage was supreme; thereafter, however, a branch under the leadership of Khaja Afq (the Ishaqiyya, “White Mountain,” or “White Hat”) arose to challenge their supremacy. When driven into exile in Tibet by the Ishaqiyya, Khaja Afq appealed to the Fifth Dalai Lama for help. The Dalai Lama called on the Zunghar khan, Galdan, who as a youth had trained in Lhasa to be a lama. In 1678 the Zunghars invaded Altishahr, and by the following year had seized control of Turfan, Hami, and the Tarim oases. Serving the Zunghars as local governors, the Afqi Makhûmdzadâs extracted tax revenues for their nomadic overlords.13

Galdan moved aggressively in the east as well. Taking advantage of a feud between the Khalkha Jasaghtu and Tushiyeri khans, and with political backing from Lhasa, in 1687–88 he invaded northern Mongolia, pressing as far as the Kerulen River and driving the Khalkhas to seek refuge with the Qing. A series of steppe campaigns between 1690 and 1697, however, including two in which the Kangxi emperor personally participated, resulted in the death of Galdan and a setback for Zunghar aspirations in Mongolia. Not least of the

Qing accomplishments during this period was the attachment of the Khalkhas, and northern Mongolia, to the empire.

The establishment of Qing bases in Hami and Khobdo seemingly confined the Zunghars beyond the Altai; however, a disastrous Qing foray in 1733, during the Yongzheng reign, allowed the Zunghars once again to overrun Mongolia temporarily before being pushed back by Qing and Khatulla forces. The two powers reached a truce in 1739, the fourth year of the Qianlong reign. Qing interaction with the Zunghars over the next decade was primarily commercial, not military, but even this proved exasperating to the Manchu court. The dynasty allowed periodic Zunghar trade missions to Beijing and Suzhou (modern Jiuhuan, Gansu). The Zunghars violated virtually every restriction by which the Qing attempted to regulate this trade, arriving in off-years, bringing too many merchants (including Central Asians) in their delegations, and exceeding quotas on permitted quantities of goods. When the private merchants from Gansu and Shaanxi whom the Qing had ordered to handle the trade were bankrupted by these mandated exchanges of their silks, tea, and rhubarb for Zunghar livestock, hides, raisins, sal ammoniac, and antelope horn, the government was forced to step in to subsidize the trade and warehouse the Zunghar products for which the market was glutted. The Zunghars also demanded that the Qing finance “tea-brewing” (aocha) pilgrimages to Tibet in 1741, 1743, and 1746, thinly disguised trading trips for which the dynasty was forced to provide military escort, livestock, rafts for river crossings, and up to 300,000 taels to handle exigencies along the way.14

THE CONQUEST OF ZUNGHARIA

Internece strife following the death of the khan Galdan Tseren in 1745 resulted in the emergence of Dawachi as khan, but in the process fractured the Zunghar confederation. When the Qianlong emperor prepared a new campaign against the Zunghars in 1754, many Zunghar groups defected to the Qing, including Amursana, a Kholt chief and former ally of Dawachi. The Qianlong emperor, Goazon, put these Oirat defectors in the vanguard of an army of 20,000 Manchu, Solon, Chahar, Khalkha, other Mongol, and Han troops. Under command of Bendi and Amursana, they marched easily into Zungharia the following year, taking Kulja (Yili) without a fight. Dawachi was captured alive after escaping to Altishahr and was sent back to Beijing for a lavish ceremony in which he was presented to the emperor. Goazon, in a show of indulgence to a steppe noble, made him a prince and installed him

*To avoid confusion, I will refer to the Gansu city as “Suzhou” and the city in Jiangsu province by the old postal name, “Soochow.”
in a mansion in the capital. Flushed with this easy success, the emperor then gloated publicly, "it was truly the time to seize the opportunity, so I ordered the attack on two fronts. But [some] people have grown overly accustomed to peace, and while I faced many fearful naysayers, upright men eager to step forward amounted to hardly one or two in a hundred." Despite the misgivings of skeptics, he pointed out, in the end "the military expenses were only 10 to 20 percent what they have been in the past!" Then, in a pattern of retribution following victory that the dynasty would repeat later, Gaozong withdrew most of the Qing forces from Zungharia, leaving only five hundred Chahar and Khalkha troops under Bandi's command in Yili.

Gaozong planned to reestablish the four Oirat tribes in the region, each under its own khan. Amursana would thus have become khan of the Khots; however, he communicated to Beijing his desire to be recognized as khan of all the Oirats, and even began using an old chop of the Zunghar khan Dawachi's instead of Beijing's formal seal that identified him as a Qing general. Gaozong was furious, and on Bandi's suggestion ordered Amursana to Rehe (Jehol, today's Chengde) for an audience in the ninth month of 1755. Amursana eluded his escort, however, and soon thereafter his followers attacked the small Qing force in Zungharia. Yong-chang, in command of over 5,000 men in the Urumchi area, was forced to advance to Bandi's aid and instead retreated to Barkol. Bandi and the Yili garrison force were killed.

In 1756 Qing armies again moved on Zungharia, but the campaign was ill-coordinated and plagued by poor intelligence. Amursana escaped to the Kazakhs, who hid him from Qing search parties. Later in the year, when the four tribes of the Oirats rose en masse, Amursana returned and, as the new Zunghar khan, retook Yili and forced the Qing general Zhao-hui and 1,500 Qing soldiers to flee southward; after a series of engagements and a twelve-day siege at Urumchi. Zhao-hui and his 300 surviving soldiers escaped to safety at Barkol. The Qing organized more forces, and Gaozong authorized mass slaughter of the Oirats. This Qing retaliation in 1757, combined with a smallpox epidemic, brought about the near extermination of those Oirats (primarily the Khoits and Choros) who had sided with Amursana. Amursana himself died of the disease in Siberia.16

THE BATTLE OF BLACKWATER CAMP

The collapse of the Zunghar khaneate left a power vacuum in Altishahr. In 1755, Bandi had freed the brothers Khoja Jihan and Burhan ad-Din, Afqij Khoja brothers whom the Zunghars had held hostage in Yili. They returned to East Turkestan, where the Qing hoped they would rule as loyal tributaries. Calculating that the Qing had neither the resources nor the will for another distant campaign so soon after the Zungharian wars, however, the Khojas defied Qing authority and killed a Qing envoy. Gaozong then ordered the conquest of Altishahr, though in this theater, too, the Qing campaign suffered from incompetence in the field and the emperor's anxiousness to declare victory and retreat.

In 1758, a Qing army under Yaraqan besieged Kucha, but allowed the "elder and younger Khojas" (as the brothers were known) to slip out of the city. Zhao-hui then advanced with his men from Barkol in pursuit of Khoja Jihan and Burhan ad-Din. Neither Akou nor Ush would take in the Khojas, who next retreated to Yarkand and Kashgar to prepare a defense. Akou, Khotan, and Ush surrendered peacefully to the Qing, and a Kirghiz chief in the latter city reported to the Qing forces that Khoja Jihan had only 3,000 bedraggled followers left, who were abandoning their weapons and slaughtering their horses and camels as they fled. On this news, the emperor decided that Altishahr could be easily (and cheaply) pacified, and after dispatching a small number of Chahar and Solon reinforcements to join Zhao-hui in Aksu, he instructed Fu-de (then in Zungharia) to camp with the main force in Pijan and Turfan and await word from Zhao-hui. Gaozong also informed Che-budeng-zha-bu, who had been charged with transferring grain from Urumchi to Kucha to support a lengthy Qing campaign, that he could cancel that operation and take his Chahar troops off to pasture their animals and rest. As Zhao-hui advanced toward Yarkand in the fall of 1758, therefore, his rear guard and supply lines were hundreds of kilometers behind him. After losing some men in a landslide and leaving others to guard the key crossroads at Barchuk, Zhao-hui approached Yarkand with just over 4,000 infantry and cavalry, their horses exhausted after the long desert journey. Since this number was insufficient to besiege the large city of Yarkand, he memorialized for reinforcements. Only on receipt of this dispatch did the emperor command Fu-de's main force to proceed immediately to Yarkand.

Zhao-hui's small army made camp in the tenth month on a forested knoll on the south side of the Yarkand river (locally known as the Blackwater, or Qarasu). Zhao-hui did not know it yet, but together Burhan ad-Din and Khoja Jihan still commanded 20,000 men-at-arms, both cavalry and foot soldiers, and this force was lying in wait in the mountains south of the city. The Khojas sprang their trap just as Zhao-hui led a detachment across the river to search for food. Ambushed in midstream, the Qing force was thrown into confusion and only succeeded in retreating to the Blackwater Camp after nightfall; there they were besieged.

Though his predicament had been avoidable and he must have recalled Bandi's fate more than once, Zhao-hui was at least lucky in his choice of the
Landmarks

Kashgar or Yarkand as well as to the military governor. Other councillors served in Yili and Tarbagatai. These high officials (Ch. dachen; Ma. amban) were primarily concerned with banner affairs and defense in their jurisdictions, and during the first century of Qing rule in Xinjiang these positions were filled almost exclusively by Manchu or Mongol bannermen, and in a very few cases by a Hanjun (Han martial) or an East Turkestani. A separate, lower-ranked, military chain of command handled affairs of the Han Green Standard troops stationed in Xinjiang cities and also governed any Chinese civilians in the Northern and Southern Marches, where no civil government for Chinese existed. The tasks of civil government for the Muslim and Turkic-speaking natives of Altishahr fell to East Turkestani officials called begs, whom the Qing appointed to administer the Turki-speaking population. In each city a panoply of beg officials handled such matters as grain tax collection, corvee supervision, and adjudication of civil disputes. Chief among these native functionaries were the hakim begs, classified as third rank in the larger cities and fourth rank elsewhere, who received cash stipends from the Qing in addition to revenues from lands granted them by the dynasty.\(^{19}\)

The administration of the Eastern March was somewhat different. A vice banner commander-in-chief (fu ditong; later upgraded to banner commander-in-chief, ditong) commanded the garrison forces in Urumchi, but as the local Han population increased, districts (xian) and sub-prefectures (zhou) were created, and magistrates like those in China proper were appointed to handle civil affairs.\(^{20}\) For some purposes these officials fell under the jurisdiction of the Shaansi-Gansu governor-general. The jasak system prevailed in Hami and Turfan, as well as among the Torgut and Khoshuut peoples settled near Karasahr. Jasaks, hereditary rulers with princely titles granted by the Qing, ruled over their peoples in these regions, subject to inspection by Qing military officials.\(^{21}\)

For the most part, the Qing administrative system in Xinjiang retained its original form until the loss of Qing control over the territory in 1864. What changes there were the Qing implemented in response to incidents of unrest or invasion, with which Xinjiang’s history abounds.

\(^1\) I use the term “Chinese” below to indicate both Han and Chinese-speaking Muslims (Tungans or Hanhui, now known as Hui). See the discussion of Qing ethnic terminology in Chapter 6.

\(^2\) A Qing census published in 1818 gives the following numbers of East Turkestani households in Xinjiang cities: Kashgar, 15,700; Yarkand, 18,341; Khotan area, 15,631; Usk, 810; Aku Cty, 8,424; Sairam, 1,049; Bai, 593; Korla, 670; Bugur, 770; Kucha, 946; Shayar, 473; Yili, 60; total, 61,767 (Tuo-jin et al. [Qingdi] Da Qing huidan shili, Jiaqing edition, 742: 11a-112a).
After the initial conquest (1757–59) and the Ush uprising (1765; discussed in Chapter 4), Xinjiang enjoyed the relative tranquility of paz Manjurica for about 50 years. In the 1820s, however, problems arose on the western frontier. By this time, many Muslims of Altishahr had become disaffected due to the excesses of rule by the Chinese authorities; opportunistic Kirghiz nomad groups made themselves available to support anti-Qing actions; and the khanate of Kokand began to assert itself in hopes of gaining special trade privileges in western Altishahr. Non-Chinese sources attest that the Qings agreed to pay Kokand an annual tribute to hold in check the khoja descendants, especially Jahangir (1790–1828), grandson of Buhân ad-Din. Despite this, Jahangir either escaped or was released and declared holy war on the Qings occupied in East Turkestan, staging raids in 1820 and 1824–25 with the aid of Afaqi Kirghiz tribesmen from the Pamirs. In 1826 attack, Jahangir also enlisted Kokandi merchants in Xinjiang and succeeded in fomenting an uprising of Afaqi in Altishahr, which allowed his force to occupy the four western cities. Although a Qing army dispatched from Zhungaria and parts further east succeeded at great expense in reconquering the territory, some officials questioned the viability of Qing rule in this region and suggested pulling back the Qing military forces and devolving control over these four cities to "native chiefs" (tusi)—in effect, abandoning western Altishahr by granting all-but-complete autonomy to the khoja. The Daoguang emperor rejected this proposal and instead dispatched Nayannceng to Kashgar to oversee the reconstruction (shanhui) of Altishahr.

Nayannceng (Na-yan-cheng: 1764–1833), a Manchu of the Janggbiya clan, was the grandson of Agui, who had led forces in the original conquest of Xinjiang, and the father of Kong-an, who served as Yili councillor between 1827 and 1850. A Manchu wunderkind (xiangyi by the age of 25, juren at 24, and jinshi at 25), Nayannceng's rapid rise through officialdom began with a series of appointments within the imperial academic establishment. When the Jiaqing emperor assumed real power in 1798, Nayannceng was made president of the Board of Works. By the time he was dispatched to Altishahr, he had already gained considerable experience in frontier affairs (in Guangdong and Kokonor) and in military pacification (the White Lotus and Tianti sects). From Kashgar in 1827 he supervised the withdrawal of the main pacification force and the reconstruction of Qing citadels and implemented reforms of Xinjiang's trade, taxation, troop deployment, currency, fiscal, and foreign policies that completely revamped Qing administration in the southern March. His memorials (collected and published by his son) provide one of our best sources on Qing imperial government in Xinjiang.

The keystone of Nayannceng's foreign policy initiatives was a retaliatory embargo of Kokand. This measure backfired, however, when the khanate staged an attack on Altishahr in 1830, ostensibly commanded by Jahangir's brother, Muhammad Yusuf, to redress the grievances of Kokandi merchants deported by Nayannceng. Once again, after laborious and costly preparations, an army marched from Aksu to restore Qing rule in western Altishahr. Although the invaders fled, the Qing court was nonetheless forced to conclude with Kokand in 1835 what Joseph Fletcher has called "China's first unequal treaty settlement". Kokand's representatives, the aqsaqals, henceforth enjoyed the right to collect customs duties on foreign imports and to exercise jurisdiction over foreigners in Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, Aksu, and Ush.

By the 1830s, it was clear to both the court and officials in the field that without some fundamental change in Qing policy and defensive posture, the four western cities of Altishahr would remain vulnerable and continue to require costly rescue expeditions. Again, some suggested a strategic retreatment to a more defensible line farther east. But a detailed survey of the topography of the Altishahr cities and of Xinjiang's revenues, expenditures, and tax base led an official to conclude convincingly that retreatment would realize no real fiscal or security benefits. From the 1820s, too, statecraft scholars began suggesting a different approach to pacifying troublesome Altishahr: colonization by Han Chinese and permanent settlement of a larger military force. This was the direction in which the dynasty moved (discussed in Chapter 6 and Conclusion).

The khoja jihads flared up repeatedly after this, first in 1847 with an invasion known as the War of the Seven Khosas, backed by Kokand, followed by similar attacks on Kashgar, Yarkand, and Yangi Hisar in 1852 (led by Wali Khan, Katta Khan, Kichik Khan, and Tawakkul Khaja), 1854 (led by Shâh Mu'min, Husayn Khwâja Ishân, Wali Khan, and Tawakkul Khaja), and 1857 (the Kucha Uprising and the invasion by Wali Khan and Tawakkul Khaja). Meanwhile, the Russian commercial presence in Zhungaria, growing since the 1840s, was finally legalized by the Kulji (Yili) Agreement of 1851, which allowed Russian merchants to trade at seasonal official markets in Yili and Tarbagattai and granted the Tsarist government permanent consulates in these cities. In the 1860 Treaty of Peking, Russia managed to extract consular and trade rights for Kashgar as well, setting the stage for the celebrated Russian-British rivalry in the Pamirs and Altishahr that would develop later in the century.

However, it was neither the Makhdumzâdas nor Russia, but the almost simultaneous eruption of rebellions by Tungans (Muslim Chinese) throughout Xinjiang in 1864, following hard on the Tungan rebellions in Gansu of 1862, that wiped out the last vestiges of Qing control in the region. Plagued
by rebellion in China and chronic fiscal shortages. Qing imperial control over Xinjiang crumbled. The way was clear for a Kokandi army led by Yaqub Beg to invade Aqishahr and for Russia to occupy the Yili Valley.26

The Jiayu Guan, Qing Expansion, and “China”

The philosopher Wang Fuzhi (1619–92) is entered in Qing period biographies, but he was intellectually a man of the wall-building late Ming. He is noted, among other things, for the sharp categorizations he drew between hua and yi, Chinese and barbarian:

The Chinese in their bone structure, sense organs, gregariousness and exclusiveness, are no different from the barbarians, and yet they must be distinguished absolutely from the barbarians. Why is this so? Because if man does not mark himself off from things, then the principle of Heaven is violated. If the Chinese do not mark themselves off from the barbarians, then the principle of earth is violated. And since Heaven and earth regulate mankind by marking men off from each other, if men do not mark themselves off and preserve an absolute distinction between societies, then the principle of man is violated.27

The fundamental distinction between Chinese and barbarians arises, according to Wang, not from biology, but from environment, which determines in turn the different “atmospheres,” “customs,” “understanding,” and “behavior” of hua and yi. As Frank Dikötter has summarized Wang’s thought on this question, “the purity of categories (qinglei) had to be preserved by strict boundaries (juzhen) and a specific Lebensraum (dingwei). The territory of the Chinese race was the ‘middle region’ (zhongguo) or ‘divine region’ (shenqiu): ‘North of the deserts, west of the Yellow River, south of Annam, east of the sea, the ether is different, people have a different essence, nature produces different things.’”28

The late Ming court chose to build walls as a military policy, but, as Arthur Waldron has shown us, the decisions that led to that choice were reached in a political climate that increasingly viewed the purity of categories and the strictness of boundaries as a litmus test of dynastic loyalty. To wall, or not to wall, involved “questions of Ming, and Chinese, national and cultural definition” as much or more than strategic considerations.29

To what extent did later Chinese scholars subject to the Manchu dynasts continue to map their moral and cultural world onto the physical one? Did they maintain the Ming sense of boundedness, of the moral imperative to distinguish hua from yi and center from outer, even while politically forbidden

from voicing such sentiments? This, of course, is one of the great questions of Qing history, in part because the Qing dynasty consciously stifled such discussion and censored the record, leaving later historians with little to go on. Wang Fuzhi’s writings could not be published until near the end of the dynasty and were little known in his own time; other writings on barbarians or frontier issues were suppressed during the censorship campaign of the 1770s and 1780s. But the hua/yi dyad and the sense that China (Zhongguo), as both civilization and state, is a naturally bounded entity centered on the Central Plain, has deep roots in Chinese thought. To be sure, Confucius could extol the superior man to remain superior while living amid barbarians and proposed going to live among them himself; likewise, Zhu Xi’s philosophy is considered cosmopolitan and universalistic, and indeed it spread readily from China to other East Asian countries.30 Nevertheless, a tradition that highlighted the spatial distinction between hua (or xia) and yi would have informed the worldviews of the well-read even in Qing times.

There is a famous description, at the conclusion of the “Tribute of Yu” in the Shang shu, of how Yu constituted the series of concentric and hierarchically arranged domains, each physically removed by a distance of five hundred li from its inward neighbor and each occupied by a politically and culturally inferior class of people. This idealized depiction and another, similar one in the Rites of Zhou, as well as the “Chinese world order” model, are often cited to argue that clear boundaries were not an important part of the traditional Chinese worldview, which envisioned instead radiating zones of diminishing cultural and political affinity to China.31 But the very next sentence following the account of Yu’s great work reads: “On the east reaching to the sea; on the west extending to the moving sands; to the utmost limits of the north and south:—[Yu’s] fame and influence filled up all within the four seas.” Although the northern and southern limits are vague, the eastern and western boundaries of the realm are here defined quite clearly indeed.

In later Chinese writings, it is not hard to find other indications of a territorial definition of Chineseness and China (or the Middle States) coexisting with the universalistic cultural one. The Southern Song poet Chen Liang believed that only in the Central Plain was the immanent spatial energy (qi) of sufficient quality to support China’s superior culture and maintain the Chinese ruler’s Mandate of Heaven. The energy of Zhejiang and Sichuan, for example, was “peripheral,” and that of distant nomadic lands “pervasive and inferior.”32 There is, moreover, a tradition extending from the Han to the Ming that views features of China’s natural landscape (mountains, passes, rivers) as boundaries created by Heaven. Such ideas were only reinforced by the debates over wall building during the Ming.33

Thus the concept that the places beyond the Ming boundaries were not
“China,” and even that environmental factors could determine the difference between those living outside and the Chinese within, could not have been unknown to Qing literati. As we have seen, Qi Yunshi, when he passed through the Jiayu Guan in 1805, half-expected the new environment to work sudden changes on his being and was not entirely disappointed.

The Jiayu Guan, a relic of the Ming mural defense system, retained an official function into the Qing period: following the Qianlong conquests, travelers from China proper still had to present their laissez-passer before proceeding through its massive gate. But for those steeped in the Chinese literary tradition, the Pass represented a symbolic, psychological boundary as well: for many in the mid-eighteenth century, as for the author of the “Tribute of Yu,” those shifting sands marked the end of China. Moreover, the Qianlong emperor’s endeavors beyond the Pass, perhaps for the reasons just outlined, did not meet with complete approval from his ministers, but rather with considerable and surprisingly direct resistance.

**Literati Dissent, Imperial Response**

Liu Tongxun, a Shandongese grand councillor much trusted by the monarch, had been coordinating logistics as governor-general of Shaanxi-Gansu in 1753 when Amursana slipped free of his escort to Rehe and asserted his command over the tribes of the former Zunghar federation. Upon learning that the Manchu general Yong-chang had retreated from Urumchi to Barkol in response to this news, Liu suggested that a defensive perimeter be established in Hami, the Western Regions city closest to Gansu, and that the lands to the west be abandoned. In his memorial Liu included the almost admonishing phrase (reminiscent of the strict categories of Wang Fuzhi), “The inner and outer boundaries must be demarcated (nei wai zhi jie, bu ke bu fen).” Gaozong, after expressing surprise that Liu had panicked so easily over Amursana, singled out this sentence for special censure. “Just think: ever since the [Zungharian] tribes came over to us of their own accord, all have been part of our territory (bantu). Yili is our border (jiangjie)! What’s this about ‘inner and outer’ being divisible?”

Liu Tongxun was a highly loyal, famously incorruptible official who had earlier risked his own career to openly criticize an imperial favorite and had thus won the Qianlong emperor’s respect. Now, in 1755, he again spoke bluntly, expressing his belief that the natural boundary of the “inner” lay at Hami and that what lay outside could be justifiably left to the Zunghar nomads. This time, however, he went too far. Gaozong could not tolerate such opinions and sentenced his minister to castration and punishment. For the Qianlong emperor, the natural limits of the realm were coeternous with the limits of his military power and included steppe as well as farm land. He found this reference to Zungharia as “outer” offensive.

Two years later, during the imperial southern tour in the spring of 1757, more Han officials questioned the wisdom of the northwestern campaigns and the policy of courting Kazakh allegiance and trade. For the glimpse it gives of his thoughts about the imperial enterprise in Central Asia, literati resistance to it, and the consciousness of history on both sides, Gaozong’s edict is worth quoting at length.

Amursana is now a wandering soul in a cauldron. Can he escape dismemberment for long? That the rebels were able to pretend to power, stirring up the Oirats and the Muslims, was solely due to their reliance on the Kazakhs. Now, Ablai [the Kazakh sultan] has already surrendered and promised, should Amursana enter his territory, to capture him for the Qing . . . I am gratified by this. Never, since ancient times, have the Kazakhs, that is, Dayuan, been in contact with the central states (zhongguo). In former times, Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty expended all his military strength, but he merely obtained horses and then returned . . . Now we finally preside over the entire Kazakh horde, and they incline their hearts our way . . . . Nevertheless, know-nothing outsiders . . . say the Kazakhs are not to be trusted and raise the example of Amursana and Bayar, who became our ministers and then repeatedly rebelled, exhausting our troops and expending our treasure. There is no end to the complaints of these people. They do not know that the Kazakhs dwell more than 10,000 li away . . . and that up till now they have never sent an emissary, nor have we summoned them. Now [the Kazakhs] call themselves “minister” (chen), receive our commands, and present horses in tribute of their own accord! Nevertheless, during the southern tour this spring, that National University student (jiansheng) from the south, Zhang Rulin, and that Confucian-school instructor from Zhejiang, Zhang Zhiye, submitted a memorial in which they rashly requested to enlist in the army. In this memorial they talked about how our troops and generals were suffering! Worthless commoners who give currency to false rumors are not worth talking about. But fools like these—have they ever been loyal to their ruler or loved their country? They just go ahead and predict disaster, without understanding the greatness of Tianxia!...
It is hard to interpret this extraordinary document as other than an imperial defense of the Zungharian and East Turkestan adventure in the face of criticism emanating from the Jiangnan. We do not have their original memorial, but one wonders if the two literati mentioned the Han dynasty precedents directly. Any scholar of the time would have known the story of the Han expedition to Dayuan (Fergana) to obtain “blood-sweating” horses and would have readily recalled Sima Qian’s critique of Emperor Wu’s ruinous foreign campaigns: the Xiongnu wars of the second century B.C., along with expensive domestic projects, exhausted Han dynastic reserves of grain and cash. The same chapter of the Shiji (the “Balanced Standard”) tells the story of the upright official (and former shepherd) Bu Shi, who in 112 B.C. volunteered to leave his post as prime minister of Qi and “die in battle” against the Southern Yue. The Zangs’ own enlistment request seems disingenuous and may itself have been an allusion to the Shiji critique.

In any case, the emperor picks up the historical thread in his response but hastens to distinguish himself from Han Wudi, depicting his forerunner’s efforts in the far west as ephemeral in contrast to his own lasting ones. Gaogong scoffs at attempts by Han Chinese literati to understand frontier matters, and, later in the edict, the emperor further justifies the campaigns by asserting (not quite truthfully) that the conquest had been rapid and what casualties there had been were to Scalon or Manchu bannermen—the dynasty had not dispatched Han Chinese border forces or conscripted peasants. Finally, Gaogong argues that his military budget amounted to only 30 to 40 percent of that Yongzheng times (note the increase from the “10 to 20 percent” he had claimed in 1759) and that domestic allocations for disaster relief, river works, tax relief, and so on had actually increased, despite the military expenditure in Zungharia.

In 1760, the Qianlong emperor once again encountered domestic resistance to the Qing presence in Xinjiang, when he personally tested the successful jinshi candidates following the metropolitan examinations of that year. By this time, the dynasty had launched a large-scale agricultural reclamation program (tuntian) in Zungharia, and Xinjiang officials were busily creating the infrastructure to allow the military, penal, and civilian colonies to grow the grain needed to support the Qing garrisons in Xinjiang (see Chapter 2). One of the questions on the exam concerned tuntian policy, and at least one candidate suggested in his answer that such efforts “belabored the people” (laomin). Hua Li has pointed out that the airing of such an opinion in this exalted venue was not a casual matter; it indicates a considerable level of resistance in literati circles to Gaogong’s policies in the far west, and in particular to the issue of Han migration to new farms in Xinjiang. Gaogong thus cast his response with a broad audience in mind: after denying that tuntian was in any way injurious to his subjects, he used the occasion to compose a long defense of agricultural development in Xinjiang in terms of economic benefits and lebensraum and had the edict distributed broadly to officials in the empire.

Justifying Empire at Home

These exchanges (of which the published Qing historical record has preserved only the emperor’s side) raise issues that will be with us throughout our consideration of the mid-Qing empire in Xinjiang. Since the Dawachi campaign, Gaogong faced criticism that the military expenditures in the northwest were too expensive, criticism that bore with it the weight of historical precedent. It is probably for this reason that he repeatedly withdrew the main Qing armies at the first indication of victory in the Zunghar wars—thus leading to the death of Bandi and his men in Yili and the near loss of Zhao-hui’s force at Blackwater Camp. During the initial stages of postconquest consolidation, the same criticisms about cost—in lives, labor, and treasure—arose often, and the emperor responded as a modern politician might, quoting percentages saved over the policies of his predecessor and arguing that the imperial expansion into Xinjiang caused no economic hardship but rather brought conditions of prosperity to the northwest.

The emperor would repeat these arguments to unnamed critics in edicts over the next several years. In 1761, for example, Gaogong commissioned and announced the results of a study by Su Hede to the effect that after the Xinjiang conquest, the dynasty saved more in Shaanxi and Gansu than it paid to occupy Altishahr—and thus the “simple and stupid know-nothings given to frivolous discussions” were wrong. In similar fashion, when in 1772 governor-general Wen-shou of Sichuan suggested opening a subscription list to raise revenue, Gaogong responded with a denial that revenue was necessary: by reducing the numbers of troops assigned to guard the borders within China proper and by cutting the food and horse allowances of Han-martial (Hanjun) garrisoned in the provinces, the emperor pointed out, he had already freed enough funds to finance Xinjiang and even save an additional 900,000 taels annually. He added that at the beginning of his reign, the Board of Revenue treasury contained only 34 million taels; by his 37th year of rule (1772), a surplus of more than 75 million had accumulated—further indirect evidence that the implementation of a forward policy in the far northwest produced savings for the empire. Within a few years, the literary inquisition reached a high point, with Song-through Ming-period geographic works on
the northern and northwestern frontiers comprising a principal category of books destroyed. The Qianlong emperor thus rejected the criticism of his frontier policy in general and of Xinjiang finance in particular, especially that voiced by Han Chinese. The official line had been laid down.

Five decades later, this "forward defense dividend" argument was codified as historical fact in the *Qindeng Xinjiang zilue* (Imperially commissioned survey of Xinjiang), compiled by exiled scholars under the supervision of the Mongol high official, Song-yun, and dedicated by the Daoguang emperor in the first year of his reign (1821). The authors of this gazetteer draw an explicit contrast between what they describe as the Han dynasty's expensive and inconclusive forays into the Western Regions and the Qing's economical and decisive victories. "Our Dynasty has, in accordance with the will of Heaven above and the affairs of men below, taken [Xinjiang] without excessive use of troops, and holds it without wasteful expenditure of treasure." How was this possible? The Manchu forces posted to defend Yili and Urumchi were transferred, the editors explain, from Rehe, Xi'an, Liangzhou, and Zhuanglang; the Green Standard Han troops came from Yansui, Ningxia, Xinggan, Xining, Guyuan, Suzhou, Hezhou, and Anxi. Because these troops had simply been reassigned to duty in Xinjiang, with no new soldiers mustered to replace them at their former postings, the provinces in China proper were spared the cost of these troops' salaries, grain, fodder, and so on. Even after the salaries and operating expenses of Xinjiang cities were paid, the gazetteer claims, China proper could still boast an annual savings of over 200,000 taels! "Not only has the acquisition of Xinjiang not wasted funds, it has saved the provincial treasuries money. And considering Xinjiang's flourishing state farms, newly established schools, mutual surveillance and protection by the common people, network of roads and surplus grain, [it is clear that] those who since olden times have advocated fortifying the passes [on the borders of China proper] as a means of pacifying the frontier could not come close to achieving this." 13

Thus, in language similar to Gaozong's earlier, the authors justify a forward frontier policy and continued Qing administration of Xinjiang on the basis of savings made possible by reducing troop strength within China proper. The statecraft scholar Wei Yuan would reiterate this line of reasoning in 1842. 14 In fact, the debate over the economics of empire echoes and re-echoes, in evolving form, throughout the era of Qing rule in Xinjiang, from the early warnings about the advisability of the Zunghar campaigns, to Daoguang period consideration of a retreatment from western Altishahr, to the famous 1874 debate between Li Hongzhang and Zuo Zongtang over maritime
Financing New Dominion

The august Qing is at the height of its military power, and the taxes and rents of Alitshah, the harvests of agricultural reclamation as well as commerce along [Xinjiang’s] roads have filled our granaries and storehouses, accumulating into a great surplus. Not only is China proper not troubled by having to dispatch supplies in haste, but because of continuous tax relief, the common people in the provinces of Shaanxi and Gansu at first did not even know of the military campaigns. How can the Han, Tang, Song or Ming dynasties, which exhausted China’s (zhongguo) wealth and power without gaining so much as an inch of land, be compared with Us?

Da Qing lichao Gaozong shilu 597:33b-37a. QL24.9 ding chou

GAOZONG’s grandiloquence on this occasion, upon receiving the news that Khoja Jihán and Burhan ad-Din had been captured in Badakhshan, reveals his hopes but not the reality of Qing empire in the Western Regions. Despite repeated claims of a fiscal windfall, the hard budgetary fact was that throughout the century between Qing conquest and the Tungan rebellions, the Qing military government in Xinjiang remained dependent on China proper. And because the cost of empire in Central Asia was a politically charged issue, not only did the court continue to advance its argument about a forward defense dividend, but it also urged officials in the field to strive toward the elusive goal of “using the Western Regions to rule the Western Regions, and not provide for [Xinjiang] expenditure from the central lands (zhongtu).” These efforts to reduce Xinjiang’s dependence on the provinces included official trade of textiles for Kazakh livestock; agricultural reclamation; traditional Central Asian as well as new forms of taxation; garrison commissioners; and such measures as manipulation of exchange rates, renting out of government property, and investment of government funds with private merchants. Many of these programs raised or freed up significant amounts of funds or provided in other ways for the needs of the Qing frontier garrisons. Nonetheless, they never sufficed to render the imperial government in Xinjiang independent of sub-
sidies from China, let alone realize a profit for the metropole. This fact highlights the fiscal vulnerability of Qing empire in Central Asia.

More positively, these forays into commerce reveal the creativity and activism of Qing authorities in Xinjiang and a state engagement with the market economy that at times transcended what was legally permitted in China proper. This difference between fiscal regulations and techniques in Xinjiang and China proper provides another reminder that we should think of the high Qing not so much as a “Chinese empire” or “Chinese dynasty,” but as an empire, ruled by a Manchu house, that encompassed China proper as but one—albeit the principal one—of its extensive territorial holdings.

This chapter and the next examine the fiscal underpinnings of Qing dominion in Xinjiang, beginning with a discussion of the Xinjiang administration’s basic needs for livestock, grain, and silver; how these needs were met; and how Qing officials used local monetary policy to stretch their stipends of silk and silver.

The Kazakh Trade

One of the most pressing challenges that the Qing faced during the Zunghar campaign’s was the provision of livestock for war, portage, and food. This demand declined only gradually following the end of the war in 1759, as the work of city construction and agricultural reclamation in Zungharia required draft animals and the garrisons needed a supply of chargers to stock stud farms. Animals bred in China proper did not fare well on the long journey to Zungharia: out of 60,000 head of sheep driven from Barkol in 1758, for example, over 27,000 died en route. Horses, though more apt to survive the journey, were half-starved when they arrived in Zungharia and had to be fattened up again before battle or work. Others made it to Xinjiang only to fall victim to famished troopers who ate them in lieu of delayed grain rations.5

Thus, when the Kazakhs who pastured near and within the former Oirat lands in northern Zungharia responded positively to an imperial overture in 1757, the news was welcome to Qing military planners. Not only did the Kazakhs promise intelligence regarding Amursana’s whereabouts, but they also expressed a desire to engage in trade that could provide war horses and sheep to Qing bannermen. This frontier exchange of textiles for livestock, formally initiated in 1758, avoided for the most part the troubles that beset border tea-for-horse markets in the Song and Ming periods and became a keystone in the economic structure of Qing Xinjiang.5
After a few years of experimentation, the Qing-Kazakh trade was institutionalized along the following lines. Late in the year, officials in Xinjiang and the northwest remitted orders for certain varieties and colors of silk to the Imperial Silk Factories (zhizao chu) in Hangzhou, Soochow, and Jiangning (Nanjing). With funds from local dianping land taxes, the factories produced the fabrics in about a year's time. The factory commissioners then oversaw the inspection and packing of the fabric into special crates, each containing 45 bolts of silk, sheathed in paper and bamboo matting, bound with hemp cord, and clamped between boards. The crates were covered with oiled cloth to repel rain and shipped in a caravan under military escort to Suzhou, where they arrived in spring or summer, around eighteen months after the orders had been put in. After inspection for fading or mold, good silks were sent on to the Camel and Horse Offices (tuoma chu) in Yili and Tarbagatai in readiness for the trade season. After 1762, the Qing authorities in Xinjiang began collecting cotton cloth woven in Altishahr in lieu of the grain tax; thereafter, almost 100,000 bolts of this “Muslim cloth” (hui bu) were shipped annually to the north to supply troops and to supplement the silk for trade with the Kazakhs.

Between summer and autumn, the Kazakhs began to arrive at the frontier outposts (karun) en route to Yili or Tarbagatai. Qing guards escorted them to a site outside the city wall, where the nomads pitched camp. The trade fair was convened in a special “trade pavilion” (maoyi ting), a suburban walled stockade with Qing guards at the gates. In hopes of keeping Kazakh prices down, Qing trade delegation members (often Green Standard troops or exiled officials) attempted to conceal the “official” aspect of the trade fair by disguising themselves as merchants before transacting business. Orats helped out as interpreters.

The Qing departed from Ming precedent by not attempting to fix horse prices by rigid fiat. Officials did make sure that prices charged for textiles in Tarbagatai were somewhat higher than those in Yili, in order to entice nomads to travel the extra distance to the latter city, which was more convenient for the Qing. Nevertheless, for the most part Kazakhs haggled with

The term is Manchu; compare Mongolian oregeal, “sentry.” In Chinese the word becomes kaien. Xinjiang’s karun were enclosed forts built in frontier zones between territory under close Qing supervision and the pastures of independent nomads not enrolled in the banners. Although often represented on maps, the karun lines did not define borders and ran along the slopes of the Tienshan within Xinjiang as well as near the external periphery of Zuungharia and Altishahr. (See, for example, the karun line north of Us—below the city toward the bottom of Map 3—on the southern foothills of the Tienshans.) Patrols were mounted from karun into nomad territory under Qing jurisdiction; some karun lay along common travelers’ and merchants’ routes.

![Figure 2. Official silk shipments to Zuungharia and Altishahr, 1765-1833. Source: Millward, “The Qing-Kazakh Trade,” Table B.](image)

Qing “merchants” to determine prices on the basis of categories of animal and textile. (For example, around 1775, one five-color four-clawed dragon robe or a bolt of four-span two-color gilt satin could be exchanged for 4 horses or 32 sheep. On the lower end of the scale, a bolt of cotton cloth could be traded for 2 large sheep or 2 small goats.) The Qianlong emperor himself established this operating principle in 1758: “We are certainly not employing this trade as a ‘loose rein’ tactic, nor to profit at the Kazakhs’ expense, but, rather, we hope to obtain horses at a low price. When you trade you should not be overly mean, nor need you be too compromising, but operate on the principle that both parties get a fair deal” (my emphasis). 5

After the official trading was completed, private merchants were allowed into the trade pavilion to exchange tea or sundry goods for any livestock or pastoral products the Kazakhs had left over. Once all exchanges were completed, bannermen would escort the Kazakhs back beyond the karun, and officials would submit new silk orders to the Jiangnan factories, based on the nomads’ demonstrated preferences.

In the annals of Chinese frontier horse markets, the trade with the Kazakhs is remarkable for its relatively trouble-free longevity. Livestock obtained from the Kazakhs not only supported the Qing military during the crucial first
years of consolidation, but the resale of sheep provided a source of revenue for the Yili and Tarbagatay administrations. Moreover, horses were even sent from Yili to supply the military in Xi'an and elsewhere in China proper. Although by the late 1790s the nomads no longer wanted as many bolts of the expensive satins and dragon robes (dun, jin, and manghao), and the overall volume of silks shipped to Yili and Tarbagatay dropped from a high of almost 18,000 bolts in 1767 to 1,000–2,000, the trade continued at a steady, low level until the 1850s, when the Taiping Rebellion cut off production by the Imperial Factories (see Figure 2). As the trade volume declined, Xinjiang garrisons compensated with livestock from official ranches and the pastoral operations of nomadic Mongol bannermen on the slopes of the Tianshan.

The Kazakhs and the “Tribute System”

Much postwar historiography of China casts discussions of China’s economic relations with its nomad neighbors in terms of the “tribute system,” which is generally summarized in simple form: nomads from the west and north traditionally presented horses and other pastoral products as “tribute” to the court in return for lavish “gifts in return.” Although these gifts were often more valuable than the horses themselves, the Chinese court subsidized the exchange in return for the political capital it gained from the “submission” of foreign peoples in the tribute-presentation ceremonies. According to the “tribute system” and “Chinese world order” model, all of China’s foreign trade before the advent of the West was similarly suffused with Sinocentric ideological content—from the Chinese court’s point of view, ceremonial window dressing was of primary importance, while the true economic content of these exchanges remained an embarrassing secret.

The Qing dynasty’s foreign trade has been similarly treated, and if one accepts that China’s “traditional foreign relations” were determined by such an enduring paradigm, then evidence may be found for such a view. Among the most famous of the works by the Jesuit painter Giuseppe Castiglione are his studies of “tribute horses.” One painting particularly well known among students of Qing history is Kazakh Tribute Horses, which portrays a kowtowing Kazakh presenting horses to the Qianlong emperor amid rustic furnishings at the Chengde imperial summer retreat. If the Kazakhs were tributaries, as Castiglione’s Kazakhs seem to be, was the exchange of silk for horses in Yili not encompassed by the “tribute system”? Was it not “tributeary trade”? The Qianlong emperor himself did not think so. When, after trading in 1758, the Kazakh sultan requested that his men be provisioned and housed for their return trip—as would be done for members of a tribute mission—the emperor replied that “traders cannot be compared to those paying respects and presenting tribute. In the past we have never given them grain or horses. Just send them home.” Remember, too, the imperially mandated principles “that both parties get a fair deal.” To be sure, the documentary traffic on Kazakh trade in these years is scattered with patronizing references to their “submission” and to the “special beneficence” bestowed upon them, and Kazakh headmen did sometimes meet with Qing ambans for tea, cakes, and the exchange of “tribute” for “gifts.” But the importance of ritual gift exchange in early modern Asian foreign relations notwithstanding (and James Hervia has recently enhanced our understanding of such exchanges in the context of Qing guest ritual), the emperor’s 1758 edict clearly distinguishes trade from tribute.

The distinction is important, given the great influence of John King Fairbank’s “Chinese world order” model on historians of the Qing and modern China. Fairbank argued that the Chinese were unprepared for the West in the nineteenth century because they had no framework with which to deal with foreigners except the “institutions and preconceptions developed over three thousand years of contact with pastoral nomads.” From this belief about “traditional Chinese” dealings with northern neighbors, Fairbank, following T. E. Tsiang, developed his theory to explain China’s failure to respond adequately to the West. There is a great irony here, for as we have seen and will see further below, the Sinocentric notions that underlie the “tribute system” paradigm bear very little relation to Qing policy vis-à-vis the pastoral nomads or other peoples in or bordering on Xinjiang (or Mongolia or Tibet for that matter) during the period immediately antecedent to that of Fairbank’s concern. Trade at frontier markets like Yili and Tarbagatay (or Canton, for that matter) could be carried out very pragmatically indeed. Once we have seen how the Qing traded with the Kazakhs, therefore, we can no longer accept such statements as “all foreign relations in the Chinese view were ipso facto tributary relations.”

* Before the year’s trade session came to a close, some of the Kazakhs might petition for an audience with the military governor, Xinjiang’s highest official. The select nomad party would be escorted into the military governor’s headquarters within the walled city and there be treated to tea and sugar cakes. If they chose to present a few horses, the governor would calculate the horses’ value and give silk worth the same amount in return. This is the sole explicitly ceremonial component of the Kazakh trade, and it does not seem to have been either perennially practiced or considered essential. Significantly, the documentary discussion regarding the establishment of trade procedures in its first years makes no mention of these meetings between nomads and the military governor. (This information derives from gazetteer sources: YIH, “maoyi,” pp. 100–102; Se-ying-a, Qingdai chuanban yitou chzhzh, NF: 2b–3b, DG:203 guichuan.) See also n. 12.
Planting the Frontier

The settlement of soldiers and civilians on reclaimed land to grow their own food has long been a staple element of Chinese frontier strategy. The Qing also adopted the policy and made development and colonization of "wasteland" a focus of its Xinjiang enterprise, particularly in the Eastern and Northern Marches, where the land was sparsely settled. The dynasty's massive efforts at land reclamation in Xinjiang left a legacy still important to agriculture in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region today and warrants monographic treatment on its own. Because this subject has been treated in much new Chinese research, however, I will discuss it only briefly here.18

Beginning with the first Qing campaigns against the Zunghars in Mongolia and the northwest during the Kangxi and Yongzheng reigns, grain supply was a key logistical problem. Military agricultural colonies (juntun, bingtun) in what is now the eastern part of Xinjiang provided a partial solution. From 1716, Green Standard troops farms established in Hami, Musang, Barkol, Turfan, and Altai, thus providing some of the grain needed in operations against the Zunghars. All these military colonies except Hami were abandoned in 1725, however, when the Qing relinquished control of these areas as part of the truce agreement concluded with Tsewang Arapan, the Zunghar khan. The Qing reestablished military farming on these sites after 1729, but by 1735 had again withdrawn to Hami.19

In 1757, the Qianlong emperor ordered that East Turkestanis and Green Standard forces be assigned to cultivate lands in the Yili region to supplement military grain supplies shipped from China proper.20 Three years later Agüti brought 300 East Turkestanis from Aksu to Yili. This group, known as Taran-chis, became the Qing's first agricultural colony of East Turkestan (huitun) in Zungharia. At the same time the dynasty reestablished Green Standard military colonies in the east of the territory and expanded these efforts northward and westward, organizing a cluster of important military farms around Urumchi. In addition to huitun and bingtun, the dynasty created several other types of agricultural colonies in Xinjiang over the next 40 years. These included penal colonies (juntun or quntun), Chinese civilian colonies (huitun or muntun), and even banner colonies (qitun). (These Yili region banner lands were generally rented out to be worked by others.) Meanwhile, military authorities in the south oversaw the organization of East Turkestan households into state farms in Kucha, Aksu, Ush, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan.21

* In Qing sources on Xinjiang, the character min indicates Chinese (both Han and Chinese Muslim, or Tungan) civilians, unless specifically modified with the character Hui (Muslim). The term Hui min indicates East Turkestanis. See Chapter 6.

During the Jiaqing (1796–1820) and Daoguang (1821–50) reigns, the military government in Xinjiang withdrew many of the bingtun soldiers from agricultural work. The land area and numbers of households devoted to civilian colonies continued to increase, however, stimulated by poor peasants and traders migrating from Gansu, Shaanxi, and elsewhere inside the Jiayu Guan. Gaozong had conceived of Xinjiang as an outlet for surplus Chinese population as early as 1760, recommending migration to Urumchi and Fijian as a solution to population pressure in Sichuan and China proper as a whole. The courts of subsequent emperors continued to support this policy, though most migrants originated in Gansu and Shaanxi, not Sichuan (see Chapter 4).28

As an incentive to potential migrants, the Qing offered settlers a grant of at least 30 mu (about 4.5 acres), a set of tools, twelve pecks of seed, and a loan of two silver taels and a horse valued at eight taels. This measure sufficed to create a population of around 135,000 Han and Tungan homesteaders in northern Xinjiang by the turn of the nineteenth century. This figure seems quite significant when compared to the Qing census figures of 63,707 East Turkestan households (at five per household, under 320,000 individuals) in southern Xinjiang, and only another 60 in Yili at the same time.21

After repulsing the Kokandi-sponsored invasion in 1830, the Qing established the first military and Chinese civilian colonies in the environs of Kashgar and other cities of Altishahr in the hope of strengthening control over this peripheral area. While agricultural reclamation by Chinese in Altishahr was carried out only on a small scale, the introduction of bingtun and muntun to the south was a departure from the earlier restriction on permanent Han and Tungan settlement of the Tarim Basin oases. Lin Zezhi's field studies of irrigation and agricultural conditions (conducted during his Xinjiang exile in the 1840s), resulted in a further expansion of farmland in the south (see Chapter 6).22 Despite this burst of development, however, the tuntian on the fertile Zungharian plains continued to be the primary source of grain for the Qing garrisons in Xinjiang.

In land area brought under cultivation (over 3,000,000 mu by 1840, according to one estimate, with an additional 600,000 mu in the south by 1850), the Qing surpassed all previous Chinese dynasties that had established agricultural colonies in Xinjiang.22 Scholars in China today proudly point out how the Qing agricultural enterprise and the associated creation on a large scale of hydraulic and communications infrastructure laid the social and economic foundations of modern Xinjiang. Though nationalistic, these claims are not without historical basis.

Nevertheless, for the Qing government in the eighteenth century, the primary goals of agricultural development in Xinjiang were more immediately
strategic and fiscal: to provide a secure grain source for the soldiers garrisoned in Xinjiang and to spare the crushing expense of shipping grain from China proper. The Qing agricultural development efforts, then, must be evaluated on these terms, and indeed, by these terms the agricultural colonies had for the most part succeeded by the end of the Qianlong reign. The historian Fang Yingkai asserts that Xinjiang tuntian “completely solved the problem of military grain and lightened the burden on dynastic finances.” Likewise, Wang Xilong concludes that “the military government [in Xinjiang] was established on the foundation of agricultural colonies (tuntian) and the armies stationed in Xinjiang relied for the most part on grain supplied by the agricultural colonies.” The sources contain many instances of officials announcing—even complaining of—grain surpluses. For example, in 1800 the imperial agent of Tarbagatai memorialized that “an excess of grain stored in the granaries accumulates over the years, not without waste.” In Yili, where around this time official and military personnel and their dependents consumed a yearly quota of about 160,000 piculs, the official granaries contained 540,000 piculs; Urumchi’s granaries held 800,000 piculs. Whether the grain was collected as tax or purchased on local markets, the state farms created an agricultural base sufficient to meet the needs of the Xinjiang military.

Local Sources of Revenue

Xinjiang’s livestock and grain needs could be met locally, as could those for such strategic commodities as salt and sulphur (used to manufacture gunpowder), lead (for shot), iron, copper, coal, and salt. Because the Qing authorities collected many of these items as tax payments, they required no monetary outlay. The government payroll, however, the largest item on Xinjiang’s budget, was another matter. In addition to the grain allowance, Manchu and Mongol officials as well as the higher-ranked East Turkestanis received both a primary salary (feng) and a “supplement for nourishing honesty” (yanglian). Rank-and-file soldiers, too, were paid a “salt and vegetable” stipend (yangcai) in money, with which they purchased food and other necessities to supplement their grain allotments. These outlays all required cash.

Immediately following the conquest of Zungharia and Altishahr, and undaunted by the 23,160,000 taels cost of those campaigns, the Qing court still entertained the notion that Xinjiang could eventually produce enough revenue to support the occupying banner and Green Standard forces. A court letter of mid-1760 ordered Shuhe (Shu-he-de), imperial agent at Aksu and concurrent president of the Board of Works, to conduct a survey of revenue and expenditure in each city of the newly conquered territory. In his edict, the Qianlong emperor asked explicitly about tuntian harvests and tax payments from East Turkestan households: “Are they sufficient for the officials’ and soldiers’ pay?”

Gaozong hoped a direct economic benefit could be reaped from the conquest of Xinjiang, but his concept of a Xinjiang that could pay for its own occupation with local land and head taxes was far from the mark. Maintenance of the territory, even in peacetime, required annual shipments of Chinese silver. To ascertain the extent to which the administration of Xinjiang relied on the provinces of China proper, we must first understand Xinjiang’s local sources of revenue and their limitations.

Xinjiang’s tax system had no diding, the combination land tax and commuted corvée assessment that had been collected in most districts of China proper as a single tax, paid in money, since the end of the Yongzheng reign. Local authorities in Xinjiang cities collected the grain tax (tianfu) according to a variety of schedules that varied with the locality, classification of land, and ethnic classification of the peasant. In much of the Eastern March, the land tax was collected at a grain-per-mu rate identical to that in Gansu, whence most of the Han settlers farming these lands had come. The Urumchi and Yili areas collected grain at a different rate per mu. Chinese peasant households who had borrowed oxen, tools, seed, and provisions from the government upon migrating to Yili paid 0.05 taels (5 fen) per mu, as did so-called merchants (those who migrated at their own expense and reclaimed land outside of state farms) who grew grain on private land reclaimed near Yili.

The Taranchis in Yili were assessed sixteen piculs of grain per household per year. Altishahari peasants were in theory assessed at a rate of one-tenth of the crop, the traditional Islamic kharaj tithe that had been in force under the Makhduumzadas and Zunghars and indeed throughout Muslim Central Asia. Actual practice in Xinjiang varied, however, with officials in some of the southern oases collecting somewhat less than one-tenth, and in others collecting a flat per-mu rate. East Turkestanis peasants farming official land (guardi) in Altishahr paid half their crop to the Qing government, except in Aksu, where the proportion was one-fifth. In Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan, much of the grain tax was payable in cotton cloth, which was then shipped north to Yili and Tarbagatai for trade with the Kazakhs and sale to bannermen and their families. There were other local variations and changes in the grain tax rates over time.

In addition to the tithe (paid in grain or cotton), adult East Turkestanis also paid a head tax (Ch. zhengfu; Tu. altan), which, according to calculations
based on 1782 tax quotas, amounted to six to eight pul (Altishahr's copper cash) per person. After the start of the jiaqiang period, residents of Aksu, Salimlu, and Bai no longer paid the alban. Other towns may have been relieved of the head tax obligation as well by late Qianlong times; a gazetteer of 1797 lists head tax payments only from the southwesternmost cities of the region: Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Khotan.23

The Qing modeled its tax system in Altishahr after that employed by the Zunghars, although initially the Manchus lowered tax rates from their Zunghar-period levels in a display of imperial munificence to the newly subjected Eastern Turkestanis. In 1779, General Zhao-hui submitted a report on Zunghar taxation levels in Kashgar and Yarkand, together with his own proposal to lower the land and head tax rates. In Kashgar, he would collect only 4,000 patman of grain and 6,000 tänggä’ of cash, as opposed to the 67,000 patman and 40,898 tänggä’ that Kashgarlik had owed annually to the Zunghars. Other taxes, such as collections of cotton and saffron or the tax on foreign commerce, Zhao-hui left unchanged.24 Eventually, the military government collected a variety of other commodities as well, either as substitutes for or in addition to the grain tax and alban. These included levies payable in copper, gunpowder, sulphur, lead, raw cotton, grapes, gold, and fodder.25

The Qing adoption of the preexisting local tax structure is an example of the modus operandi of Manchu authorities in postconquest Xinjiang: they did not apply Chinese models to a non-Chinese setting. Moreover, although the Qing later raised Altishahr’s alban tax quotas from their low levels of the first years after the conquest,26 the quotas remained lower than or equal to Zunghar tax levels. This may have been because the Qing authorities saw low tax rates—lower at least than those levied by their predecessors and rivals—as a means of legitimizing their rule in East Turkestan. Because in Qianlong and jiaqiang times the Qing attempted to rule Altishahr through local elites (the beg officials), with only minimum military presence, the dynasty hoped to avoid excessive taxation of the East Turkestanis population. Although native Altishahiris cannot be said to have enjoyed low taxes (they were subject also to surcharges and illegal taxes charged by local begs), the tithe was light compared to what the Xinjiang government collected in the more fertile north.

Green Standard troops assigned to the Yili region agricultural colonies were taxed 20 to 20 percent of the crop.27

Another striking difference between Qing fiscal administration in Xinjiang and in China proper was Xinjiang’s lack of a salt gabelle. The main reason for this was the ample supply of easily extractible salt throughout Xinjiang and particularly in the Tarim Basin, where saline lakes and surface salt crusts are common. In such geographical conditions, monopoly production of salt must have been deemed impossible, if indeed the Qing considered it at all. The government did briefly attempt to control the sale of salt to the Yili garrisons in 1772, after authorities discovered that Torghuts* were transporting salt to Yili to sell. But the Salt Bureau established to supply salt to the Yili military populace earned little revenue. Gross takings amounted to only 5,039 taels on sales of over 5,000 carriages—after the bureau paid its operating costs it had cleared only 0.7 taels! It was not until 1809 that a full-scale salt administration was adopted throughout Xinjiang, and even then only in the north was it at all effective.28

Another important revenue source commonly drawn upon by the Qing state in China proper was merchant wealth, though this, too, was initially

* The Torghuts (Ch. Tuerhute) were a tribe of Western Mongols or Orhats, who in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century were forced from Outer Mongolia into Zungharia by westward expansion of the Khalkha Mongols. In the first decades of the seventeenth century, under pressure from the Zunghar chief, Ba’tur Khangaiji, groups of Torghuts migrated further west, settling eventually along the Ermi, Yariik, and Volga Rivers. There they became known to Russians and surrounding tribes as Kalmucks. The Qing emissary Tulsin met with the Torghut Khan, Ayuki, in 1714, in Siberia. By the latter half of the eighteenth century, the Volga Torghuts fell under increasing Russian pressure, especially in the form of military call-ups, and large numbers fled eastward in search of new lands. In 1770, under Khan Ubashi, the Torghuts began their epic return to Zungharia, harried by both Russians and nomads in Russian employ along the way. The Torghuts sought asylum in Yili in 1771. Gaozong, greatly pleased by their “return to allegiance,” resettled them in Khobdo, Etsin Gol, and two sites in Xinjiang—east of Yili and north of Karashahr. The Torghuts continued to suffer from severe poverty, however, and appear most frequently in the Qing sources as smugglers, rustlers, prostitutes, and so on. Today a region much larger than the former Karashahr jurisdiction has been designated the Ba’er-gu–lo–le Mongol Autonomous Prefecture, and some Torghuts and Khobdus (now classified simply as “Mongols”) still live in Korla, Jinghe, and surrounding areas. There is a statue and a small museum commemorating Ubashi in the center of Jinghe (north of Korla) today. The prefectoral government-run hotel in Korla features a yurt-shaped discotheque, with cement images of Mongol women dancing on the roof. See Khodorkovsky, Where Two Worlds Meet; Ma Dazheng and Ma Ruheng, Paozuo yuan de minzu; Hummel et al., Eminent Chinese, pp. 660–61, 784–85 (Tulsin and Shu–ho–ie). De Quincey’s famous essay “Revolt of the Tartars” and Hedin’s chapter on the Torghuts in Jebl are amusing and vivid renditions of these same events.
available to the Xinjiang administration only in a limited fashion. For the first decades of Qing rule in Xinjiang there were few Han merchants or gentry of great financial stature; attempts to put tea sales on a monopoly footing repeatedly foundered on this fact. Chinese peddlers, small shopkeepers, and garden farmers were increasingly common, but there were no concentrated commercial wealth in the newly conquered territory to compare with Liang-huai or Changlu, the main centers of official salt production in China proper. Rather, through the 1750s and 1760s, the most highly capitalized merchants in Xinjiang were natives of Yarkand, Khotan, and Kashgar, as well as foreign Central and South Asian traders resident in those areas. After defeating the Makhdumzada Khojas and while first establishing tax rates and other aspects of their administration in Altishahr, Manchu officials traded and solicited contributions from rich Muslim families eager to demonstrate loyalty to the new rulers. Thus, in early 1759, Suhe'de was able to exchange rewards of silver, silk, and cloth for large gifts of grain, saving the expense of shipping the grain from Gansu to the Qing forces then campaigning farther west in Altishahr. Months later, the execution of Khoja Jihan unleashed a small flood of contributions from surrendering East Turkestan households, each rendering unto the Qing Khan one ounce of gold. Ten wealthy Muslim trading families of Khotan, “Bode’erge and others,” donated ten ounces of gold each.37

These were one-time windfalls, however. The Qing did not regularly exact funds from East Turkestan merchants on an official basis, perhaps out of concern that doing so would incur political repercussions undermining the primary Qing purpose of a stable Altishahr. In any case, the fortunes of the wealthiest East Turkestan merchant families declined under the Qing (see Chapter 5). Contributions—in other words, exactions—from Han merchants in Zungharia were a second expedient, but they do not seem to have been common in Xinjiang until the Xianfeng reign (1851–61). Considerable numbers of merchant contributions appear in the sources between 1853 and 1855, the beginning of Xinjiang’s fiscal crisis (see Conclusion). But even then, Yili authorities collected only 38,000 taels in merchants’ contributions—less than 6 percent of the city’s average annual silver allocation from the provinces. By contrast, it has been estimated that in China proper, money from contributions provided nearly 17, 54, 36, and 23 percent, respectively, of the Qianlong, Jiaqing, Daoguang, and Xianfeng period budgets.38

Merchant Loans and the Provisioning of the Qing Military

Merchant loans, on the other hand, were significant from Daoguang times or before. Especially in the 1820s and 1830s, local military officials in Xinjiang often resorted to loans or cash remittances from merchants to cover temporary shortfalls or the costs of urgent military preparations. For example, before Kucha was granted an increase in its allowance of Chinese silver, officials in this city were forced to borrow from local merchants every intercalary month because the budget provided for only twelve months in the year.39

Because of the distance from China proper, in times of military emergency it was primarily Chinese merchant capital and remittance services that financed the initial mobilization of Qing forces to defend Altishahr from Kokand and the Khojas. For example, as soon as he received the distress call from Kashgar in the fall of 1830, Urumchi commander-in-chief Cheng-ge arranged for a remittance (huidui) loan of 30,000 taels through merchants operating locally, with which he purchased flour, gunpowder, fuses, and other supplies for the upcoming campaign. The merchants were to be repaid in Lanzhou from an emergency shipment of 500,000 taels of official silver en route from China proper. But 30,000 taels was not enough for Cheng-ge’s preparations, and because time was of the essence he obtained additional merchant advances totaling 200,000 taels by the following month (November). The government in Aksu, the staging area for the campaign, likewise found itself short of ready cash and faced severe inflation as the town filled up with Qing soldiers. Authorities there took out a remittance of 10,000 taels to supplement the contributions of hakim beg Ahmad, some additional funds borrowed from prominent local Muslims, and 20,000 taels shipped from Yili.40

In addition to borrowing at least 210,000 taels of silver, the Qing turned to Xinjiang’s Chinese merchants as a source of grain, carts, and draft animals needed for the campaign. Logistics had been a key problem in the initial conquest of Eastern Turkestan. By the early nineteenth century, the Qing relied heavily upon the Chinese merchant network to distribute and market foodstuffs in towns, where the army could then procure them en route. Evidence for this is found in an 1830 memorial by Sa-ying-a in which he complained that the scarcity of Chinese merchants in the Karashahr area exacerbated the problems of provisioning the army. Nor was 1830 the first time military requisitions had targeted the Chinese community in Xinjiang. Cheng-ge found that “in Urumchi the [Chinese] common people have not yet recovered after the last [requisition, in 1826–27], and commercial goods, carts, and camels are scarce.” Similarly, because merchants were few in Aksu, in 1830
the army faced a camel shortage there; “since the last war,” a report explained, the government had been forced to borrow from the native Muslims. Thus in 1826, as in 1830, the Qing military appears to have relied extensively upon Chinese merchants for financial and material support.

Even with merchant credit rapidly available, it nonetheless took the Qing military months to respond to the Khoja and Kokandi invasions, during which time the four western cities were in enemy hands or under siege. Months more would have been required had Qing quartermasters in Xinjiang been forced to wait for silver to be carted from China proper before procuring necessary materiel. This situation reminds us just how tenuous was the fiscal basis of the Qing government in Xinjiang.

**Xinjiang’s Silver Lifeline**

With the money revenues from head tax and merchant exactions limited, the salt monopoly impractical, and merchant loans feasible only as a last resort, the administration of Xinjiang depended almost entirely upon Chinese silver to pay military salaries, food stipends, routine operating expenses, and such special costs as repair of official buildings. This annual budget of silver shipped from China proper to Xinjiang was transferred from prosperous provinces of China proper by a system of revenue sharing, hence the name, **xiexiang**, “shared pay”; other terms include **xiangyan**, **xieyin**, or simply **jingfei** (expenditure). In the early sixteenth century, the provinces of China proper were classified as “surplus,” “self-sufficient,” or “deficit” according to whether their tax revenues (not including native customs or salt gabelle) were sufficient to meet the administrative needs of the province. “Surplus” provinces (Shanxi, Henan, Zheji, Shandong, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Zhejiang) were required to redirect to “deficit” provinces (Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou) and frontier territories such as Xinjiang a portion of their tax revenues. Supplanting its share of provincial revenues, Xinjiang also received transfers of funds from salt commissioners, direct grants from the Board of Revenue, and merchant contributions.

**Xieyang** funds were transferred first to Gansu, then sent on to regional centers in Xinjiang: Yili, Tarbagatai, Urgum, Kashgar (including Yangi Hisar), Yarkand (and Khotan), Aksu (and Ush), Kucha, Karasahr, Pihin, Hami, and Barkol. Officials in each of these cities memorialized in advance to the Board of Revenue and the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, providing an itemized report of the previous year’s expenses (souxiao) and requesting **xiexiang** for the following year. Usually the transfers followed fixed quotas that changed in response to shifts in administrative status and the number of troops garrisoned in the various districts. The total amount of **xiexiang** funds allocated to Xinjiang rose over the period from 1758 to 1864; in particular, after the suppression of Jiaolong’s jihad in 1828, the upgrading of military preparedness in the south led to increased need for silver to pay the new troops and provide for their families (see Table 1 on troop strength, see Chapter 3).

How much **xiexiang** was sent to Xinjiang? There has been little study of this question, which is complicated by the fact that totals fluctuated from year to year and because a considerable amount of allocated **xiexiang** was offset in Xinjiang by official commercial activities and special taxes (see Chapter 3).

Despite the difficulties in estimating the exact totals of silver transferred from China proper, even approximate figures will help demonstrate why Qing officials in Yili, Urgum, and elsewhere in Xinjiang strove to expand their local sources of revenue. Zeng Wenwu estimates that 3 million taels were shipped annually from China to pay military and official salaries. However, the source upon which Zeng relies for this figure is the **Qingding jingding Shaan Gan Xinjiang Huifei fanglue**, an 1836 text relating events of the 1870s. It is inaccurate to assume, as Zeng does, that silver transfers to Xinjiang had remained unchanged for the one hundred years from mid-Qianlong to Tongzhi times. In fact, in the eighteenth century, **xiexiang** payments were considerably less than 3 million.

From the gazetteer and other data assembled in Table 1, I estimate that by 1795 around 845,000 taels of silver were transferred to Xinjiang annually. Just after the increase in Altishahr troop levels in 1828, the sum was at least 905,000 taels, probably higher.

A survey of Xinjiang’s finances performed in 1838 by En-te-heng-e, the Yarkand councillor, corroborates these estimates and adds information for a later point in time. En-te-heng-e memorialized that “funds transferred to Yili amount to 670,000 taels per year [c. 1838], and the eight cities of Altishahr in total need no more than 250,000 taels.” He adds that before 1826, Altishahr received 50,000 taels of **xiexiang**, in 1828 this was increased to 160,000 taels, and in 1830 this was increased again to 240,000 taels. Thus, according to En-te-heng-e, prior to 1826 Xinjiang (exclusive of Urgum, Turfan, Hami, and other Eastern March cities) received 760,000 taels from China proper; after 1828 this amount increased first to 830,000 taels, and then to 910,000–920,000 (in the 1830s). If an estimate of Urgum’s stipend (90,000 taels) is added to En-te-heng-e’s figures, the results (850,000 taels before
| TABLE 1: Xiexiang Silver Quotas and Shipments to Xinjiang (in silver taels) |
|-----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                             | 1759–95         | 1764–1820       | 1821–27         | 1838–50         | 1851–62         |
| Yili                        | 610,000*        | [610,000] 599,900* | 678,900*        | —               | 610,000*        |
| Tarbagatai                  | —               | —               | —               | —               | —               |
| Hami                        | —               | 50,000–60,000*   | —               | —               | —               |
| Urumchi                     | 89,004 (1783)*  | 125,500 (1784)*  | 78,808*         | —               | —               |
| (95,000–96,000) 60,000–70,000*|                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| Korashar                    | —               | —               | —               | —               | —               |
| Kucha                       | —               | —               | —               | —               | —               |
| Akto                        | —               | —               | —               | —               | —               |
| Ush                         | —               | 12,000*         | —               | —               | —               |
| Kashgar                      | 8,000 (1795)†   | 18,000 (1802, 1803) | —               | 96,933*         | —               |
| 12,000*†                    |                 |                 |                 | [91,251] 80,416 (1835)* |                 |
| 21,819*                     |                 |                 |                 | [113,894] 95,116 (1841)* |                 |
| (10,000*†                    |                 |                 |                 | [97,895] 60,045 (1846)* |                 |
| (8,000 (1810) (includes Yangi Hisar) |                 |                 |                 | [107,292] 89,476 (1847) |                 |
| Yangi Hisar                 | —               | —               | —               | 8,115*          | —               |
| Yarkand, Khazan             | —               | —               | —               | 22,524*         | 19,884*         |

SOURCE: a. XYWYu (1772); b. ZYLSY (1773); c. Yang-bao et al., Wuxianzi shiyi (1965); d. [1772] 1803) e. Yang-bao and Xiong-shan, Ta'er baijia baiyi (1803). f. SZJJ (1803) g. XZX (1810) h. ZYXZ (1810) i. Zhao, shi (1857) j. NXYGZG (1803) k. XZSL 155 376–386, DG94 jiouchou. l. ZPZZ MSZM 79, GQ-IQ-26 m. ZPZZ MSZM 74, DG14-8. n. Zhang Xing, Hai Shi (1864) o. Qi Yanli and Wang, Xinxiu congzhong shiye, 520 (1803) p. XZX (1903) q. DG15, t. guizhou. Note: Figures given in brackets represent quarterly actual amounts of xiaxian (transferred) without brackets. When noted in the table, years indicate the exact date to which a particular citation refers: otherwise, each figure indicates xiaxian for around the same time as the publication of the source from which it is derived.

One question related to Xinjiang's colonialism is the extent to which foreign merchants to zagajia and Xinjiang's colonial administration were essential to provide goods to the Qing dynasty. This is particularly relevant in the context of the Qing dynasty's reliance on foreign trade to sustain its economy. In the early 19th century, China was a major exporter of silver, which it received from foreign merchants in exchange for goods. This trade was crucial to the Chinese economy, as silver was used to finance the country's military and administrative expenses. The influx of silver into China had a significant impact on the country's economic development. For example, the Chinese economy was in a state of stagnation, and the influx of silver helped to stimulate economic growth by providing much-needed capital for investment. The Chinese government also used the silver to pay for the costs of the war with Britain, which had a significant impact on the country's economy.

Yanbuga for the Manchurians? Although there are insubstantial amounts of evidence remain in Xinjiang, it is well-documented that the Qing dynasty relied heavily on foreign trade to sustain its economy. This trade was crucial to the Chinese economy, as silver was used to finance the country's military and administrative expenses. The influx of silver into China had a significant impact on the country's economic development. For example, the Chinese economy was in a state of stagnation, and the influx of silver helped to stimulate economic growth by providing much-needed capital for investment. The Chinese government also used the silver to pay for the costs of the war with Britain, which had a significant impact on the country's economy.
tions, Gresham's law predicts silver would have been hoarded in Xinjiang. Moreover, a Qing prohibition against export of Chinese bullion to South and Central Asia indicates that Kokand's and other foreign merchants were in fact exporting silver. Suhede expressed concern over the drain of silver from Xinjiang as early as 1760, when he was serving in Aksu as assistant military governor, and Nayanceng made stanching the outflow of silver one goal of the new trade policies he introduced in 1828. Nayanceng accused local East Turkestan merchants of buying (imported?) goods with silver. Therefore, silver must have passed easily to local merchants from the hands of the Manchus and Han who might conceivably have brought it back to China proper.52

From the 1830s, and probably before, Chinese silver was continuously available on the market in Ladakh, and Punjabi traders eagerly purchased it. The hoof-shaped silver ingots, locally known as yambu (Ch. yuanbou), were greatly desired for their purity by the maharajahs of India and sold in the 1840s for 166 Company rupees apiece. This trade continued until the 1850s, when the supply of yambus dried up. Silver yambus were among the products exported to Kokand and Badakhshan as well.53

The possibility of a silver drain to Xinjiang and beyond is of interest to the monetary history of the Qing, in particular in light of debates over the effects of British and American opium sales on the Chinese economy. It has been argued that sales of foreign opium created a shortage of silver in China, with the result that silver's relative value rose vis-à-vis that of copper. This created severe economic and social side effects, particularly among the peasantry, who sold their crop for copper cash but had to pay taxes in silver.

One problem with this argument is the chronological discrepancy between the onset of the decline in market value of copper cash (noticeable as a secular trend beginning in the mid-eighteenth century) and that of the net outflow of silver due to opium purchases. Before 1827, the evidence indicates that Guangzhou enjoyed a net inflow of silver; thus opium alone could not have caused the inflation of silver values.

Exports of silver to Xinjiang may have contributed to the silver tail's rising market value in China proper; certainly xiiixiang shipments, which began around 1760, correspond chronologically to the attested trend of declining copper cash value better than does the chronology of opium imports. Graphs of North China market exchange rates of copper cash for silver taels show the long-term trend of rising silver values beginning in the 1750s-1760s. What had been an extremely gradual increase in the relative value of silver to copper becomes more abrupt around 1760 and continues climbing until the end of the Qianlong reign (1795). This suggests that shipments of silver to Xinjiang may have affected silver values in China proper.54

There were, of course, other reasons for the changes in the copper cash-silver tael market exchange rate. Greater Qing extraction of copper from Yunnan and stepped-up minting of zhiqian from the 1730s began by midcentury to relieve the copper shortage caused by the growing Qing economy and the cessation of Japanese copper imports in 1719.55 By the 1820s, large-scale counterfeiting of copper cash, along with opium sales, became sizeable factors.

With only sporadic figures on the yearly xiiixiang allocation, then, and no way to determine how readily that silver could return to China proper, it is only possible to suggest that the transfer of silver bullion from the provinces of China proper to the military government of Xinjiang contributed to the long-term increase in silver value. Still, this case reminds us that however poorly integrated it was to the macroregions of China proper, Xinjiang was to some extent part of a pan-Qing economy and needs to be considered in investigations of the imperial fisc.

Two Metals, Three Currencies

Be it at an annual cost of 4 million taels or 850,000, silver drain or no, the maintenance of empire in the far northwest was a considerable financial proposition. Xinjiang's annual stipend throughout the eighteenth century was more, for example, than the annual diding tax quota of each of five poorer provinces in China proper (Gansu, Guangxi, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou).56 At the 1838 level, it would have required almost the entire diding tax revenues of either Fujian, Guangdong, Hubei, or Hunan to support Xinjiang's military government for a year. Military campaigns boosted costs still higher: defeating Jahangir cost 11,165,000 taels, at least 8 million of that coming from the Board of Revenue and the Chinese provinces.57 Except for the alban, Xinjiang's major tax revenues were all collected in kind, not money. Therefore, the territory's administrators needed supplementary monetary income both to reduce the need for increased silver outlays from China proper and to fund local projects not allowed for in the xiiixiang budgets, which provided little more than salaries and food stipends.

The impetus for local revenue enhancement began at the top. Gaozong, who as we have seen remained defensive about the costs of his imperial enterprise in Xinjiang, frequently encouraged his ministers and generals during and after the conquest to break free of administrative precedents set in China proper. In 1765 the emperor berated an official for memorializing on a petty matter regarding the Kazakh trade. Such ways, Gaozong complained, perpetuate "the bad habit of rigid formalism" (jüni zhi louxi).58 Officials on
financing new dominion

frontier postings apparently internalized this political culture of innovation, even to the point where one military governor felt he must explicitly justify employing in Yili an expedient with a Chinese precedent. In 1772 Shuqede memorialized,

Yili is a newly opened area on the extreme frontier. All matters should be handled simply—it is not convenient to manage things in rigid accordance with the regulations of China proper (zhao nei di zhangcheng jin bani). But through the years Yili has grown increasingly crowded with all manner of officials, soldiers, and Chinese and Muslim farming households. Everywhere merchants are gathering like clouds, and although we cannot imitate the practices of inside the pass (neidi) in everything, no more can we fail to establish regulations in keeping with local circumstances in order to prevent foul play.15

Given the fiscal limits they faced in Xinjiang—the comparatively small agricultural tax base, the political need to keep tax rates low for east Turkestanis Muslims, the impracticality of the salt monopoly, and the dearth of extortable merchants—administrators were forced to develop new techniques or expand upon old ones to raise money. And they were encouraged by the court to do so, since any money raised locally in the New Dominion meant less silver to be delivered there. Officials in Xinjiang thus devised a panoply of methods to enhance their revenue, including commercial taxes, official commissaries, even investment schemes. Central to this set of money-making techniques was Xinjiang’s currency structure.

Even before the Qing conquest, Chinese cash (zhigian) circulated in Hami and Turfan. In towns along the northern rim of the Tarim Basin, silver passed by weight; other forms of barter were also common. The south, however, had its own minted currency, the pul (Ch. honggian or pu’erqian). The pul was made entirely of red copper, unlike Qing “copper” cash, which was in fact cast from an alloy of copper, lead, and sometimes tin and/or zinc. The pul was small and thick, with no central hole, and weighed between 0.14 and 0.2 Chinese ounces (liang). Originally, it bore on one face in Arabic script the name “Yarkand,” where it was minted, and the name of the Zunghar khan (for example, “Galdan Tseren”) in Oirat Mongolian on the other.

When Galdan Tseren succeeded Tswang Arap in 1727 he attempted to remint all the pul in circulation in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan by collecting the old currency from the East Turkestanis at the rate of two old coins for one of the new (bearing his name), melting down and reminting until all of the old coin had been replaced. As with other aspects of their administration in Xinjiang, the Qing followed this Zunghar practice. General Zhao-hui in 1759 proposed that half a million new Qing pul be minted from 7,000 catties of copper originally shipped to Xinjiang to cast cannon. Accordingly, a Han mintmaster named Zhi Kunyu was dispatched from China proper along with several other specialists. Zhi fired up the Yarkand furnace in the autumn of 1760, striking the first 2,500 strings of 1,000 pul each by the tenth month. The new pul was marked “Qianlong tongbao” (Qianlong currency) on one side and on the reverse bore the name of the minting city—in this case Yarkand—in Manchu and Arabic script. Although the new pul differed somewhat in design from the old—it had a central hole for stringing—it still consisted of unalloyed copper and weighed the same as the Zunghar coin. Authorities called on local East Turkestanis to turn in their Zunghar pul at a rate of two for one of the new Qing pul, ensuring compliance by enlisting local elders to coordinate collection and by phasing in the requirement that the alban be paid in the new currency. Old coin was reminted into new, and after a year the Yarkand mint had minted over 4 million pul, of which almost 2.2 million had been returned to circulation in Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan; the remainder lay in the Qing treasury in Yarkand. Cash supplies were for the time being sufficient, and officials in Yarkand reported that while rich households could endure such exigencies, the poor people could no longer afford to give up their old pul at the extractive two-for-one rate. Thereafter, by imperial grace, what Zunghar pul remained in circulation were exchangeable one-for-one with the new pul.16

By 1769 the Yarkand mint, having reminted virtually all the old pul, ceased operations. Still, the Qing continued to mint pul in other Altishahr cities. The Aksu mint, established on the Yarkand model in 1761, struck pul for Aksu, Kucha, Karashahr, Sairam, and Bai.17 The operations of the Aksu mint were moved to Ush from 1766 to 1800, then returned to Aksu.

In 1773 a mint in Yili, the Baoyi (Ma. Bori), began producing Chinese-style cash of copper alloyed with lead or tin. This was in response to the severe shortage of currency for small transactions that accompanied the growth of Yili’s commercial economy. Five of the Yili zhigian were defined as equal to one pul, but the two forms of copper currency seem to have circulated separately, the pul in Altishahr and the Yili cash in the Northern and Eastern Marches.18

Copper required by the Aksu, Ush, and Yili mints was supplied by means of a tax assessed in Altishahr, the official sale of grain for copper, and official and private mining operations. According to the 1782 Huangyi xiyu tuahi, the Qing government in Xinjiang collected a yearly total of 33,716 catties of bulk copper in taxes from Karashahr, Kucha, Shaya’er, Aksu, Sairam, and Bai. In addition, sales of grain in Aksu, Ush, Kashgar, and Karashahr made available a further 6,000 or so catties for use by the Yili mint. Such rates of copper
the tax payments and military pay had been converted at this rate for some time. The actual Yarkand market rate in late 1760 was 120:1, so local tax payers benefitted while bannermen still suffered by the new rate. It seems that the idea was still to maintain aesthetic symmetry between the two units of exchange: at 50:1 one tänggā had equaled one tael; at the new official rate one pul was equivalent to one fen.

That the Qing saw broad symbolic implications in the Altishahr exchange rate may be seen in a comment from the imperially commissioned Xinjiang gazetteer completed in 1782.

At the time of the Han dynasty eight taels of silver equaled 1,000 cash [in the Western Regions]. That is, at that time silver was cheap and copper cash expensive. Recently in Altishahr, 50 pul—one tänggā—equaled 1 tael, so that 1,000 cash was equivalent to 20 taels of silver. Clearly, compared to Han times, cash was two and one half times as expensive. But since this region entered our dominion the price of money has declined to the point where 100 cash equals a tael. This is how our Sacred Dynasty nurtures [the Western Regions]: treasure flows so that it is there in plenty.44

In fact, the change from 50:1 (1000:20) to 100:1 was purely administrative, as we have seen, a correction of the original mistaken equation of the tael with the tänggā. But chief editor Fuheng allowed the passage to read as another one-up for his master over Han Wudi.

Politically symbolic as it might be, the pul-tael exchange rate in Altishahr in the year this gazetteer was published actually functioned in quite a different manner altogether. Already by the 1760s the market tael value had exceeded 100:1 (see Table 2); more importantly, no longer did a single conversion rate govern both collection and disbursement of official funds. Rather, local officials had begun to develop ways to exploit the discrepancy between legal and market rates of exchange.

In China proper, manipulation of copper cash to silver tael conversion rates was one of the common forms of petty corruption or “customary fee” (lounui) by which hard-pressed local magistrates supplemented their inadequate operating budgets. By accepting copper cash as tax payment at a slight premium over the going rate of copper-silver exchange, officials could make a small profit when converting the copper to silver themselves before submitting the taxes to the capital. Magistrates used funds realized in this way for stationery, to pay the cost of delivering taxes to Beijing, or to make up for shortfalls in tax collection. While technically illegal, the practice was common, particularly after the Qianlong and Jiaqing periods, and generally overlooked.45

collection proved unsustainable, however, and by 1804 tax payments of copper amounted to only about 8,500 taels annually. Mining thus remained the most important source of copper for Xinjiang’s mints; the largest mine, at On Bash (Ch. Wenbashí) outside Aksu, produced around 16,200 taels per year.66

Although the two copper currencies circulated freely in their respective regions, the silver tael remained the official unit of account in Xinjiang. The Qing set salaries and, for the most part, tax quotas in terms of silver. Chinese silver came to the new territory in 50-ounce (liàng) ingots (yuánbāo) and circulated locally in smaller pieces. But, as in China proper, copper money was necessary for small transactions, including those by which bannermen and Green Standard troops got much of their food. The authorities in Altishahr paid soldiers and officials a portion of their wages in pul, calculating the amount according to an official rate of exchange. As in the provinces of China proper, Qing officials were actively concerned with the relative market values of silver and copper—the buying power of their wages and those of their subordinates depended on these rates of exchange. The pul-tael exchange rate in Altishahr presented special challenges, since the military government had in effect taken control of an established currency and grafted the silver tael onto it at an arbitrary rate of exchange.

East Turkestan traditionally referred to a unit of 50 pul as one tänggā. In 1759, during the preparations to mint the first Qianlong pul, the Qing adopted the tänggā unit and set it at parity with the silver tael. Convenient though it was, this exchange rate nonetheless underestimated by half the value of silver on local markets. The following year, Yang Yingju and Šüheide memorialized that, because a tael of silver fetched a market price of 100-110 pul, as opposed to the 50:1 official rate, officials and soldiers were being short-changed on the portion of their salaries paid in pul. The officials therefore suggested adjusting the official exchange rate by which East Turkestan paid their taxes and by which portions of military salaries were converted for payment in pul. The Grand Council’s opinion on the matter recognized that the official pul-tael rate must fluctuate, since it was impossible to regulate market exchanges among “the Muslim masses”: “We have not yet succeeded in using law to restrain [market exchange rates] in China proper, let alone in the Muslim lands.” The Grand Council, with imperial concurrence, suggested that Šüheide as councillor (and the highest official in Altishahr) periodically adjust the official exchange rate to bring it into accordance with the market value of the tael.44 This was a great departure from the policy in China proper, where the official exchange rate of 1 kuping tael to 1,000 cash remained fixed, despite market fluctuations, from the conquest of China to the 2840s.

By early 1761 officials in Altishahr cities had reset the official pul-tael rate

at 100:1, following the lead of Aksu, where both tax payments and military pay had been converted at this rate for some time. The actual Yarkand market rate in late 1760 was 120:1, so local tax payers benefitted while bannermen still suffered by the new rate. It seems that the idea was still to maintain aesthetic symmetry between the two units of exchange: at 50:1 one tänggā had equaled one tael; at the new official rate one pul was equivalent to one fen.

That the Qing saw broad symbolic implications in the Altishahr exchange rate may be seen in a comment from the imperially commissioned Xinjiang gazetteer completed in 1782.

At the time of the Han dynasty eight taels of silver equaled 1,000 cash [in the Western Regions]. That is, at that time silver was cheap and copper cash expensive. Recently in Altishahr, 50 pul—one tänggā—equaled 1 tael, so that 1,000 cash was equivalent to 20 taels of silver. Clearly, compared to Han times, cash was two and one half times as expensive. But since this region entered our dominion the price of money has declined to the point where 100 cash equals a tael. This is how our Sacred Dynasty nurtures [the Western Regions]: treasure flows so that it is there in plenty.44

In fact, the change from 50:1 (1000:20) to 100:1 was purely administrative, as we have seen, a correction of the original mistaken equation of the tael with the tänggā. But chief editor Fuheng allowed the passage to read as another one-up for his master over Han Wudi.

Politically symbolic as it might be, the pul-tael exchange rate in Altishahr in the year this gazetteer was published actually functioned in quite a different manner altogether. Already by the 1760s the market tael value had exceeded 100:1 (see Table 2); more importantly, no longer did a single conversion rate govern both collection and disbursement of official funds. Rather, local officials had begun to develop ways to exploit the discrepancy between legal and market rates of exchange.

In China proper, manipulation of copper cash to silver tael conversion rates was one of the common forms of petty corruption or "customary fee" (lounui) by which hard-pressed local magistrates supplemented their inadequate operating budgets. By accepting copper cash as tax payment at a slight premium over the going rate of copper-silver exchange, officials could make a small profit when converting the copper to silver themselves before submitting the taxes to the capital. Magistrates used funds realized in this way for stationery, to pay the cost of delivering taxes to Beijing, or to make up for shortfalls in tax collection. While technically illegal, the practice was common, particularly after the Qianlong and Jiaqing periods, and generally overlooked.45
Table 2: Pul-Tael Market Exchange Rates in Altishahr, 1750-1847 (in pul per silver tael)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Atishahr</th>
<th>Yarkand</th>
<th>Kizilcay</th>
<th>Yining</th>
<th>Hetian</th>
<th>Aksu</th>
<th>Karamshahr</th>
<th>Usb</th>
<th>Khottan</th>
<th>Kiska</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>70-80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>80-90</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 provides further examples of multiple official exchange rates at work in the cities ringing the Tarim Basin. As the figures for Yarkand in 1804 show particularly well, the pul value of high officials' salaries was calculated at one rate (100:1), which was also the rate employed for government purchase of grain and other expenditures. The rate for the food stipends of middle-level officials and military personnel (yengtai) was higher (160:1), and that of rank-and-file soldiers and clerical staff higher still (220:1). This system assured that the rank-and-file, who received a considerable portion of their wages in pul, enjoyed the most favorable rate of exchange. After 1804, in fact, exchange rates for the rank-and-file payroll were adjusted quarterly to match the previous quarter's market rate, up to 250:1. The councillor, superintendents, and others who could afford received fewer pul per tael.

Of course, another important variable was the percentage of a salary paid in silver versus that paid in pul. For example, in Karashahr in 1804 the superintendent received his yangtai ten months of the year in silver, and two months in pul exchanged at 160:1: his subordinates were paid 80 percent of their stipends in silver and 20 percent in copper, at exchange rates that varied with their rank. In Usb the proportions were 60 percent silver, 40 percent copper; in Aksu 70 percent and 30 percent. These percentages varied through time as well as from city to city.

Other rates applied for government sale of silk or forced purchase of provisions, as well as for alban payments and rents on commercial and government land. The prices for forced purchase of grain or other official expenses in 1804, for example, were kept low by means of an exchange rate set at half the market rate. However, what evidence we have suggests that officials did not use exchange rates to disguise tax hikes. The pul-tael exchange rates that applied to East Turkestan households paying the alban and commercial taxes were in line with the current market rates. Manipulation of the pul-tael exchange rate and adjustment of the proportion of each currency used to pay salaries, food stipends, and other expenses gave Xinjiang officials a powerful tool for balancing their budgets. The ability to juggle the two currencies could provide considerable savings, especially because pul was locally minted from local copper and was thus readily available to Qing authorities in Altishahr. Between 1814 and 1815, for example, Tuo-yan-tai realized such a savings by paying the food stipend of Aksu's officials and troops entirely from accumulated pul savings (70 percent converted at 220:1 and 30 percent at 160:1). He saved China proper 11,000 silver taels in this way. Even on a routine basis, payment in pul resulted in sub-
### TABLE 3
Official Pul-Toed Exchange Rates in Altishahr

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Altishahr</th>
<th>Yarkand</th>
<th>Kashgar</th>
<th>Yangi Hisar</th>
<th>Akto</th>
<th>Karakash</th>
<th>Ush</th>
<th>Khunan</th>
<th>Kucha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1759</td>
<td>50 b</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>70 b</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>100 b</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>200 t</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766</td>
<td>90 s</td>
<td>90 s</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>160 yc, sk</td>
<td>160 yc, sk</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>220 syc</td>
<td>200 s</td>
<td>220 s</td>
<td>220 s</td>
<td>240 s</td>
<td>250 s</td>
<td>250 s</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1804</td>
<td>160 o</td>
<td>100 u, gn, ex</td>
<td>100 o</td>
<td>200 sk</td>
<td>200 sk</td>
<td>160 oyc</td>
<td>160 oyc</td>
<td>100 ex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1814</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1828</td>
<td>160 oyc</td>
<td>100 oyc</td>
<td>100 oyc</td>
<td>160 o, yl</td>
<td>220 s</td>
<td>160 u, yl</td>
<td>160 u, yl</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1847</td>
<td>220 s</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- The table above outlines official pul-toed exchange rates in Altishahr.
- The rates are given in units such as 'syc,' 's,' 'yc,' and 'o,' indicating different denominations.
- The sources for these rates include various historical documents and records.

---

**Shanxi Investments (see Chapter 3):** A total of 25,500 taels of silver, and 850 taels of silk, were paid out to eleven officials, as well as to several eunuchs, to purchase grain and cloth. In addition, 250 taels of silver were paid out to the four eunuchs to purchase grain and silk. These payments were made in the form of pul-toed exchange rates, as specified in the document.

---

**Financing New Domination:**

- The cloth woven by East Turkestan in the area of Khunan, Yarkand, and Kashgar from cotton grown in the southern Far Eastern provinces was in demand among Altishahr officials.
- The cloth was exchanged for silver and other goods, allowing the Altishahr government to purchase necessary items.
- The exchange rates were dependent on the market conditions and the demand for the cloth and silver.

---

**Shanxi Investments (continued):** Around 25,000 taels of silver were received in exchange for grain and cloth. The officials were instructed to use this silver for further investments in the region, ensuring the flow of funds and resources to support the economic and administrative needs of the Altishahr region.
Financing New Dominion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1762</th>
<th>1763</th>
<th>1764</th>
<th>1765</th>
<th>1766</th>
<th>1767</th>
<th>1768</th>
<th>1769</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yarkand</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khotan</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Unit: pul/bolt)

After purchase at the above prices on the markets of the respective cities, the authorities had the cloth dyed for between eight and fourteen pul per bolt and shipped it north. We have no direct information on shipping costs, but sources quote the 1782, 1804, and 1827 prices of Altishahr cotton cloth in Yili and Tarbagatai at 0.4 taels; this was either the government’s cost or the retail price charged Kazakhs and Qing personnel. Comparing the pul cost with the tael price is hazardous, but if we assume (as Wang and Lin claim) that cloth prices remained steady after 1785, then at the 1801 exchange rate, one bolt of cloth, dyed, cost at most 26 + 14 = 40 pul at 200 pul/tael = 0.2 taels. This leaves a minimum of 0.2 tael per bolt for shipping and profit. But a simpler way to view the advantages of the official cotton cloth trade in Xinjiang is from Beijing’s point of view: neither minting pul, nor purchasing, processing, and shipping cotton cloth cost the center any silver at all, yet the business kept mutton on the tables of the bannermen in Yili and Tarbagatai. Moreover, while market prices for cloth in Yarkand, Khotan, and Kashgar declined or held steady after the 1760s, pul values relative to silver declined greatly. Thus, as a proportion of taxes received, Altishahr’s cloth grew less expensive over time.

Currency Troubles and Reform

The Altishahr mints reduced the weight of the pul from its original 0.2 Chinese ounces to 0.15 in 1771 and to 0.12 in 1774. After the Yarkand restruck almost all the old Zunghar pul and closed down, the Aksu and Ush mints continued to mint 1.6 million pul annually from raw copper taken as taxes and from On Bash and other mines. The newly minted pul were distributed throughout Altishahr via official and military wages. One would expect pul inflation to have been severe given this continued increase in supply of the copper coin. A serious inflation would have undermined both the official cotton trade and the system of multiple pul-tael exchange rates. That pul values fell as gradually as they did is a puzzle; the most likely explanation is that in the 60 years of peace following the Qing conquest, during which time the Qing promoted agriculture and handicraft (particularly cotton cloth) production, Altishahr’s economy grew at a rate sufficient to absorb a greater money supply. Just as important, the yearly influx of xiezhang shored up the value of the pul.

This effect of silver imports is especially noticeable during the Kokand-sponsored invasions after 1826. When Jahangir attacked Kashgar and Yarkand in that year and Manchu banners from Heilongjiang were dispatched to assist in the recovery of this territory, 8 million taels poured into Xinjiang to support the military effort. As Table 2 shows, pul values rose to 80:2:1 or 90:1:2 that year. Officials feared that at this exchange rate the Qing would be unable to provide the troops with sufficient clothes for the winter and contracted private merchants to mine additional copper in Aksu in an attempt to get more pul into circulation. One of the furnaces at the Yili Baoyi mint was assigned to mint additional pul for shipment south. Similarly, after the invasion of 1830, an official in Karashia reported that fodder and similar items had to be procured with pul—silver rapidly falling in value, merchants would not accept it as payment.

The same phenomenon troubled Yi-shan and Zha-la-fen-tai in Aksu in 1847, as they coordinated the Qing response to the jihad led by Katta Khan and Wali Khan (“War of the Seven Khojas”). The market value of the silver tael had fallen from 400:1 to 180–190:1, yet because the treasury could afford to pay the troops at no more than 110:1, Yi-shan acknowledged that they would still be “left out in the cold.”

Earlier in the Daoguang period, officials in Altishahr had attempted to resolve this problem of periodic copper shortage with two attempts at currency reform, the first during Jahangir’s jihad. In 1827 military governor Changling ordered 50,000 taels of silver from China proper struck into silver pul coins. The coin never circulated freely, however, as Altishahris suspected the silver was adulterated with copper or lead, and the Qing withdrew it after a year.

In the spring of the following year, Nayanceng, lately dispatched from his previous posting as governor-general of Zhili to supervise the postpacification work in Altishahr, proposed his own ad hoc currency reform. In order to stretch limited copper supplies (the On Bash mine had begun to play out). Nayanceng requested permission to mint a new, copper coin weighing 0.15 Chinese ounces and marked “worth ten” (dangshui). This new pul would be worth ten Yili copper cash (hence the markings) and two standard pul. Granted cautious imperial approval for a one- to two-year trial, Nayanceng used 30 percent of the Aksu mint’s annual supply of copper to mint the ten-cash/two-pul coin and with it paid a portion of Aksu’s (and the following autumn, Yarkand’s and Kashgar’s) military wages. Muslim merchants
and the soldiers themselves reportedly found the new coin convenient, and it circulated at its marked value despite its disproportionately light weight. Encouraged by this favorable beginning, the imperial commissioner proceeded with the second stage of his plan earlier than promised, and in the spring of 1823 he began minting half of Aksu's available copper into "worth ten" coins, using the copper savings realized in this manner to mint still more pul, which he in turn distributed to the commands in the cities of Altishahr to pay their troops. In this way Nayanceng hoped to finance the increased numbers of troops stationed permanently in Altishahr after 1828.

In theory, Nayanceng's reform would have allowed a reduction of Altishahr's xie,xiang by 2,200 taels when 30 percent of the available copper was minted into ten-cash/two-pul coins, or by 3,500 taels when half the copper went for the new coin. But Nayanceng at the same time determined that all Altishahr officials should be paid only in silver—a decision that actually required a 3,000 tael increase in the region's stipend. Nevertheless, Nayanceng's currency reform, though really little more than a monetary shell game, was a modest success. It brought the pul back down to its prewar levels (from 80:1 in early 1826 to 100:1 in the third month of 1828 to 200:1 in the eleventh month of 1828) without causing monetary chaos. It was, in fact, the most effective of his otherwise ill-starred economic and political programs in Altishahr and demonstrates the potential of Qing monetary policy in southern Xinjiang.

It is noteworthy that the idea of larger denomination copper coins as a response to monetary crisis became common in administrative circles in China proper by the middle of the Daoguang reign, not long after Nayanceng's reform in Xinjiang. Both members of the court and field officials, most notably, Guangxi governor Liang Zhangju (served 1836–41), proposed the minting of "large cash" (daqian) as a partial solution to the high silver price brought on, they believed, by purchases of opium from foreign traders. Although (or perhaps because) he had permitted the experiment for the opposite monetary conditions in Altishahr, the Daoguang emperor held off in China proper. It was not until the third year of the Xianfeng reign that the Board of Revenue ordered mints empire-wide to produce coins marked "worth ten," "worth fifty," "worth one hundred," and so on.

This case illustrates again the willingness of Qing authorities to innovate in Xinjiang, going beyond what was legal or acceptable practice in China proper, but doing so with imperial sanction. This flexibility was to a great degree the product of both fiscal and political necessity. As shown in Chapter 1, the Qing conquest and consolidation of rule in Xinjiang took place in a cli-
Official Commerce and Commercial Taxation in the Far West

Our dynasty, too, has turned the energies of the realm to controlling [the Western Regions], not unlike the age of Han with the Xiongnu and Dayuan. As soon as we had surmounted climatic conditions, set right the affairs of men, arrayed city defenses, and established civil administration, people began to think, "Was not this conquest exhausting to the people? Is not maintenance too expensive? Have not the numbers of soldiers been increased? Has not treasure been wasted?" In the Northern and Southern Routes, there are some 19,000 troops, with some 1,400 officials. There are permanent garrisons and rotating garrisons. The soldiers and dependents of the permanent garrisons are Manchus, Solons, Mongols, and Oirats, transferred from Shengjing, Helongjiang, Zhangjiakou, and Rehe. The Green Standard troops alternating on frontier duty at the rotating garrisons are transferred from Shaanxi and Gansu. The annual expenditure for their pay is some 678,900 taels—the very sum China proper would have provided them [had they not been transferred]. Where is this troop increase?

Wei Yuan. Sheng wu ji, 4:204 (1842)

Wei Yuan’s claim that there were only 19,000 Qing troops in Xinjiang—used to argue how cheaply the territory was taken and held—has been often repeated in later Chinese sources. As will be shown below, this figure falls far short of real Qing troop strength in the Western Regions. But it demonstrates how the concern over costs of empire in Xinjiang remained constant throughout the era of Qing control in Xinjiang. This chapter continues the examination, begun in Chapter 2, of how Qing officials in the Western Regions attempted to defray those costs and focuses in particular on the Xinjiang garrisons as economic actors and on attempts to tap the region’s lucrative long-distance trade. Although the extraordinary methods of revenue enhancement proposed—some implemented, some not—reveal considerable inventiveness and at times a keen understanding of the special features of

the Xinjiang economy, they also demonstrate the political limits that circumscribed imperial administrators in a colonial setting. Moreover, as I will discuss in the final section, "The Fiscal Foundations of Empire," these measures failed to relieve the territory’s dependence on silver from China.

Xinjiang Military Deployment

The part of Zungharia referred to by the Qing and by historians today as Yili was not a city, but rather a broad region bordered to the east and northeast by districts under the jurisdiction of Urumchi and Tarbagatai and to the northwest by lands within the Kazakh transhumance. Kirghiz nomads pastured flocks in the Tian Shan range to the south. The governmental center of this district, and the central military command for Xinjiang as a whole, was a sprawling complex of nine walled cities spread over an area of approximately 3,750 square kilometers on the north bank of the Yili River. The Yili military governor's headquarters (jiangjun fu) and the quarters of some of Yili's Manchu bannermen were located in the central Manchu city, known as Yili or Huiyuan. About 25 kilometers to the east, Huining housed the remaining Manchu banners and their commanders, as well as the commandants of the Sibe, Solon, Chahar, and Oirat forces. These nomad bannermen themselves were camped in the pastures and mountainsides around Huining and the eight cities, the Solons to the northwest, Chahar to the northeast, and the Oirat and Sibe south of the river in the area of today's Chabuchar Sibe (Ch. Xibo) Autonomous County. Others were stationed at the karun guard posts surrounding Yili. West of the Manchu cities were five garrisons of Han Green Standard troops: Gongchen, Zhande, Ta'erqi, Guangren, and Suiding. These Han cities were surrounded by military farms on reclaimed land (kengtun). Southeast of Huining was Xichun, likewise a Green Standard fort. Ningyuan, at the easternmost corner of the complex, was inhabited by Taranchi Muslims transferred from Aksu and other East Turkestan cities to work the Muslim agricultural colonies (huitun) around Yili. More Muslims lived in outlying villages (see Map 2).

The Qing occupation of Yili began in 1760 under the supervision of Agüi, who settled bannermen, Han soldiers, and Taranchis in the fertile Yili valley. Through the 1760s and 1770s, Manchu, Chahar, Sibe, Solon, and Oirats transferred from Rehe, Liangzhou, Zhuanglang, Xi'an, Zhangjiakou, Helongjiang, and Shengjing; some Oirats and Torgut troops were enlisted locally. Han Green Standard troops were transferred from Shaanxi and Gansu postings to garrison the new frontier in
Yili. After 1778 the Han soldiers, too, were allowed to settle with dependents in the region. According to the 1807 Xichui yaozhi, there were over 17,000 Qing troops, plus their dependents, in Yili by the late Qianlong period.

The Qing situated defense installations in other parts of northern and eastern Xinjiang in a similar pattern, with a series of walled garrison cities or forts to house Manchu and Han troops. In some places, such as Turfan, indigenous Muslim troops were billeted in like fashion. Although in Yili there were a few "banner farms" (qitun) worked by Solons, Chahars, and Sibes—not by Manchus—for the most part only Chinese and East Turkestanis worked the land.3

Wei Yuan's figure of 19,000 Qing troops in Xinjiang considerably underestimates real Qing troop strength in the Western Regions. Although there is some disagreement in the sources concerning the numbers of troops stationed in Xinjiang, before 1826 there seems to have been 35,000-37,000 soldiers, half of them Manchu or Mongol banner troops (qitun), posted in the Eastern and Northern Routes. Combined with another 4,000-5,000 in the Altishahr region, this amounted to a total of approximately 39,000-42,000 men for Xinjiang as a whole, around 18,500 of them Manchu or Mongol banner troops. Moreover, there were 1,200 Qing officials and large numbers of native begs (see Table 4). In 1828 the Qing increased troop strength by 3,700 in Kashgar, 200 in Yangi Hisar, 600 in Yarkand, and 1,000 in Aksu.4 (None of these figures includes family members, who would have been present in the Eastern and Northern Routes.)

As we saw in the last chapter, xieziang silver provided only the basic wage (fengxiang) for these troops, plus a nonstaple food stipend for the Han sol-

---

3 XCVL, 2. Figures from the imperially commissioned (Qingding) huangya Xinyuzhi of 1782, corrected by Xie Zhining, likewise show total troop numbers of around 42,000. Xie provides a convincing argument why Wei Yuan's oft-quoted figure of 19,000 troops for Xinjiang's Northern and Southern Marches is mistaken. Zeng and other historians have followed Wei Yuan, but as we have seen in the last chapter, neither Wei's nor Zeng's figures are generally reliable (Xie, "Qianlong shiqi," pp. 9-12). Just a few pages later in the Sheng yuan 4 (4:11b-13a) the individual figures in Wei's city-by-city breakdown of Qianlong period troop strength in Xinjiang's three marches yield a total of 32,400; Wei's own subtotals here for the Northern and Southern Marches—their inconsistency with the individual city numbers—add up to 21,900. It is easy to fault Wei Yuan's arithmetic; it is more important to understand that his figure of 19,000 troops appears in a tendentious passage justifying the conquest of Xinjiang in economic terms. His point is identical to that of Qianlong's 1772 edict to Wenzhao, which, indeed, Wei cites here as well: the control of Zanghar was possible with only 19,000 troops, all transferred from other parts of the empire. Hence, there has been no increase in numbers of men at arms in the empire, and no added cost to China proper.
TABLE 4
Qianlong-period Official and Military Personnel in Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Official</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yili</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>27,202</td>
<td>17,670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarbagatai</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi*</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>17,707</td>
<td>18,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altashir</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>4,721</td>
<td>4,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>41,630</td>
<td>42,830</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: XCYL, p. 2.
*Including Hami, Barkol, Turfan, and Kar Karu Usu.

...diers (yancai) and "nourish integrity" (yanglian) stipends for higher-ranked officers and officials. This left few funds for the other costs of maintaining a garrison, especially one that included military families. Nomadic components of the Qing military in Xinjiang had their herds and some farmland; the Qing provided them with a small allowance, but otherwise expected them to fend for themselves. However, the Manchus within Huiyuan and Huining, of whom there were over 6,000 households by 1772, and those similarly garrisoned elsewhere in Xinjiang required and received additional assistance from the Xinjiang government, primarily for the maintenance of dependents and other family-related expenses. The authorities provided special aid to support Manchu bannermen with large families; for the orphaned, widowed, crippled, sick, and old; and to help with education, wedding, and funeral expenses. The Xinjiang government also guaranteed that such essential items as medicine, cloth, tea, and sundry manufactures were available to bannermen, Green Standard troops, and their families in Yili, Urumchi, and other Xinjiang garrison cities.

Given their limited silver budget, how could officials afford to provide such aid, goods, and services? They went into business.

Tea and the Beginnings of Official Commerce in Xinjiang

Qing officials had used commerce to supplement their budgets in Xinjiang from the first. When during the military campaigns against Amursana and the Makhdujmàze Khojas they traded Chinese silk and cotton cloth for livestock and provisions. In addition to the border trade with the Kazakhs in the north, officials shipped cloth to Altishahr, where it found a ready market and allowed the army to procure grain more cheaply than by direct cash purchase. In the spring of 1759, for example, cotton cloth from Gansu and elsewhere in north China shipped via Suzhou to Kucha, Aksu, and Ush served as a hedge against rising grain prices in these Altishahr cities. Suheide and Yung-gui (Yong-gui) could trade for grain and avoid alienating the local population with forced purchases. The following year, Suheide suggested that camels and mules being driven by the military from Hami to Aksu be loaded with trade goods (tea and tobacco) for the trip out. In this fashion, the considerable costs of driving livestock could be partially alleviated by selling the goods in Altishahr. Besides tobacco and various kinds of tea, the Qing sold light silks and fine chinaware in the newly conquered city of Aksu. In subsequent years the Qing continued to transport and sell goods from China proper in Xinjiang cities. Silk was of course a popular item; in 1765 Yang Yingju in Lanzhou received an order from the assistant military governor in Kashgar for 780 bolts of several varieties of silk for use as ceremonial gifts and for trade with the East Turkestanis and Kirghiz. Qing silk shipments to Yarkand, Kashgar, Ush, Aksu, and Karashahr started arriving two years later and continued steadily until the 1850s, interrupted only as a result of Jahangir's jihad. Other items included cotton cloth, hides, agricultural tools, clothing, shoes, and felt, as well as medicines and spices.

But of the items the Qing government shipped to its garrisons in Xinjiang, tea was primary. In 1755, a large shipment ("100,000 catties") was forwarded to Hami to entice the Zuughars to come to terms. Several years later the dynasty instituted annual shipments to supply the new Yili and Urumchi area garrisons with tea that would in theory be less expensive than that which tea merchants had already begun to transport to Xinjiang. Yang Yingju reported that around 1762 the garrisons needed 103,500 catties annually. He proposed that troops en route to tours of duty in Xinjiang could transport the tea to depots in Hami and Barkol and then to points west. By the following year the Qing had begun to send 125,000 catties of brick tea annually through the Jiayu Guan to be infused and drunk by Manchu bannermen and their families, as well as any Oirats or Muslims (Taranchis) who wished to buy it. For a while, at least, it appears that official prices undercut those of the tea merchants already doing business in Yili.

Although the officers and troops in Xinjiang paid for this tea—either through voluntary purchase or by direct deduction of part of their food stipend—Qing tea shipments to Xinjiang at this early stage were not a fully commercial enterprise, but were rather designed to resolve a quartermaster's predicament of massive proportions. The Qing managed tea production and sales with a licensing system derived from Ming precedents, themselves legacies of the more highly organized Song system. The Ming dynasty had used both tea and salt sales certificates (yin) as compensation for merchants who contracted to ship grain to the military camps along the northern border.
During the Qing, merchants hoping to sell tea in the northwest were likewise required to buy licenses (chayin) entitling them to purchase tea at plantations (in Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou) and sell it in border areas. Throughout the Yongzheng reign, Qing authorities at four functioning Tea and Horse Agencies in the northwest collected as tax half of the tea shipped by merchants. The government then used this “official tea” (guancha) to trade for horses from Tibetans, Zunghars, and other nomad groups along the frontier. Merchants, meanwhile, were allowed to sell their “merchant tea” (shangcha or fuchan) on local markets. A problem arose, however, because, unlike its predecessor, the Qing really did not need to engage in border horse trade as a long-term, large-scale measure. With Mongolia under control, the Tea and Horse Agencies became an anachronism.

From the last half of the Kangxi period until near the end of the Yongzheng reign, the Tea and Horse Agencies in the northwest conducted no tea-for-horse trading; nevertheless, they continued to collect tea license fees from merchants. In Kangxi times this posed no problems, for the Tea and Horse Agencies collected the fees in silver. But under Yongzheng these offices collected and stored 1,36 million catties of tea annually and, except for the four years from 1731 to 1735, exchanged none of it for horses. Furthermore, because merchants with licenses understandably turned over to the government only the poorer quality tea (much of it adulterated with grass and twigs), keeping the better product to sell themselves, “official tea” could not compete with “merchant tea” in Xining, Taizhou, Lanzhou, and other urban markets in the northwest. The fact that the governors-general and provincial governors, upon whom fell the responsibility for this tea, could not change prices in response to the market without first memorializing and receiving approval from Beijing virtually assured that little of the growing stock of tea could be sold off. At the beginning of the Qianlong reign in 1736, when the tea tax reverted to payment in silver, the northwestern Tea and Horse Agencies had over 2.6 million catties of tea on hand. In 1755, when the Qing finally found a use for all that tea, over a million catties remained. It was this surplus brick tea, passed up twenty years earlier for its poor quality by Tibetans in Xining, that the dynasty transported to Xinjiang for the banners, deducting the costs of tea and shipping from their wages. Moreover, the Tea and Horse Agency supplies apparently held out for almost another fifteen years: after 1767 Tarbagatai still received tea from Xining and Taomin, sites of two of the Tea and Horse Agencies. In 1770, the Grand Council suggested supplying the Torgut Mongols (who had recently been resettled in Xinjiang after their calamitous return journey from the Volga region) with tea from Gansu’s Tea and Horse Agency. This time, however, the reply came that because of the (early Qianlong) change to collection of tea license fees in silver, “there was not much tea left in Gansu.” This legacy of the superannuated Tea and Horse Agencies had finally run out, although the offices continued to function as part of the general system of tea administration.

Formation of the Xinjiang Commissaries

There is no record of bannerman complaints about the quality of their tea. Perhaps this was because life in the new cities of Yili was Spartan in all respects and must have seemed doubly so to those Manchus transferred from the more urban setting of Xi’an. Ming-rui, as Yili military governor from 1762 to 1766, was in charge of settling each wave of arriving troops into quarters and arranging for their provisions—all for the most part before the construction of the Yili garrison towns was complete. (Huiyuan, the first city built, was finished only in 1765). During this period Ming-rui memorialized the court with a suggestion that an endowment (zisheng yinling) be established, presumably by imperial grant, the interest from which could be used to pay for weddings, funerals, rewards, and condolences for the Manchu banners. Gaozong replied, “The soldiers garrisoning Yili are all from Zhuangliang and similar places and are steeped in Han customs. They are good-for-nothing rubbish (feiqi wuyong zhi ren). We specially ordered them to submit to hard labor and train their [military] skills. An endowment? That would let them profit. Certainly not.”

Despite this rebuff, however, Ming-rui and other officials had by the mid-1760s created with local funds a network of investment and retail ventures that would provide extra money for just those social needs the emperor initially opposed. Central to these endeavors were various kinds of commissaries, or guanpu, that competed with local merchants to provide retail goods to bannermen and their families. In 1764 the bannermen garrisoning Yili contributed (or had deducted) fifteen taels each from their resettlement allowance to establish an official cloth shop (guanbupu). The cloth shop distributed profits to its investors. After some years, when the cloth shop had repaid the principal, the Yili government started dispatching officials with a small military escort to Lanzhou on alternate years. There they borrowed 60,000 taels (80,000 after 1790) from the provincial treasury and purchased stock for the store, which later sold these goods to Yili bannermen and their dependents, deducting the price directly from wages. The provincial treasury was repaid through a deduction from Yili’s annual xiei xiang allotment. Profits in the store
initially ran to 70 taels monthly—more than the monthly yanglian of a banner commandant.  

From these beginnings the commercial network grew. A series of official pawnshops further supplemented banner revenues. The Gracious Benefit pawnshop (Enyi Dang) was established in 1766 with 10,000 taels from the guanbupu. In 1773 it borrowed an additional 10,000 taels and later returned the entire 20,000, having accumulated its own operating capital of 30,000 taels. It charged borrowers 2 percent monthly interest and remitted its profits to the cloth shop. In 1787 a new branch opened, specifically to provide aid for Yili’s Manchu widows, widowers, and orphans. Because profits from the New Gracious Benefit pawnshop proved insufficient for this purpose, three years later the Gracious Relief pawnshop (Enzu Dang) was established, capitalized initially at 10,000 and later 13,000 taels. The earnings of the New Gracious Benefit and the Gracious Relief pawnshops were deposited in a special treasury dedicated to the Manchu bereaved.  

While the official cloth shop provided clothing and revenue and pawnshops brought in funds for eleemosynary use, other specialty shops opened to cater to the garrisons’ needs while contributing their profits to the growing administrative slush fund. In 1771 an apothecary (yaopu) opened for business with stocks of drugs and 1,044 taels borrowed from the cloth shop. The Yili apothecary henceforth purchased supplies on the same Lanzhou trips and delivered its profits into the same fund as the official cloth shop. Commissaries also sold the tea shipped from Gansu: cotton and cotton cloth from Altishahr; and lumber, charcoal, stationery, agricultural tools, and various products from the Kazakh trade, including hides, fur, and stomach lining traded by the nomads in the trade pavilion after the conclusion of the primary exchange of livestock with the Camel and Horse Office.  

All of this official commerce was legal, and the Beijing bureaucracy learned every detail in volumes of reports flowing in from Yili. Expenditures and allocations of silver, copper cash, silk, grain, tea, cloth, livestock, and medicines, along with military and agricultural equipment, were recorded in Manchu and Chinese in reports often more than 50 pages long. These were sent first to the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu for inspection and then forwarded to the Board of Revenue in the capital. One indication of the growing scale of official economic activity in Yili (and later, other Xinjiang cities) is the fact that the bureaucracy soon despaired of carefully reviewing Xinjiang’s economic reports. In 1773 the court dropped the requirement that these economic reports be submitted bilingually. After 1774 the reports were sent directly to the board, bypassing the review in Lanzhou. Finally, around 1778, the forms were condensed into a single “four column list” (sizhu qing-

dan) for each city, thus greatly reducing the volume of data to be reviewed by the Board of Revenue. By the same token, however, the switch to summary economic reports ceded greater autonomy in economic matters to the Yili military governor.  

Following Yili’s example, other cities in Zungharia and along the route between Hami and Urumchi established official shops: those in Urumchi developed particularly quickly. As in Yili, Urumchi began with an official cloth shop, capitalized with borrowed funds—in this case from the soldiers’ clothing allowance. The store opened in 1772, selling goods purchased in Lanzhou and Xi’an, repaid the banners in three years, and at the same time made almost 20,000 taels profit, which allowed it to operate independently. Profits thereafter were stored in the Urumchi treasury to provide stipends for needy troops and official trips.  

From as early as 1762, the increasing population of the Urumchi area had created a shortage of fuel. From 1772, when Urumchi’s official cloth shop opened, the assistant commandant began mining coal to distribute to the soldiers and officials; repayment came through direct deduction of wages, and profits joined those from the official cloth shop in a charitable fund.  

In 1774 the Gracious Attainment pawnshop (Encheng Dang) opened in Urumchi with 21,312 taels from a horse insurance fund (majia). By 1778 the Gracious Attainment was operating in the black with over 30,000 taels of its own capital. After a further infusion of 10,000 taels from the official cloth shop in 1791, the pawnshop’s yearly earnings of 6,000 taels were dedicated to the support of Manchu widows and orphans. In 1775, Urumchi officials borrowed 1,000 taels from the official cloth shop to finance a labor agency (jiangyi ju), the exact functions of which are unclear; it was, however, a profitable enterprise, and by 1780 had repaid its loan and was worth 7,659 taels. Other projects included a lumber store, a mill to grind grain for the Manchu garrison, another pawnshop with a second-hand clothing shop next door, an official apothecary with four resident medics, and a shop that sold bureaus and chests. All were run by the Manchu garrison.  

In Tarbagatay, the government sold silk, tea, and cotton cloth to officials and troops at a profit from as early as 1765. The Tarbagatay guanpu were not formally established until 1802, however, when officials memorialized that the high prices for goods brought to the frontier by merchants, including clothing and weapons, amounted to a severe hardship for the banner forces.  

* The majia fund was a pool into which each soldier, including the Green Standard troops, was required to deposit the price of a new horse. When invested, this horse insurance fund yielded interest that financed replacements for military mounts that sickened or died.
They requested and received Grand Council approval to follow Yili's example and open a garrison store with locally available funds. The explicit aims of this project were to undersell local merchants and to provide supplemental revenue for official travel expenses and maintenance of military horse herds. Tartagatai's imperial agent, Xing-zhao, was authorized to dispatch an official to purchase goods in China proper. Green Standard laborers built ten guanpu buildings under the supervision of skilled carpenters and mudbrick masons. Xing-zhao personally contributed the paint and nails.  

The garrisons of Turfan, Barkol, and Guocheng also operated official shops and pawnshops. Officials in Turfan, for example, sent buyers at three-year intervals to Xi'an, Liangzhou, and Lanzhou to procure stocks of cloth and tea with 4,000 taels borrowed from the treasuries of Shaanxi and Gansu provinces. As elsewhere, the advance was repaid out of xiezhiang silver before the stipend was shipped to Turfan. Barkol's was one of the most prosperous pawnshops: in 1806 it held clothing as collateral on 30,320 taels worth of loans and had cash reserves of 1,665 taels.  

Although Gaogong had rebuffed Ming-rui when the military general first broached the subject of an endowment for the welfare of the Manchu banners in Yili, by 1770 he relented, acknowledging that the Yili garrison forces, stationed there in perpetuity, were well trained and satisfactorily inured to hardship. Although we do not have Ming-rui's original memorial, it seems that he had hoped for a grant from the imperial household to establish the endowment. (Both Yongzheng and Qianlong emperors had made such grants—known as shengzi yinliang—to garrisons elsewhere.) By 1770, however, over 30,000 taels of tax and rent revenue had accumulated in the Yili treasury, enough to establish the extra-budgetary endowment fund at no cost to Beijing. The emperor ruled: "Let favor be shown to the Yili soldiers through bonuses, condolences, weddings, and funerals [provided by the endowment]." Investment at interest thus became another means by which garrison authorities in northern Xinjiang supplemented their budgets.  

Presumably, one of the earliest instances of such investment in Xinjiang involved the 30,000 taels just mentioned, although we have no further information on this case. But in 1777 Huuyuan invested 50,000 taels of its guanpu profits. In 1789, the Yili military governor and imperial agent borrowed 27,000 taels from the horse insurance pool and invested it at 1 percent monthly interest with merchants from Shaanxi Province in China proper. The officials then used the interest income to supplement the widows and orphans fund, for which pawnshop revenues had proved insuficient. These and other examples of investment of Xinjiang's official funds, most of which were raised entirely by Xinjiang authorities themselves, are summarized in Table 5. The sources we have suggest that such investment became an increasingly important supplement to garrison budgets, especially during the Xianfeng reign, when xiezhiang shipments were no longer regularly available.  

The emperor acquiesced to investment of official funds in Xinjiang and presumably knew, from their inception, about the activities of official stores. However, the Qianlong court was initially ambivalent about such active par-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>How Invested</th>
<th>Monthly Interest Earned</th>
<th>Recipient of Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>Tax and rent income</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>Yili widows and orphans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>Guanpu profits</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>Chaahl banner aid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1789</td>
<td>Horse insurance fund</td>
<td>27,000 Shaanxi merchants</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1793</td>
<td>Xi'an provincial treasury</td>
<td>64,800 Shaanxi merchants</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1799</td>
<td>Horse insurance fund</td>
<td>20,000 Local merchants</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1834</td>
<td>Yili surplus tax and rent incomes</td>
<td>10,000 Local shopkeepers</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850s</td>
<td>Horse insurance fund</td>
<td>40,000 Shaanxi merchants</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rent income</td>
<td>10,000 Pawnbrokers</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yili garrison widows and widowers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Proceeds from sale of horses and sheep</td>
<td>15,000 Pawnbrokers</td>
<td>9–1%</td>
<td>Chaahl river works and general maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public funds (gongzhiang) remaining in local treasury</td>
<td>8,000 Pawnbrokers</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>Yili Manchu garrison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The R34 item was a proposed investment: we have no record of whether it was approved.

Table 5: The sources we have suggest that such investment became an increasingly important supplement to garrison budgets, especially during the Xianfeng reign, when xiezhiang shipments were no longer regularly available. The emperor acquiesced to investment of official funds in Xinjiang and presumably knew, from their inception, about the activities of official stores. However, the Qianlong court was initially ambivalent about such active par-
participation in commerce by its Manchu banners in Zungharia. In 1775, a few years after the first Yili guanpu set up shop, Gaozong reacted. "The Manchu officers and soldiers of Yili and Urumchi garrisons now have all established commissaries and appoint [personnel] to engage in trade. This is far from what is meant by 'defending the frontier!" Moreover, Manchu troops from childhood are trained at riding and shooting; they are not accustomed to commerce. In time, this will surely lead to trouble. It has a strong bearing on their character." The emperor asked the Grand Council to consider the question. In their answering memorial, these ministers echoed Gaozong's fears, but recognized the fiscal importance and established history of official commerce in Zungharia.

Yili and the other cities have opened shops. Although this has profited the soldiers, we fear lest in the long term [the Manchu bannermen] will become like the Han, fond of leisure and treating work with contempt, so that their skills will deteriorate. [Preoccupation with commerce] should be strictly prohibited. But in these places the guanpu have already been in operation a long time and cannot be eliminated all at once. Let 1etu (Yile-tu) and Suo-ruo-ma-ze-ling summon rich merchant commoners from Urumchi, Barkol, and Hami to come manage the business. The annual profits can still be apportioned to support the soldiers."27

The rescript on this recommendation (congshi) indicates that it was adopted, and this concern in 1775 may have had a temporary effect, for although I have found no other record of any interruption of business as usual, in 1789 the Yili military governor, Bao-ning, requested permission to establish official shops to prevent private merchants from hoarding and price gouging. Without explicitly mentioning any precedent, he echoed earlier arguments by pointing out how profits from guanpu could help fill two of the standard shortcomings of Xinjiang’s military budget: replacement of horses and funds for official trips. The existence of such a proposal suggests that Yili’s official shops had indeed been shut down for a period. When the emperor agreed to Bao-ning’s proposal, authorizing Bao-ning to send buyers to China proper, he reestablished the Yili official shops.28

Despite this memorial, I have found no further information regarding implementation of the 1775 decree. On the contrary, the lengthy gazetteer accounts of official shops and investments dating from after that year make no reference to the decree or to enlisting Urumchi merchants to take over operations. It is unclear to what extent, if any, the mundane tasks of running these official enterprises in Zungharia as a whole were ever turned over to private Chinese merchants. In each city of northern Xinjiang, at least after

1789, if not from 1770, the guanpu remained the keystones of official investment portfolios that linked retail stores with local and regional treasuries, the Gansu treasury, and xieqing budgets, not to mention the debt, consumption, and welfare of the Manchu banners. Profits from official shops were integrated into Xinjiang’s fiscal administration as a whole; for example, loans against xieqing were used to purchase new stock, and purchases by bannermen were paid for by direct deductions from the payroll before disbursement of wages. In Xinjiang, where there were almost no ranking Han officials, it seems inconceivable that authorities would delegate such critical fiscal concerns to Han merchants, even if ones rich enough could be recruited.

Perhaps inevitably, given the opportunity to sully themselves through commerce, some Manchus chose to do so. Word reached Beijing in 1827 that soldiers sent from Yili, Urumchi, Barkol, and elsewhere to purchase uniforms in China proper used the trips as cover for a secret trade in women, gambling equipment, antiques, and curios. According to the censor Niu-jian, who broke the case, "There’s nothing forbidden that they don’t bring back." The commissioner argued that items needed by the Xinjiang garrison should be as much as possible be purchased in Xinjiang. "In future, the garrison commander and the like can be bought in China proper, but cloth and tea are readily available outside the Pass and should be obtained there to avoid shipping costs and abuses."29 Again, we see that the capital viewed the established official commerce in northern Xinjiang with some suspicion and would have preferred a system that relied more heavily on private merchants to supply the garrisons. Nonetheless, nothing changed.

From the perspective of Xinjiang officials, especially those responsible for banner and Green Standard garrisons, official shops and related investments were too useful to forgo. A survey of the benefits of the commissary system must begin of course with the goods and credit it made available, apparently at a fair price, to the populations of Huiyuan, Ningyuan, and other Manchu garrison cities. But as we have seen, private merchants could also provide cloth, medicine, sundries, and credit, albeit more expensively. More than simple PX stores, however, the guanpu were highly profitable operations (the cloth shop and apothecary, for example, realized an annual return of over 50 percent) and allowed Xinjiang’s administrators to perform tasks for which the primary budget of xieqing was insufficient. Tables 6 and 7 show the earnings from investments, official shops, and pawnshops in Urumchi and how these revenues were disbursed around the end of the Qianlong period.

In addition to such fixed annual expenditures, moreover, the guanpu revenues proved useful for special purposes. In 1769, for example, the official cloth shop provided students in Yili’s new banner school with stipends for
TABLE 6  
Capital and Annual Earnings of Urumchi Commissaries, c. 1796  
(in silver taels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guanpu Type</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Earnings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cloth shop</td>
<td>19,640</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawnshop</td>
<td>41,092</td>
<td>6,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor agency (jiangyi jiu)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber shop</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>1,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apothecary</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second pawnshop</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68,732</td>
<td>20,530</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Yong-bao et al., Wuhanqi shi yi, pp. 334-b.  
*Includes 30,000 taels borrowed from the treasury's majia fund, repayable in five years.

TABLE 7  
Annual expenditure of Urumchi Guanpu Revenues, c. 1796  
(in silver taels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare for retired, crippled, aged, widows, orphans, and those with many dependants among banner population</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forgiving of payments to horse insurance fund</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stipend for soldiers on official business or when driving game on hunts</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per diem for soldiers on long trips; carriage, karen, and ranch workers' stipends</td>
<td>Individual daily amounts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenses and coal stipend for infantry</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacing commissary buildings</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repayment of treasury loan for barracks repair</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pawnshop repayments on treasury majia loan</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Yong-bao et al., Wuhanqi shi yi, pp. 334-b.

provide relief for Manchu banners in emergencies. In 1813, when an epidemic broke out in Huiyuan, Manchu officials and soldiers bought almost 7,000 taels worth of medicine on credit—more than could reasonably be deducted from their salaries in a single year. The military governor and councillor instead temporarily cleared the deficit with profits from a sale of livestock to Manchus and Orats and deducted the cost of the medicine from salaries over the next few years.

Xinjiang’s Official Commerce and China Proper

Official shops and government investment were not unique to Xinjiang’s administration. In fact, from the second year of the Yongzheng reign (1724) the Imperial Household Agency provided loans (shengzi yinliang) to provincial yamen and Manchu garrisons in China proper and the northeast for investment in retail shops or pawnbroking. As in Xinjiang later, the profits were spent on the welfare of soldiers, including the Green Standard troops, and their families. The shengzi yinliang thus served as a form of endowment funds, except that recipients of these imperial loans owed interest to the court; interest rates varied with locality from 8 to 15 percent, but usually were about 10 percent annually.

Although vigorously promoted by the Yongzheng emperor, this practice of making imperial credit available to local garrison officials became controversial under his son. Soon after Gaozong succeeded to the throne, Subede, then a young censor, memorialized against the imperial investments on the traditional grounds that commerce “is not the essence of the court,” and in particular warned that the loans had come to be used in a manner contrary to their original purpose. As became increasingly clear through revelations that continued throughout the first half of the Qianlong reign, local officials put an even larger proportion of their shengzi yinliang into usury, reloaning money at much higher interest and rolling the earned interest back into capital. As a result, officials neglected garrison retail commerce and, more importantly, the rank and file whom the imperial loans were designed to benefit in the first place. In some places, local civil or military authorities allocated the interest income to the main budget, where it paid their own “nourish integrity” (yanglian) stipends and other costs that should have come out of land tax revenues. Besides these quasi-legal subventions of imperial intent, outright embezzlement was not unheard of.

By 1754 the Qianlong emperor decided to call in the remaining loans and end the system of imperial investment. However, the shengzi yinliang
had become so thoroughly integrated into local fiscal administration that not until 1770 could all the provincial yamen find alternative sources of capital (including deductions from military pay and horse insurance funds) and completely phase out their reliance on imperial investments.35

Military governor Ming-rui, in trying to provide social services for the bannermen newly arrived in Huiyuan and Ningyuan, faced the problem common to garrison administrators elsewhere in China: while expenditures on bereavement, marriages, funerals, and similar assistance to Manchu military families were legitimate and necessary, no provision was made for these expenditures in Xinjiang’s main budget. Ming-rui hoped to fill that budget gap with the interest from an imperial endowment, but his request came too late—by the 1760s Gaozong considered the shengzi yinliang program ripe with abuse and was phasing it out. As a result, Ming-rui and his successors were forced to develop their system of official shops and investments without imperial capital, drawing on xieziang, the horse insurance fund, military clothing and settlement stipends, commercial rents and taxes, and eventually the earnings of the official enterprises themselves for a source of working capital. Moreover, the guanpu and various official investments seem to have operated effectively and without deviating from their original design for almost a century. There is no evidence that large amounts of the shops’ capital were siphoned off into high-interest loans, nor have I discovered any cases of serious abuse, though no doubt there were some.

It is a curious coincidence that the period of the Yili commissary system’s development corresponds to the tenure of Suhe de as military governor in Yili (1771–73). Although first to note local abuse of imperial investments in China proper early in the Qianlong reign, Suhe de presided over the expansion of a similar official commercial network in Yili and, in 1775, was a member of the Grand Council that advised against eliminating the Yili official shops outright, suggesting instead (as shown above) that merchants be brought in to handle the business. Thus reprieved, Yili’s official commercial network proved longer lived and of greater fiscal importance than similar official enterprises in China proper or the northeast.

The Southern Commissaries

From the time when its armies first occupied the oases rimming the Taklamakan Desert, the Qing had engaged in official commerce to help feed them and to relieve strain on extended supply lines and the imperial treasury. Qing officials in Altishahr oversaw the sales of silk, tea, and other products on local markets for pul, which they then entered for accounting purposes under primary revenues and used for soldiers’ wages, food stipends, and so forth. This allowed a savings of the equivalent amount of xieziang silver. Around 1804, for example, Qing officials in Ush sold between 200 and 300 bolts of silk and 3,250 carriages of tea—the tea sales alone were worth over 500 silver taels.36

The cities of southern Xinjiang did not initially follow Yili, Tarbagatai, Urumchi, Barkol, Turfan, and Hami in establishing guanpu. The main reason for this was the relatively small number of troops stationed in the south: before 1828, there were only around 5,000, of whom only 825 were Manchu bannermen.37 Moreover, the non-Manchu troops, primarily Han soldiers of the Green Standards, were not permanently stationed in southern cities but rather served there on rotational tours of duty. Thus they brought no dependents to Altishahr. The only military farm (bingtun) in the south in Qianlong times was in Ush, and this employed only 650 Han troops. Because guanpu and official investments were primarily designed to provide for the welfare of banners, particularly the Manchu, and their dependents, during the first decades of Qing rule there was little need for such institutions in Altishahr.

After Jahangir’s invasion and the Altishahr rebellion in 1826, however, the court decided to station banner forces permanently in Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Aksu and to increase total troop strength in the south by 5,500 men. Furthermore, these soldiers were allowed to bring dependents.38 Facing the problem of supplying necessities at war-inflated prices to the bannermen in these cities, Nayanqeng decided to follow the example of Yili 60 years earlier and establish official shops in Kashgar and Yarkand.

Like Nayanqeng’s other economic programs in Altishahr, opening guanpu in the south was a major reform. However, his proposals in this regard were not entirely economic in scope, nor were they exclusively directed at succoring the banners. Rather, he intended them as weapons in a campaign to control foreign trade and traders in Altishahr, particularly Kashgar and Yarkand, cities astride the trade routes to Central and South Asia. After recapturing the southern cities from Jahangir, the Qing had placed an embargo on trade with Kokand, hoping to force the khanate to turn over the remaining Khoja descendants whom it was harboring. In mid-1828 Nayanqeng deported all Kokandi merchants who had resided in Xinjiang less than ten years.39 In order to prevent other foreign merchants from establishing an enclave in Kashgar or Yarkand, to interdict smuggling of tea and rhubarb to Kokand, and to staunch what he saw as a drain of silver from Xinjiang due to East Turkestan purchases of foreign goods with specie, Nayanqeng proposed moving all foreign trade out of town. Under Nayanqeng’s plan, foreign merchants would be allowed to exchange goods only under close official supervision in
trade pavilions (maoyi ting) in the mountains outside Kashgar and Yarkand. Nayanceng's proposal was based on the precedent of the trade pavilion outside Yili, which had been the venue for successful trade with the Kazakhs each autumn for almost 70 years.

In his memorials on the subject, Nayanceng explicitly links the institutions of the maoyi ting and guanpu. For example, he planned to erect the trade pavilion in a remote spot called Mingyol (Mingyueluo), 100 li from Kashgar beyond the Kalanggu karun on the main route to Andijan and Kokand (see Map 3). This, Nayanceng reported, was according to the "precedent of the Yili guanpu." All exchanges at the new trade pavilion were to be by barter, at officially fixed prices. After this trade enclosure in the mountains was established, "so that, externally, we may check up on barbarian merchants' whereabouts and [prevent] illegal domicile, and, internally, restrain those traitorous merchants who speculate and conspire," Nayanceng considered it also "necessary to open official shops in order to stamp [the papers of merchants] coming and going and to control what is ours." 40

As in Yili, the main difficulty in setting up the southern guanpu was finding seed money. Nayanceng determined that he would not need to draw upon Altishahr's primary silver revenues, but could capitalize the new official shops with proceeds from the sale of property confiscated from the deported Kokand households. Almost 69,000 catties of tea had been obtained through these confiscations. Nayanceng hoped to distribute it to the soldiers garrisoning Altishahr, deducting the tea's market value from their wages to realize 50,000 taels of savings from xiezhang. The Qing had also taken about 185,000 taels in cash and other property from the Kokandis and rebel Altishahr merchants. The bulk of this went to repair walls, military post stations (juntai), irrigation canals, and other infrastructure damaged during the war, as well as for construction of the trade compound and barracks at Mingyol and of the new commissaries in Kashgar and Yarkand. However, about 15,000 taels were left over after these projects, and Nayanceng also invested this in the official shops. 41

The Daoguang emperor approved Nayanceng's proposal reluctantly, expressing the reservation that, although the plan to control border trade in southern Xinjiang according to the Yili model looked fine on paper, over time the strict regulations would exist in name only and Qing administration of the guanpu would become a farce (wansheng). In addition, some officials were concerned that, because the trade would be between "Muslims and barbarians," calling in Han merchants to handle the corrupting business matters would not be an option: Altishahris beg officials would have to be used. 42

Still, the Kashgar and Yarkand trade pavilions seemed to function smoothly
enough at first. A party of merchants from Bukhara (Bugs'er) applied for permission to trade in the autumn of 1828 and was accommodated at Mingyol, where under guard by 200 Qing troops they traded 40 percent of their goods for tea and textiles from the guanpu stocks and the remainder with private merchants, including perhaps some Han or Tungan from China proper in addition to Altishahr traders.\textsuperscript{45}

Nayanceng proposed that the commissaries’ profits be distributed to the Manchu and Han officials and soldiers in Kashgar and Yarkand, with a fixed portion reserved for yamen administrative expenses and maintenance of government buildings. He later suggested that these revenues could provide gifts to tributary Kirghiz whose transhumance included the mountains around Kashgar and Ush—this would mean a further savings to the treasury of 1,000 taels annually.\textsuperscript{46}

Such uses of the revenues from official commerce followed the precedent set in northern Xinjiang. There was a major difference between southern and northern guanpu; however, in the south, they never turned a profit. Six months after the establishment of the Kashgar trade pavilion and official shop, Jalungga (Zha-long-a), who succeeded Nayanceng as councillor, reported that the guanpu had already faltered. “If this thing can work, then carry on,” grumbled the emperor. “If not, then shut it down. I will not run it from this distance.”\textsuperscript{46}

Jalungga, along with E-er-gu-lun and Ishäq, the Kashgar hakim beg, told the story of the failing guanpu in their subsequent memoir. When Nayanceng first established his system to control foreign trade by channeling it through the trade pavilion and official shop, the Jaliängir hostilities had only recently concluded. Prices were high and the shop set its tea prices even higher than the going market rate, at 0.8 taels per catty. Since the fourth month of 1829, however, market prices for tea had plummeted as a direct result of the embargo on Kokandi merchants, who had been the principal buyers of Chinese tea in Kashgar. Nayanceng had intended to sell off the confiscated stocks of tea through sales to Qing soldiers in Altishahr. In such a market, however, this was impractical and most of the 69,000 catties ended up as inventory in the official shop. Although the Bukhara merchants had traded for tea, Jalungga mentioned in this memoir that “it is forbidden for tea to be exported beyond the karun, and the local market for tea is limited,” suggesting that in the zealous attempt to keep tea out of Kokandi hands, all foreign sales of tea had been suspended. “When goods are plentiful, their price is low,” the three officials noted, displaying a sounder appreciation of supply and demand than their predecessor had. “Merchants ship and turn around [tea] quickly, without seeking extra profit, allowing them to sell cheap.” The commissaries’ stale, overpriced tea stocks, on the other hand, found no buyers.

The one somewhat profitable aspect of the business was the purchase of sheep from Kirghiz nomads for resale in Kashgar and Yarkand. But even this small success turned out to be short-lived. The Kirghiz found the Qing price for Yarkandi cotton cloth too high and brought progressively fewer sheep to the trade pavilion over the months. Whereas in its first five months of operation the guanpu earned over 10,000 taels from sheep sales, profits on this side of the business fell to 6,500 over the next ten months. The situation in Yarkand and Ush (where a third, embryonic guanpu had opened) was similar.\textsuperscript{46}

Near the end of 1829, therefore, Jalungga and his colleagues sought and received approval to shut down the ill-fated Altishahr guanpu operation and allow local Muslims and “barbarians” to trade directly, under official supervision.

The debate over what to do with the sum of money salvaged from sheep sales and a steeply discounted liquidation of the tea stocks makes a revealing epilogue to the story of the failed Altishahr official shops. In it we see that officials in Kashgar, although relieved to be free of the unworkable guanpu, nonetheless wished to retain the measure of financial independence that the control of a capital fund could provide. In their memorial of late 1829, Jalungga and his colleagues proposed that, since 40,000 taels were left after the guanpu experiment, an equivalent sum could be deducted from the next xiexiang shipment (due in 1831) and invested for the Altishahr authorities in Gansu and Shaanxi at 1 percent monthly interest. This interest income could then be sent to Kashgar and Yarkand annually to subsidize administration and tributary gifts. The Board of Revenue, however, disagreed. After deliberation, the board responded that there were not many wealthy merchants in Gansu, and, because Xinjiang’s funds had long been entrusted with Shaanxi merchants, it was “inconvenient” to invest further amounts. The 40,000 taels should instead be spent in lieu of the equivalent amount of xiexiang—thus in effect passing a one-time savings on to the provinces that subsidized Xinjiang’s military government. But despite the emperor’s agreement with the board’s plan, Jalungga memorialized again in late 1829 or early 1830, this time suggesting that “since the budget for 1831 has already been drawn up,” he would prefer to put the money (by now, with the addition of some other miscellaneous revenues, a tidy 80,000 taels) in a special emergency fund designed to prevent Kashgar from being caught short of cash should the city be attacked again. We do not know the fate of this 80,000, but Kashgar did indeed get its emergency fund eventually.\textsuperscript{47}

The troubles of the Kashgar and Yarkand guanpu stemmed from a problem with their initial conception: Nayanceng borrowed the example of two distinct institutions that had been successful in Yili, the trade pavilion and the official shop. In Yili and Tarbagatai the trade pavilion was simply an en-
closure that served as venue for official and supervised private trade with the Kazakh, trade that was aimed primarily at securing livestock and hence fell under the purview of the Camel and Horse Office of the Yili government. The guanpu, on the other hand, served as the cornerstone of a complex of official investments designed to raise revenue for Manchu banner welfare and miscellaneous projects that fell outside the xiiexiang budget. While there were points of contact between the Kazakh trade and northern official shops (notably, the sale by the guanpu of livestock, pastoral products, and Altishahr cotton cloth), they were distinct in both management and purpose. In attempting to transplant these institutions to Altishahr, Nayanccng conflated them—a fact that is clear from his use of the terms guanpu and huoqi ting almost interchangeably in his early memorials on the subject. But rather than serving as banner retail outlets for goods from China proper, Nayanccng’s guanpu were in theory simply clearinghouses for the confiscated goods of deported Kokandis and nomad products from the trade enclosure. In practice, they served as little more than warehouses for these goods. Unlike the northern commissaries, Nayanccng’s shops did not attempt to undersell local merchants, nor did they procure goods from China proper (although the idea was proposed). Rather, they fixed tea prices unreasonably high, ensuring that none would sell domestically; at the same time, restrictions on tea export cut off the potential foreign market. Nayanccng had launched the Kashgar and Yarkand administrations into the tea business just when Qing sanctions against the Kokandis caused the local tea market to collapse.

The Qing and the "Silk Road"

To many, the "Silk Road" of the high Qing period—especially the various trade routes across the Tarim and Zungarian Basins, which the Manchus conquered and maintained—does not live up to the golden reputation of earlier eras. Scholars have suggested various reasons for this decline, including competition from maritime trade routes, the loss of China’s exclusive control over silk technology, and the political fragmentation of the Eurasian Steppe, east and west, that followed the demise of the Mongol empire. But much of this sense of decline may be more a matter of historical perception.*

* We have few quantitative measures of ancient Silk Road commerce. However, our modern fascination with the region’s history seems to stem not so much from the volume or even value of ancient trade, per se, but from other concerns. For the Japanese, for example, the eastward transmission of Buddhism is of key importance. Han Chinese take satisfaction from and geopolitical justification in the knowledge that their eponymous Han dynasty progenitors explored and conquered Western Regions territory, as did the Tang (a dynasty that, unlike Yuan and Qing and despite an undeniable whim of the barbarian, Han today claim as their own). And, for reasons not unlike those of the Chinese, Europeans and Americans take pleasure in the exploits of Western explorers, archaeologists, and treasure hunters who have unearthed Indo-European civilizations (not to mention Caucasian mummies) along the old Silk Route or devised cunning Great Game moves to determine whether Britain or Russia would dominate the pivot of Asia.
commerce from a position astride the trade route. The Qing conquest and development of Altishahr and Zungaria actually lifted many political and logistical barriers to travel and commerce, allowing a final flourish of “east-west” trade on which Korkand thrived, despite increasing competition from maritime routes. It is thus somewhat odd, then, that the Qing did not make a priority of tapping this considerable east-west transit trade.

Customs barriers at each oasis town in the Tarim had been a bane of itinerant merchants, and a boon for ruling powers, from ancient times. The Tang, for example, collected customs in its Western Regions holdings. However, with the exception of Hami (see next paragraph), there were no internal customs in Qing Xinjiang from the time of the conquest until the 1850s. Customs were collected, at low rates, on the value of goods imported from abroad by East Turkestan merchants, Kirghiz nomads, foreign tributaries, and “other barbarians,” with tax rates depending on the place of origin of the merchant involved. Until 1760, the Qing maintained the old Zungaria tariff rates, assessing 20 percent of the value of goods imported by local merchants and 5 percent on imports by foreigners. Early in 1760 the Qing lowered the duties to 5 percent for Qing subjects (East Turkestan merchants), 3.3 percent for foreign tributaries (waifaan, including Kokandis and many Kirghiz groups), and 2.5 percent for other foreigners (Kashmiris, Badakhshans, and others from the Pamir countries). The tariff on imported silk, cotton cloth, and hides was higher: East Turkestanis paid 10 percent ad valorem and tributaries paid 5 percent.

Tapping Private Commercial Wealth in Xinjiang

For the most part, however, the empire concerned itself with monitoring, and taxing, the sedentary commerce of Chinese merchants settled in Xinjiang cities. As Qing armies advanced into Zungaria in the 1750s, these Han and

commerce and Taxation in the Far West

| TABLE 8 | Customs Tariffs in Qing Xinjiang as Paid on Imports by Different Classes of Merchants |
|---------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|         | East Turkestan | Foreign Tributaries (including Korkand) | Kashmir, Badakhshan, and the Pamir Countries | Muslims | Non-Muslims |
| Up to 1760 | 10% | 5% | 5% | 10% | 5% |
| 1760–1807 | 5% | 3.3% | 2.5% | 10% | 5% |
| (duty on silk, cotton cloth, hides) | | | | | |
| After 1807 | Exempt | Exempt | Exempt | Exempt | Exempt |
| 1829 | | | | | |
| 1832 | | | | | |
| After 1835 | 2.5% | 5% |

Tungan (Chinese Muslim) merchants from China proper were close behind. Official documents note their presence almost immediately after the fighting ended. Developing garrison towns in Yili and Urumchi offered commercial opportunity, and the availability of land must have been still more attractive. Many of the “merchants” referred to in Qing sources were in fact simply commoners with means to immigrate and cultivate their 30 mu without financial assistance from the government. Some, too, were able to purchase additional land and hire laborers to work it. Because these cultivators were independent, unlike the commoners working state farms or soldiers on military farms, they were under no obligation to produce grain and could specialize instead in more lucrative fruits and vegetables. Truck farms (caiyuan) sprang up on the outskirts of Yili, Urumchi, and other cities in northern and eastern Xinjiang.

Qing authorities wasted no time in attempting to tax these commercial farmers and the private merchants who opened small shops or peddler’s stands in Xinjiang cities, mostly on government land. (Although no explicit description of the distribution of government land [guandi] and private land has come to light, the general principle seems to have been that, because the new cities in Zungharia were founded by the Qing, virtually all land was state-owned.) Control, rather than revenue, seems to have been the initial goal—or at least the justification—of this commercial taxation: virtually all the Han and Tungan inhabitants of Xinjiang at this time were recent immigrants, and Qing officials expressed a need to monitor these Chinese merchants in the growing frontier towns.

In 1766 Urumchi Commander-in-Chief Jing-ge-li suggested categorizing the over 500 new shops in Urumchi into three classes for inspection and taxation; he proposed that commercial farmland, of which over 300 mu was by then under cultivation, should also be surveyed and taxed. The emperor not only agreed with the proposal but ordered its implementation in “Yili, Yarkand, Aksu, and other cities,” in all of which merchants and commercial farmers occupied government land. “This [policy] will help us inspect [the merchants] and also be of benefit to public finances.”

Jing-ge-li proposed taxing Han and Tungan shops in Xinjiang 0.3, 0.2, or 0.1 taels per month, depending on the size of each establishment. Commercial fruit and vegetable farmers were to pay 0.1 taels per year on each mu of land they cultivated. Throughout Xinjiang, Qing authorities undertook the necessary surveys almost immediately. The same year, we learn, there were eight large, eleven medium, and fourteen small shops in Kashgar, mostly in the “new city,” although a few Han merchants opened up shop among the Kashgardiiks in the Muslim city. In Urumchi, where immigration from China proper was much greater, the merchant population was higher.

Many local authorities emboldened upon this system by building housing, shops, or bazaars on government land and renting this property out at per-<i>jian</i>’ rates considerably higher than the standard commercial tax (which was assessed per merchant household). In Yili in 1768, for example, the Hui-yuan authorities constructed 80 shops outside the main gate of the city. Each Manchu banner received monthly rents from 20 of these shops, applying the takings toward stationery and other miscellaneous expenses. Around the same time, officials in Urumchi’s Manchu garrison rented out 400 shops; likewise, government-owned structures surrounding the Urumchi drum tower were rented to private merchants. By 1784, competition from privately constructed housing and shops in Urumchi forced the authorities to lower rents on officially owned property in less central locations.

The second important commercial tax in Xinjiang was the stamp tax on livestock exchanges; this was first instituted in Urumchi in 1764 and somewhat later in other cities. To collect this tax, the Xinjiang authorities required that an official license and seal accompany each transaction involving camels, horses, sheep, asses, mules, cattle, or pigs, for which a fee amounting to 3 or 4 percent ad valorem was paid by the buyer. Livestock rustling was a common crime in Xinjiang; documenting exchanges and channeling trade in animals through official brokers was thus an important control as well as a revenue-raising measure.

Qing sources refer to this livestock stamp tax variously as “tax at point-of-sale” (<i>luodishui</i>), “commercial tax” (<i>shangshui</i>), and other terms. Commercial taxes on shops and truck farms, along with revenues from official property, were all called “rents” (<i>jangsu</i>). These “rents,” in combination with the stamp tax, appear in budget accounts as <i>zushui</i>, “rents and taxes.” The combination and hence the nomenclature was unique to Xinjiang, and for this reason one gazetteer compiler took pains to explain the usage.

For accounting purposes, “rents and taxes” were generally pooled with official shop revenues, and surplus <i>zushui</i> funds provided start-up capital for many official shops, as well as discretionary funds for government projects; temple support and maintenance of military post stations in Ush, a food sti-
TABLE 9
Growth of Commercial Taxation in Urumchi, 1763-77
(in silver taels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Building Rents</th>
<th>Land Rents</th>
<th>Livestock Stamp Tax</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>1,082.5</td>
<td>144.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,226.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td>1,258.6</td>
<td>199.6</td>
<td>376.4</td>
<td>1,834.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>1,377.3</td>
<td>218.1</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>2,015.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766</td>
<td>1,495.6</td>
<td>316.5</td>
<td>424.3</td>
<td>2,236.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>2,701.9</td>
<td>358.2</td>
<td>528.1</td>
<td>3,588.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td>2,802</td>
<td>487.3</td>
<td>712.4</td>
<td>4,001.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>2,925.6</td>
<td>596.3</td>
<td>712.5</td>
<td>4,234.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>3,092.7</td>
<td>600.8</td>
<td>820.2</td>
<td>4,513.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>606.8</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>4,241.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772</td>
<td>3,250.8</td>
<td>605.7</td>
<td>844.5</td>
<td>4,701.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773</td>
<td>6,103.2</td>
<td>652.3</td>
<td>920.9</td>
<td>7,676.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>5,370.4</td>
<td>675.1</td>
<td>931.2</td>
<td>7,276.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>5,767.9</td>
<td>713.2</td>
<td>931.2</td>
<td>7,412.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td>5,379.4</td>
<td>819.8</td>
<td>893.8</td>
<td>7,083.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>5,801.3</td>
<td>536.5</td>
<td>965.8</td>
<td>7,303.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Wuhansheng zhenghe, pp. 131–33

TABLE 10
Commercial Taxes Collected in the Eastern and Southern Marches, c. 1804
(in silver taels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Yiili</th>
<th>Urumchi*</th>
<th>Karakhan*</th>
<th>Kucha</th>
<th>Akou</th>
<th>Ush</th>
<th>Kashgar*</th>
<th>Yungki Hisar</th>
<th>Yarkand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>1,600–17,700</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>986.4</td>
<td>1,393.9</td>
<td>886</td>
<td>679.4</td>
<td>776.6</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: HITZ 7.8a, 8.7a; 9.1b–1c; 10.1b–2a; 11.2a–2b; 12.2c; 13.2d; 14.2a–b; 15.2a; 16.2c; 17.2d; 18.2e; 19.2f; 20.2g; 21.2h; 22.2i; NWSW 14.2j–k; XIZL 9.2m

*Some values have been converted from pais to taels at current local rates.

†Figure from c. 1815.

§Includes Urumchi region (Changji, Suilai, Forming Counties) as well as Jimusa, Yibe, Gucheng, Tusfan, Kor Xia, Uruz, and Jinghuw, each of which remitted taxes to the Zhedi Circuit treasury.

pend for demobilized infantry in Yiili, a gift of sheep to needy Chahar in Tarbagatai, or a special purchase of grain at harvest time in Urumchi.

In Yiili and especially Urumchi (where by the nineteenth century rents made up over a quarter of the local budget), “rents and taxes” provided significant supplementary funds to Xinjiang officials. In Altishahr, however, zshshui did not realize a great deal of revenue. The fixed low rates, capped at 0.3 taels per month even for the largest businesses and at 3 (later 4) percent on livestock exchanges, were one reason for this; another was the fact that only merchants from China proper were subject to the rents and tax. Thus despite the importance of commerce in Altishahr, “rents and taxes” revenues remained relatively low. (See Tables 9 and 10.)

San-cheng Goes Too Far

One official in Altishahr attempted to secure a greater portion of local commercial wealth for his administration. San-cheng, who had been cashiered and demoted seven years earlier, took up the post of Yarkand assistant superintendent in 1810. After verifying a survey of local merchants carried out by the Manchu secretary, San-cheng memorialized with a plan to bring recently arrived small merchants onto the tax rolls. This particular proposal met with approval, but San-cheng had still grander schemes: To the three categories of shops established by Jing-ge-li’s 1762 memorial, San-cheng planned to add an “upper” and an “upper upper” grade; these larger shops would owe 0.5 and 0.6 taels per month. Other cities had amended the Jing-ge-li proposal by adding additional tax brackets based on finer gradations. In Karashahr, for example, the rates were 0.16, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.5, and 0.6. None, however, had exceeded the ceiling of 0.3 taels per month. Furthermore, in order to regulate small itinerant merchants, San-cheng proposed a tax on small shops and inns (where traveling merchants stayed and stored their wares) on a monthly 0.05 tael per jian basis—as opposed to the flat rate based on the land area occupied by the establishment. San-cheng claimed that this new rate, “half that charged the third grade shops,” was concessionary; in fact, it comprised a steep increase over previous tax levels because of his change in the method of assessment. Established shops, too, would have faced higher burdens. An inn with ten to twenty jian would have faced an increase from the previous top rate (0.3 per month) to 0.5 to 1 tael at the new proportional rate. Finally, and most seriously, San-cheng wanted to classify Altishahri Muslim merchants and add them to the commercial tax rolls in Yarkand, a violation of the dynasty’s policy of distinguishing Chinese and East Turkestanis.

San-cheng’s thinking is hard to understand. Could he have confused the per-jian rent charged merchants who rented commercial and residential space in official buildings with the three-tier tax rate paid by merchants who built their own shops on government land? It seems unlikely: if we today with an incomplete documentary record can understand Xinjiang’s commercial taxation, surely San-cheng could not have made such a blunder in a functioning yamen with the relevant precedent-setting memorials on file and a staff with local experience. Yet could San-cheng have deliberately planned to confuse his superiors in the capital with an ambiguous memorial, in hopes that the response would give him expanded authority to tax? He sent out a lateral communication on his proposal to Tie-bao, the Kashgar councillor, only after dispatching his memorial to Beijing—in itself a violation of standard practice (he should have consulted with his colleagues and superiors in Xinjiang...
could legally be resold by itinerant merchants who purchased it from large tea merchants in Gansu. Still, this left 200,000 to 300,000 cases of the tea sold in Xinjiang unaccounted for, and Nayanceng concluded that it was being sold under false license or without license at all. The high prices Nayanceng found upon his arrival in Xinjiang also disturbed him. Tea within the Jiayu Guan cost only 1.7 to 1.2 taels per case; he viewed prices of 7 to 10 taels in Altishahr to be a clear sign of abuse.

Nayanceng drew even more evidence of mercantile malfeasance from the fact that at some of the military post stations near Yarkand, local Muslims had attacked merchants from China proper at the time of the Jahangir troubles. Since Jahangir’s forces had not reached these post stations and thus could not have incited local Muslims to rebellion, Nayanceng reasoned, then Chinese merchants must have brought these attacks upon themselves by inflating prices during wartime. Nayanceng thus found the Han and Tungan merchants from China proper as much to blame for the recent disturbances as Kokandi traders and the invaders themselves: “Traitorous merchants trade [tea] privately and plot with foreign barbarians to exploit the Muslim masses. . . . The situation worsens with each passing day. Something must be done.”

In the summer of 1828, Nayanceng decided to crack down on illegal tea trading and traders by fixing the price of tea and establishing a series of tax barriers to inspect and tax tea shipped from China proper. The model for this plan was the system of inspection stations regulating the export of tea via Mongolia to Kiekhun for trade with Russia. Nayanceng requested authorization to set up an inspection and taxation station at Jiayu Guan similar to those at Shuhukou, Guihua, and Zhangjiaskou (all north of Beijing). In its final form, Nayanceng’s tea taxation network would also have included inspection stations in Gucheng, Urumchi, and Aksu, a tax barrier at a key bridge at Kuitun north of Kus Karasu on the route from Urumchi to Yili and Tarbagatai, as well as stations to collect tax at points of sale in Yili, Tarbagatai, Kashgar, and Yarkand. Special karun were to be built at communications nodes and on alternate routes to interdict smugglers. Merchants entering Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor would obtain licenses at the Langzhou Circuit yamen; on these would be recorded their names and the amount and type of tea they had to sell. At the Jiayu Guan and at each subsequent station the merchants would pay the tax and receive a new pass that listed their destination in Xinjiang along with the other information. The process would have been identical for merchants who came to Xinjiang via Mongolia and Gucheng, except that they were to be issued the first license in Zhangjiaskou (Kalgin), Guihua (Kike Khota), or Dolonner. The particulars of each merchant’s tea shipment were to be reported to officials at their destination and to Yili as a
check on both smuggling and on the officials collecting the tax. This tea tax would be cumulative, based on a three-level division of Xinjiang by distance from China proper; thus a merchant bound for Kashgar would be liable to pay tax three times: at Jiayu Guan, Aksu, and Kashgar, while one bound for Yili would pay at Gucheng, Urumchi, and Yili. Despite the addition of a tax on the already high price of tea in Altishahr, Nayançeng calculated that his policies would ultimately benefit Altishahr consumers, including the military, since he planned simultaneously to fix retail prices at 4 taels per case of brick tea in Aksu and 5 taels in Kashgar. He argued that based on the wholesale price of 3.1–3.2 taels in China proper and his own estimates of shipping costs (1.2–1.5 taels as far as Aksu), merchants could sell at the fixed price and still clear 1.5–1.6 taels profit on each case of tea they sold in Aksu, 2 taels for sales in Kashgar. Curiously, Nayançeng neglected to include the tax itself in this calculation. In fact, even if merchants could buy wholesale and ship at the costs Nayançeng suggested, after taxes they would have cleared only 1 tael per case in Aksu, 1.2 in Kashgar.

Nayançeng's memorials present the tea tax and fixed tea price principally as a means of regulating merchants from China proper, whose high prices and dealings with Kokandi traders he considered threatening to Xinjiang's stability after Jahangir. But he also promised that the tax would create considerable revenue for Xinjiang's administration and, in particular, finance the increased numbers of troops and their dependents now permanently stationed in the south without requiring an increase in Xinjiang's primary budget of silver shipments from the provinces. Echoing a familiar theme, he wrote, "It is my ignorant opinion that the needs of the Muslim Territory be met from the Muslim Territory's revenues: it is not worthwhile to draw on xiejiazhi from the main [imperial] budget to support frontier wilderness." Assuming Chinese merchants would import an annual 200,000 cases of brick tea to Kashgar and Yarkand, Nayançeng projected tax revenues for Xinjiang of "over 100,000 taels." This estimate did not even include tax on loose tea (zaçha), for which Nayançeng had no sales figures. Had the Qing tax collectors truly been able to collect it, this potential tax revenue alone could have financed Qing administration in Kashgar and Yarkand after 1828 with 60,000 taels to spare (compare Table 1).

As was the case with the Altishahr official shops, however, Nayançeng's scheme was founded upon a gross contradiction: even given a high rate of merchant compliance and successful collection of the tea tax, the Qing could not have profited by taxing the tea trade while prohibiting the export of tea to Kokand. As long as the tea embargo cut off much of the market for Chinese tea in Central Asia, little tea could flow through Xinjiang and Qing revenues would have been limited.

Asked to advise the throne on this plan early in 1829, the grand secretaries Tuo-jin, Chang-ling, and Fu-jun rejected it on the grounds that it would give merchants an excuse to raise prices and that military personnel would as a result have to draw more heavily on silver stipends to buy their tea. In their judgment, the unsettled frontier region needed soothing after Jahangir, not an inflationary tax that would in any case be difficult to collect.

The Fiscal Foundations of Empire

The preceding chapters have surveyed the fiscal structure of the Qing empire in Xinjiang. Trade with the Kazakhs and agricultural reclamation supplied the Qing military with livestock and grain, but for geographical, historical, and political reasons, local land and head tax revenues were limited. The Xinjiang government thus depended upon shipments of silver from China proper to pay the Qing soldiers and officials—an uncomfortable fact that the Qianlong emperor both attempted to explain away and encouraged his officials to alleviate. To reduce this reliance on xiejiazhi and to raise revenue for administrative, maintenance, and welfare costs not included in the main budget, authorities in Zungharia and Altishahr turned to that sector of the region's economy left open to them—commerce—and both taxed it and engaged in it their official capacity. Through currency manipulation, sales of silk and tea, commissaries, pawnbroking, investments, and "rents and taxes" on commercial property and livestock exchanges, the Manchu and Mongol officials who governed Xinjiang attempted to secure a greater proportion of Xinjiang's wealth for the purposes of military rule.

The Qing fiscal policies in Xinjiang fit into a broader pattern noted by students of Qing economic history, namely, the growing importance of commercial taxes relative to that of the land tax as a proportion of government revenues. This phenomenon, illuminated in the work of Wang Yeh-chien, was particularly pronounced after the mid-nineteenth century, when fiscally strapped imperial and provincial governments attempted to penetrate more deeply into the booming economies of local marketing systems through a variety of "other" taxes, most of them commercial. Susan Mann has argued that it was the crises of the mid-nineteenth century that forced the dynasty to abandon the primary reliance on agriculture and the land tax (the ben) dictated by the norms of Confucian statecraft and turn increasingly toward com-
mmercial taxation (the mo). Nevertheless, according to Mann, this shift toward
greater revenue-gathering from the commercial sector should be seen not as
a symptom of dynastic decline, but as part of a process of nation building.68

In Xinjiang during the Qianlong period, we witness the same process at
work—with a difference. There was no tradition of Chinese peasant land
tenure in the Western Region, no dcing tax rolls, no precedents concerning
Han Chinese whatsoever. For Altishahr Muslims, the new Manchu overlords
did follow tradition—Central Asian tradition—in implementing a taxation
system. But with regard to Chinese immigrants to the Eastern and Northern
Marches, Xinjiang was a tabula rasa. Qing authorities thus turned readily,
mostly without ideological inhibitions, to the commercial economy. With
agriculture for the most part devoted to providing grain, Xinjiang authorities
were forced by circumstances, and encouraged by the emperor, to rely more
heavily than their colleagues in China proper upon commercial taxation and
the related technique of currency manipulation as sources of revenue.

We might take this line of thinking even further: It may not be entirely co-
incidental that some policies conceived in Xinjiang by officials under pressure
to limit xiexiang shipments were later employed in times of stress in China
proper: the “worth ten” coin, Nuyenceng’s tea tariff—which, as an inter-
national customs, anticipates the likin tax—and, after 1835, the Altishahr “treaty port”
system in which the Qing conceded extraterritoriality, an indemnity, and
control over customs to a foreign power in hope of avoiding costly border
wars.69 Xinjiang was a laboratory of sorts.

Finally, how successful were these measures at relieving Xinjiang’s reli-
ance on the silver stipends?

Although we lack the annual itemizations (qingdan) that would answer
this question diachronically for each of Xinjiang’s cities, we have in gazetteers
“snapshots” of Xinjiang’s finances for given years. Table 11 displays xiexiang,
revenue from commercial enterprises, and commercial taxes as well as the
head tax (alban) for major Xinjiang cities around 1795. Except for Kucha,
where revenue from government sales, interest, rents, and commercial taxes
amounted to only 3 percent of the value of xiexiang, in all the remaining
cities the proportion is sizeable; in absolute terms, the amounts for Yili and
Urumchi are especially impressive. We lack this type of data for the period
following the watershed of 1828, but a comparison of Kashgar’s assigned xie-
xiang quotas (from Table 1) with the xiexiang amounts offset by locally raised
commercial revenue gives an indication of the importance of these sources
of official revenue during the later period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Xiexiang</th>
<th>Head-tax (alban)</th>
<th>Revenue from Commercial Activities</th>
<th>Commercial Revenue as Percentage of Xiexiang</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yili</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td>79,500</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashgar</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>3,623</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>(includes Yangi Hisar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yangi Hisar</td>
<td>Included in Kashgar budget</td>
<td>2,677</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarkand</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>12,575</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>(includes Khotan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khotan</td>
<td>Included in Yarkand budget</td>
<td>4,800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ush</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aksu</td>
<td>8,600</td>
<td>2,483</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kucha</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakhoja</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urumchi</td>
<td>95,500</td>
<td>44,740</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: ZITXL, 128–75; Yong-hao et al., Wulumuqi shi, 282–293, 356–61; Table 6.
Notes: Figures do not include internal transfers of cash or of copper cash minted and distributed in Xinjiang.
+a includes from jade to coins at soldiers’ pay exchange rate for 1860.
+ Includes entire Zhendu Circuit and Yark Kasa Uru.

1835 1841 1846 1847 1849
Xiexiang quota requested 91,255 113,894 97,895 107,292 97,466
Xiexiang shipped 80,416 92,156 80,045 89,476 79,538
Xiexiang savings 10,839 18,778 17,850 17,816 17,922

Significant as these savings were in relative terms, however, overall, revenue
from these commercial sources, other taxes, and savings from the manipu-
lization of currency exchange rates were still insufficient to achieve the
official goal of “using the Western Regions to govern the Western Regions.”
The revenue from all commercial sources in 1795, for example, was equivalent
to less than 17 percent of the total silver stipend shipped to Xinjiang to meet
that year’s budget. Even under the innovative fiscal policies implemented in
the territory in the Qianlong period, Xinjiang could not pay for itself.

In hindsight, then, there is a logic to San-cheng and Nuyenceng’s tax plans,
for both attempted to tap Xinjiang commerce more effectively, the former
by raising commercial tax rates and extending them to Muslim merchants,
and the latter by taxing the high-volume, “east-west” trade in tea. There
were specific reasons behind the court’s rejection of both proposals; but the
fact that the dynasty made no further attempts to widen the scope of Qing commercial taxation to include Central Asian Muslims suggests that stability and control were just as important as revenue enhancement in determining Qing tax policy in the Western Regions. And in the first decades of Qing rule there, the primary objects of Qing concern were the Han and Tungan migrants drawn to Zungaria and Altishahr almost before the smoke and dust of 1759 had cleared.

CHAPTER 4

“Gathering Like Clouds”: Chinese Mercantile Penetration of Xinjiang

Duty took men of old to such frontier towns:
In court today, those prized horses may still be found.
The long road through mountains and passes—when will it end?
All through our hall, the strings and flute weep for you, my friend.

_Zhang Wei, “Seeing Off Lu Ju on Embassy to Heyuan,” Tang Dynasty_

The shops lie packed like fish scales left and right.
State-planted willows wave our front, a verdant brume.
Once everyone’s gone home through lamplit night,
Lute-song rises here and there beneath the moon.

_(Wealthy traders and merchants of substance reside north and south of the old city gates. Even after the night market has closed, there is always strumming of the bamboo and strumming of silken strings. They say this local custom relieves the hardship of a day’s work._)

_Ji Yun, Random Verses of Urumchi, 1772_

The Manchus brought the Western Regions into China; merchants and a few sophisticated exiles like Ji Yun brought China to the Western Regions. The process was uneven and much evidence of it disappeared in the conflagrations of 1864, but from 1759 until that time the influx of merchants from China proper to the cities of Xinjiang created outposts of Chinese urban culture and commercial life throughout the New Dominion.

In the winter and spring of 1759–60, Shaanxi-Gansu Governor-General Yang Yingju spent several months surveying the newly conquered Muslim territories. Yang (whom we have met as Lanzhou supervisor of the Kazakh silk trade) was among the first Qing civil officials to visit Altishahr. When he arrived, he found Chinese—that is, Han and Tungan—merchants already there.

According to one source, by 1759 Chinese merchants in “Pijan, Aksu, Ush,
Khotan, Yarkand, Kashgar, and so on [had] all established markets where they cluster together . . . to trade. This date may be a year or so too early for the western Altishahr cities mentioned; however, in that same year Yang noted the presence of forty merchant households from China proper living as far west as Toksun, where they had opened shops outside the Qing fort.9

The penetration of the New Dominion by Chinese merchants was indeed rapid, and this raises several issues regarding Qing policy. How were these Chinese migrants controlled and their impact on East Turkestani society managed? Given that the Qing already recognized the Chinese as a destabilizing factor in Mongolia, would Chinese merchants be allowed to mix freely among the East Turkestani Muslims, or would they be segregated in walled compounds like the bannermen and Green Standard soldiers? What effect would the Chinese influx have on urbanization and urban life in Xinjiang? The material in this chapter suggests some answers to these questions.

Go West Young Han: The Open-Guan Policy

Wherever Qing armies ventured in Inner Asia, Chinese merchants were seldom far behind. This was true during the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and early Qianlong campaigns against the Zunghars in Mongolia and in the Hami region, where Han merchants from north China “chased the camps” (gan da-ying) to supply the armies and trade with nomad groups; it was equally the case in Xinjiang during the conquest of Zungharia. In the autumn of 1755 with the Qing advance westward and initial pacification of the Zunghars, before Amursana’s rebellion, Chinese merchants were permitted to continue the periodic Zunghar border trade under military supervision in Barkol.8 Later, when these customers were all but wiped out, the Qing forces in Zungharia still required supplies. At first, merchants could only haul goods to Barkol via Suzhou and Anxi in Gansu—a route that required over 300 li (550 km) of travel through bleak cobbled desert and ensured that prices in the north would be high. This detour had become institutionalized in 1734 when, following Yongzheng’s disastrous sortie against the Zunghars and the Qing withdrawal, merchants had been forbidden to travel beyond the line of frontier karun in western Mongolia. In the summer of 1756 Huang Tinggui memorialized to have this restriction lifted, since the area as far west as Yili had by then been all but secured by the Qing. The proposal was approved, and from the spring of this year the “northern route” via Khalikha and Uliasutai was once again opened to supplement the Gansu corridor (or “western route”) to Xinjiang.

Guards in the karun were instructed to allow properly documented merchants traveling toward Barkol and Hami, and later Yili, to pass freely after inspection.4

In those days, the Qing military was particularly interested in the “cattle, sheep, and goods” that merchants drove from China proper to bases in Zungharia, thus reducing official expense. But the Qing court’s decision to allow free commerce between Xinjiang and China proper proved to be more than a temporary military expedient. Repeated pronouncements on the subject reveal that the Qianlong court viewed the “free flow” (liustong) of people and commerce to Xinjiang as necessary, in an almost nutritional sense, to the sustenance of the population and the consolidation of Qing control over the region. When, over time, those merchants crossing Mongolia (and trading on the way) caused “incidents of competitive strife,” frontier officials in 1759 suggested closing the northern route to merchant transit. In his return edict, the Qianlong emperor scoffed at such thinking as “displaying extreme ignorance of commerce,” tantamount to “giving up food for fear of choking.” With sufficient inspection to root out crooked merchants (jianzhang), “the goods of each people may be exchanged, to the benefit of the economy.”5

The Qianlong court’s thinking about the role commerce and Chinese merchants would play in the New Dominion became fully clear early in the following year. Zhou Renji, governor of Guizhou, memorialized on the large numbers of people pouring into Sichuan from other provinces and requested that a law prohibiting such migration be enacted. Again, the return edict employed the aphorism about food and choking to dismiss the governor’s concerns. Why fret needlessly over the presence of a few “disreputable types” among an otherwise peaceable migrant population? Recognizing that interprovincial migration was due to population pressure, Gaozong proposed Inner Asia as an outlet for crowded Han masses and a fertile field for mercantile endeavor.

These days the population increases daily, but agricultural lands are limited to their present size. We should think of how the flow [of population] may succor the homeless impoverished. For instance, now outside Gubeikou [a pass north of Beijing] there are several hundred thousand households of Chinese (neidi minren) going to farm . . . And for those farming outside the pass, clothing and food are more abundant each day . . . . The Western Realm is pacified; our territories are vast. Places like Pijian and Urumchi are continually putting more land under cultivation in state farms, and the numbers of itinerant merchants (kemin) applying themselves diligently to commerce grow with each passing day.6
Other edicts over the next few years further encouraged and smoothed the way for merchants from China proper to travel to the northwest. Of special concern were those traders, primarily from Shanxi and Beijing, who plied the northern route across the steppe to Zungharia or this route’s southern variant via the Ordos and Alashan. From the time of the reopening of the northern route in 1756, both Mongols and Chinese wishing to cross the border to Barkol, Hami, or Pijan to trade with the military garrisons and growing state farm population had first been required to obtain permits from the Ulasutai general, a detour that added hundreds of kilometers to what would otherwise be a relatively direct westward journey from Zhangjiakou or Guihua (Hohhot). In mid-1760 this regulation was revised: henceforth Mongols with their livestock and Han merchants with livestock and other goods could obtain passes from their local jasaks or officials in charge of the areas through which they passed. Merchants who departed from Zhangjiakou or Guihua could now travel directly to Xinjiang, thus cutting over 40 days from the journey. Underlying this reform was the reasoning that “merchants must congregate [in the newly conquered areas]; this will be more beneficial to Xinjiang.”

In order to accelerate Xinjiang’s commercial development, especially in the eastern and northern areas, where most of the civilian and military state farms were located, the dynasty encouraged and even sponsored merchants to migrate along with the peasants relocated for agricultural reclamation work. These “merchants” were not all engaged solely in commerce; many came to take up offers of free land, on which they grew cash crops. They were classified (and, as described in Chapter 3, taxed) differently from peasant homesteaders, however, probably because in China proper they had not been registered on the diqing tax rolls but were engaged in private trades or working unregistered land. Whatever their origins, in 1762, the settlement at government expense of these “merchants” (shangmin) or “householders” (humin) and their dependents began. In 1772, 32 households were brought out to the Urumchi area to open new farmland, and 123 to engage in commerce. The next year the authorities resettled 4 more merchant families to Urumchi, and in 1776 33 merchant households were moved from Pijan. In 1778, 2,456 merchant households migrated with government help, either from China proper or the city of Urumchi to tuqantian farms in Dihua (Urumchi) prefecture and nearby counties of Jimusa, Fukang, Changji, Hotubu, and Manasi.

Although government-financed resettlement took place only in the Eastern and Northern Marches, the invitation to Chinese merchants applied to Altishahr as well. For several years, Yang Yingju reported in 1763, merchants had been traveling freely to Altishahr, hindered by no official obstructions or coercion. Banner commander-in-chief Yunggui reported from Kashgar:

Since the pacification of the Muslim Region, merchants from China proper coming via the post road, and the Muslim villagers, have been mutually amicable and free of criminality. Moreover, Muslims at the post stations (taishan) irrigate and open farm land. Water and fodder are plentiful along the road, and there is no impediment to travelers. If this is made known to merchants, soon they will come to trade and in no time [this area will be just the same as Hami and Turfan. This, moreover, will be of benefit to officials and troops.]

In an edict to the Grand Council, Gaozong ordered that this information be publicized, but that merchants merely be encouraged, not coerced, into going to Xinjiang. Passes should be issued to those wanting to go, and over time his goal of a “natural circulation” of merchants would come about of its own accord.

This picture of the cities of Altishahr thrown open to Han merchants from China proper differs considerably from the impression left by the writings of Joseph Fletcher and others on Qing Xinjiang. “The Ch’ing government,” Fletcher writes, “maintained a strict policy of segregating Altishahr from contact with the Han Chinese for fear that Han businessmen would take over Altishahr economically.” Although, as we shall see below, Han merchants were not allowed to bring their families or marry and settle locally, and authorities made some attempts to segregate merchants from China proper from East Turkestanis within Altishahr cities, the general policy toward merchants from China proper trading in Altishahr was in fact just the opposite of that implied by Fletcher: they were encouraged to come.

By 1764, officials in Shanxi noted that merchant traffic in the counties of Jingyang and Sanyuan had increased “several times” since the opening of Xinjiang. As a result, they petitioned to have the character designations of these posts upgraded, as well as those of three other counties for which official business had increased for the same reason. The requested designations for the five Shanxi counties were “trade center, busy, vexatious, strategically important, and shorthanded” (chong, juan, nan, yao, que). By 1772, reported the Shanxi-Gansu governor-general, Wen-shou, the flow of people westward was so great that there were long delays getting through the Jiayu Guan gate in Gansu. He suggested that the gate be left open during the day for all to pass out of; only those returning need be questioned.
New Infrastructure and Systems of Control

The Qing improvement of Xinjiang’s communications infrastructure, while primarily intended to facilitate military transport and transmission of official correspondence, greatly aided merchant travelers as well. One of the earliest concerns of the Qing military government in Zungharia and Altishahr was the quality and security of the main roads that linked cities within Xinjiang and connected Xinjiang to foreign countries and to China proper. Kashgar’s roads to Kokand, and Yarkand’s routes to Tibet, Kashmir, Leh, and Badakhshan were rugged and undefended against Kirghiz and other highwaymen until the system of Qing karan was completed and manned. Within Xinjiang, authorities saw to it that East Turkestan workers were established in perpetuity to maintain the road through the key Muzart Pass that linked Yili with Altishahr. Groups of laborers stationed every three miles along the glacier track kept it swept and marked with cairns, allowing caravans and troops to avoid crevasses and moraines. Xinjiang’s eastward desert routes, although generally more readily passable than those through the mountains, still required work. After inspecting the route between Gansu and Urumchi, Wen-shou requested in 1772 that a military detachment be sent with stone workers to widen several sections of the road and facilitate cart traffic. Development of wells, springs, and canals and construction of water tanks and inns along this route began as early as 1757, when Qing military personnel traveling between the Jiayu Guan and parts west noted that such improvements would help military and merchant alike. Work began with some success on the Gobi Desert section between Anxi and Hami by the following year, and by 1777 Qi-shi-yi could report that beg officials in Altishahr had channeled water and built caravanserais at intervals along the highway, each staffed by several households of East Turkestans to provide for travelers’ needs. The Turki word for these hostels, lênggär, entered Chinese as lan’gang and is found in Altishahr place-names to this day.

The most important Qing addition to Xinjiang’s communications infrastructure was the establishment and manning of a variety of relay stations along Xinjiang routes. There were four different kinds of station: The juntai provided fresh horses and provisions for the express imperial communication service linking the territory with Beijing for the transmission of important official documents; the yizhan fulfilled the same functions for ordinary imperial and local document transmission; yingtang were water depots for military use; and the karan (Ch. kalun), in mountainous or border regions, were used for patrols and merchant travel. In fact, however, in Xinjiang the

differences implied by these classifications were more administrative than practical, since all four types of station could share the same routes and most functions could be handled by a single type of post station. Between Urumchi and Yili, for example, along the 1,700-li (850-km) branch route traveled by official correspondence, there were 20 juntai, 22 yizhan, and 14 water depots, as well as karan and private caravanserais. From Turfan to Kashgar, on the other hand, 62 juntai handled all official functions. Because of their flexible nature, the post stations are often referred to in Qing sources by the omnibus term taihan.

Besides provision of water, horses, food, and lodging for official messengers bearing urgent memorials, the taihan put up traveling officials and exiles as well as beg officials and foreign tributaries en route to and from imperial audiences in the capital. Official consignments of xiexiang silver, silk, cotton cloth, tea, and other goods were shipped via post stations. Moreover, as in Qing Mongolia, Xinjiang’s official post-station system protected merchant caravans. In return, merchants helped supply the often remote taihan with goods.

The taihan as far west as Hami had been established during the Zunghar campaigns; those north and northwest of Urumchi were originally built around the time of the first victory over the Zunghars in 1755. With the second flare-up of hostilities the Qing lost control over these routes, but in 1758-59 restored the post-station system in Zungharia and constructed new juntai along the Southern March from Urumchi to Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan. In Altishahr, the post-station duties fell as corvée service upon the East Turkestan population, as did the cost of providing post horses (Mo. ulag-a; Tu. ulag). (In this the situation was similar to that in Qing Mongolia.) Beg officials, Manchu secretaries (Ma. bithesi; Ch. bitishe), and, at some post stations, small detachments of Green Standard soldiers supervised the taihan. Merchants from China proper built shops at the taihan as far west as Aksu, but not at those in the easternmost part of Altishahr. In 1851 it was proposed that merchants be invited to do so, in order to protect lines of communication in times of rebellion and invasion.

A Tungan merchant, Ma Tianxi, journeyed from Turfan to Kashgar in the early nineteenth century. His account confirms the importance of the post stations to merchant travel in Altishahr. In approximately two months on the road between these two cities, a merchant would spend 46 nights at the Qing taihan or in settlements near by. Food, lodging, and water were always available. Even at the smallest post station, East Turkestans from the nearest village sold travelers water and bread for themselves and beans for their horses. Because in places the distance between taihan was too great for a
caravan to travel in one day. Ma reported that he was sometimes obliged to camp beside the road; however, even in sparsely populated areas such bivouacs were necessary only about one night out of five.\(^{21}\) In the Eastern and Northern Marches of Xinjiang, where traffic was heavier and post stations more closely spaced, merchants could count on room and board at the end of each day and a steady supply of water along the route.

The Road-Pass System

The taizhan network was also the chief means by which the Qing monitored the movements of nei\(\text{di}\) merchants in Xinjiang. A pass system similar to that governing Han merchants in Mongolia applied to those merchants wishing to trade in Xinjiang. Merchants applied for road passes (lapian) with appropriate authorities in China proper in Beijing, Zhangjiakou, or Guihua for those journeying along the steppe route, or in Suzhou for those reaching Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor. The passes recorded the number of merchants in a party, the merchants’ names, registered place of origin, age, distinguishing physical features, goods, and itinerary. Cities in Xinjiang could issue passes for subsequent destinations upon a merchant’s turning in the original pass and paying a fee of a few pul to cover administrative expenses. East Turkestani merchants exiting the karun line to trade in Kirghiz, Kokandi, Kashgar, and other foreign merchants entering Altishahr and Zungharia were issued similar passes. All road passes were to be inspected and countersigned at various points en route to ensure that merchants maintained their original itinerary and had not picked up unauthorized or contraband goods and that the passes matched the man. Cities served as primary inspection points; in Aksu, the brigade commander (youchi) in charge of pass inspection was the same officer responsible for the area’s taizhan. In Kashgar, the commander of the city defense battalion (chengzhou ying) supervised inspection of passes and reported to the seals office (yinfang), where clerical staff of the councillor’s yamen prepared further submissions to Yili. Some Xinjiang city administrations had a passport office (piawou chu) to handle such matters.\(^{22}\)

\(^{21}\) The pass system for Mongolia was established in 1720 by decree of the Kangxi emperor. Initially, only a limited number of trading permits were issued, but this rapidly increased to 374 in 1792 and 800 in 1798. Many merchants failed to comply with the pass laws, as with other restrictions on length of residence, trading in the camps of the Mongol banners (as opposed to designated towns), and so forth. See Sanjedor, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule, pp. 33–34.

Because passes were inspected at each point and were relinquished upon return to China proper and because the information they bore was shared between yamen in different cities, in theory the road-pass system allowed the authorities to generate a record of each merchant’s travel, although in practice this probably was not possible.

One indication of the administrative importance placed on the pass system in Xinjiang is a memorial explicitly mentioning passes and registration documents for foreign Muslim merchants, along with tax records, as a main use of paper in Xinjiang’s yamen and a reason why no yearly paper surplus could be realized.\(^{26}\) Still, resourceful merchants could avoid checkpoints, and often did. Two conspirators in the famous Gao Pu jade smuggling case did so in the following way: Zhang Luan and Li Fu set out from Yarkand with a pass to Aksu. There they exchanged this for one terminating in Ush. Somehow they kept this pass as far as Pijen, where they turned it in for a pass to Hami, but they failed to turn this one in at all, carrying it with them all the way to Fenyang county, Shanxi, where it was later seized as evidence against them.\(^{26}\) Although the system seems easily circumvented in this case, the fact that the well-connected Zhang Luan went to such lengths to confuse his paper trail suggests that the passes were to an extent effective in governing merchant activities in Xinjiang.

Other Control Measures

There were also measures for the control of merchants residing permanently or sojourning for long periods of time in Xinjiang. Han and Tungan residents in Xinjiang’s Eastern March were organized in baqia units and governed by local civil officials just as in China proper. Elsewhere, especially in Altishahr, a headman known as xiangyue was responsible for Han and Tungan settlers under his supervision. Whether he expounded the Sacred Edict (the maxims of the Kangxi emperor) is unclear; in sources on Xinjiang, xiangyue refers generally to the title and office of this unranked headman, an elder of the mosque or local community, and not the “village lectures” elsewhere associated with this term.\(^{26}\)

Until early in 1760, Chinese merchants accused of crimes in Xinjiang were to be sent to Suzhou—back to China proper—for trial and punishment. This practice was of course unworkable in the long run: “If it were Yili or Yarkand, how could [the criminals] be sent to Suzhou?” the court wondered.\(^{26}\) Thereafter, then, two legal systems operated in Xinjiang: (1) Qing law, adminis-
tered by Manchu, Mongol, and Han military and (in the Urumchi area) civil officials, and (2) Muslim law (shari'ā) of the Hanafi school, administered by the beg and akhīnds (Ch. "kühng") of the native East Turkestani bureaucracy. Application of these legal systems was roughly divided along ethnic lines. Thus, even when in Altishahr, Han and Tungan merchants from China proper were subject to judgment and punishment according to the Qing code.

In the Urumchi area (Zhendi Circuit) they were under the direct supervision of magistrates, and in Altishahr cities that of the commander of the city defense battalion. Serious legal matters (murders, robberies, and lawsuits) that involved people from China proper fell ultimately under the jurisdiction of the seals office of each city.

Under certain circumstances, however, this juridical division by ethnic category did not hold. While less serious crimes among East Turkestani subjects probably seldom reached the attention of Manchu authorities, murders and thefts were supposed to be reported to military officials. And although these officials were advised "not to adhere rigidly to the statutes and precedents of China proper," this meant only that Confucian-influenced sentencing for familial crimes was to be partially modified, not fully abandoned. If among the East Turkestani a nephew killed his uncle, or a younger brother murdered his older brother, then these cases "naturally must be decided according to the statutes and precedents of China proper (neidi)." Only murders involving more distantly related clan members were to be treated according to Islamic law. Likewise, migrants or travelers from China proper were sometimes subject to Muslim law, particularly in cases that involved Han crimes against East Turkestanis. Horse thieves from China proper who stole Muslims' horses, for example, were to be dealt with according to the "old Muslim law"—decapitation followed by public display of the head. Other robberies were punished by chopping off perpetrators' fingers. To do otherwise, the court determined, would be "unfair." Fights between Chinese and East Turkestanis in Kashgar around 1850 seem to have fallen somewhere in between Qing law and shari'ā: they were to be adjudicated by the secretary for Muslim affairs (Hutou zhanging). The hakim beg and Kashgar akhīnds handled disputes between East Turkestani and foreign Muslims.

In addition to these overlapping legal systems, there were statutes directed specifically at Chinese merchants in Xinjiang. For example, the traditional prohibition on the export of metal implements (steel, iron, copper, and tin)

---

* Akhīnds were East Turkestani religious functionaries recognized by the Qing. Like begs, they were tax exempt and enjoyed official status. See Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," pp. 73–74–77.
Necessary, its subjects who traveled too far, or for those who exited the karun without proper documentation.32

The Ush Rebellion and Segregation Policies in Xinjiang

Five years after their conquest of Altishahr, Qing authorities were startled by an uprising in Ush that required over half a year to repress. Particularly worrisome was evidence that prior to taking up arms, the East Turkestan inhabitants of Ush had appealed for aid from Central Asian rulers sympathetic to the Makhțūn Mīrzā Khoja cause.

Severe misuse and exploitation of the Ush Muslim population lay behind this revolt: as the story comes down to us, hakim beg ʿAbd Allāh, a member of a Hami family ennobled by the Qing, gave his retainers (Ch. alebatu, from Mo. albatu) free rein and he himself engaged in extortions of the Ush populace. The Qing superintendent, Su-cheng, was not better: with his son he took East Turkestan women into the yamen and “displayed licentiousness,” then allowed them to be gang-raped by the servants.

The incident that ignited the Ush uprising seems to have been the impressment of 2,400 East Turkestan men in March of 1765 to transport chestnut seedlings (shiazao zhū, often translated “jujubes”).33 The porters mutinied not far from the city, fashioning clubs from the saplings to attack their military escort. Upon returning to Ush, the porters, joined by much of the city populace, slaughtered ʿAbd Allāh, Su-cheng, the garrisoning force, and several other officials. The violence of their rebellion was matched by the severity of the Qing response: when the city finally fell after a prolonged siege, Ush was totally depopulated, and those women, children, and elderly left alive were relocated to farms in the Yili region.34

After the retaking of Ush, Xinjiang military governor Ming-rui suggested several reforms aimed at preventing similar situations from occurring. Primary among these were measures putting the hakim begs of Altishahr’s cities under closer supervision by Qing military authorities to prevent nepotism, usurpation of functions assigned to lower beg officials, and other abuses. Another reform codified the protocol for meetings between beg and Qing military officials, while additional suggestions dealt with taxation and cadastral surveying. Somewhat curious, given that none of the accounts mention any Han role whatsoever in the uprising, was one item concerning Chinese merchants in Xinjiang. Ming-rui proposed:

The places where Chinese dwell (minren juchu) should be segregated. [The numbers of] traders from China proper will in future gradually in-

crease. If they live close to the officials and soldiers they can still be controlled and not allowed to foment incidents. [But] if they are permitted to follow their inclination and settle in among the Muslims (Huiren), this will easily cause trouble. I request that the relevant ambans be ordered to thoroughly investigate [merchants from China proper] and have them all move to areas of military residence to do their business. If they continue to live mixed among the Muslims, they are to be punished.35

According to this rule, approved by the court, merchants from China proper who journeyed to Altishahr for short or long stays were to reside in proximity to the Qing garrison in each city, segregated from the native East Turkestan population. There is no evidence that Chinese merchants were involved in the Ush uprising; perhaps it was simply nervousness at this early example of Altishahri unrest that led Qing officials to move to tighten the relatively lax rules that had governed Chinese merchants up to that point. More likely, however, it was the recent example of the 1755–58 uprisings in Mongolia that underlay the segregation policy. These loosely linked rebellions arose from noble and popular Mongol dissent over onerous corvée duties at the post stations and karun posts, and even greater fury at Chinese merchants and moneylenders.36 Han and Tungan traders in Xinjiang served an important purpose in supplying the military garrisons, and resident Chinese merchants provided a significant amount of commercial tax revenue, but Ming-rui and others now sought to minimize Han contact with the Muslim population lest the traumas caused by the commercial penetration of Mongolia be repeated in yet another Qing Inner Asian territory.

Historians in the twentieth century have made much of this policy of segregation in Xinjiang, and it has even been credited with assuring the peace for the six decades between the Ush uprising and the Jihāngīr war.37 Yet as we shall see, when merchants from China proper accepted the imperial invitation to ply their trade in Xinjiang, the segregation order was seldom rigidly enforced, and what segregated Chinese and East Turkestan communities did exist did not develop until after the troubles of 1826.

The Chineseness of Xinjiang Cities

“Diverse goods converge like the spokes on a wheel, trade doubles, livestock and vehicles are gathered; all is just as in China proper”—so He Shen (He-shen) imagined Xinjiang from his seat on the Grand Council in 1784.38

The expanding Chinese role in Xinjiang’s commercial development inspired Qing exiles and officials to record descriptions of a densely vitral urban
landscape, the teeming marketplaces overflowing with goods. The language used to describe Xinjiang’s growing towns (“just as in China proper”) is in sharp contrast to the bleak images of vast, lonely wastes traditionally found in Chinese poetry depicting the Western Regions. Consider, for example, Zhang Wei’s poem quoted at the head of this chapter, or Hong Liangji’s despairing lament, *Exiting the Pass*, written of his journey into exile in 1799–1800:

> For half a lifetime, never one idle stride.  
> Scaling the Five Peaks left my temples hoary white.  
> But now, outside the Wall, for ten thousand li,  
> East, west, north, south—Heaven’s Mountains all I see.

Qi-shi-yi’s 1777 *Record of Things Heard and Seen in the Western Regions* evokes a very different atmosphere in his description of the markets of Yarkand: “The bazaar street is ten li long. On every bazaar day the goods are gathered like clouds and the people cluster like bees. All manner of miraculous items and treasures may be found. The livestock and fruits in particular are beyond compare. People here are respectful to people from China (zhong-guo zhi ren) and love and honor the magistrates.”

Such bustle and bounty was of course due not only to the presence of merchants from China proper. Altishahr cities, particularly Yarkand and Kashgar, had been important commercial centers before the Qing conquest, and after 1759 South and Central Asian merchants contributed greatly to this picture of plenitude and vigorous commercial activity in Altishahr. But in eastern Xinjiang and Zhungaria, it was the Han and Tungan merchants who replicated the Chinese commercial scene just as peasants, exiles, and soldiers on the state farms were creating an agricultural landscape reminiscent of China proper.

**The Eastern March**

Since well before 1759, merchants from China proper had frequented Hami, Turfan, Barkol, and other cities on the Tianshan donglu, or Eastern March. East Turkestan residents in this area, moreover, had maintained close contacts with China, even in Ming times. But it was later, after the Qing conquest, that the Eastern March (which also included Gucheng, Kur Kara Usu, Pijan, and Urumchi itself) received the nickname “Little Soochow–Hangzhou” (xiao Su Hang) for its concentration of merchants and abundance of grain and other goods.

**HAMI**

The crossroads of trade and post-station routes to Zhungaria, Altishahr, and Gansu, Hami was, as we have seen, an important center for Qing trade with the Zunghars and, later, a base for merchants supplying Qing armies in Barkol and Zhungaria. With its military garrisons, merchant quarters, and old “Muslim city” (Huicheng), Hami may have been partially segregated, though apparently not in the manner Ming-rui suggested. In any case, separation of merchants from the local population was not a serious concern to the Qing in the Eastern March, and the sources thus do not distinguish clearly the ethnicity of merchants populating cities in this region, or the neighborhoods of these cities. Most notable here, rather, is the expansion of commercial activity and Han presence over time. As Qi-shi-yi described the city in 1777, there were large numbers of well-stocked merchants gathered primarily outside the west gate of the new city, which contained the yamens of the Qing administration. The Hami prince (jimuang) and his establishment lived in a citadel five li to the west; poor East Turkestani villages dotted the surrounding area. By 1804, we know, there were also markets and traders both inside and outside the prince’s old “Muslim city.” Forty years later, each city had a large, well-defined commercial sector. In the Qing compound, an inner wall contained the administrative buildings, principal state temples—including those to the Gods of War (Wu Miao) and Literature (Kuixing Lou)—as well as the military citadel (bingcheng): a broad avenue ran between this inner wall and the eastern outer wall, across which the temple to the God of Medicine and a mosque faced each other. On the northern end of this avenue, a prosperous area lined with shops straddled a Sentry gate in the northeast corner of the outer wall. Further off in the northeast suburbs lay an East Turkestani neighborhood.

West of this main city, a new, smaller cantonment had been built adjacent to the Hami prince’s walled palace. The inner compound consisted of housing for Qing military personnel and dependents, but between the inner and outer walls to the west was another commercial avenue where “soldiers and people (min) lived together.” Shops and civilian residences were concentrated around the northwest Sentry gate; to the southwest was a mosque, and just outside the southwestern gate the Hami jimuang’s residence. By 1846 there were three Han ancestral halls and temples in the immediate outskirts of Hami city, the Luo (1773), the Sun (1819), and Lu (1846), as well as a temple to the God of Wealth (caishen) dating from 1843—all indications of the growing numbers and economic clout of Han merchants.

The illustrations of the Hami cantonment printed in the 1846 *Gazetteer of*
Hami ignores new settlement and commercial development described in the gazetteer's own text, but indicate locations of some official structures as well as city walls (see Map 4 and Figure 3).44

TURFAN

At Hami the road to Urumchi split, one fork leading north of the Boghda Mountains to Barkol and Gucheng, and another south through Pijan (in 1782: "densely populated; merchants converge"45) to Turfan. The layout of Turfan was similar to Hami's, with a Manchu cantonment enclosing barracks, yamen, and official temples, and the East Turkestan population under the control of the Turfan jasak prince (Ch. zhasake junworing) growing fruit and cotton on karez-watered farmland surrounding the city. Besides the Manchu bannermen, the population of the garrison city itself was mostly Han and Tungan, who were not permitted to farm land privately, and thus may be assumed to have been primarily tradesmen.46 East Turkestan merchants from Altrishahr traded here as well, and even some Andijani merchants.47 The town was an emporium for silks and teas from China proper, which along with local grapes and melons were shipped westward to Urumchi; Turfan cotton was shipped eastward to China proper.48

There seems to have been considerable interaction between the merchants from China proper and Turfanis Muslims, although the Qing sources tend to enlighten us only when that interaction turned ugly. In 1803, for example, during the lunar year-end festivities, a Han, Zhang Liang'er, was observing a parade of Turfanis dancing in the streets when some youths insulted him in Turki. Zhang understood the language, however, so he gave chase. When A-bu-du-lu-pu, a bystander, intervened, Zhang turned to confront him instead of the escaping youths. Picking up some dried feces from the ground, Zhang thrust it in A-bu-du-lu-pu's face. Enraged, A-bu-du-lu-pu shoved Zhang, who fell awkwardly on some rocks and sustained injuries to his side and arm. A-bu-du-lu-pu and a friend of Zhang's named Li Quan then helped Zhang home, but he died nine days later.49

This story is interesting in that it suggests a fairly complex relationship between Han and native Muslims in Turfan. On the one hand, it reveals a degree of ethnic tension, but on the other, there is evidence of communal interaction as well. Zhang knew some Turki, at least, and Li Quan and A-bu-du-lu-pu were likewise able to communicate. It is hard to say how common such linguistic ability was among the Chinese and Turkestanis in Turfan or

* Jasak, the term used by the Qing for the hereditary heads of the eight Mongol banners and other nomad chiefs, was also applied to the prince of Turfan.
Mercantile Penetration of Xinjiang

Influx of Han homesteaders and merchants drove up prices for these items in "Little Soochow--Hsiangzhou," despite the area's relative proximity to China proper. In Altishahr, where there were no Chinese homesteaders and Han and Tungan merchants entered more slowly and never in such great numbers as in the Eastern March, demand for such mundane Chinese products remained relatively low.

Urumchi

Although Yili remained Xinjiang's political and military capital until after the 1864 Tungan rebellions, Urumchi became the region's commercial and financial center soon after the conquest, thanks to large numbers of troops, exiles, and peasants working state farms in the area, most of whom were permitted to settle permanently and bring out dependents. Many "merchants"—including private farmers and laborers as well as tradesmen—likewise took advantage of Urumchi's rich potential in the first decades after the conquest.

The rough military camp and earthworks built in 1755 (in Juijawan, northeast of the modern city) were replaced in 1758 by a proper walled enclosure about 500 meters in circumference and 3 meters high, with four gates. This was situated south of Hong Shan, in the area known today as Nanguan (along Jiefang Road, south of Rennin Road), and housed the superintendent's offices, military barracks, and so on. The area's growing garrison force and increased duties occasioned by the flourishing huiyuan land reclamation required that the city be rebuilt and expanded to twice its original size in 1763. This walled city, named Dihua, initially housed the entire Urumchi garrison; in 1765, however, ground was broken just to the north for New Dihua, and two years later the military government moved into these new quarters consisting of 2,000 barracks rooms and 627 "bays" (jiyan) for yamens, storehouses, granaries, and temples. (Today's "Nannan," "Beimen," and "Daximen" place-names recall features of New Dihua.) In 1772 the Manchu banner

*Sesame was at any rate difficult to come by in Xinjiang in the late eighteenth century.

as J. Yun discovered ([Wudumug 2a shi, p. 35, stanza 88 [Wuchen]);

Oh, the shine of fresh-pressed sesame paste!
What a shame the north-route merchants can't have a taste.
Because the "Heavenly Woman" you think you look upon,
Turns out to be just "peach blossom rice" of that man from Ruan.

(The "huama" [sesame] is "china," which Su Dongpo has discussed so discriminately.
But Westerners [i.e., local Urumchi residents] use hemp seeds for sesame, and the oil has a horrible taste. Unless you're a local, you can't eat it.)
troops and officials moved a few li northwest of Dihua (to a site at the western end of today's Nanchang Road, near the August First Agricultural Institute), to a new cantonment eight li in circumference, its four gates each signed in Manchu, Mongol, Chinese, and Arabic scripts. Officially called Gongning Cheng, this site later came to be popularly known as "the old Manchu city" (luo Mancheng). Dihua thereafter served as the Green Standard base. In 1825 a second Manchu city (xin Mancheng) was built just east of New Dihua (in the area of today's Jianguo Road) to house overflow Manchu bannermen and their dependents.32

Some historians have discussed the existence of separate Han and Manchu cities (such as Dihua and Gongning) in Urumchi, Barko, and Gucheng as examples of the "segregation policy" in effect in Xinjiang.33 This is misleading, for in fact Manchu garrisons (often including Mongol bannermen) were walled off from surrounding Han populations in China proper as well—most dramatically in Beijing, where on Dorgon's order in 1648 Han and Tungan were expelled from the entire walled city. This is indeed a segregation policy, but it has nothing to do with the regulation promulgated after the Ush rebellion. In fact, as will be discussed below, the special conditions in Altishahr often led to Green Standard troops and Manchu and Mongol bannermen sharing a walled citadel, with only East Turkestanis excluded; groups segregated in China proper could thus be integrated in Altishahr.

The official gazetteers of Urumchi tell the height levels, thicknesses, and circumstances of all these walls, and, read on their own, leave an impression of a grim frontier outpost, dominated by one, then two, then three fortresses. They neglect to mention the merchant community and commercial structures that threatened to engulf these compounds almost before their completion. From less formal sources we discover that what met the eye of an observer gazing south from the slopes of Hong Shan around 1770 was the Temple to Guandi, the theater, and the market.34

The presence of Guandi temples in Xinjiang cities is quite intriguing. According to Hong Liangji, exiled briefly to Xinjiang in 1800, they were ubiquitous outside the Pass, with even villages of only two to three households boasting a small temple to this God of War. Guandi temples commemorated Guan Yu (A.D. 162–220), the famous hero of the Three Kingdoms period and a deity of complex cultural and political importance. Starting in the early eighteenth century, the Qing brought the Guandi temples under official control, enlisting the popular god for the official cult. That the Qing constructed Guandi Miao in the garrisons or Han areas of most Xinjiang cities, often with merchant "contributions," suggests the enlistment of architecture and cult to the purpose of empire building—a practice that resembles the Roman con-

struction of state temples, fora, baths, and amphitheaters in frontier cities in Spain, Gaul, and Britain.35

But to return to Urumchi. To a traveler in 1777, the city was "the most prosperous and populated place outside the Pass." Further, "Because [Urumchi] is easily approached from all four directions, the name-brand stores (zhaodi dianmu) crowd together like fish scales; the marketplaces and thoroughfares are broad. People come from all over to the teahouses and wineshops. There are thespians, singers, and skilled craftsmen—nothing is lacking."36 Han and Tungan merchants had moved into and reshaped the old Dihua city; there was now a "South China Lane" (juanmen xiang), where people from the affluent south-central provinces congregated. There were busy markets both north and south of the old city as well.37

We have some more precise indications of the pace of Urumchi's commercial development. As early as 1762, merchants from China proper had opened 500 shops or stalls in Urumchi's markets and were growing cash crops on over 300 mu of land in surrounding areas. It was this that led banner Commander-in-Chief Jing-ge-li to develop a plan to tax Chinese merchants in Xinjiang; as tax rates remained constant, the commercial tax takings for 1763–77 reveal the rapidly growing numbers of merchants in the Urumchi area (see Figure 4).38 By 1784 there were so many privately owned shops and dwellings in central parts of the city that Manchu garrison officials were forced to reduce rents on the buildings they rented out to more remote locations. A baojiu survey undertaken in the last year of the Qianlong reign (1795) revealed that out of a total of 20,662 civilian households (129,642 individual men, women, and children) in the Urumchi region, 11,545 households (43,791 individuals) were registered as merchants; 35% of these "merchant" households were engaged in commercial agriculture, paying tax in silver, working a total of 27,090 mu of land—the rest, presumably, were engaged in business. There were 143 additional merchant households working land in Turfan, Kur Kara Usu, and Jinghe, outside the Urumchi administrative region.39

Foreign tourists in Urumchi today sometimes complain that the city is "too Chinese" in comparison with the Central Asian atmosphere of southern Xinjiang; many believe Urumchi's East Turkestan culture has been erased by Han immigration and architecture. In fact, the Uyghur population and cul-

* As discussed in Chapter 3, Chinese migrants to Xinjiang who were not established on state farms (tuntian) were classified as merchants (shangmin), even if engaged in agriculture. This was perhaps because they had not been registered peasants in China proper to begin with.
dates and opened an academy in 1771, specialist book retailers set up shop, and “the sound of recitations could be heard.”

Even without books, there was plenty to do. The several wineshops in the city offered music and performances nightly, “reminiscent of Beijing.” One could get a seat for several cash. Women as well as men came great distances to attend these shows. The players included professional boy singers and many skilled amateurs, often exiles. One group of convicts organized a troop to perform kunqu opera. Lao Liu, the carpenter, “was best at female roles. Though over 30, he had not lost his looks.” There were bordello too, on the back streets. Ji Yun provides a guide to these districts:

Topsy-turvy clothing, at night no screen over the door,
lovely flowers lent to men to gaze upon as they wish.
If people coming west ask where the gay (fenglin) places are,
Look for a pole a zhang high, at the end of a yellow earthen wall.

(Where there is a pole erected in the house, these are the women’s lanes. This is also called ‘sacrificing to the god’s ear.’)90

Merchants were a flamboyant and powerful presence in the city. Recent arrivals were often confused by the local style that wealthy merchants affected, with their long coats of yak’s hair serge dyed such colors as “pine” and “rose”—considered women’s colors by northern Chinese. The merchants organized native-place associations, each with a temple and festivals to its own city god. “As soon as the Liangzhou festival is over, it’s time for the Ganzhou one. Pipes and drums greet the god, not stopping all day long.” As elsewhere in the empire, these organizations exercised great influence in Urumchi, commanding the allegiance of sojourners from their respective native cities. Ji Yun’s barber was required to go to the temple for four or five days running during his native-place festival and dared not open for business even when an eminent customer needed a shave and a trim.91

The Northern March

Yili and Tarbagatai were more remote than Urumchi, with greater populations of bannermen (including Chahar, Oirat, Sibe, and Solon as well as Manchu troops); many of these nomad soldiers were actively engaged in animal husbandry in the mountains. The massive land reclamation efforts relied primarily on state farms, and there was less private homesteading of land
than in the Eastern March. The annual Kazakh trade required government shipments of silk from China proper and cotton cloth from Altishahr; official limitation of this trade to the trade pavilions seems to have assured that, for the first half-century at least, private trade remained a sideshow to the main attraction of textiles-for-livestock. Official business in the Northern March, then, played a relatively larger role, and private commerce a smaller one, than in the eastern or southern region of Xinjiang.

**Yiili**

Although of less economic importance than Urumchi, Yiili was nevertheless home-away-from-home for growing numbers of Chinese merchants from the latter half of the eighteenth century on. And despite the fact that Han Green Standard troops and Manchu bannermen were stationed in separate garrisons of the Yiili complex (see Chapter 3), Chinese merchants clearly moved among all nine cities. For the most part, however, we are aware of their arrival only because special officials were posted to handle them. In 1764, Military Governor Ming-ruí predicted that lawsuits would inevitably arise as a result of the large number of merchants living among the bannermen and their families. Ming-ruí requested that a special civil commissioner (lishi tongzhi) be established in Yiili to handle cases involving Chinese and bannermen, as well as certain other civil affairs. The court approved the request, stipulating that only officials fluent in Mongolian and Manchu as well as Chinese could hold the position. Significantly, here in Yiili the dynasty did not respond to this evidence of potentially troublesome ethnic interaction by tightening segregationist policies.

The next military governor, Agou, pointed out in 1767 that Yiili now boasted a population of over 20,000 bannermen and Taranchis, several thousand Green Standard troops and exiles, and a constantly growing number of Chinese merchants congregating in the cities of Huiyuán (the military governor's headquarters) and Suiding (a Green Standard garrison). Among these traders, "few were good," and a single magistrate was not enough to handle all the trouble that arose. Deputy magistrates (xujian) were therefore selected from among worthy officials in Shaanxi and Gansu for posting to Huiyuán and Suiding, where they governed the merchants, adjudicated legal matters, looked after granaries, and supervised the jails. Five years later, Suhe declared a tax and inspection system on transactions of livestock, despite imperial instructions that Yiili not rigidly adopt the institutions of China proper (where such sales were officially supervised). But, Suhe reasoned, merchants from all over, many of them disreputable, had been "gathering like clouds," and it was necessary to crack down on a wave of rustling incidents. As Yiili's population continued to swell with soldiers, military dependents, merchants, and Muslims, the court approved further administrative changes to accommodate an expanding agenda of civil duties. In 1780 the current civil commissioner was retitled "commissioner for civil pacification" (fumin tongzhi) and assigned to handle criminal cases. Two additional deputy magistrates were appointed at the same time, bringing the total number of these officials to four.

By the early nineteenth century, Yiili could boast at least one of the diversions of urban Chinese living. In 1808, there were two opera troupes in the Yiili region. Dramatic pursuits were not, of course, what Gaozong or his son had in mind for the homesteaders and bannermen defending the frontier, and to prevent farmers and bannermen youths (zidi) from falling into low-class (xiula) ways, Military Governor Song-yun simply forbade the troupes from recruiting any new members. The Jiaqing emperor found this response wanting in severity, however, and, reminding Song-yun that Yiili was a military camp where the banners should dedicate themselves to martial drilling, he ordered that the troupes be driven back to China proper.

**Tarbagatai**

Tarbagatai's administration underwent much the same expansion, with gradual appointments of civil officials outside the banner system to accommodate the influx of merchants, whose number was thought to include many undesirables. In 1766 Shaanxi and Gansu dispatched a civil commissioner to Tarbagatai to inspect and guard against cases of banditry among the "increasing numbers of merchants coming and going since the autumn of 1765," and to look after grain supplies. By 1819 the merchant population was large enough to require the posting of secretaries literate in Chinese. In the past, Tarbagatai's affairs had mostly involved "barbarians," so only the Manchu and Mongolian written languages were used in the transaction of official business. But with the numbers of Han and Tungan merchants in the city increasing daily and the "surprising frequency" of brawls, theft, and murder, the need arose for personnel able to record testimony in the original Chinese. Thus an unfortunate exile, Li Tong, originally of the Board of Punishments in the capital, was kept on for an additional three years to handle such business after the completion of his three-year sentence. (Apparantly it was difficult to get qualified Han officials for Tarbagatai service otherwise, for in 1829 another exile was similarly retained after doing his time.)

Despite the need for such officials, however, Tarbagatai never seemed to attract merchants from China proper in such numbers as other Xinjiang cities, perhaps because of its severe northern climate and the fact that official trade took priority in dealings with the Kazakhs. Whatever the reason, a memorialist later complained that the paucity of Han in Tarbagatai had inhibited his
land reclamation efforts. There were only 141 Han households resident in the city circa 1834, and 47 of these “households” consisted of a single man each.58

The Southern March

The Qing did not open state farms in Altishahr for subjects from China proper until after the 1830 Kokandi invasion. For the first 70 years of Qing rule in the region, then, except for Green Standard soldiers and a small number of Chinese enslaved to begs, all other Han and Tungan in southern Xinjiang were officially classified as “merchants.” Indeed, most were in fact engaged in commerce, with only a small number raising crops on government land or land rented from begs. Merchants from China proper settled in Altishahr somewhat more slowly and in smaller numbers than they did in the Eastern and Northern Marches. Although they could travel, trade, and live indefinitely in Altishahr cities, they were not allowed to bring out families or marry locally until the 1830s. Whereas in Urumchi and other places in the Eastern March cities resembling those in China proper were created in the first few decades after 1759, in Altishahr the Qing occupation produced a pattern of Qing walled garrisons constructed within or beside older East Turkestan cities. Before 1828, Chinese merchants dwelt within these Qing citadels, near them, or among the East Turkestan population; no general rule defines their residence patterns.59 After Jihângir’s invasion, a more segregated pattern did emerge in Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, and Yarkand, the cities most threatened by Kokand and the Makhdûmzâdas.

Karashahr

For a traveler proceeding southwest along the post-station route from Turfan, the first large city encountered was Karashahr. It consisted, in fact, of three discrete settlements and the pastureland in the Tianshan to the north. Karashahr itself was an old fortress in the valley of the Yulduz (Ch. Kaidu) River, first occupied by the Manchus in 1757, who placed it under the command of a superintendent with a small force. The walls were rebuilt in 1778, 1797, and 1794. The East Turkestan towns of Korla (to the southwest), and Bugur (west of Korla) fell under Karashahr’s jurisdiction, and at the time of the Qing conquest were populated by only a few hundred households each of Dolans.60

* Dolan (Ch. duolan or duoeur) was a Turki name for the mountain people who pastured Khoja Jihan’s horses on the southern slopes of the Tianshan. The Qing considered them a variety of East Turkestanis (Huiiz). Qi Yunshi, comp., Xichu yaolu. 2110.

Qing gave lands in this part of the Tianshan to a group of Khoshuuts, and after the return of the Torghtus from the Volga region in 1771, a large portion of this Oirat tribe were resettled in the Karashahr region and encouraged to farm as well as pasture animals.61 When Qi-shi-yi passed through in the 1770s he was not much impressed by the Torghtus, finding the men larcenous and the women meretricious. Torght children were often sold into slavery among the East Turkestanis, and some were resold in Badakhshan and Hindustan. Of course the refugees had only recently settled in Karashahr after an odyssey during which many of their number had perished; despite Qing aid, they remained extremely poor. Qi-shi-yi’s account must be read circumspectly.62

Qi-shi-yi wrote that Torghtus and East Turkestanis lived in the small city of Karashahr. (He did not mention any merchants present, and where he encountered Chinese tradesmen and busy merchants elsewhere in Xinjiang he usually described them.) By the first decade of the nineteenth century, however, there was a sizeable community of Han and Tungan merchants in the Karashahr region. We first learn of this in a case involving allegations of extortion and other abuses on the part of Karashahr’s superintendent, Yu-qing, in 1807. Yu-qing was accused of using capricious arrest and strong-arm tactics to extort payments from merchants running a still and pawnshops in Karashahr. Investigations revealed that the still had opened only recently; the bootleggers had formerly run a mill. Because merchants in town needed liquor for New Year celebrations and processions of temple gods, the pair diversified, probably during the tenure of Yu-qing’s predecessor (Lai-wu, served 1804–6), and began distilling some of the grain ground in their mill into spirits. Similarly, the pawnshops were not exclusively engaged in pawnbroking. Rather, they were dry-goods stores, none highly capitalized, whose managers occasionally took goods in pawn at 3 percent monthly interest.63

Of note here are the hints about the rate at which merchants from China proper arrived in Karashahr. If we assume that Chinese trading communities had to achieve a certain population before such secondary industries as distilling or financial services like pawnbroking could be locally profitable, then Karashahr reached that stage probably in the decade prior to 1807. (An official investigating Yu-qing reported that there were no formal pawnshops [daandang] in Altishahr, only Karashahr’s dry-goods stores with their sideline pawnbroking operations.)64

Another indication that the numbers of Chinese merchants in Karashahr increased around this time is a request in 1830 by the Karashahr superintendent, Ha-ban-a, to station a detachment of troops in Korla and Bugur, because “in the two Muslim towns under Karashahr’s jurisdiction . . . Han merchants (maoyi Hanmin) have been gradually increasing,” and owing to
the distance from the Karashahr garrison to these towns, special precautions were necessary. Clearly, Han residence in Muslim cities was not considered illegal, though it was a source of concern. The next year, the authorities tallied the Chinese merchants in Karashahr for tax purposes. They discovered 1,457 shops in Karashahr and 446 shops at the post stations (perhaps including Korla and Bugur).^{74}

KUCHA

The next major city along the taizhan route stood behind an old city wall of willow staves reinforced with earth and sand. The Qing moved into Kucha in 1758 and set soldiers to work building yamens and temples. The outer wall was rebuilt in 1793. In 1821 there were 369 businesses in town managed by Han or Tungan merchants. For Kucha we do have some evidence of segregation, but only for a later period: a traveler in 1873, describing the city as if it had been before the Qing loss of Altishah or Tungan rebels and Ya'qib Beg, mentions a wall dividing the town into two sections, one for the “Chinese” garrison and traders, as well as the “Kalmak” (i.e., Manchus and Mongols of the banners), and the other for the Muslims.^{75}

AKSU

Qi-shi-yi noted Aksu's large size, the volume and variety of its grains, fruits, and other produce, as well as the many camels, horses, cattle, and sheep to be found in the city. Good local artisans excelled in jade carving and saddlery; the people were rich and litigious. “ Merchants from China proper and traders from foreign tributary countries crowd in like fish scales or clusters of stars; the streets and markets are in commotion. Whenever you happen upon bazaar time, you are packed in shoulder-to-shoulder, your sweat falls like rain and you are enveloped in a cloud of waves.”^{76}

Aksu's fortifications were more elaborate than Kucha's or Karashahr's, with both inner and outer walls, the su dâuza — water gate — where the Aksu River entered the city, and towers at the corners and gates. The neighborhood of one of the towers, the Guanyin Ge, was a particularly busy market frequented by Han and foreign merchants. Along the dense web of lanes and alleys within the walls were teahouses, shops, and inns; the official buildings and barracks for Manchu and Green Standard troops also lay within the cantonment. The bazaar, five li (2.5 km) in length, extended between the Qing cantonment and the Muslim city below. This was a crossroads for all Altishahr and a major jade entrepôt. Affairs of the private merchants in Aksu initially fell under the purview of officials in Ush, but after the revelation of Gao Pu's jade smuggling scheme in 1778, officials were posted to Aksu to inspect merchant road passes.

Residence in the Aksu area seems to have been only roughly divided along ethnic lines. Chinese merchants inhabited the cantonment along with Qing military personnel. Whether East Turkestani and foreign merchants were excluded from residence there is unknown; they could enter to transact daily business. In 1828, while searching for a site on which to quarter 2000 soldiers newly posted to the city, Nayanceng noted in a memorial that the East Turkestani mosque lay outside the city to the northeast, while just southeast of the city were “shops and houses of traders” (maoyi puhu). It is unclear from Nayanceng's reference whether or not this commercial district was exclusively or primarily Han and Tungan; however, the 330 shops and 859 residences of Chinese merchants recorded in the 1832 survey may have been in this area. The outlying towns of Bai and Sairam were under Aksu's jurisdiction and were primarily East Turkestani.^{77}

USH

After the repression of the rebellion in Ush, the Qing rebuilt and repopulated this city almost from scratch. A new fortress, called “Yongning” (“eternal peace”), was erected abutting a steep hillside at a remove from the remains of the old town (see Map 5). Nayanceng later renamed this citadel “Fuhua” (roughly, “confident transformation”). The authorities located the garrison barracks and government offices within the citadel, and official temples, including the Imperial Hall (Wanshou Gong), were built on the heights, with the altars to land and grain behind them. The Guandi temple bore an inscription on copper from the Qianlong emperor, commemorating the Qing victory over the Muslims who rebelled in Ush in 1765.^{78}

After the rebellion, the Qing moved hundreds of households of East Turkestan from Aksu, Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan to repopulate the area and revive its agriculture; 810 East Turkestani families farmed and paid grain tax by 1780, and 38 additional families worked farmland allotted to the city's beg officials. By 1857, there were 2,938 registered East Turkestani households under the jurisdiction of Ush. Most townspeople lived in mudbrick structures in an unwalled area below and southeast of the Qing citadel.

Despite the small numbers of Han and Tungan in Ush in the 1780s, by 1821 Ush registered 746 large and small shops and domiciles of merchants from China proper. The Chinese traders were governed by officials in the yamen of the city defense battalion, which handled civilian litigation, interrogated vagrants, arrested miscreants, and set market prices on commodities. Two squad leaders (hazorg) patrolled the bazaar, reporting major cases to the amban.

There were many foreigners — primarily Central Asians — in both Aksu and Ush: in the latter city in 1828 there were 120 households of Andijanis, of whom 50 had resided there for over ten years and were primarily engaged
in agriculture. The other 70 households consisted of traders who frequently crossed the karun to return to Kokand, and of whom many were apprehended with stocks of rhubarb and tea. Interestingly, the Han and Tungan merchants seem to have outnumbered the Andijanis in Ush, insofar as we may compare figures for Chinese shops in 1851 with those for Andijani households in 1828.\footnote{\textsuperscript{79}}

**Kashgar**

Yang Yingju arrived in the westernmost city of Xinjiang in April 1760, and in his reports mentioned no Han merchants. Two years later, having found the old city of Kashgar too congested, the Qing authorities constructed a new walled compound to contain the barracks, treasuries, granaries, armories, Imperial Hall (Wanshou Gong), and Guandi Temple. They built this city two li (1 km) to the northwest on a riverbank, the former site of Barbak ad-Din’s orchard estate. This cantonment, called in Chinese “new city” (xincheng) or by the official name Laining Cheng, came to be known by Turkestans as Gilbag, “rose garden.” Not long after the new city’s completion, it was already home to 28 establishments run by merchants from China proper selling food, drink, and small sundries; there were five more, including one large shop, in the old city. Five years after that, in 1767, there were a total of 50 shops, stalls, and restaurants in both old and new sections of Kashgar; many were situated in a dense quarter outside Laining Cheng. The influx of Chinese merchants was clearly quite rapid. Moreover, although none was highly capitalized and most of the new shops added between 1762 and 1810 were ranked “small” or “medium,” during the first few years at least the businesses expanded over time: in 1762 their average size was 2.75 rooms or “bays” (jian) by 1767 that had increased to 3.4 jian each.\footnote{\textsuperscript{80}}

By Qi-shi-yi’s time, the old and new cities “adjoined closely”—probably through development of the land originally separating them. The Manchu traveler describes the city’s luxurious style in the 1770s, the wealth of its inhabitants, and the skill of its goldsmiths, jade carvers, singers, and dancers. Qi-shi-yi found the East Turkestanis here better tempered than in Kashgar and parts east, where “the Muslims are violent and the villages uncivilized.” A later visitor tells us of the Friday bazaars held in the old city and horse markets outside the wall. Although Kirghiz brought a great number of horses for sale here, apparently the Chinese preferred mules.\footnote{\textsuperscript{81}}

In 1794, councillor Yong-bao had an extramural commercial quarter of 150 jian erected outside Laining’s south gate, to be rented to merchants from China proper who “previously lived in the Muslim city.” This looks like an attempt—albeit 30 years after the promulgation of the edict mandating such
procedures—to segregate the Han and Tungan population from the native Kashgarlik. To be sure, control over these sojourners, single male merchants must have been one reason for building these shops and accommodations, but the official need for rent revenue was surely equally important. As we have seen, revenue from Kashgar’s official commercial activities, primarily rents and sale of silk, amounted to almost half the value of Kashgar’s annual xierjiang allotment (see Table 11). Moreover, if it was a segregation measure, segregation per se was not strictly enforced. Merchants from China proper continued to live in the Kashgar Muslim city well after this date: in 1860, there were “in the new and old city” a total of 96 Chinese merchant establishments not on government property (hence owing tax, not rent). Furthermore, we know that somewhat later Han and/or Tungan even resided and traded in the East Turkestan villages of Kashgar’s hinterland.43

During the invasion led by Jahangir, Chinese merchants joined with the Manchu bannermen and Green Standard forces to defend Laining citadel. This merchant militia included traders from Zhili, Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Shanxi, and the Jiangnan, and almost 900 died fighting the Khoja supporters. As it did for the East Turkestanis who died in the line of duty, the Qing government arranged for relief funds to be sent to the families of the deceased merchants and honored them with temple sacrifices according to the same protocol followed for dead footsoldiers.44

The Mahdumzada followers destroyed Laining Cheng, and the Qing rebuilt the city, as it did Manchu cantonments in Yangi Hisar and Yarkand. Fortunately for the dynasty, Kashgar authorities were able to recover a remarkable amount of money by confiscating the property of East Turkestanis who had joined the Khojas and by selling off Andijani merchants’ stocks of tea and rhubarb. With 107,089 tael thus obtained from “rebels” Abd Allah and Mi-las-Sulayman, the Qing built (among other things) a strong new fort about twenty li (10 km) southeast of the Kashgar Muslim city, furnished with barracks, yamens, storehouses, temples, and 4,318 commercial units to be rented out. Qing officials referred to this new city at the time of its construction as the “Manchu city” (Mancheng), as opposed to “Muslim city” (Huicheng) or “old city” (Jiucheng) for old Kashgar. Locally the fort was “Chinese city” (Shahir-i-Khatal) or “new city” (Yangi Sahr). Not until somewhat later did this Qing cantonment come to be known as the “Han city” (Hancheng).45

With the construction of a new cantonment, including merchant quarters, after the great watershed of the Jahangir invasion, something resembling true segregation for Chinese merchants and East Turkestanis had arisen in Kashgar. Although they still attended the Friday bazaars, which Qing officials supervised in a cursory fashion,46 the merchants from China proper now lived a good distance from Muslim Kashgar.

YANGI HISAR

Eastern Turkestan is itself walled in by mountain ranges to the north, west, and south. From Kashgar, foreign trade routes continued west past the karao line and through the Pamir passes to Kokand and elsewhere in Central Asia. The main tazihan route turned back southeast, however, continuing along the string of oases between the mountains (the Kunlun) and the desert (the Taklamakan). Yangi Hisar lay two days’ journey along this road from Kashgar, in open country at the base of a barren ridge. The town conducted much trade with the Kirghiz and was famous for its dancing girls and musicians.

After taking the city in 1779, the Qing divided the existing mud-walled town into two sections with a wall running east to west through the center and quartered the troops and officers in the northern half. In 1775, with a donation from the hakim beg, Sultan Khoja, the Manchus built a new extension for the garrison, abutting the northern wall of the old city, which they left entirely to the East Turkestanis. A single gate through the three-meter-high wall afforded communication between Muslim and Manchu quarters of Yangi Hisar.47

There were no Chinese merchant shops recorded in Yangi Hisar until 1794, when five small enterprises were registered; these were first taxed in 1806. In 1811, there were 33 shops. Nineteen years later, however, authorities in Yangi Hisar mustered a militia of almost 500 Chinese “merchants and exiles” to help defend the city against the Kokandi invasion. Chinese homesteading was not yet permitted in Altishahr, and as there were no large exile colonies and those few exiles present were generally enslaved to beg, it seems likely that the bulk of this force was composed of merchants. (At that time, the soldiers stationed in Yangi Hisar and nearby tazihan amounted to only 360 men.)48

As in Kashgar and Yarkand, the Qing rebuilt its Yangi Hisar cantonment after Jahangir’s attack. Mobilizing confiscated rebel funds, authorities constructed new yamens, barracks, temples, and storehouses some distance away from the Muslim city behind crenelated battlements seven meters high and a surrounding ditch seven meters deep. Also in the new settlement were 503 units to be rented to merchants from China proper. This cantonment was called “Manchu city” by officials in charge and known as “new city” (Yangi Sahr) in Turki.49

YARKAND

Two or three days’ journey further southeast took a traveler to Yarkand, a city reportedly more opulent even than Kashgar, and a major entrepôt for Xinjiang’s foreign trade with the Himalayan countries and South Asia. The old city, which had served as Khoja Jihan’s stronghold, was contained within
Mercantile Penetration of Xinjiang

impressed visitors with its free-spirited ways: Qi-shi-yi describes dancing girls, actors, and “sodomry in the style of Fujian and Guangdong.” Women were generally not veiled, regardless of social standing, and horseless—not a meat permitted within Islam’s dietary restrictions—was openly sold and commonly consumed, a practice not to be found in contemporary Western Turkestan. One East Turkestan’s complaint to a British agent in the 1870s, during the reign of Ya’qub Beg, is particularly revealing about life in Yarkand under Qing rule.

What you see on market day now... is nothing to the life and activity there was in the time of the Khitai [i.e., Chinese]. Today the peasantry come in with their fowls and eggs, with their cotton and yarn, or with their sheep and cattle and horses for sale; and they go back with printed cottons, or fur caps, or city made boots, or whatever domestic necessities they may require, and always with a good dinner inside them, and then we shut up our shops and stow away our goods till next week’s market day brings back our customers. Some of us go out with a small venture in the interim to the rural markets around, but our great day is market day in town. It was very different in the Khitai time. People then bought and sold every day, and market day was a much jollier time. There was no Kazi Rais with his six muhtasibs armed with the dira to fling people off to prayers, and drive the women out of the streets, and nobody was bastinadoed for drinking spirits and eating forbidden meats. There were musicians and acrobats, and fortune-tellers and story-tellers, who moved about amongst the crowds and diverted the people. There were flags and banners and all sorts of pictures floating at the shop fronts, and there was the jallab, who painted her face and decked herself in silks and laces to please her customers... Yes, there were many rogues and gamblers too, and people did get drunk, and have their pockets picked. So they do now, though not so publicly, because we are now under Islam, and the Shariat is strictly enforced.

This positive impression of the commercial conditions pertaining in Yarkand under Qing rule was echoed by a “Mussulman merchant” in conversation with an explorer in the employ of Britain’s Great Game rival, Russia. The merchant believed that “thanks to Chinese rule there was a safety in the country that was favorable to the development of trade such as had never existed before in consequence of the ceaseless robberies and internecine wars.” He pointed to the Chinese shops and caravanserais for the accommodation of itinerant merchants as examples of Yarkand’s advantages. Chinese merchants arrived in Yarkand around the same time as they came

a sturdy earth wall over five kilometers in circumference and ten meters high, entered by five gates. On taking the city in 1759, the Qing chose not to construct new fortifications, but simply added gatehouses and guardhouses, built new official buildings where necessary, and where possible converted existing structures to government use. The contributions of officials, soldiers, and Chinese merchants paid for the erection of a Guandi Temple. Most Qing offices were situated in a corner of the western section of the city, separated from East Turkestan dwellings by only a thin earthen wall.

During the Jihangir war, the yamen, barracks, and treasury in Yarkand were all destroyed. Nayanceng, dispatched to the region to oversee postwar reconstruction, was concerned about the close proximity of Qing personnel and the East Turkestanis under the old arrangement. He thus proposed that a new cantonment be built on higher ground a little over a kilometer west of old Yarkand. Funds realized from the sale of rebel property sufficed to build this “Mancheng,” and new walls, temples, yamens, and barracks, as well as 1,132 jian for rental to Chinese merchants were erected on the new site within a compound about 1.5 kilometers in circumference. In addition to occupying official rental space, merchants from China proper built outside the new city and in the direction of old Yarkand, so that eventually a bazaar extended from the Mancheng all the way to Yarkand’s east gate.

In 1830, a Kokand-sponsored army torched these extramural houses and businesses as the infuriated Chinese merchants watched from the ramparts of the new city (see Chapter 6). Partially as a result of this event, the final reshaping of Yarkand’s urban structure under the Manchu was the erection of an outer wall in 1835. This new, rectangular rampart surrounding the Manchu city was over two kilometers in circumference and allowed those merchants who had formerly lived outside to reside within a defensive perimeter.

Qi-shi-yi described the density, activity, and prosperity of Yarkand with his accustomed metaphors (“clouds,” “bees,” “the teeth of a comb”). Already in 1777 he noted the presence of merchants “from Shansi, Shensi, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang [who], balking at neither distance nor danger, sell their goods here.” There were also Andijanis, Kashgaris, and other foreign merchants. The old city’s main bazaar extended the length of the town between the eastern and western gates, with a circular marketplace in the center of town. These were the venues of the Friday bazaar, but the many “Chinese shops” along this road, “some exceedingly well built,” did a busy trade all through the week. The street running from the east gate to the Manchu city was “a lively scene of activity and trade,” lined with restaurants and stalls, with “the cattle market and gallows on one side, and the horse market on the other.”

Despite its many madrasa colleges and mosques, Yarkand under the Qing
to Kashgar: within a few years after the Manchu conquest of Altishahr. In 1763, Yarkand superintendent Xin-zhu taxed nineteen merchants who occupied 44 jian (an average shop size of about 2.3 "bays" or rooms). By 1822, there were 142 shops liable for commercial tax and three merchants farming government land. In addition, 43 businesses operated in buildings rented from East Turkestan, including the hakim beg. The average shop size at this time was 29 jian, but in fact size seems to have been unevenly distributed, with a small number of large stores and many tiny stalls. We have no more commercial tax figures for Yarkand after this time, but there are some indications of the numbers of individual merchants: 128 merchants from Zhili, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan, led by a Tungan, Jin Zhonggu, died while defending Yarkand from Jahangir’s followers in 1826. As in Kashgar, these men were honored with official sacrifices and their relatives compensated. In 1830, a fifth-rank beg named Duo-li-sū-pi said that there were over 400 Chinese traders in Yarkand. Finally, we have the estimates from British agents: 200 resident Han merchants in the early 1830s (excluding Tungans, Han artisans, and itinerants); 5000 “Chinese and Tungan traders, shopkeepers, and followers” in the new city circa 1861; and, “during the Chinese occupation,” a “floating population of nearly 10,000 followers, sutlers, artificers, peddlars, and merchants whose activity brought life, wealth and prosperity to the city.” A new policy, enacted in 1831, allowed Han settlers and merchant and Green Standard dependents to move permanently to Altishahr (see Chapter 6). Although these later figures of 5000 and 10,000 are impressionistic, they indicate a sizeable increase in the numbers of Han and Tungan in Yarkand, an increase probably brought about by this policy change. (Available figures for the numbers of Chinese shops and merchants in Xinjiang cities are summarized in Table 12.)

**Khotan**

The easternmost city in southern Altishahr, Khotan, was actually a group of six small towns. The Qing occupied the largest of these, Yiliqi (Tu. Elichi), walling off the southeast corner of the existing earthen compound for the headquarters of the commandant and military personnel and leaving the rest of the city to the East Turkestanis. Yiliqi came to be known as Hetian Cheng (Khotan City).

Although jade and gold brought some traders and adventurers to Khotan from China proper, perhaps because of their small numbers or Khotan’s relative remoteness, they were never officially taxed, nor were government rental units constructed to house them. Instead, the few resident merchants, who dealt in jade, gold, carpets, and local silk, wool, and gold filigree fabrics, rented space from East Turkestanis and lived among them. They included merchants from Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Gansu, organized under a xiangyue headman. The city walls, official buildings, and regional post stations were repaired after Jahangir, but as the threat of invasion was never so great here as in Kashgar, Yang Hisar, and Yarkand, no new city was constructed until 1884 (when Xinjiang’s new provincial authorities implemented junzi-style administration throughout Altishahr and at the same time built a separate military compound in Khotan).

**"Manchu Cities" or "Chinese Cities"? Rectifying the Names**

Zeng Wenwu and Lin Enxian, when discussing divided cities and removed cantonments in Xinjiang, use the term “Hancheng” (“Han city,” or “Chinese
city”) for the Qing citadels, regardless of the time period in question. This is highly misleading, for, as shown above, these city sections or fortresses were referred to as “Mancheng” (Manchuria city) or “Xincheng” (new city) when first completed.

Once again, it is instructive to see what Wei Yuan, that early Chinese nationalist, had to say on the matter. On reconstruction in Altishahr after Jihangir, he wrote, “According to the original Muslim custom, [Altishahr] had no walled cities. When Xinjiang was first pacified in the Qianlong period, beside the Muslim villages shoulder-high walls (qiang) were erected; these were called “Hancheng.” They contained only the official yamens, barrack, granaries, and treasuries; the merchant (shangmin) market streets were all outside the Hanchengs, or mixed among the Muslim houses. Therefore in the uprisings of 1826, the four cities [of western Altishahr] were easily lost.”

Wei Yuan is wrong on three counts here. As shown in this chapter, some places in Altishahr did in fact have fortified cities before the Qing conquest, the Qing did not in all cases construct cantonments in Qianlong times, and such cantonments as were built were not at the time called “Hancheng”—at least not in Qing sources available today. Why, in any case, would the cantonments be called “Han cities” if the Han merchants lived outside? This absurdity, inherent in Wei’s argument and in the terminology employed by Zeng, Lin, and others, is most patent in a sentence from the Xinjiang jianshi, the official line on Xinjiang’s past, published in 1980 in the People’s Republic: “The Qing dynasty prohibited people of the Han nationality from going to southern Xinjiang, and even if there were [Han] merchants there to trade, they were only allowed to live near the Hancheng.”

The distinction between “Mancheng,” or “Xincheng,” on the one hand, and “Hancheng,” on the other, is not a trivial or pedantic one. Though these nineteenth- and twentieth-century historians may not even have been aware of the terminological shift they were executing, in doing so they have contributed to the historiographical erasure of the Manchu role in the creation of the empire and the confusion of “Qing” and “China” by turning Qing cities in Xinjiang into Chinese ones retroactively. The proposal by Gong Zizhen (Wei’s contemporary and colleague) to sinicize Xinjiang’s population, economy, and environment (see Conclusion) is analogous, as are attempts in the early Republic to redefine “Chinese” in politically expedient ways.

Qing Xinjiang was not yet China. Han Chinese coexisted there with other peoples, and the Qing employed a variety of institutions and techniques to govern them. Distinct administrative systems—military, beg, junzian, jasak—functioned in different parts of the territory; two different legal codes and sets of judicial personnel were juxtaposed in Altishahr in a complex overlap wherein a criminal’s origin and ethnicity partially determined the selection of tribunal and means of punishment. Special restrictions applied to Han and Tungan in Xinjiang during the first decades of Qing rule there: they needed passes to travel, they paid commercial taxes to which East Turkestan was not subject, they could not marry locally or bring dependents to live in Altishahr, they could not reclaim and cultivate land in Altishahr, and they were not allowed to venture abroad.

Despite these constraints, however, from soon after the conquest until well into the nineteenth century, Chinese merchants entered Xinjiang, including Altishahr, in significant numbers. Moreover, Ming-rui’s 1765 proposal to segregate them from East Turkestan notwithstanding, there is no evidence that strict segregation was ever actually implemented as official policy—no such law was printed in the 1842 collection of the substrates of Altishahr (Huijiang zeli). The construction of shops and residences for Chinese merchants, such as those built in the shadow of Laining Cheng in Kashgar in 1794, can best be understood as a means to extract rent revenue from the traders and to accommodate them near the refuge of the Qing cantonment and not as a government plan to segregate them from the local population. Merchants dwelt and did business in the old Muslim cities of Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan up to and after 1826; they were taxed normally by officials who knew their whereabouts and seemingly did not mind. Should we view the erection of new fortresses removed from the old cities in Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, and Yarkand as belated implementation of a 60-year-old edict regarding merchants from China proper, as some scholars have done? Or was this rather primarily a military response to the increasingly unstable situation vis-à-vis Kokand and the Khojas? The latter explanation best fits the data we have.

Nevertheless, despite their freedom of movement within Altishahr, Chinese merchants in Altishahr cities did tend to segregate themselves from East Turkestan areas and gravitate toward Qing citadels, or to the space between the cantonments and Muslim old cities. This was especially the case in the western cities after the Jihangir invasion, and the reasons for it may be easily surmised. As we have seen, Chinese merchants and the commercial economy they stimulated were an important source of supplies and supplemental revenue for Qing imperial outposts in Xinjiang. Thus in some cities the Qing government actively encouraged such a settlement pattern by making housing and commercial property available to Chinese merchants inside or in the immediate extramural area. And for their part, Han merchants most likely felt more comfortable near the Qing forts, in the company of their Chinese compatriots, close to native-place societies, and in the shadow of the Guandi and
other temples, than out among the bazaars and mosques of Central Asian Xinjiang. (For Tungans, who were Muslims, the situation was somewhat different, as we shall see in the next chapter.)

Though named "Manchu cities" initially, the new citadels that Chinese merchants in Altishahr eventually cohabited with Qing garrison forces did come to be called "Hancheng" by the early nineteenth century, the remarkable advance of Chinese merchants into Qing Central Asia resulted in major shifts of Qing ethnic policy, with implications for the imperial conception as a whole. Before we consider that shift, however, we will take a closer look at some of the merchants themselves.

CHAPTER 5

The Merchants and Articles of Trade

Qulmaq ad, Xitayga sız.
To the Kalmak, cloth; to the Chinese, words.

Nineteenth-century East Turkistani proverb

As with the terms "Manchu city" and "Han city," words employed in Qing sources can indicate where conceptual boundaries were drawn and how the various human and territorial pieces of the Qing realm fit together. Although the Qing permitted commercial intercourse between China proper and Xinjiang, throughout the Qianlong reign and into the nineteenth century these regions remained distinct. This distinction is clearly illustrated by the terminology used in official sources to refer to both regions. When official Qing materials discussed Xinjiang in juxtaposition to China proper, the latter was occasionally zhongguo (central country) or zhongyuan (central plain), and most commonly neidi (inner land). Xinjiang appears often as guanzwai ("beyond the pass" or "frontier portal").

Qing official terminology likewise distinguished different groups of people, though not always with the terms one might expect. In Xinjiang’s Chinese-language official correspondence and in gazetteers, the generic word min ("people," "person," "subject") and compounds containing this character (shangmin, jumin, minren) occur far more frequently than the term Han. Often, such words appear in conjunction with the term neidi, which makes their meaning unambiguous. Minren and similar terms were almost never applied to East Turkestanis, and in fact were often used in contrast to such words as Huizi or Humin (Muslims), by which the East Turkestanis were known. For example, Qing officials divided the lists of militia men who died during the defense of Altishahr cities into two categories, boke Hui and shangmin; when these persons’ names and places of origin are listed, we see that the former category contains Turkic names of beg and East Turkestan, while the latter is made up exclusively of the names of Han and/or Tungan from the provinces of China proper.

Qing materials commonly include Tungans with the Han in such terms as shangmin, neidi shangren, min, or jumin. Where the Tungans’ religion...
was at issue, however, they were distinguished more precisely as a variety of Han, the "Han Muslims" (Hanhuizhi) or "Muslims from within the pass" (neidi Huimin). Thus Nayançõg fulminated against the "Hanhuizhi who have been squatting in each city of Altishahr, cheating East Turkestanis out of their money, and teaching them to break the law."a

East Turkestanis were called "Muslims" (Huimin, Huizi; Ma. Hoise). The term chantou, "wrapped head," for the East Turkestanis—a reference to the turbans worn by some East Turkestan men—came into official use only in the Guoqing period, around the time the Qing placed Xinjiang under provincial administration with primarily Han officials; this usage continued into the Republican Era. The term was known at least as early as the mid-Qing, however. The 1809 Xichui zongtong shilue explains the origin of the term Huijiang ("Muslim frontier," i.e., Altishahr) in the following way: From Hami and Turfan to the eight big cities of the west, the wrapped-head Muslim masses (chantou Huizhong) live together in their clans. Therefore [this region] is called Huijiang." Kokandis or others from western Turkestan were generally subsumed under the name Anjiyan (Andijanis), or referred to as yihui (foreign or barbarian Muslims), Huishang (Muslim merchants), or a similar compound.a And there were of course names for the other peoples in Xinjiang: Ha-sa-ke (Kazakh), Bu-lu-te (Burut, Kirghiz), Ka-shi-mi-er (Kashmiri), and so forth.

Because Qing officials in Xinjiang carefully maintained these terminological distinctions—more carefully, in fact, than they did the physical segregation of Chinese from East Turkestan—the historical record left by government dispatches makes it clear that there were distinct classes of merchants, divided on ethnic, regional, and professional lines, carrying on the trade between Xinjiang and China proper.

East Turkestan Merchants

When I said, "Kiss me once!" she said, "Bring me silk-stuff!" When I said, "I am no dealer in silk-stuff! ... What shall I do my friend?" She said, "If you want me, oh, boy, bring me some silk-stuff!" Having gone forwards and returned and come home and opened the box and taken out the bank-notes and taken the copper coins and put them into the saddle-bag and put a lock on and entered the stable and saddled the horse and put on the saddle-bag and mounted the horse and gone to Peking and taken to a pigtail and become a rich Chinsaman and opened a shop and bought silk-stuff and stuffed it into a sack and loaded it on

Compared to the rich Kokandi merchants who controlled the tea and rhubarb markets to the west, or the Chinese traders with access to the fortresses and the Manchu overlords, East Turkestanis merchants lacked economic and political influence in Qing Xinjiang. This had not always been the case. In the seventeenth century, merchants from the Tarim Basin cities and Turfan participated in a trading network that linked the Middle East, India, Transoxiana, Russia, Siberia, Gansu, and Qinghai. Membership in Naqibbandi religious brotherhoods afforded these "Bukharans" (as Turkestanis merchants were known in Central Asia) a measure of independence from local rulers and allowed freedom of movement despite the political fragmentation of Central Asia in the seventeenth century. After the Zunghar occupation of the Tarim Basin cities late in the century, East Turkestanis merchants allied themselves with these western Mongols, trading with the Qing at Suzhou and even traveling to Beijing as "envoys" of the Zunghar khan.b After the Manchu conquest, however, East Turkestanis merchant guilds lost their influence and merchants their mobility. Qing administrative structures left Altishahr natives at the mercy of beg officials imported from Hami and Turfan, and the pass system legally limited the distances and duration of foreign and domestic trading trips. West Turkestanis merchants, on the other hand, could continue to work the powerful Naqibbandi networks; they enjoyed the support of the Kokand khanate, and Xinjiang's structure of import duties was skewed in their favor. East Turkestanis merchants may have been forced to ally with Kokand and other foreign merchants to be successful.a

Nonetheless, although Qing sources are largely silent about their activities, East Turkestanis merchants seem to have played a considerable commercial role in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They traded with Kazakhs and Kirghiz in the mountainous regions surrounding the Tarim Basin. Some ventured to Ladakh, to which Yarkandis could travel legally. And if the pass system proved inconvenient, the "ortung" (Turki for the karat guard posts) "could be easily avoided." (Nayançõg railed against the loose enforcement of pass laws for East Turkestanis exiting Xinjiang: fairly porous borders had been customary before his arrival in Altishahr—and became common again after his departure.)a Moreover, while traveling between Xinjiang cities or even to China proper and Beijing, although native East Turkestanis were in theory required to obtain passes from the Qing ambans through their hakim begs, in practice they could pass check points unin-
spected. Ji Yun noticed the ease with which East Turkestanis moved between Turfan and Urumchi around 1770:

The Turfan tribe of old has had close relations [with China].
Selling fruit, they come all the time to the inner city gate [i.e., inside the city walls].
Just like swallows in high spring upon a bridge.
They come and go as they please, paying no attention to anybody.

(Turfan has for a long time belonged to the empire [nei shou]. No different from locals [tu ren, i.e., Chinese in Urumchi]. [Turfanis] come to trade and are not inspected.)

In 1803 a case arose in which a Kashgari named Se-pa-er traveled without a pass through Hami, Turfan, and Karashahr on his return from Beijing. (A Tungan who was handling Se-pa-er’s luggage had to apply for passes and was detained by the authorities.) Somewhat later, around 1835, an East Turkestan reported that no passport was necessary for him to go from Yarkand to Beijing, and nothing prevented him from staying as long as he wished in China proper. Foreign merchants, too, could travel as far as Beijing with a pass obtained for a few tānggā from the amban in Yarkand.10

Tribute Trade

Many East Turkestan traders visited China proper on the occasion of beg’s imperial audiences. After Zhao-hui’s successful conclusion of the Altishahr campaign in 1759, on his “triumphal return” he escorted the first wave of newly appointed beg officials, together with East Turkestan nobles whom the dynasty was relocating to Beijing. Subsequent contingents followed over the next three years until all begs above fourth rank had been granted an audience and an all-expenses-paid trip to the capital. In 1774 the system was revised, and the court then entertained delegations led by hakim begs of Kho- tan, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, Kashgar, Aksu, and Kucha on a six-year rotating schedule. After 1811 the schedule was again changed, this time to a nine-year cycle. All begs above the fourth rank thereafter visited the capital once every nine years; newly appointed begs fifth rank and below were granted audiences in the year following their appointments.11

As often when such junkets were provided at court expense, the retinues multiplied and their luggage swelled year by year. The beg missions became markets on the move across north China, creating difficulties for the person-

nel of the post stations along the route, who were responsible for providing horses and carts for the begs and baggage. Gaozong was not particularly anxious about this problem (“Begs from Altishahr coming for an imperial audience in their proper year bring a few things with them to sell—what is wrong with that?”), but the volume and weight of goods to be carted was considerable. Around the end of the Qianlong era, begs of various ranks and ennobled rulers in Xinjiang were permitted to bring the following amounts of luggage (given in carriages) with them to Beijing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Luggage (carriages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>third ranked</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fourth ranked</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fifth ranked</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sixth ranked</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>male relative</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wong</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belle</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>betzii</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gong</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A memorialist who drew attention to the problems caused by such large caravans pointed out that even allowing for sufficient clothing for the journey and a certain amount of “local products” as gifts to the emperor, the current quotas were excessive and could reasonably be reduced without compromising the dynastic principle of largesse to “outer vassals” (waifan).12

The court approved this proposal, but permanent solutions were never possible to the problem of quasi-covert trading by tributary missions. In 1816 the Lifan Yuan issued a notice that Xinjiang begs routinely exceeded their luggage quotas, to the extent that the excess baggage delayed the delegations’ arrival in Beijing by weeks. The “three kneelings and nine kowtows” of the imperial audience ritual were scheduled for the first day of the new lunar year (yuandan), but in some years the Xinjiang delegation did not reach the capital until the 27th of the 12th lunar month—just three or four days before the ceremony. After a policy review, the court decided that all begs whose turn it was for an audience should assemble well ahead of departure time in Hami, where the Hami superintendent would inspect and weigh all items except “local products” (melons, raisins, fruit preserves, small knives, and so on, to be presented to the emperor) and limit them to the stipulated weight. If begs brought extra servants, their baggage allowance would be reduced as a penalty. After the missions’ departure, each official through whose jurisdiction the caravan passed, from governor-general down to county-level officials, was to repeat this procedure and would be held responsible for escorting the begs and their baggage train within quota from his bailiwick. “Crimi-
nal merchants” and carriers of “private goods” discovered on the way were subject to severe punishment—which indicates that trading on the audience missions was not a sideline the beggs engaged in on their own, but probably involved commercial specialists as well.15

These beg visits to the imperial capital, when carefully considered, pose another interpretive challenge to the “tribute system” model by which “China’s traditional foreign relations” have been understood. Consider the word fan, for example, as in wai fan. The term has been variously translated “vassal,” “dependency,” “tributary,” or “colonial” in English and has generally been understood to refer to non-Chinese. John King Fairbank himself noted the greater complexity of the term and pointed out that it, like tribute, was applied to persons and matters domestic as well as foreign, noting that Ming Dynasty Princes of the Blood were known as fanzong.16 Nevertheless, there is a tendency in all of Fairbank’s work on tribute and the “Chinese world order,” and among those influenced by it, to treat the Mongolian, East Turkستان, and other wai fan under Qing rule as foreign because they were not culturally Sinic and because they undertook “tribute missions” to the Qing court. It is, of course, a major argument of this book that this view obscures the real nature of the Qing empire.

One way to clear up the confusion is to abandon the idea of a monolithic, unchanging “Chinese world order” and look instead specifically at the Qing case. With regard to such uniquely Qing institutions as the Lian Yuan (charged with handling the East Turkistan beggs), a better understanding of the Qing outlook can be gained simply by examining, as Ning Chia has done,17 the Manchu name for the agency: tuleqi golo be dasara jurgan. The term is rendered as “ministry for ruling the outer provinces.” Golo—province—is the same term applied to Hubel or Fujian and was not used for Kokand or the Kazaks. This is not to say that administratively Xinjiang was indistinguishable from the provinces of China proper (to which the term golo was principally applied); we have seen ample evidence of Xinjiang’s special administrative status. But in the Manchu term translated as Lian Yuan in Chinese, the accumulated semantic baggage of two millennia of usage, under which the term fan labors like begs en route to Beijing, is neatly avoided. Thus, while Altishahr and Zungharia were physically outlying (distinguished from neidi, “within the pass”), they were certainly not “foreign” following the Qianlong conquest.

In Chapter 2, I argued that knowledge of how the Qing traded with the Kazaks allows us to refute Fairbank’s statement “All foreign relations in the Chinese view were ipso facto tributary relations.” Consideration of the Xinjiang beggs’ imperial audience trips (rujin, chuojin) presents us with the

paradoxical case of “tribute missions,” which seem to be precisely what Fairbank had in mind, but which have little to do with foreign relations. The beggs’ way to the capital was paid, they presented “local products” to the throne and received “gifts in return,” and they were allowed to trade on route and in Beijing—a privilege they regularly abused. While seemingly embarked upon a classic “tribute mission,” these men were not in fact ambassadors, nor were they troublesome nomads to be appeased with gifts and trade—to compare them, say, to a delegation from the Xiongnu to the Han court in the first century B.C. (as is implicit in the Fairbank model) obscures far more than it reveals.18 Rather, the beggs were Qing officials who held their offices and ranks at the pleasure of the emperor; the highest-ranked among them, the hakim beggs, had the right to memorialize the throne directly. Thus not only were Qing foreign affairs not conducted entirely through the “tribute system,” but “tribute missions” (or, more precisely, imperial audience trips) were not exclusively for foreigners.

East Turkestanis in Beijing

Little is known about the community of East Turkestanis resident in the capital. The Qing relocated to Beijing several members of eminent East Turkistani families who had aided in the conquest of Altishahr. These included members of the Khoja clan descended from Makhdüm-i A'зам via 'Inâyât Kirîät, as well as Huo-ji-si from Ush and others, along with the household establishments of each. The East Turkistani nobles were entered into the Mongol Plain White Banner, under the supervision of the Lian Yuan.19 The dynasty also resettled a number of captured followers of Khoja Jiān and a troupe of artisans and entertainers. These East Turkistani musicians and dancers performed at court banquet on the emperor’s birthday, new year’s day, and other special occasions, with their families they numbered over 300 when first brought to Beijing, over 1,800 by Guangxu times. The prisoners and entertainers were organized under a banner captain (zuoling) and their stipends paid by the Imperial Household Agency.20 Commoner East Turkestanis in Beijing—such as Mai-ma-di-min, who was held in Beijing pending trial for shrubarb smuggling in 1792—were placed under the supervision of this captain. Early in 1760, the Qing finished constructing quarters for the noble East Turkestanis southwest of the palace, just below West Chang’an Avenue on the site of today’s East Anfu Hutong. Later, when mansions were built for these princes, the East Turkestan quarter, popularly known as the “Muslim Camp” (Huîzi Ying), became home for the Altishahri goldsmiths, musicians,
and dancers. According to a persistent folk tradition, Rong Fei (Xiang Fei), Gaozong's East Turkestan concubine, is said to have gazed wistfully over the wall from her residence on the south bank of Nanhai (the present Xinhua Men) at the activity in the bazaar and mosque of the Muslim Camp.  

We do not know how many East Turkestanis lived in Beijing, or what their occupations were. Presumably, in addition to prisoners, artisans, entertainers, and East Turkestan nobles, there was a small floating population of merchants and clerics that either joined this community from Xinjiang or developed out of the original group as its population expanded. One man, named Se-pa-er, although described in an 1805 official Chinese Household Agency document as a "vagrant unemployed barbarian Muslim of Kashgar," nonetheless had the wherewithal to accumulate so many trade goods that he needed to hire a rostouble for the journey home to Altishahr. His Tungan employee had been a bondswoman of another East Turkestan resident in Beijing, Qimu-shi-ting, and as a result himself dressed as an East Turkestan, wore no queue, and had adopted Tungan customs. Yet only when he tried to travel in Xinjiang was he found out. This suggests that East Turkestanis were not uncommon in Beijing in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Chinese Merchants in Xinjiang

People in Xinjiang divided the Chinese merchants operating there into two groups: the north bend traders (beitaoke) and the west road traders (xiluke). The north bend group took their name from the great oxbow of the Yellow River; they came to Xinjiang via the northern route that passed through Inner Mongolia north of the oxbow, or they detoured south to cut across the Ordes. These merchants were primarily from Shanxi province or Beijing and operated out of bases there and in Zhaingjiakou and Guihua, cities that were also the departure points for trade with Mongolia and with the Russians at Kiakhata. Because some Shaanxi merchant firms functioned in a manner similar to that of the Shanxi companies, I have included them in the discussion of north bend traders, although some followed different travel routes.

The west road traders came to Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor, Suzhou, and the Jiayu Guan—a "west" road from the perspective of China proper. Their origins were diverse, including Guangdong, Hunan, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Sichuan provinces, but primarily they came from Shaanxi and Gansu. This group also included many Tungsans. (See Map 6.) For the purposes of this section, I will consider the xiluke as a whole and take up the special circumstances of the Tungsans in a later section.

Map 6. Trade routes of north bend traders (beitaoke) and west road traders (xiluke).

THE NORTH BEND TRADERS

It was the north bend traders who brought Ji Yun his shrimp and hazelnuts. "Big merchants mostly come from the North Bend, saving 30 stages over the official route," Ji wrote, adding that the "rich merchants all originate in Guihua; the locals here call them the beitaoke. . . . From Guihua to Dihua takes only two months, but you must bring your own cooking pots and tents."  

Most from Shanxi, some from Shaanxi (Xi'an) and Zhili (Beijing, Zhaingjia-kou), the north bend traders represented some of China's most powerful merchant houses. Of course, Chinese from the Shanxi area had always been adept at trade with nomads, and there are records from the Han dynasty of trade between the Xiongnu and Shanxi merchants. The Shanxi firms of Qing times began to take shape during the late Yuan and Ming, trading tea for horses on government contract, and they had established a unique structure that linked tea-growing concerns (production) in south and central China with trading on the borders (retail) in loose vertical conglomerates. This structure allowed the firms of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to purchase, process, and
package tea according to the particular needs and tastes of various markets: jasmine-scented tea for north China, brick tea for Xinjiang and Mongolia, black tea for Russia.

Another characteristic of these companies, to become most pronounced during the Qing, was their close relationship to the imperial government, especially in financial operations. In the late Ming, several Shanxi merchant families began trading with the Manchus from bases in Zhangjiakou, procuring for them grain, horses, and weapons. After the Qing occupation of Beijing in 1644, these merchant houses were rewarded with the title "imperial merchants" (huangsiang), and thereafter, like the merchants of Huizhou in Anhui province, Shanxi merchants were granted lucrative contracts to manage the dynasty's salt administration. One particularly prominent Shanxi merchant family, the Fanz, in addition to management of the salt monopoly, was also responsible for supplying grain to the Qing armies during Kangxi's and Yongzheng's forays against the Zunghars. As we have seen, scions of this house later served as consuls during the opening phases of the government trade with the Kazakhs in Zungharia. The Qing pacification of Khalkha and reduction of the Zunghar threat opened Mongolia to Shanxi firms' steppe retail operations in an unprecedented fashion; the Treaty of Nersinsk (1689) initiated direct tea trade with the Russians, which was likewise dominated by Shanxi concerns. Meanwhile, close connections with the wealthy Imperial Household Agency and government deposits in Shanxi remittance banks (piaohao) provided the firms with huge infusions of capital. Shanxi trading and financial operations ramified throughout the empire during early and mid-Qing, with remittance banking and pawn-brokering particularly important in the south, and mobile and sedentary trade in tea, dry goods, and light manufactures, along with money-lending, comprising the basis of their commercial success in the northern and western border regions.

Underlying this success beyond the passes was the Shanxi traders' training and discipline and an organizational structure that allowed them to fan out and do business widely throughout Mongolia, Xinjiang, and even Tibet. Apprentices, many from Datong and Shuoping prefectures in Shanxi and Xuanhua prefecture in Zhili, were brought into the firms at the age of fifteen or sixteen. During the apprenticeships, which could last from two to fifteen years, these boys worked for an experienced trader in the field; one large firm regularly sent young workers to Khotdo for training in Mongolian, Uyghur, Kazakh, or Russian languages, and their bilingual ability gave rise to the name "interpreter firms" (tongshihiang) as a general term for these companies. By the conclusion of the apprenticeship, the young employees had accumulated experience and their own capital. Generally, then, they returned to Shanxi at company expense—the firm might even pay for presents for their relatives. After marrying, the new journeymen would set out again, returning home on leave only every few years. Once established in this way, some Shanxi merchants worked for a salary based on the quality of their salesmanship. The firm would not allow itself to lose money: if operations were unprofitable, the employees made up the loss from their own pay. Other Shanxi traders operated on a share partnership or quasi-independent basis, maintaining ties to the home firm, often purchasing wares from caravans dispatched by the home company and availing themselves of the firms' remittance network to transfer funds.

Large Shanxi shops in outlying areas, including Xinjiang, often went by the same name or one similar to that of the home firm, thus I translate the general term for such large stores, zihao, as "name-brand." They are best thought of as branches or even franchises of a company back in Shanxi—or, in some cases, Zhili or Shannan.

A typical name-brand store (zihaoju) was designed as a double compound with a smaller square compound in front consisting of a front sales area, two wing buildings, and the "counter" (changgui) or office, where the manager handled financial matters. Behind this a larger courtyard opened up, somewhat lower than the front buildings, but likewise enclosed by side and back rooms. These served as a hostel for guests of the firm, including caravan teamsters or nomads in town to trade. In this yard would be stored goods and coal; it was used also as a stable for livestock. (See Figure 5.)

Xinjiang's best known north bend trader is the infamous Zhang Luan, who conspired with the Yarkand superintendent Gao Pu to smuggle thousands of catties of jade from Yarkand to Soochow in the late 1770s. But Zhang's career before his fateful involvement with that errant Qing bondservant and official provides a detailed case history of a Shanxi merchant in eighteenth-century Xinjiang.

As a young man from Youyu County, Shuoping Prefecture, Shanxi, Zhang got a job in 1768 as a camel teamster for the San Yi Dian, a Guihua concern that traded Chinese cloth for hides in Mongolia and Xinjiang. A San Yi Dian manager, Jia Youyu, from the same county as Zhang, found the young man very able and the following year promoted him to partner and sent him to run the San Yi's Aksu branch. In 1773, Zhang used 10,000 taels of the shop's funds to buy jade, which he sold in Suzhou for 23,000 taels. However, he repaid only 9,000 taels (in cash and goods) of the San Yi Dian's capital, and Jia had to travel to Xinjiang to collect the remainder. Despite some hard feelings following this incident, Zhang maintained a relationship with the firm even
after resigning in 1776. When he left the San Yi Dian, Zhang returned to Shanxi, where he formed a partnership with three men from the south of the province. The four pooled 13,000 taels of capital to start their business. One of these men, a salaried partner, had worked for the San Yi at Shahukou, a pass in the Ming wall just north of Youyu. His job took him to Yarkand with goods caravans, and there he met Zhang Luan.

Zhang’s new enterprise dealt in Soochow silk and Yarkand jade, as well as felts, hides, carpets, cotton cloth, and other items. At the time of his arrest in 1778, Zhang possessed fixed assets worth 4,583 taels in Soochow (a house evaluated at 4,000 taels and copper, tin, china, and draft animals worth 583 taels). He was owed 2,321 taels in debts in this southern city. Other current assets included 500 taels worth of tea bound for sale in the Suzhou branch of the San Yi. 500 taels worth of cotton cloth for China en route to Gansu and Shanxi, a shipment of silk and embroidery of unknown value likewise destined for the northwest, an investment in a consignment of goods from the Guihua San Yi Dian to Urumchi, and a Buddha head carved from “leadstone” already sold for 1,321 taels to a collector in Guangdong. Several beggs in Yarkand, including the hakhim beg Hudawi (E-dai), owed him a total of 10,126 taels for silks purchased on credit. Zhang held remittance slips for 11,790 taels, which he planned to redeem at the Shangwen Yinhao and other money-shops in the capital. His family holdings in Shanxi included a tiled house, a fifteen-room earthen building rented out to a dyer, a cloth shop, and a drygoods store as well as livestock and debts receivable. Zhang Luan had of course also invested heavily in jade.27

Most north bend merchants did not rub shoulders with imperial bondservants or wind up at the center of celebrated smuggling cases involving commodities monopolized by the Imperial Household Agency. Were not Zhang Luan exceptional, we would not know so much about him. Yet his story highlights general characteristics of the north bend traders and their businesses. Most striking is the extent of the San Yi zihao network; testimony in this case reveals that, besides the home office in Guihua, this firm had branches in Shahuokou, Suzhou, Aksu, and probably Urgench and routinely did business in Yarkand, where it may have had a base as well. The branches, while remaining affiliated to the home office and drawing on the firm for capital, could act with considerable autonomy—as Zhang did when he began speculating in jade with San YI money. These firms sold on credit and relied on remittance services to finance business transactions across long distances. Indeed, their activities spanned the empire and linked the Jiangnan with Altishahr. Primary profits for richer merchants like Zhang Luan derived from exchange of Chinese luxuries for jade; more mundane manufactures (dry goods, hardware) and pastoral products served as the staple articles of trade.

Other individual north bend traders included the following:

- Li Dequan of Xin Prefecture, Shanxi, sold miscellaneous items in Aksu and around 1785 bought 34 pieces of scrap jade for 6,000 cash.
- Zhang Dakui of Wencheng County, Shanxi, ran a drygoods and hardware store in Aksu. He traded cloth and tea for 1,300 worth of low-quality jade stone in 1783.
- Li Shaokang, 51 years old, of Gan Prefecture, Shanxi, opened and ran the Yuan Tai Quan name-brand store on North Avenue in Kashgar’s new city sometime before 1830.
- Liu Shaojun, 66 years old, of Yongning Prefecture, Shanxi, ran the Tong Tai Xing name-brand store outside the Kashgar fort. During the Kokandi invasion of 1830 he moved into the walled new city, transporting some of his stock in four or five carts. He did not have time to save all his goods, however—an indication of the size of his business. Note also the location of his store, outside the new city.
on the side and loaned money to local Tungans, including an akhünd surnamed Ma.
• Wei Zhongxiao, from Jin County in Gansu, ran a store selling miscellaneous items, including tea, in Kashgar around 1784.
• Wang Ming, of Ling Prefecture in Gansu, was dealing in cloth and tea from his shop in Aksu when he was caught smuggling jade in the bottom of his cart in 1784.
• Around 1785, many Gansu natives were illicitly mining gold in the Khotan area.
• Song Liangdi, of Zhangye County, Gansu, grew vegetables in Aksu until he was caught in 1785 in possession of 50 catties of scrap jade stone.
• Hu Kui, from He Prefecture, Gansu, worked as a laborer in Kucha around 1785.
• Cao Zhi, originally of Wuwei County, Gansu, was a butcher in Yarkand. He was arrested in Kucha in 1785 with nine ounces of jade sewn into his trousers.
• Zhang Bao came to Kashgar in 1826 at the age of 34 and opened a shop or inn outside the citadel.
• Xing Sheng, 33 years old, of Meng County, Henan, went to Kashgar in 1826 as a trader. Four years later he joined other Chinese merchants in the militia to defend the city against the Kokandi invasion.
• Liang Dashou, 36 years old in 1830, was a native of Xi'an who grew up in Yili and operated a small shop at the Jin Ding Temple. He loaned money to the Yili hakim beg, Ishâq, and later followed him to Kashgar to seek repayment.
• Yan Lianggui, 34 years old, a native of Ning Prefecture in eastern Gansu, came to Kashgar in 1827, where he ran a small business away from the walled city. He sheltered in the garrison compound when he heard rumors of the Kokandi attack and was put in charge of a troop of 50 merchant militiamen.

As is clear from the last few examples, Chinese merchants in Kashgar were swept up by military events during the Khoja and Kokandi invasions of the 1820s. One group captured by Jahângîr included an exiled Catholic from Shaanxi (Zhu Tianzhuo) and six Tibetan merchants (Li Shenzhao, Tian Guan, Ma Tianxi, Wu Erqi, Liu Qifeng, Nian Dengxi). They were taken prisoner and their queues cut off when the Kashgar citadel fell in September of 1826. Because they refused to fight with Jahângîr’s forces, they were enslaved: Nian was first given to a beg and after a failed escape was sold to Prince Batur Khan of Bukhara. Liu Qifeng and Wu Erqi had been given to Omar Khan

The West Road Traders

Goods and merchants from south China mostly traveled to Xinjiang via the Yangzi River as far as Hankou, then northwest along the Han River past Xiangyang and into Shaanxi on the Dan River. From Xi'an they were conveyed northwest on the Jing River to Jingzhou, or, less commonly, via the Wei River into Gansu at Qinzhou (modern Tianhui). Jingzhou transhipped the bulk of southern goods, while Liangzhou served the same function for trade items arriving in Gansu from the capital and elsewhere in north China. Suzhou (today’s Ji’nan) was the next bulking center, whence Xinjiang-bound traffic embarked for Hami.29

The Chinese merchants who traded in Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor were a diverse group, including Han and Tungan and, in addition to the majority who came from Gansu or Shaanxi, natives of several provinces of China proper. For the most part, west road traders’ operations were smaller in scale than those of their north bend counterparts, often amounting to little more than long-distance peddling. Discussing merchants from Gansu and Shaanxi who did business in Altishahr, Tie-bao reported in 1811 that they were “sellers of snacks and foods, tiny, un-united hardware [dealers]. There are no large-scale merchants.”30 The individual cases about whom we know a few details tend to confirm Tie-bao’s assessment.

• Lei Ying, of Heyang County in Shaanxi, was a partner around 1778 in the Zheng Heng store (pin) in Hami, which sold sundry goods. Sun Quande worked in a similar shop, also in Hami. Both men dealt in jade
of Bukhara, but were taken as booty in battle by Batur, who tried to give them away as dowry for a Muslim woman. When Liu and Wu refused, they were cursed, beaten, and tortured. Zhu, Tian, Li, and Ma were indentured to Andijani Muslims; Li was sold to a man named Sandeman in Tashkent but somehow managed to plan an escape with Zhu, Tian, and Ma. They had heard that the Kokandi border guards killed on sight any Chinese trying to recross the Pamirs to return to Altishahr, and the route via Badakshan seemed no more promising, with little water and food available and widespread illness in the region. So the four fled westward, where "outer barbarians would not interrogate them closely." Dressed in robes and turbans they passed inattentive border guards into Bukharan territory. Begging their way through villages up the Amu Darya, they had reached "Wuluganqi" when they met up again with Nian Dengxi, in flight from Bukhara. The five learned from Central Asian merchants of a route from Russia to China and joined a caravan traveling farther northwest to get to Russia. In a place called "Mayianglei," Liu Qifeng and Wu Erqi joined the party, and all seven pulled camels, hauled loads, and begged from the Central Asians until they arrived in Orenburg, probably sometime in 1831. There they appealed to the Russian border guards for travel papers.

Seeing that these men were Chinese, the guards detained them while seeking instructions from superiors. The seven merchants were then sent under escort to Irkutsk, where they were again delayed until winter, when the freezing of Lake Baikal opened the route to Kakesha. Because by this time the rags they wore "hardly covered their bodies," the Russian authorities in Irkutsk provided them with clothing and small sums of money. At some point while in Russian care, the men were questioned about conditions in Xinjiang, and Ma Tianxi provided an account of the post-station trade route, which eventually found its way into a British publication (see Chapter 4). Finally, the Russians escorted the seven to Kakesha for repatriation in 1832. Sensibly, in time for the inquest in Kulun (Urga, now Ulan Batar), the men had already made a start on growing back their queues and could boast three to four inches of hair; Liu Qifeng had begun secretly while still in Bukhara—surely at some risk—and his hair was now a foot long.31

Tungan Merchants

Liu and the other Tungan merchants had their hair forcibly cut after being taken prisoner. Later, they were able to disguise their Chinese identity by adoption of the turban and other forms of Central Asian Muslim dress. As they neared home, however, once again they took their cues from the Qing.

This incident serves as an apt reminder of the Tungans' ambiguous status in Xinjiang. As reflected in the official Qing terms for them, Hanhsu or neiid Huimin, they were, on the one hand, Chinese-speaking and considered Gansu and Shaanxi to be their homes; on the other hand, as Muslims, they shared the Islamic faith—if not the precise manner of practicing it—with the East Turkestanis. Educated, devout Tungans could read Arabic and perhaps some Persian as well, which gave them a lingua franca with similarly cultured natives of Altishahr. As might be expected, given that they shared cultural traits with both Han and East Turkestanis, Tungan merchants in Xinjiang often mediated commercially between these two groups.

Many Gansu and Shaanxi Tungans, facing repression and relegation to marginal lands after periodic rebellions,32 migrated to Qinghai, Tibet, and Xinjiang where they engaged in long-distance trade, specialized as transport workers, or set up small businesses as restaurateurs, butchers, or hide and wool dealers. In the northwest provinces of China proper, they also traded tea on government license, splitting the business with Shaanxi and Shaanxi merchant groups.33

Like Han west road traders, Tungan merchants moved to Xinjiang soon after the Qing conquest and took their small-scale operations throughout Zungharia and Altishahr. One area where they held a particularly prominent position was in Urumchi, where the names of the Tungan mosques scattered throughout the old part of the city today record the origins of these Muslim Chinese traders: Lanzhou Si, Suzhou Si, Shaanxi Da Si, Hezhou Si, Ninggu Si (Ningxia and Guyuan), Balikun Si (Barkol), Sala Si (Salars), Qinghai Da Si, Dongfang Si (Suiyuan, Hohhot area). Although most of the presently existing mosques were established after the 1864 rebellions and have been rebuilt or relocated since their foundation, they follow the pattern of the older Shaanxi Da Si and Lanzhou Si. In the Lanzhou mosque, for example, Tungan merchants could stay temporarily in the large courtyard in simple accommodations or even tents. Outside was a stable and a lot to park carts. Although the mosque excluded no one, merchants from Lanzhou would naturally assemble in the Lanzhou Si for prayers, and the assembled worshipers included many business contacts. There was no accommodation within the compound of the Shaanxi Da Si, but rooms and storage were available in a hostel nearby. This mosque was first built before the Tungan rebellions with contributions from Tungan merchants, originally of Shaanxi, who resided in Urumchi.34

The Tungan mosques of Urumchi, then, in addition to their religious function, served much the same purpose as did native-place association halls (huiguan) for Han merchants: they provided an itinerant merchant with lodging,
storage, and the company of others from his home town with whom he could trade, borrow funds, and exchange information.

The available data on individual Tungan merchants in Xinjiang suffer from the same systematic flaw as do those for Han, namely, that Qing officials tended to note only those Tungan merchants accused of crimes or involved in military events. The most egregious case is that of Zhao Junru, Gao Pu's and Zhang Luan's coconspirator in the jade scandal. Zhao was a Tungan from Weinan, Shaanxi, who went west to seek his fortune in 1759 or 1760 and did not return to Weinan again until 1778 (when he was apprehended while on his way home with illegal jade). After a few years selling a variety of things in Yarkand, he had become one of the city's most eminent Chinese merchants and served there as a xiangying headman. He socialized with Yarkand's beg and Manchu officials and (a gesture ironic in hindsight) had presented Gao Pu with the gift of a carved jade item upon the latter's assumption of the post of superintendent. In Aksu and Yarkand, Zhao owned 4 mansions, a restaurant, a house, 25 asses and horses, and 160 camels. In Shaanxi he had a large house, a somewhat smaller store, 78 m2 of land, livestock, clothing, jewelry, and furnishings. In 1778 Zhao went to Gao Pu's yamen for a road pass home to see his father in Weinan, and the superintendent entrusted him with 3,000 catties of jade to smuggle into China proper. Thereafter, the Qing authorities confiscated in Shaanxi 4 carloads of hides and clothes and 71 cases of silks and embroidery from Soochow bound for sale in Xi'an.34

Although Zhao's story is not representative of the careers of most Tungan merchants in Xinjiang (like many rich Han traders he worked the lucrative Soochow-Altishahr route trading silks and jades), it is useful to note the extent to which he had invested in livestock, restaurants, and inns—enterprises in which less wealthy Tungan merchants were commonly engaged. Some examples of other Tungan merchants follow.

- Zhao Yongfu came to Turfan in the fifth lunar month of 1822 and worked as a hired laborer. In the eighth month of the following year he proceeded to Yarkand and opened a food stall. In 1826 he went to Kashgar to collect debts. He helped defend the city when Jahangir attacked in the sixth month but was captured; his queue was cut off, he saw Jahangir himself and then worked as a cook until the Qing army arrived. Zhao then turned himself in to the Manchus and again started work as a laborer.

- Ma Jialin exited the Jiayu Guan in 1823 to make his living in Turfan. In 1827 he followed the Qing army to Yarkand, where he married an East Turkestan woman named A-bi-dai.

- Ma Delong drove a cart to Yarkand in 1824 and there sought to make a living. He married A-bi-bai but soon after went to Urumchi in search of sustenance. In 1827, working as a camel teamster, he accompanied the Qing army back to Yarkand.

- Chang Fengqing, in his early thirties in 1828, had done business in Yili until 1826, when he joined the Qing militia coming south to recapture Kashgar from Jahängir.

Several observations may be drawn from these examples. First, the poverty of these merchants is striking, compared with the Han merchants discussed above. Second, each of these Tungan merchants was involved in one way or another with the Qing defense and counterattack against Jahangir. We should not make too much of this, given that the sample is not representative of Tungan merchants as a whole. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the advance of the Qing army served as the mechanism that drew these merchants deeper into Altishahr. Third, being Muslim did not prevent Tungans from fighting alongside the Qing against Kokandis and followers of the Khojis. (In fact, a leader of the Kashgar merchant militia, Zhang Mingtang, who was killed in the 1826 invasion along with 886 other merchants, was a Tungan.) On the other hand, being Chinese did not prevent them from marrying East Turkestan women.35

The Tungan's double identity made some Qing officials in Altishahr nervous. Behind this anxiety lay the history of Tungan relations with the Qing dynasty. There had been a Tungan rebellion in northwest China from 1645 to 1649, soon after the Qing assumption of power in Beijing. The rebellion, with a Ming restorationist thrust, was also linked to the Muslim governor of Hami. By the time of the Qing conquest of Xinjiang, relations between Han and Tungan in Gansu and Shaanxi were generally deteriorating, and Qing officials viewed Tungans as a potentially disruptive influence in this area.

In 1761, a Tungan named Muhammad Amin Ma Mingxun returned to China after years of study in Bukhara and Yemen. He built a mosque, gathered initiates, and began to teach a new branch of the Naqshbandiyya to Tungans in Gansu and Qinghai. His teachings, influenced by the reform movements then prevalent in Islamic centers of the Middle East, opposed the emphasis placed on saints and their tombs in Central Asian and northwest Chinese mystical sufism. More important than this, however, Ma allowed the use of the jahr, or vocal style, in the remembrance (dhikr), hence his "path" came

* "Literally, 'remembrance,' 'recollection,' 'mention.'" In Sufi mystic ritual, "The word has acquired a technical sense of 'litany' in which the name of God, or formulae like 'God
to be known as the "Jahriyya." These teachings challenged those of the established Naqshbandi faction in the northwest, known as Afaqyya after the Makhdoom Zada Khoja Ajad, who had preached and established a chain of initiates in Gansu and Qinghai in the 1670s. Struggles for power by these two branches of the Naqshbandiya path (often inaccurately labeled "New Sect" and "Old Sect") led to violence, and the Qing arrested Ma Mingxin in 1784 after a rival accused him of "heterodoxy." In response to a subsequent uprising by his Jahriya followers, the Qing put Ma Mingxin to death. More unrest followed. Through much of this, the "Old Teaching" Afaqyya sided with the Qing. In 1784 a major rebellion of "New Teaching" believers under Tian Wu took the Qing three months to repress, and the dynasty enacted a series of measures to proscribe the Jahriyya.38

The Afaqyya-Jahriyya disputes in Gansu, Qinghai, and Shaanxi corresponded to the migration of Tungans from these provinces to Xinjiang. After the Tian Wu uprising in particular, Qing officials became concerned that rebel followers were fleeing to Altishahr. As a result, itinerant Tungan merchants in Xinjiang were subjected to unusual scrutiny and harassment by Qing officials in the New Dominion.

In 1784, following the Tian Wu rebellion, Qing guards in Kucha searching for smuggled jade in the cart of a beg en route to an imperial audience discovered something still more worrisome: letters and texts in Arabic script. The beg was not implicated, but the authorities arrested the cart driver, a Tungan named Han De, originally from Xining. Han De had first exited the Jiayu Pass with his father and had been driving carts for a living for more than a decade. The Arabic books belonged to another Tungan, Ma Guoying, who worked in a salt and tea shop in Aksu. Guoying had asked Han De to deliver them to a relative, Ma Qijiao (a.k.a. Idil), an itinerant trader based in Kucha. Other Tungan merchants, including Qijiao's correspondent, "Isma'il," were likewise caught up in the Qing investigation.

The Tungans involved in this case were all sent to Lanzhou for questioning, and the materials were presented to the Tungan xiangyou in that city to be screened for heterodoxy. The xiangyou pronounced them wholesome "Old Teaching" texts—simple Qur'ans. Although found innocent, Han De and the others were nonetheless to be banished to insalubrious southern China, a sentence only later commuted to resettlement under probation in Urumchi. The emperor reprimanded Xinjiang officials for exceeding their brief in this case by searching the belongings of a beg. Gaozong did not intend seizure of scriptural texts and investigations of begs to be part of the imperial audience experience. "And except disciples of the New Teaching and those Muslims surnamed "Ma" [whom the emperor presumed to be relatives of Ma Mingxin], do not go searching Muslims wildly like this again."39

Such imperial concern for the rights of good Muslims is admirable, perhaps, but Gaozong thus unwittingly exposed a sizeable proportion of the Tungans in Xinjiang ("Ma" is the most common Tungan surname) to arbitrary search and seizure. Over the next month the Qing dragnet hauled in Ma Tingxiang, Ma Wenju, Ma Runeng, and Ma Cang in Kashgar, all "merchant Tungans" (maoyi Huimin) from Gansu; their names were not on the wanted list of the Tian Wu rebels from Jingshang (Lanzhou Prefecture, Gansu), and Guo-dong memorialized for instructions on what to do with them. He received an admonishment from the emperor: "The good Muslims of Jingshang trade everywhere. Where did you get the idea to arrest and investigate them all?" His edict ordered that the four Mases be released to remain in Kashgar or return home, as they wished.40

Besides revealing the anxiety of Xinjiang officials—for whom mixed imperial signals could have made life no easier—these cases illustrate the archetypical employments of the Tungan merchants in Xinjiang: cart driver, itinerant merchant, tea merchant. Moreover, the adoption of Islamic names by Ma Qijiao and his correspondent, and the three protagonists' concern with the conveyance of Qur'ans suggest that there was a religious as well as commercial component to their relationship: they may have shared membership in a menhuan (a religious, social, political, and commercial organization formed by Tungan Sufi orders).

The Qing classification of Tungans as a subcategory of Han (Hanshu) led to a curious problem when Tungans assimilated with the native East Turkestanis population. The first such instance we know of involved not a merchant but a Green Standard soldier, Hai Tunglu, rotated to Kashgar duty around 1824. In that year he began frequenting the Kashgar market to discuss scripture with Andjani Muslims. He then disguised himself as an Andjani merchant, got an Andjani saddle and horse and tried to escape west past the karun aided by an East Turkestan named Yunus. His actions were considered a "great breach of the law" by field officials, and, while the court agreed, the Grand Council had to request the Board of Punishments and the Court of Colonial Affairs to deliberate and advise the court on exactly what law Hai had broken.41

Later, Nayanceng was greatly exercised by the instances of "destinification" he discovered among Tungans in Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, and Yarkand while directing postpacification reforms after the Jihingir invasion. The case focused

...
occupied a niche depending on direct marketing among East Turkestan urban and village populations—a position that may have earned some the enmity of their customers.⁴⁶

Further evidence of diversified commercial roles for Han, Tungan, and East Turkestan merchants in Xinjiang emerges from study of Xinjiang's main articles of trade.

**Xinjiang’s Tea and Rhubarb Trade**

It's a long way from the Fujian sea.
What Xinjiangese knows xiulongcha tea?
They just always say that official tea’s “heat”
Cuts the bone-chilling cold of mountain spring water.

*(It’s not easy to get good tea. Locals in Urumqi drink only the official brick tea (fucha). They claim that the water in this place contains a cooling humor that harms the stomach, but that the warm character of brick tea can counteract this tendency.)*

There were various types of tea available in Xinjiang, just as there were various types of tea drinker. *Fucha*, or “supplementary tea” best suited the tastes, not only of longtime residents of Urumchi, but also those of the Mongol and Manchu peoples stationed in Xinjiang. These bannermen also bought “big tea” (dacha) and “catty tea” (jinchu), which were somewhat cheaper brick teas. The Central Asians, on the other hand, especially the Kokandis who bought much tea in Xinjiang, preferred “mixed tea” (zacha), which came in large bundles, and “fine tea” (xicha)—leaf teas such as bohea (wuji), jasmine (xiangqian), Baihao, and zhulan.

Of these teas, only “supplementary tea” was regularly shipped into Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor. The term arose from the time when the Qing traded tea for horses in the Gansu and Qinghai border regions of China proper (see Chapter 3). Merchants who contracted to ship tea under license from south China to the Tea and Horse Offices in Gansu and Qinghai were allowed to sell an additional amount of tea themselves—hence the name “supplementary.” By the early Qianlong period, although the Tea and Horse Offices in Xining, Taomin, Hezhou, Zhuanglang, and Ganzhou were no longer in the business of bartering tea for horses, merchants were still required to purchase licenses. The licensed merchants shipped tea as far as the northwest, but then for the most part resold it in Liangzhou and other Gansu cities to private west road traders, often Tungans, who carried it to Xinjiang under a system known as “substitute sale of accumulated licenses” (daixiao zhiyin).⁴⁴ The west road
traders carried no licenses and were not officially contracted, but the tea remained recognizable as government tea—perhaps the packages bore special markings. About 600,000 catties of fucha were imported annually to Xinjiang in this fashion; the tea continued to be known there as fucha throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, although it had long since ceased to be supplementary to anything.  

The other types of teas reached Xinjiang primarily via the Mongolian steppe route in the caravans of north bend traders, who in theory paid a tax on it when exiting the passes at Guihua or Zhangjiakou. Tea was of course a specialty of Shanxi farms, whose tea trade at Kialkha with the Russians was a primary source of income, and it was an obvious extension of this business to ship to Xinjiang as well. But just as fucha was transferred from rich merchants in official service to private traders in Gansu before continuing on to Xinjiang via the Gansu corridor, “mixed tea” and other brick and leaf teas seem to have changed hands on Xinjiang’s borders before distribution in Xinjiang. North bend traders shipped it to Gucheng, where they traded it for grain and flour (produced in Zungharia), which they then carried north to sell to Mongol nomads and bannermen in Khobdo and Uulasutai for silver and pastoral products. From Gucheng, other merchants distributed these teas throughout Xinjiang. According to an 1828 estimate, between 100,000 and 300,000 catties of mixed and fine teas were exported from Yili and Tarbagatai in a year, which comprised “70 percent” of the tea brought north by Chinese merchants. Thus, at a minimum, north bend traders carried 150,000–350,000 catties of tea into Xinjiang annually in the early nineteenth century.  

Privatization of Xinjiang’s Tea Trade  

Chapter 3 discussed the official shipments of tea from the Tea and Horse Offices in Gansu and Qinghai to the military garrisons of Xinjiang cities in the first decade after the conquest. By the late 1770s, such official tea sales, paid for by deductions from military yancai stipends, had for the most part been replaced by private trading in tea. (The exceptions were Yili and Tarbagatai, which continued to procure for official sale approximately 100,000–150,000 catties of tea per year until the 1850s.) The privatization of tea sales to the Xinjiang garrisons happened first in Urumchi, where the superintendent requested the cessation of official tea shipments in 1768 on the grounds that the official price was higher than that charged by merchants. Surrounding counties stopped putting in requisitions for tea during the following few years.  

With a variety of privately traded teas available in Xinjiang, there was less demand for fucha and consequently fewer licenses were purchased to ship tea to the Gansu and Qinghai Tea and Horse Offices. The offices no longer needed tea, but the license fees were a source of revenue that one governor-general, at least, hated to see decline. Nayanceng, who served in Shaanxi-Gansu from 1822 to 1825, memorialized sometime before the summer of 1823 that private sales of tea in Xinjiang should be forbidden in order to improve the sales of Gansu tea licenses. The Board of Works approved this suggestion, but the negative results of the new policy soon became clear in Zungharia. Yili General Qing-xiang reported that tea shortages occasioned by the new policy were causing severe hardship to Han and Muslim alike in the territory under his command. Moreover, the interdiction of private tea sales in Xinjiang had redounded upon the Qing garrisons and the livelihood of the Mongols in Uulasutai and Khobdo, who had depended on the north bend traders’ triangle trade with Gucheng for grain and flour. On hearing of these troubles, the court authorized the shipment of 7,000 cases of zacha to Gucheng annually, but still did not permit free sale of this mixed tea in Xinjiang; rather, it ordered Qing-xiang to study the possibility of enacting in Xinjiang a state tea monopoly like that of China proper, employing rich local merchants to distribute tea on government contract. While the general looked into this, the 7,000 cases sat in Gucheng. Qing-xiang reported back the following year (1824) that Xinjiang lacked merchants rich enough to take on the risks of managing a government monopoly and that Gucheng’s garrison population of 2,000 military personnel plus “not many” civilians could not consume so much tea. Ultimately, the court reopened Xinjiang to private trade in mixed and other varieties of tea through Gucheng; fucha, however, as before could be shipped in only from Gansu. In addition, a customs station was established in Gucheng to tax incoming tea. The revenues thus realized were sent to Gansu to make up for lost tea license fees.  

In the 60 years following the conquest of Xinjiang, the activities of north bend traders had linked the economy of northwest Mongolia to the private tea trade in Xinjiang (and ultimately Kokand demand); these merchants had, moreover, proven to be more efficient suppliers of the garrison and civilian population in Zungharia than Qing quartermasters. As for the Gansu corridor, the other main trade route into Xinjiang, state control over tea sales did not reach beyond the Jiayu Guan. West road traders, operating on low margins, handled the retail distribution of tea initially produced and shipped to the northwest by rich official merchants (guanshang) in China proper, who were unwilling to carry it further. Though the dynasty had not entirely deregulated the tea business in Xinjiang, it did permit its wholesale privatization. Abandoning monopoly as a revenue device, by the 1820s the Qing taxed tea sales in the New Dominion only at the customs house in Gucheng and via the “license” fees—now paid in specie—to the moribund Tea and Horse
The Merchants and Articles of Trade

Offices. Although the embargo of Kokand in 1828 led to the implementation of more stringent inspection procedures and Nayancceng's flirtation with more extensive tea taxes (see Chapter 3), by 1831 the tea trade in Altishahr and Zungharia returned to essentially the same pattern as earlier in the decade.

Rhubarb

The 1828–31 embargo cut off Kokand's supply of rhubarb as well as of tea. As the utility of this product, and hence the reasons behind Kokand's demand for it, are not immediately obvious to readers today, a word about the purgative root is in order.

Although best known in the twelfth century for its stalks, which, baked in pies or stewed with sugar and cream make a tart dessert, it was the medicinal value of the rhubarb root, particularly that of several strains grown in western China, that commanded the world's attention. Clifford Foust has presented evidence that Chinese "great yellow" (dahuang) began to reach Europe in quantity via the Middle East as early as the eighth or ninth century, where it was known from the classical pharmacopeia for its cathartic properties. Later, rhubarb became something of a panacea to Europeans. According to one source from the 1720s, rhubarb "possesses the double virtue of a cathartic and astringent. . . . It readily evacuates particularly the bilious humors, and strengthens the stomach walls. It is given with great success in all obstructions of the liver, in the jaundice, in diarrhoeas, and in the flux albous and sometimes given as a purgative, sometimes as only an alterant; and which way ever it is taken it is an excellent medicine, agreeing with almost all ages and constitutions."

In the sixteenth century, Central Asian merchants were the most active shippers of rhubarb. It became a major article of the Sino-Russian caravan trade even before the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) opened China's commercial relations with Russia. The Romanov empire thereafter managed Russian imports and exports of rhubarb under one form of monopoly or another until 1782, maintaining quality control and dominating sales of the drug in the Western European market until the mid-eighteenth century. Even so, significant amounts of rhubarb continued to move westward through Xinjiang, India, and Central Asia. The root was one of the major items desired by the Zunghars in their trade with the Qing at Suzhou. After the Qing conquest of Zungharia and East Turkestan, Qing officials in Xinjiang were very aware of the great demand for rhubarb to their west and south. Qi-shi-yi, for example, wrote rather fantastically of Hindustan, "Rhubarb is especially valued, and people will gladly exchange for it more than ten times its weight in gold. Thus to cure all ailments and sores in this place would require no less than a hundred [ounces of gold]. When honored guests come to a feast they are given rhubarb instead of tea. If in their youth people do not ingest this drug they will surely die, so no matter how poor, every little Muslim must have half an ounce hanging in a bag at his chest to lick and sniff at." No one kind of traders in Xinjiang dealt in rhubarb, so curtailment of the rhubarb trade affected Han, Tungan, East Turkestanis, and foreign merchant alike. When for reasons of foreign policy or border defense the Qing embargoed trade with Russia or Kokand, mere possession of the root could get a merchant into trouble. The 1727 Treaty of Kakhita demarcated the Mongolian-Siberian border and established normal trading relations between the Qing and Russia. After 1737, the bulk of that barter trade took place in Kakhita (Maimaicheng) on this border. In 1764–68, 1779–80, and 1785–92, however, owing to border disputes, the Qing shut down the Kakhita trade, and the court ordered officials in maritime and northern border regions to increase vigilance lest goods destined for Russia be exported by third parties. Rhubarb, of course, like tea, was a prime Russian import. Therefore, during the longest Kakhita embargo (1785–92), memorials and edicts concerning rhubarb smugglers in Xinjiang sped back and forth across the route. In Aksu, the emperor learned, Ma Chengxiao and four others sold rhubarb to an Andijani named La-ha-mo-te. Gaozong pointed out that, although Kakhita was closed to Russian traders, Yili, Kashgar, and other Xinjiang cities could easily become conduits for the root through the offices of Kirghiz and Andijani merchants—indeed, the Laha-mo-te case provided concrete evidence of such smuggling. "This is all due to traitorous merchants conspiring to profit by buying from inside the Pass and selling to Andijani Muslims, who turn around and sell to the Russians," rescripted the emperor. "If I enact a strict embargo but the Russians can still get rhubarb, what's the difference [between this] and not embargoing at all?" Nor were East Turkestanis exempt from scrutiny. After a group of East Turkestan merchants from Hami were caught shipping 5,000 jin of rhubarb from Suzhou to Urgum in 1789, the court promulgated an edict warning the Muslims of each city in Xinjiang that rhubarb traffickers would henceforth be sent to Gansu for punishment.

The embargo against Kokand (1828–31) was of course another important period of government restriction of the rhubarb trade in Xinjiang. Although rhubarb was never traded in such volume as tea, and was therefore less of a concern, most of the actions taken by Nayancceng and others to control the circulation of tea in Xinjiang during this period applied to rhubarb as well, including confiscation of stockpiles, limitation of amounts East Turkestanis
could purchase, issuance of licenses, and maintenance of official vigilance in key gateway cities to prevent smuggling of the drug to Zungharia, whence it might be exported by nomads.

Jade

The Chinese word \textit{jade}, translated as “jade,” is a very general term, referring to any of a variety of stones suitable for carving. In common speech, it is often used in opposition to \textit{shitou} (“rock”)—a piece of stone is either a \textit{shitou} (worthless) or \textit{yu} (valuable). “Jade” in English, although somewhat more specific, is likewise confusing in that it refers to two petrologically distinct materials: nephrite, a silicate of calcium and magnesium with varying amounts of iron in a tightly interwoven, needlelike crystalline structure, and jadeite, a silicate of sodium and aluminum. The latter stone is most valuable when bright green, thus resembling its Chinese namesake, the Southeast Asian kingfisher (\textit{feicui}). Jadeite was not widely known in China until the eighteenth century, when it began to be imported from Burma.\footnote{37}

Nephrite (hereafter “jade”) carries a much longer pedigree, having been highly regarded in China proper since at least neolithic times. Its hardness and luster made jade a material par excellence for worked funerary objects, scepters, tablets, talismans, chimes, animal figures, wine vessels, sash pendants, and a host of other ritual, ornamental, and functional objects. Neolithic lapidaries probably got nephrite from sources near Lake Tai and in the northeast (from Liaoning to Shandong), but the finest source of jade available to China since antiquity derived from the Kunlun Mountains south of the Tarim Basin. Marco Polo was referring to this material when he noted the plentiful presence in the rivers not far from Khotan and Yarkand of “stones called jasper and chaledony.”\footnote{38}

TRIBUTE JADE AND THE USBAQAL MONOLITHS

After conquering East Turkestan, the Qing took control of the region’s jade production, extracting mountain and river jade with corvée labor drawn from the East Turkistani population. The richest deposits of jade lay in Miertai Mountain, a little over 500 kilometers from Yarkand. There East Turkestanis ascended the slopes on yaks loaded with excavating tools to cut enormous boulders from the mountainsides with hammer and chisel (see Figure 6). The best riparian jade came from two rivers that emerge from the Kunlun range south of Khotan and skirt the city on either side before converging north of the city to flow into the Taklamakan as the Khotan River. In the beds of

\textbf{Figure 6.} Jade boulder carved with a scene of jade quarrying, Qianlong period. Note the conical fur hats and boots of the miners, which reveal them to be East Turkestanis or perhaps Kirghiz. Photograph courtesy of the Palace Museum, Beijing.
The court initially required that all jade mined and gathered in the Yarkand region each year be shipped to Beijing. Later, an annual tribute quota of 4,000 catties (2,000 kilos) was established, although actual amounts varied somewhat depending on the size of the pieces of rough jade carted to the capital in a given year. Besides these annual shipments (which took five to six months to reach Beijing), the court also dispatched officials to Yarkand to arrange extraordinary consignments every few years, including, for example, material to cut four sets of jade chimes for the Ningshou Gong in 1775. These special orders were generally larger than the tribute quota, one in 1776 weighing 20,000 catties (10,000 kilos). In 1812, because stocks of jade in the Imperial Household Workshop (Zaoban Chu, located within the imperial city) were sufficient, the court lowered Khotan’s jade quota to 2,000 catties annually. Later, in a typical display of frugality, the Daoguang emperor eliminated this tribute requirement altogether during the first year of his reign (1821). Although at first Xuanzong had intended only a temporary cessation, on the grounds that palace storerooms were full, the Altishahr jade tribute was never restored. Available jade tribute figures are given in Table 13.

The jade excavated and shipped eastward during the first half century of Qing rule in Xinjiang was more than enough for one empire, however. Perhaps nothing better sums up the character of the Qing at its height under Qianlong, with its remarkable military, logistical, administrative, and artistic skills and grandiose vision, than the court’s ability—and desire—to turn Khotanese mountain jade into Beijing’s jade mountains, boulder by massive boulder. Several of these monumental jade sculptures were produced, four of them from single pieces of rough jade weighing 1,500, 2,000, 2,500, and 4,500 kilograms respectively. The 4,500-kilo boulder arrived in Beijing in 1780; the Imperial Household Workshop drew up a design, modeled after a Song painting on the subject of Great Yu quelling the waters, and the following year shipped the raw jade stone, a four-sided plan, and a wax mock-up to Yangzhou for sculpting under the auspices of the Lianghui Salt Administration, which paid 7,280 taels for the work. Fearing that the wax model would deteriorate over time, the Yangzhou craftsmen executed a second model in wood before starting in on the jade itself. Completion of the work took six years (over 86,000 work days) and spanned the tenures of two salt commissioners. The finished “Great Yu” jade mountain (later known as “King of the Jades”) stood 2.25 meters high and was almost a meter in diameter. The salt administration shipped it over inland waterways back to the capital in 1787, and the following year Gaozong had it inscribed with a poem of his own composition and the pattern of his imperial seal. The piece remains in the collection of the Beijing Palace Museum.

The Qianlong era’s predilection for monumental nephrite sculpture left Xinjiang officials a troublesome legacy that endured half a century after Gaozong’s death. During the long-lived emperor’s final months, Yarkand officials began transporting two enormous pieces of jade along the post road to the east. When these pieces were first excavated, Yarkand superintendent Ji-feng had supposed cutting the rocks up, as they were rather severely fractured, but Heisen ordered them shipped whole—clearly, the Jiaqing emperor, Renzong, later declared, for Heisen’s own profit. Later in 1798 an official in the field informed Heisen of the hardships endured by the East Turkestan convivia laborers charged with hauling the stones, which were later estimated to weigh a total of 15,000 kilos. Heisen apparently failed to memorialize at this point either and ordered the shipment to proceed. Two weeks after Gaozong’s death, Renzong learned of the massive jades still en route from Altishahr and dispatched an express edict to the responsible officials to abandon the boulders wherever they were upon receipt of the order. The new emperor had the boulders involved rewarded with bolts of silk and the porters paid in silver to “display sympathetic feelings for our Muslim subjects.”

The jade stopped here, but the story does not. Yu-qing, superintendent of Karasahr, discovered the jade boulders on an 1806 inspection trip to Ushatol (Wushaketa, now Wushitala), where they had been abandoned seven years before. The superintendent suggested in a memorial that “peddlers and traders might worry that imperial grace now swarm over the great distances to Yarkand and elsewhere with their money” might be called in to purchase (at the government’s price), break up, and haul off the jade pieces, thus yielding a tidy profit in silver for the Xinjiang authorities. The Jiaqing emperor would

* Although this was the third year of the Jiaqing reign, at this time Heisen still enjoyed commanding influence in the Qing court. Renzong did not begin to rule in his own right for another four months.
have none of this, however, responding that this idea of profiting from the jade missed the point and forbade Yu-qing from selling the boulders. Later, however, he reconsidered and instructed Yu-qing to look into transporting the two smaller pieces in the autumn with the tribute jade, if this would not involve too much difficulty. Yu-qing zealously set about making the arrangements, requisitioning carts, ropes, 50 to 60 horses, and several dozen East Turkestanis. But when the emperor heard of these preparations and learned that even these “small” pieces weighed 1,850 and 3,750 kilograms—each one greater than the annual tribute quota at this time—he was highly displeased and transferred Yu-qing to Yili where Song-yun could keep an eye on him. The jade monoliths remained in Ušaqtal, where Lin Zexu found them east of the post station in the spring of 1845. Lin wrote: “Seeing them [the jade boulders] now, they look like small mountains. They are rough, uncut gems. One face protrudes, a jade green with a crystal luster. One may look, but it is forbidden to take a chisel to them. It is a mysterious thing.” What finally happened to the nephrite monoliths is unknown.

Jade is unique among the items the Qing court shipped to the capital from the New Dominion in that it was the only article with intrinsic commercial value. To be sure, of the over 110,000 kilograms of tribute jade shipped to Beijing between 1760 and 1820, much went to carving the jade mountains and hanging chimes, innumerable ceremonial or display items (archaic imitations of bronzes, faux-Moghul bowls and teapots, human and animal figures, ruyi scepters to be given as gifts to loyal ministers, banquet tableware, jewelry, hair ornaments and trinkets, implements of the scholar’s study, tablets, sacrificial vessels, Buddhist and Taoist icons), and even such practical things as flutes, cymbals, boxes, and backscratchers. But after the best-quality pieces of each grade of jade were selected and carved, much second-quality stone remained in the Imperial Household Workshop and Scepter Warehouse (Ruji Guan). This is the imperial household sold off at the Chongwen Men, or through "apporitionment" (i.e., forced sale—tampat) to salt administrations, silk factories, or custom houses. In 1804, for example, the Lianghual and Changlu Salt Administrations; the Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Jiangning silk factories; and six southern custom houses purchased—or were ordered to buy—over 2,600 catties of second-through fifth-grade jadestone from the palace for 5,329 taels.

PRIVATE COMMERCE IN ALTISHAHR JADE: A TALE OF TWO SUZHOU

That Yu-qing could consider soliciting merchant help in dispensing with the Ušaqtal monoliths demonstrates that a private market for jade existed in Xinjiang at this time. Indeed, although Qing authorities in the Yarkand and Khotan area controlled the extraction and gathering of the stone and set up special karun to interdict smugglers and illicit miners, possession and traffic in jade was illegal only for a short time during the 1779–1862 period, and then only in Xinjiang. In 1773 the court gave permission for jade extracted from Mierti Mountain to be registered and sold to officials, soldiers, and common merchants after the annual quota of tribute jade had been selected from the year’s haul. Such private purchases were limited to 50 catties (25 kilos) and were accompanied by a certificate (ping) with which merchants and others could bring their jade along the post road back through the Jiyuan Guan to China proper.

After taking up the post of Yarkand superintendent in 1776, Gao Pu revised the system. The jade left over after the tribute had been sent was to be divided up, with 60 percent sold to merchants and the remaining 40 percent retained, supposedly as compensation for the East Turkestani miners, but most probably falling to Gao Pu himself. Gao also raised the individual weight limit on mountain jade to 150 catties, arguing that it was a shame for high-quality boulders to be cut up for the sake of mere legal formalism (but the emperor later ascribed the impetus for this reform to Gao’s corrupt scheming).

By this time, the word was out that jade could be purchased legally in Xinjiang and the jade rush was on. The Jiyuan Guan, now kept open all day to accommodate the busy westward traffic, saw Chinese merchants pass through en route to Altishahr in unprecedented numbers. Jade was of course particularly attractive to long-distance traders because of its high value relative to weight and volume, and many of the merchants who carried silver or traded silks, tea, rhubarb, and other Chinese products in Xinjiang brought their profits home in the form of jade. Although certified and hence legally importable jade was available only in Yarkand, the Xinjiang jade market most frequented by Chinese merchants was not, as might be expected, in Khotan or Yarkand, but in Aksu, where East Turkestan sold jadestone in the Muslim city and where the East Turkestani and Chinese shops in the bazaar dealt in rough and carved jade. Silk and other goods traded here were often bartered directly for jade.

With more merchants passing through the Jiyuan Guan, and with a growing number of jade certificates to tally, inspections inevitably became cursory and private jade slipped through into Gansu illegally. (Zhang Luan could get through any customs barrier with a few words and a small gift to the inspectors, all of whom were acquainted with him.) Suzhou (Gansu) served as a major entrepôt for Altishahr jade and goods from China proper. Merchants operating between Xinjiang and Gansu, many of them Tungans, could mar-
ket jade from beyond the Pass in one of Suzhou’s many jade shops (jiyin) whether it had been shipped legally or not. Once a private merchant sold or bartered a consignment of jade in Suzhou, it was “clean”: its provenance could not be traced, though everyone knew it came from Khotan.20

Merchants from south China then purchased or exchanged luxury items for the jade in Suzhou and carried it to other parts of the empire, including the jade carving centers of Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangning, and especially Yangzhou and Soochow (jiangsu). This latter city was the main center of jade carving and dealing in the Qing, and its street of lapidaries, Zhuanlu Xiang, received a great fillip from increased supply of jadesone and increased private and official patronage during this period. Wealthy merchants like Zhang Luan set up residences and businesses in Soochow centered on their jade trade. The imperial court farmed out much of its tribute jade to the salt administrations and silk factories for carving, and the commissioners of these imperial household monopolies availed themselves of the talented artisans in the Jiangnan cities to perform the work.21 One result was an increase in technical and artistic skill in jade carving that clearly impressed contemporaries. From the time of the victories in Zungaria and Altishahr, the scholar Ling Tingkan noted, the skill of Yangzhou’s carvers had improved in unprecedented fashion, as could be seen in two large pieces displayed in one of the city’s famous Buddhist temples and, on a smaller scale, in the city’s famous “Hindustani” (faux-Moghul) jade-work, clocks, pipes, snuff bottles, and miniature fire engines (shuiyanchong).22

A second result of the vastly increased jade supply was a popularization of jade items. Lin Sumen wrote of the prevalent fashion in Yangzhou around 1805 for rich and poor alike to affect jade mouthpieces on their pipes. Flourishing production of jade assured moderate prices for such items, which were readily available in Yangzhou markets.23 The Qianlong emperor, who wrote over 800 poems on jade-related subjects, deplored the “vulgarization” that attended the expansion of jade supply, from Xinjiang, and of demand, from rich merchants. Carvers employing over-decoration and flashy new designs

...to get a better price for their work gailled him in particular, and he used his bully pulpul to promote aesthetic conservation of this precious resource.24 The uncovering in 1778 of the jade scam perpetrated by Gao Pu, Zhang Luan, Zhao Junru, and coconspirators marked the end, for the time being, of the Qing court’s accommodation of private jade trafficking. The wide-ranging search for Gao Pu’s associates and their goods-in-transit netted a host of more modest smugglers, most unconnected to Gao Pu, and in the process revealed the workings of the jade trade in the eighteenth century. These merchants’ stories are summarized in Table 14.

Several points emerge from analysis of this sample. The merchants involved fall into two general categories: those based in Xinjiang and the northwest, operating between Xinjiang and Gansu (the first section of the table), and those either from the Jiangnan or traveling between there and the northwest (the second section). There were, in addition, Kokandi merchants buying Altishahr jade. The first group are typical west route traders, leaving their hometowns in Gansu, Shaanxi, and Shanxi to be employed in or run shops or work as laborers throughout Altishahr. They include many Tungans, probably more than are explicitly identified as Muslims in the sources. They operated on a small scale, often spending no more than a few hundred cash to buy a piece or two of refuse jade from Tungans or East Turkestanis, or occasionally from shops in Altishahr and in Suzhou. Many were tea or cloth traders.

The second group were generally more affluent. Silk merchants journeying between Jiangnan cities and Xi’an, Lanzhou, Suzhou, and other northwestern destinations would purchase silk and other goods would offer exchange for jade. Some ventured as far as Aksu, but most seem to have traded in Suzhou, often with Tungan suppliers. They dealt in large pieces of high-quality stone; often several merchants would pool capital in a single shipment of jadesone, which they transported by cart and riverboat to Soochow and Yangzhou for sale.

In addition, two more general conclusions are possible. The first is that Tungan middlemen were ubiquitous in the jade trade, whether in Xinjiang or in the jade entrepôt of Suzhou; this is not surprising after what we have already seen concerning these Chinese Muslims. And second, there were no exclusive jade merchants among these “smugglers”; all dealt simultaneously in such other commodities as cotton cloth, tea, and silk. Some of the Shanxi merchants caught up in the Gao Pu investigation claimed as much in their depositions: “Those who go to Soochow to sell jade are by no means specialist dealers in jade. They are all traders who go between Gansu, Suzhou, Aksu, Yarkand, and so forth, selling silk and miscellaneous items and pri-


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merchants Dealing in Jades in Xinjiang and China Proper, 1778-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Table 14</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jade Merchants or Smugglers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place of Origin/Base of Operations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Place and Manner of Purchase</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MERCHANDS BASED IN THE NORTHWEST</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lei Ying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi; partner in Zheng Heng Shop in Hami</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought jade from Tungan leather shop owner, from sheep broker, and from camel teamster; traveled with over 100 caravans to Shaanxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sun Quande</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi; worked at Hami Tian Deng Shop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hami Tungans who owed Sun money repaid him with jade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fan Yungji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi; ran a shop in Suzhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased jade in Aksu from Zhou Xiuhong, a Jiangnan man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four or five unnamed individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended in Jingzhou, Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplied by the Tian Xi Tran in Suzhou and by Tungans from Gansu and Shaanxi, now resident in Suzhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wei Zhongxiao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu; ran shop in Kashgar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traded tea for small amount of jade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang Ming</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu; ran shop in Aksu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traded cloth and tea for 24 pieces of jade worth 7 taels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu Kui (Tungan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu; had worked as laborer in Ush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought small piece of jade from unknown East Turkestanian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cao Zhi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu; sold meat in Yarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought small pieces of jade in Yarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Dequan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong; sold goods in Aksu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased 34 pieces of jade worth 65 taels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Datun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong; ran shop in Aksu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traded cash, cotton cloth, and tea for 15 pieces of jade worth 56 taels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Ge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong; ran store in Aksu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought 40 caravans of jade worth 23 taels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Guoyun, Zhang Tingchun, Shi Bingjun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gansu; did business in Aksu and Yarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traded tea and purchased small pieces of jade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Yingfu, Ma Shide, Mu Jun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did business in Yarkand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought small pieces of jade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hai Shenglian (Tungan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in China proper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealt privately in jade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ma Tianlong (Tungan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprehended in Aksu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concealed jade in a cart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MERCHANDS FROM OR OPERATING IN THE SOUTH**

| **Jade Merchants or Smugglers**                              |
| **Place of Origin/Base of Operations**                       |
| **Place and Manner of Purchase**                             |
| **MERCHANDS FROM OR OPERATING IN THE SOUTH**                 |
| Wu Qizhou and seven others                                   |
| Purchased in Aksu and Suzhou with proceeds from silk sales; received jade in Suzhou, Liangzhou, and Lanzhou in repayment of debts for credit sales in the past; total of 1,367 caravans |
| Zhao Aiyuan, Mr. Peng                                       |
| Shandong                                                    |
| Shipped consignment of large white jade pieces from Aksu to Soochow |
| Xu Juercu                                                   |
| Soochow                                                     |
| In 1773 went to Gansu to sell dry goods; in 1776 to Aksu, then Yarkand; returned to Aksu and Suzhou in 1777, buying jade from a Lanzhou Tungan in Aksu; returned to Soochow in 1778 |
| Li Buhan, Fu De                                             |
| Purchased 1,000 caravans of jade worth 14,000 taels in Aksu from Zhao Junru; two Shandong men, living in Suzhou San Yi Dian, bought into the deal |

**KOKANDI MERCHANDS**

| **A-hu-la and followers**                                    |
| **Kokand**                                                   |
| Bought jade illegally in Kokand                              |

**Sources:** For Lei Ying, Sun Quande, and Fan Yungji, GIPSYSA 23:909a-910b; for the unnamed merchants, GIPSYSA 26:909a; for Wei Zhongzhuo and Wang Xing, Fu-kang-an, Zong'an, or 24, PL45:9-13; for Hu Kui, Cao Zhi, Li Dequan, Zhang Datun, and Li Ge, Fu-kang-an, Zong'an, or 24, PL45:26; for Zhang Guoyun et al. and Li Yingfei et al., Fu-kang-an, Zong'an, or 24, PL45:28; for Hai Shenglian, GIZL 33:98a-22a, 356-991; for Shaanxi, GIZL 356-991; for Zhang Dechang and Mr. Shi, GIPSYSA 25:909a-910b; for Yang Tianzhen et al., GIPSYSA 23:909a-910b; for Wu Qizhou et al., GIZL 1:98b-21b, 30a, 543 to 547, and GIPSYSA 24:908a, 870a, for Zha Aiyun and Mr. Peng, GIPSYSA 25:909a, 991-992a, for Xu Juercu, GIPSYSA 26:933b-934a; for Li Buhan and Fu De, GIPSYSA 26:900; for Kokandi merchants, GIZL 1:978b-925a, PL45:1 remiz.}

Volleying jade stones to Soochow to sell. And they all stay at innsthey don't run jade shops.225 (Zhang Luan, the wealthy jade dealer in collision with Gao Pu, did own jade shops in Soochow, but he seems exceptional in the breadth and net worth of his business activities.)

When it cracked down on Gao Pu and prohibited all private jade dealings in 1778, the court expressed little concern over the small, independent merchants who traded a little nephrite on the side. Some, indeed, still held certificates when they were caught, and, although the Qing had revoked the jade certification system when it made the trade illegal, where goods and certificates tallied the dynasty took no action. Nor, indeed, did the dynasty punish...
any merchant not affiliated with Gao Pu, except to confiscate the jade. The emperor likewise realized the futility of trying to chase down all the Chinese merchants implicated in sales and resales of jade items in the northwest during the previous boom years. The 1778 investigation was thus greatly limited in scope. If everyone who had dealt with Gao Pu and his associates were punished, Gaozong pointed out, not one of the Soochow jade shops would be spared. Nevertheless, after this initial display of leniency, for the next 21 years, as long as the restriction against private dealing remained in effect, officials would occasionally apprehend jade smugglers and pronounce sentences as if upon thieves, with the number of heavy bamboo blows based on the value of the jadeestone found in the criminal’s possession.98

In yet another example of how the economy in Qing Xinjiang was increasingly deregulated over time, the jiaqo emperor lifted restrictions on jade entirely as soon as he came into his own, in 1799. At the same time, he relaxed laws forbidding private ginseng gathering in the northeast. Merchants were free to trade in the stone; those being punished for past offenses could have their cases reviewed. Moreover, the Qing government ceased jade mining operations in Khotan, thus freeing up the soldiers and officials who had supervised jade extraction in the past and avoiding the expense of equipping and provisioning the East Turkestan mining crews. Thereafter, the state still managed the selection of tribute jade, but East Turkestan could sell directly to Chinese merchants. Han and Tungan were still technically required to hold certificates for their jade, subject to inspection in Aksu or at the Jiayu Guan, but it is doubtful how vigilantly this system—which never covered more than a fraction of the privately traded jade in Xinjiang—was enforced in the nineteenth century.96

After this almost complete privatization, Chinese merchants made their way to Altishahr in increased numbers. In Kashgar, Councillor Fu-jun noted this fact, attributed it to the lifting of restrictions on jade, and even theorized that the price of copper cash (relative to silver) in Altishahr would thereafter be dependent upon sales of jade in the Jiangnan: as Chinese merchants clamored to buy jade from East Turkestan, who, Fu-jun claimed, sold only for pul, the price of copper money rose not only in Yarkand, but also in Aksu, Kashgar, and Yangi Hisar—presumably because of Chinese merchants’ demand for copper money and the amount of silver they dropped into the local economy. If jade did not sell well in China proper, Fu-jun believed, the copper price in Altishahr would fall again.97

One puzzling aspect of the commerce between China proper and Xinjiang between 1759 and 1862 is the problem of how Chinese merchants brought

profits home. The exports from the Chinese provinces via Xinjiang abroad to Central and South Asia are easily identified: silk, cotton cloth, silver ingots, tea, and rhubarb are frequently discussed in the Qing sources, and the reasons for their demand are easily appreciated. In addition, merchants brought for sale in Xinjiang those items that Han, Tungan, Manchu, and others required from China proper (tea, silk, cloth, china, drugs and foodstuffs, copper ware, iron tools). But what could these merchants bring back from Xinjiang that could be sold in China proper? Xinjiang was too far from the urban centers of China proper for most pastoral products—generally bulky and heavy in relation to their value—to be profitable imports. Qi-shi-yi does mention that a fashion in Beijing for coats and hats made of the hide of Bukharan “heavy-boned sheep” created a demand for these skins in the 1770s (“When style creates a taste for something, a place 10,000 li away responds like an echo”).99 And we have seen that Zhang Luan shipped a cartload of hides to Shanxi, so there must have been some market for such items. But it would seem that most demand for hides, felts, wool, and even livestock on the hoof could be adequately supplied from closer pastoral regions in Mongolia. Cotton grown in the Eastern Marsh, particularly the Turfan area, was imported profitably to the northwestern provinces, but the same was not true of the produce of Zungaria and Altishahr. Some flax, too, was exported to China proper. However, even taken together, the eastward trade of these items does not seem commensurate with the voluminous westward commerce in tea, rhubarb, silk, and other Chinese products.

Jadestone, on the other hand, was clearly a major eastward trade item, eagerly purchased by Chinese merchants exchanging goods in Xinjiang. Jade must have gone some way toward “balancing” the China proper–Xinjiang trade. We have seen that from the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, and perhaps still later, there was a direct and sizeable private silk-for-jade trade linking Suzhou in the northwest with Soochow in the Jiangnan, and, moreover, that small-scale tea traders operating in Xinjiang regularly exchanged tea for jade, which they could market in Aksu or back in Gansu. For this reason, above and beyond the anecdotal evidence on jade amassed above, we may assume an important role for jade in the commerce linking Xinjiang with China proper.

Opium

Opium may have played a similar part from the 1830s to the 1850s. Although we know little about the opium trade in this region, within a short time of
the implementation of the opium prohibition in Xinjiang in 1899, authorities confiscated almost 160,000 ounces (liang) of opium. Most was seized from foreign—especially South Asian—merchants, but Han and Tungan were implicated in these cases as well. Somewhat later, Chinese merchants met the caravans of Tatar merchants who sold opium for its weight in silver outside Yili and Tarbagatai. The volume of opium imports from Kashmir and other Himalayan countries increased in the fifteen years after the Qing prohibition; by the 1840s it was a staple article of trade, with 210 mounds (about 7,854 kilos) smuggled in goatskins to Yarkand yearly. A series of arrests in Urumchi in early 1840 brought in over 30 smokers and dealers; it is likely that the Chinese merchants who purchased opium stocks, whatever their origin, smuggled the drug eastward to Gansu and other provinces of the northwest.20

We cannot look entirely to simple formulas (silk-for-jade, silk-for-horses, silver-for-opium) to describe the commercial relations between Xinjiang and China proper. Rather, it seems that most merchants relied on a more complex series of transactions (such as the triangle trade that supplied the Mongol banners in Khoddo and Ulusautai with flour through tea sales in Gucheng) or set up shop for some time in Xinjiang in order to amass profits in monetary form. No doubt the Shanxi firms’ remittance services were an aid in the “repatriation” of such earnings. Moreover, although there were long-distance caravans plying the whole route from Yarkand, say, to Guihua, or from Soochow to Aksu, more commonly a rough pattern of relay trade prevailed, whereby one group of merchants traded between China proper and gateway cities near the Xinjiang border (Suzhou, Gucheng, Urumchi), and another group, based in Xinjiang cities, conveyed goods from the entrepôts further into the Xinjiang interior for local retail or sale to foreign merchants for re-export. To a great degree, these stages of the relay trade corresponded to the distinct classes of merchants identified in this chapter. Affluent Jiangnan traders and major Shanxi merchants worked the Soochow-Suzhou axis, generally not venturing beyond Gansu. Many Shanxi merchants on the northern route, too, turned back or continued north to trade in Mongolia after selling their goods in Gucheng or Urumchi. The Xinjiang-based merchants included many Tungans, East Turkestanis, and less-highly capitalized Han peddlers and shopkeepers, as well as a smaller number of established name-brand firms. Thus, despite the great influx of Chinese merchants to Xinjiang during this period, the distinction between “inside” and “outside the Pass,” enshrined in place-name usage and maintained by the territory’s administrative structure, was reflected in private commercial arrangements as well.

This chapter’s focus on major trade items and groups of merchants adds complexity to the story, begun in Chapters 2 through 4, of the relationship between Qing empire builders and Chinese merchants in Xinjiang. As the Qianlong emperor had argued, merchants from China proper were indeed critical to the maintenance of Qing outposts in the New Dominion, not only for the commercial taxes and rents they paid, but by supplying tea to Xinjiang garrisons, a variety of other goods to towns throughout Xinjiang, and, indirectly, grain to Mongols and Qing forces in northwestern Mongolia. (As we will see below, they were also a critical source of portage and credit to the Qing military in wartime.) But while the dynasty in principle approved of and relied upon Xinjiang trade, the court and officials often cast a wary eye upon individual Chinese traders, many of whom indeed operated outside the law. Chinese taken abroad as captives, tea and rhubarb dealers flaunting embargoes, smugglers of jade, opium runners, virtually anyone surnamed “Ma”—all at one point or another were perceived as a threat to imperial order in Xinjiang, even as economic networks and ties to China proper (such as those of the Shanxi firms) expanded. In particular, the Tungans fell under scrutiny disproportionate to their minor economic clout, in part because their identity as Muslim Chinese challenged the categories by which the Qing organized its subjects in the New Dominion.
Qing Ethnic Policy and Chinese Merchants

On arriving in Kashgar, Your ministers entered the city to conduct a reconnaissance. The city wall is over ten li in circumference, and over 2,500 households of dog-Muslims live within.

Zhao-hui, Memorial. February 3, 1760

The East Turkestanis metamorphosed from subhuman barbarians into imperial subjects sometime during the third week of February 1760. The move toward neutral depictions of the Qing's new Xinjiang subjects was early and abrupt, at least in official materials. MemoriaIs from the Zunggar and Altishahr front between 1758 and early 1760 referred to the East Turkestanis, then still a newly conquered and unknown entity, with a derogatory character hui ("Muslim") that included the canine radical in conjunction with the phonetic hui, thus creating an ethnonym with an effect something like "dog-Muslim." Zhao-Hui, Huang Tinggui, and Yang Yingju all used this character in their dispatches of this time. For example, an important policy document sent in by Zhao-hui from Kashgar on February 3d, 1760, contains this character, even in its extensively corrected Grand Council copy. In his series of reports from the cities of Altishahr, Yang Yingju employs the canine-hui character in memorials dated February 1st, 2d, and 26th. On February 26th, however, he writes the character without the deprecatory radical, which thereafter does not appear in official Qing sources. Somehow in this ten-day interim the Shaansi-Gansu governor-general either decided or was ordered no longer to refer to the East Turkestan in this pejorative manner.

Qing Images of Xinjiang Peoples

Such evidence of official Qing concern over the language used in reference to new Muslim and Mongol subjects forces us to confront a deeply held assumption about Chinese culture and empire, namely, that in Qing times, the

"Chinese empire," was Sinocentric. This is a principal lesson of John King Fairbank's writings on the "Chinese World Order"; according to that paradigm, one would expect "the Chinese" to view those peoples who were culturally non-Chinese as "barbaric." But the evidence from these early dispatches from Xinjiang indicates the emergence of a very different approach to cultural difference among Qing subjects, as well as an official recognition that language mattered in formulating ethnic policy.

To be sure, there was much in Xinjiang that was alien to Han and Manchu alike. Qi-shi-yi, a Manchu traveling in Altishahr in the latter half of the eighteenth century and writing about it in Chinese considers the Arabic script to be a mess of scratchings and wrigglings—hard to make out and outlandishly horizontal: "The Muslim script is like the tracks of birds, like tadpoles. It is read horizontally and linked up. Breaks are particularly difficult to distinguish." Not surprisingly, given the unfamiliarity of the region and its people, and their recent status as enemies, the early unofficial gazeteers of Xinjiang likewise contain examples of chauvinistic and derogatory depictions. One of the harshest may be found in the 1772 Huixiang zhi.

The Muslims' natural character (fuzing) is suspicious and unsettled, crafty and false. Hard-drinking and addicted to sex, they never know when they have had enough. They understand neither restraint nor restraint, and wild talk takes the place of shame. They are greedy and parasitical. If husbands, wives, fathers, or sons have money, they each hide it away for themselves. If even one cash falls into a drainage ditch, they have to drain, sift, and dredge until the coin is retrieved. They enjoy being proud and boastful, exaggerating their reputation. They prefer ease to industry, considering an opportunity for inactivity and sleep a great boon, and a drunken binge from dusk to dawn a great joy. Their character is lethargic, and they lack foresight. They do not know what it is to learn skills or to store grain, thus they must have someone to rely on in order to survive. Still, they have their good side: they can endure hunger and cold, will take any insult, and can be happily frugal.

In a passage on the East Turkestan Islamic marriage system, the authors lingered upon what was to them the outrageous custom of considering children by a man's various wives all to be of equal rank in the inner family, distinguished only by age, and of treating a woman's children by different husbands as consanguineous (tongbao). Then they interject an assimilationist note: "Now, because they have come over and submitted and are already part of the realm, they also know to look up to and revere Chinese customs (huafeng) and gradually will accept the rituals and proper conduct."
Qing Ethnic Policy and Merchants

One factor behind this style of description is no doubt simply an author’s natural desire to write compellingly about things strange and new. Qi-shi-yi in 1777 records the bizarre information he had “seen and heard” regarding other peoples of the West, such as Kukandis with sheep nine inches tall, or Russian ladies who wear long, double-lined skirts because they lack underwear. When he discusses people whom he had first-hand experience, however, his descriptions take on a harder edge. “Now Torghuts and Khoshuts are settled on this land. It is indeed a pleasant place to dwell, but the people are restless and lazy and cannot apply their energies to cultivation to feed themselves. The men put their efforts into highway robbery, and their women shamelessly into prostitution. They are just a bad type (lei) of western people (rongren).”

In later gazetteers, however, such as the Huijiang tongzhi (1804) and Xichui zongtong shilue (1809), pejorative images of the peoples in Xinjiang are generally absent from the ethnographic descriptions. Most significantly, the ethnographic material in the imperially commissioned gazetteers, Huanyu Xiuyu tongshi (1782) and Xinjiang zilue (1821) is free of patently defamatory language. The reason for this is stated explicitly in the latter work, compiled under the supervision of Song-yun: “The Muslims of the south and the Oirats of the north have become subjects (fuji), are equivalent to the registered people (bianmeng), and must not be called ‘outer barbarians’ (waiyi).” Thus the Xinjiang zilue distinguishes them clearly from Kazakhs, “Buruts” (Kirghiz), and other nomadic peoples on Xinjiang’s borders and beyond.

Nailene Chou notes a similar contrast in the attitudes expressed in materials on Xinjiang (mostly poetry and articles by exiles) of the middle and late Qing periods. In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Qing commentators observed the customs of Xinjiang peoples “with interest and amusement”; while they occasionally expressed disapproval, overtly pejorative terms were avoided. “By contrast, in works done in later Ch’ing, say, after the Moslem rebellion in the 1870s [sic], references made to the minorities were often phrased in contemptuous ways. This change perhaps reflects the difference between a genuine self-confidence and a nervous chauvinism.”

1 The term yi (“foreign, barbarian”) was not applied to the native inhabitants of Xinjiang (East Turkestanis, Oirats, Torghuts, and so forth) following the conquest. I have discovered only one instance in which it appeared: in his Wushi shiyi (also published under the title Xinjiang Fuhucheng zilue), a practical handbook for Qing officials in Ush, Bao-da includes a section on the Huiyi chu, an office that supervised local Muslim affairs, adjudicated murder cases, and issued passports for Muslim travel abroad, often in concert with the Ush hakim beg. This agency also handled matters pertaining to foreign Buruts or Andijanis, who are referred to as yi in other sources. I suspect that by the late date of this gazetteer (1857), the official neutrality of the Qianlong period had given way to a more Sinocentric outlook.

Chou suggests that bitterness over the bloody Tungan rebellion could explain the latter attitude. But, as I suggest below, there seems to be something more deep-seated distinguishing the attitudes of the eighteenth century from those of the late nineteenth, for the Qianlong-era ideology of empire differs profoundly from that held by Han Chinese of the Ming or Republican periods and, indeed, from that attributed to the Qing by the “Chinese world order” paradigm.

Five Nations, Under Heaven: Gaozong’s Vision of the Empire

Official terms for and references to the East Turkestanis were sanitized following the dynasty’s 1759 military victory in Altishahr. The changed terminology seen in Yang Yingju’s official correspondence with the court was but the first step in the ideological promotion of the East Turkestanis from semicanine barbarians to full members of the Qing imperial polity, a process that began no later than 1759. When the Qianlong emperor fully articulated the new imperial vision, East Turkestani joined Han, Manchu, Mongol, and Tibetan as one of the five culture blocs that comprised the principal domains of the Qing realm, a status from which such other peoples as the Miao or indigenous Taiwanese, who lacked writing systems, were excluded. This position in the empire is symbolized, for example, by the inclusion of Turki (in Arabic script) among the languages used on gates and on pylon steles. Following the Xinjiang conquest, for example, the Qianlong emperor ordered that the main gates at the Chengde summer palace and the Shenyang palace, as well as “dismount here” steles at the Qing ancestral tomb complexes, be recarved in Manchu (Qing), Chinese (Han), Mongol (Monggu), Tibetan (Xifan), and Arabic/Turki (Huiizi). Thus he intended to “proclaim the supremacy of the unified linguistic universality of our dynastic house.”

Further evidence may be found in two major multilingual publications: the Wuti Qingwen jian (Imperially authorized mirror of the five scripts of Qing letters) and the Qidingxi Xiuyu tongwen zhi (Imperially commissioned unified-language gazetteer of the Western Regions). The latter work, completed in 1767, is a geographical and genealogical dictionary of Western Region place-names and personal names in Manchu, Chinese, Mongolian, Tolo (Oirat Mongol), Tibetan, and Turki, with Manchu entries primary and

1 The Tolo (from Mongolian for “clear, lucid”) script was adapted from the Mongolian in 1684 by Zaya Pandita, a Khoshuut, to represent the pronunciations of western or Oirat Mongolian. Enoki “Introduction,” p. 18.
elevated (see Figure 7). The dictionary was intended principally as an aid in the compilation of the military history of the conquest of Tibet and Xinjiang ([Qingding] pingding Zhungqer fangqie) and the imperial gazetteer of the Western Regions ([Qingding] huangyu Xiyu zuishi). In addition, it served the vital function of standardizing Chinese transliterations of these non-Chinese names, thus avoiding confusion in field dispatches to the court as well as in historiography. Above and beyond this, however, through the collection and codification of genealogies of ruling elites and etymologies of place-names in Zungharia, East Turkestan, Qinghai, and Tibet, it was an exercise in imperial scholarship and scholarly imperialism, a linguistic conquest to consolidate both practically and symbolically the military victories already achieved.

With a well-chosen example in his preface to this work, the Qianlong emperor portrayed the unity of these five peoples “under Heaven” and simultaneously situated himself, in his celestial capacity, as the element unifying the whole.

Now, in Chinese [Hanyu], “Heaven” is called tian. In the language of our dynastic house [yao] it is called abka. In Mongolian [Mongyyu] and Zungharian [Zhuyu] “Heaven” is ющее. In Tibetan [Xiyuu] it is nam-mkhol. In the Muslim tongue [Huiyu, i.e., Turki] it is called asman. Let a Muslim, meaning “Heaven,” tell a Han it is called asman, and the Han will necessarily think this is not so. If the Han, meaning “Heaven,” tells the Muslim tian, the Muslim will likewise certainly think it not so. Here not so, there not so. Who knows which is right? But by raising the head and looking at what is plainly up above, the Han knows tian and venerates it, and the Muslim knows asman and venerates it. This is the great unity (da tong). In fact, once the names are unified, there is nothing that is not universal.13

From Gaozong’s exalted viewpoint in this passage, Han and East Turkestan cultural entities occupied equivalent positions under a universal heaven—represented by the emperor himself (Gaozong’s Manchu reign-name, Afkai Wehuiyhe [supported by heaven], contains the word “heaven”—abka—within it). Neither Han Chinese, nor Chinese civilization, enjoys a privileged position within this vision of da tong.

The emperor’s pluralist configuration of empire, with its implied equivalency for each of the five groups mentioned, stands in contrast to John King Fairbank’s depiction in his discussions of “the tributary system” and “the Chinese world order.” According to this theory, “Chinese dynasties” understood their relations with “non-Chinese” peoples and countries in terms of a hierarchy of peoples ranging from culturally superior to inferior around the
Sinic cultural and (to some degree) geographical center. Where, as was often the case, the actual nature of the relationship belied this characterization, the tribute ritual and terminology employed by the court served to maintain the fiction for political and historiographical purposes. To represent this arrangement, Fairbank employed a series of concentric rings, with China at the center and outlying zones extending like pond ripples of progressively attenuated civilization (Figure 8). This image, with its classical precedents in the "Tribute of Ya" and the Zhou li, has influenced the way Western scholars of China in the latter half of the twentieth century imagined traditional China's relationship with its neighbors. The schematic is useful as a description of the rhetorical stance adopted by Chinese elites at certain times with regard to foreign peoples and accurately characterizes the institutions employed for a period during the Ming. It must however be seriously qualified for each dynasty discussed, a task undertaken by the other articles in the Chinese World Order collection; Morris Rossabi and contributors to the volume China among Equals have, moreover, challenged the applicability of the Sinocen-
Han, in keeping with the implications of the less value-laden Manchu term (outer provinces, Ma. tudgeri golo—discussed in the last chapter).

The lines connecting each bloc to the imperial house do not represent a merely “tributary” relationship; rather, imagine them to convey any and all of the multifarious means of articulating and producing the emperor-subject relationship: gift exchange, court audiences, intermarriage, autumn hunts, religious patronage, personal communications, imperial tours, sponsored scholarship, and so forth.

One could, moreover, elaborate upon this diagram, by including compartments for bond servants and the eight banners, Han scholars, common Han (min), other groups, such as the Tao and Miao, or even the multitude of foreign lords with whom the Qing imperial house interacted on similar terms. I would not want to exaggerate the usefulness of the diagram in Figure 9, however. It is an attempt to represent the views expressed by Gaozong in the preface to the Xiyou tongwen zhi and implied by the examples of ostentatious polylingualism given above. Inasmuch as the emperor’s views were those of the court, the diagram may be said to reflect the Qing imperial ideology at this moment in the late eighteenth century. I hope the contrast with the ubiquitous, and, for the Qing, inaccurate model of Sinocentric rings will be thought-provoking, but do not pretend to encompass in such a simplistic fashion the manifold differences in status of the groups represented, let alone explain how the positions of those groups relative to the center of power changed over time.

If what I have called the pluralist Qing empire of the latter eighteenth century is not well characterized by concentric rings, the melting-pot would be a still more unfortunate analogy. Though the empire’s culture blocs were in theory juxtaposed on an impartial basis, the boundaries between them were nonetheless to be strictly maintained lest excessive, uncontrolled contact lead to trouble. Walled cities, or cantonments within cities, often served this purpose materially. Where Fairbank’s map implies assimilation, a gravitational pull toward the Sinic center, the domains in the Qianlong emperor’s eyes were to remain culturally discrete, their boundaries vigilantly maintained by the state through administrative structures, laws, the pass system, and so forth.

In practice, however, Chinese merchants who journeyed to Xinjiang transgressed cultural as well as geographic boundaries. They lived both inside and outside the cantonments, frequented bazaars between new and old cities, set up shop in the Muslim part of town and even penetrated remote East Turkestan villages and steppe camps of nomads. Some Tungans intermarried with East Turkestanis. Because of their mobility—and this distinguished them from Chinese agriculturalists on state farms in Xinjiang—they were in frequent contact with East Turkestanis. And because of these merchants’ commercial sophistication, the Qing viewed such contact as potentially dangerous, if unavoidable. Hence the laws and edicts governing Chinese merchants in Altishahr focused on various types of interethnic contact. In particular, three kinds of crime were particularly sensitive, because they challenged the normative imperial model directly by blurring the boundaries between peoples of the empire or by threatening to drive the East Turkestanis, through intense exploitation, to the point of rebellion against the Qing. These crimes involved hair, sex, and money.

A New Twist on the Queue

In a “postpacification” memorial from Altishahr, Nayanceng presented the court with what he saw as the typical curriculum vitae of a Gansu Tungan:

In the province of Gansu three out of ten Tungans (Hanmi) have no livelihood; they are almost all ramblers who travel beyond the Pass as far as Altishahr, where the first thing they do is study the Muslim language [i.e., Turkish] and rely upon their shared religion to establish their reputation. Men and women do not avoid each other, but fornicate at will. They swindle and cheat—there’s nothing the Tungans will not do. After a while they take East Turkestani wives and gradually grow closer [to local society]. Before the Jahangir affair there were even Tungans who went so far as to cut their queues and act as akhunds. Thus their religion leads them to violate the law, causing strife on the frontier.

As this catalog of crimes builds to its crescendo, it follows the young Tungan through experiences of unemployment, vagrancy, language study, networking, sleeping with local women, petty entrepreneurship, miscegenation, and finally cutting off the queue and serving in the religious establishment. This litany charts both a geographical and a cultural journey, as well as what seems a remarkable social leap from rootless vagrant to married pillar of the Altishahr Islamic community. But such hyperbole aside, the emphasis Nayanceng puts on queue cutting in this passage illustrates the particular meanings the Manchu headaddress conveyed in Xinjiang: by clipping his braid, such a Tungan severed a last tie to China proper and Chineseness. He was guilty less of sedition per se than of crossing the ethnic boundaries within which the Qing imagined its subjects to exist.

Dorgon’s 1645 decree imposed the shaved forehead and queue on the men of the recently conquered Han population of China proper. Ming loyalists
viewed it as a demeaning sign of submission, and there was much resistance to the tonsure and much ruthless repression of those who failed to keep their foreheads closely shaven. We know little about how Han (or Tungan) Chinese in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries viewed their enforced hairstyle; perhaps they resented it, perhaps they accepted it as a dreary fact of life. But if Philip Kuhn is right, the question of sedition by queue clipping in the mid-1700s was so sensitive that not even the Qianlong emperor could raise it freely in secret communications with his officials.  

It is curious, then, that the Qing did not enforce the Manchu headdress on East Turkestanis after the conquest of Altishahr in 1759. Rather than require all to adopt the tonsure and queue as a unifying symbol and visible sign of loyalty, in Xinjiang the Qing made the hairstyle serve as a distinguishing characteristic, a badge of rank and a mark of ethnic identity. Until after Jahangir’s jihad, no East Turkestanis wore the queue. After the Qing victory, a memorialist suggested that those beggs who remained loyal during the 1826 invasion and uprising be given hereditary title to their offices, tax benefits, and permission to wear the queue, “to show distinction” (yi shi qubie). In 1828 the court bestowed the right to wear a queue upon Ishaq b. Muhammad Hudawi and his sons and grandsons, in recognition of his Kashgar hakim beg’s successful efforts to capture Jahangir. Not long thereafter, other beggs and Muslims with hereditary rank began to clamor for the right to display their affection and loyalty to the dynasty in this fashion. Xuanzong thought such avid loyalty deserving of reward and first ordered that those who wished could grow queues, while others, for whom the abrupt change might be difficult, could do as they liked. The forever skeptical Nayanceng, however, pointed out that the East Turkestanis viewed the Manchu coiffure as a status symbol and suggested that allowing everyone to adopt it would result in “no distinction whatsoever” and a loss of the queue’s cachet. In the end, the relevant substance in the Huijiang zili permitted nobles (jumang, gong, etc.), beggs from the hakim down to the fourth rank, and the sons and grandsons of loyal beggs to wear the queue if they wanted to. Beggs below the fourth rank were expressly forbidden from wearing the queue, “in order to demonstrate restraint.” What was to Han and Tungan men a common duty, then, was thus to the East Turkestanis a rationed privilege.

This distinction cut in at least two ways. Beggs and nobles so honored were, on the one hand, set apart from other East Turkestanis and from the mass of lower beg officials who were not invited to the capital for imperial audiences and with whom Manchu authorities in Xinjiang had little direct contact. On the other hand, the queue distinguished men from China proper—the Han and Tungan merchants and farmers—from South and Central Asians, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and the majority of East Turkestanis.

One might think that migrants from China proper were clearly identifiable in any case by their dress, speech, and customs, but identification was not the point so much as maintenance of the cultural boundaries by which the Qing organized its subjects. As the Tungans whom Nayanceng found so dangerous illustrate, assimilation in border areas was not one-way; as we have seen, there were cases of Turkicized Chinese just as there were East Turkestanis who spoke Chinese or dressed and wore their hair like Manchu officials. As an externally imposed label, the queue thus served the Qing authorities in Xinjiang, who associated cross-cultural drift with sedition, as a touchstone of Han-ness as well as of loyalty to the dynasty. Chinese merchants were allowed to journey to Qing lands far from their homes within the Pass on the condition that they remain within their cultural frontiers. For this reason, then, cutting off the queue stood near the apex of Nayanceng’s hierarchy of Tungan perfidy. Similarly, when prisoners were returned from Central Asia without the ordained pigtail, Xinjiang officials noted that fact in reports and the captives hastened to assure the authorities that they had been born involuntarily.

For foreigners, too, the queue immediately identified Chinese merchants. It is unclear why Kirghiz, Kokandis, and the Khojas almost invariably cut the queues of their prisoners from Xinjiang, but the gesture clearly bore symbolic import: perhaps they intended to demean their captives or discourage them from escaping back to suspicious Qing officials. For a while in 1826 and 1827 a band of Kirghiz who pastured their animals near Ush began taking the queues—and scalps—of merchants, soldiers, officers, caravaneers, and other “Chinese” (teidi ren) they waylaid in the mountains. In the past these nomads had occasionally stolen a head or two of livestock, leaving people unharmed, but since the beginning of the jihad the herdsman had greatly escalated the violence of their attack. Jahangir sought the assistance of these Kirghiz in his campaign against Qing rule in Xinjiang, and when Kirghiz presented him with scalps, the attached queue sufficed to prove that the unfortunate victim had indeed been a “Chinese” infidel.

Interruption, Fraternization, and Rape

As in any military occupation where large numbers of alien troops are stationed in the midst of a civilian population, sexual relations between the
occupying force and local women could be an explosive source of discontent in Xinjiang. This was demonstrated soon after the Qing conquest, when Su-cheng's molestation of East Turkestan women proved a principal factor behind the 1765 rebellion in Ush. In Altishahr, the delicacy of the situation was exacerbated by the fact that not until after 1832 did the Qing permit garrison troops or Chinese merchants to be accompanied by family members. It is thus no surprise that Qi-shi-yi should comment on the plentitude of prostitutes in Kashgar.24

Xinjiang authorities viewed intermarriage and fraternization between native East Turkestan women and men of various other groups in Xinjiang as threatening to security. Marriage between Kokandi merchants and East Turkestan women was most common, both before and after the jihad of 1826. In the aftermath of that event, when Nayaneng expelled the Kokandi merchants from Altishahr, he separated them from their wives and forbade such marriages in the future. Song-yun, in his memorial urging the retraction of Nayaneng's disastrous postpacification measures, advised the emperor that Kokandi-East Turkestan marriages should once again be allowed. With the lifting of the embargo in 1831 the merchants returned and were reunited with their wives.25

The most serious cases of fraternization with East Turkestan women involved not Chinese merchants but Manchu officials, banner troops, Green Standard soldiers, and exiles enslaved to begets. If we take the behavior specifically prohibited in statutes as a guide to the sort of abuses that actually occurred, then Han soldiers and exiles occasionally took East Turkestan wives. Moreover, both Manchu officials and soldiers brought East Turkestan women into the Qing citadels at night, or spent the night out themselves; some had long-term contractual arrangements with prostitutes. While stationed at the kashun or while traveling, Manchu soldiers sought female companionship in the East Turkestan villages and towns—a practice that greatly angered the Muslim population.26

Because of their powerful position, Xinjiang's Manchu amans were often able to engage in sexual exploitation; such activity was especially threatening to security on the frontier, as the Ush case made clear. In 1807 Yu-qing was accused of a series of abuses of his position as superintendent of Karashahr. Most of these involved extortion and other sorts of peculation, such as misuse of the official price to buy skins and furs from the Torghtus for his personal use. But the investigation also disclosed that Yu-qing had procured a nine-year-old Torghtu boy named Manji27 for his household. During his short time in Yu-qing's yamen, the boy cried each time the amban approached. Although Yu-qing claimed he had only acquired the boy in order to study Mongolian with him and sent him back home soon afterward, the officials on the case suspected the worst.28

The most dangerous case of exploitation of East Turkestan women since the Ush affair occurred between 1828 and 1829, just as Jahângîr began his campaign of incursions into Altishahr. While investigating the cause of the unrest, Q ing-xiang discovered that the Qing councillor Bin-jing and a circle of accomplices had been extorting bribes from East Turkestanis. Although Q ing-xiang reported that these abuses were unconnected to Jahângîr, the Veritable Records entries warn ominously against revealing the true extent of Bin-jing's crimes to the Muslim masses, lest it turn their hearts against the dynasty. What the Veritable Records failed to report (it is unclear whether the court ever learned the full details) was that Bin-jing had "dishonored" the daughter of the Kokandi aqsaqal, who killed the girl and rushed with her severed head to Bin-jing's yamen to confront the councillor. For whatever reasons, Bin-jing was rapidly removed from the post.29

As we have seen, Nayaneng also uncovered several instances of Tungan men marrying East Turkestan women. He separated the couples and forbade the practice: statutes to this effect were thereafter inserted into the Huijiang zeli.30 No other specific cases of Han or Tungan marrying East Turkestan women have come to light. Perhaps Chinese merchants, because of their vulnerable position, exercised restraint or simply avoided detection. Still, such associations must have occurred, for the issue arose again in 1846 in diplomatic correspondence between the Qing and Kokand. The Daoguang emperor recalled in a proclamation to the Kokandi mingibsi, Mussulman Quli, that the Kashgar councillor would severely punish Chinese (zhengyuan ren) who took East Turkestanis as wives. The Qur'an prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-Muslims, and thus Mussulman Quli heartily agreed, adding, "There is no allowance for such [marriages] either in the Muslim classics [i.e., the Qur'an] or in the ways of China. In handling local matters, it would be better if there were no such people." Nai-mai-ti, the Kokandi tax agent in Kashgar, was still more enthusiastic and promised to have "bad Muslim women" (buhuto de Hui'si nüren) bound and brought to his yamen. This was going too far, however, and the emperor, testy about jurisdiction in a city where Qing control over commercial affairs had already been seriously eroded, responded in an edict, "Don't you know the great emperor has local officials, as well as the hakim and other begets, to handle these matters? If ever there is such a woman, they will handle her. There's no cause for you foreigners to tie her up and carry her off. Don't interfere with local affairs."31
concern, even when the Qing ceded jurisdiction over Kashgar's foreign trade, customs tariffs, and other aspects of commercial affairs to foreign interests.

**Chinese Money-lending in Xinjiang**

Pawn-broking, money-lending, and selling of goods on credit was a specialty of many north bend traders in Xinjiang, including those trading in areas populated by East Turkestanis and Western Mongols. Such practices easily led to friction between Chinese merchants and the local population and occasionally erupted into violence. Judging from the quantity of such cases, Chinese merchants who engaged in such forms of banking were far more common than those intermarrying with other peoples.

Perhaps because of the devastating effects of Chinese usury in Mongolia, where the rebellions of 1755-56 were to a great degree sparked by popular Mongol enmity toward the Chinese traders to whom they were in debt, the Qing was alert to the potential for similar practices by the Chinese merchants resident in Altitshahr. Nayangceng detailed some of the techniques Chinese lenders employed to ensure their profits. In addition to charging high initial interest rates, a favorite trick was the note that came due after a short period—three months or even a week after the loan was made. If the East Turkestan could not repay the loan, plus interest, by this time limit, the merchant would “change the ticket,” refinancing to combine interest and principal into a new, higher loan on which the borrower now owed interest. After a year, these merchants might take houses or land in lieu of repayment for the compounding debt.32

Needless to say, in the Southern and Eastern Marches, loans were frequently the cause of disputes. Liu Yingjiang's case is one example. Liu had come from Shangxi to Sanbao, near Turfan, early in the Jiaoqiang reign. With his uncle, Liu Shisheng, and a third man he opened a drygoods shop in 1804. Over time, he loaned money and extended credit to Hu-da-bai-er-di; because the man was delinquent in paying, Liu was forced to demand several times for the debt, which amounted to a little over one tael and three piculs of grain. In 1805 Hu-da-bai-er-di agreed to farm a piece of land by the city moat for Liu for two years as payment of the debt; he then used the land or its proceeds to pay off another debt, enraged Liu Yingjiang, who jumped him one day outside the drygoods shop in town. The two grappled until separated by onlookers.

In the spring of 1806, Hu-da-bai-er-di came to Liu's store. A man named Niyaz, who lived outside of town owed him grain, Hu-da-bai-er-di explained.

If Liu would come with Hu-da-bai-er-di to visit Niyaz he could simply take the grain as repayment then and there. The two rode off, Liu on horseback, Hu-da-bai-er-di on a mule. Near an old beacon tower in a wilderness outside of town, Hu-da-bai-er-di asked exactly how much he owed Liu. Liu dismounted to scratch figures in the sand, and Hu-da-bai-er-di, pretending to go relieve himself, stole up behind Liu, garroted him with a tethers-rope, and left the body in a gully. The investigation was hampered by difficulty in identifying this corpse later, as wild animals had ripped off the head and dragged it away, but Hu-da-bai-er-di was eventually caught and himself beheaded.34 A similar case arose a few years later in a village outside Kashgar. Liu Wenyuan was owed 2,200 pul by an East Turkestan farmer named Ibrahim. Liu went to the man’s fields to seek repayment, got into a fight with him, and sustained a grudgery from which he died in a few days. Ibrahim was sentenced to strangling after the autumn assizes.34 And around 1850, Liu Xinghu, originally of Shanshi, died outside Urumchi under similar circumstances. Liu ran a shop outside the lower west gate with his cousin Wang Zhonghai and there they “did the East Turkestan trade” (zuo chantou maimai). When an East Turkestan debitor died, the two foreclosed on his debt for nine taels of silver, three piculs of wheat, and two piculs of beans, taking the collateral, a piece of land, in lieu of repayment. Liu and Wang gave the land to two East Turkestanis, A-i-za-su-xia and Su-bu-er-gai, who promised to repay the dead man’s loan in return. A-i-za-su-xia took the loan contract away with him, but many days passed, and he did not return with the money. Eventually Liu rode off to get the contract back. On his return Wang noticed a small cut near his eye, and Liu admired he had grappled with the two East Turkestanis. By the next day Liu’s wound had begun to suppurate, and Wang summoned A-i-za-su-xia and Su-bu-er-gai, telling them they would have no cause to beat people up if they simply paid the money they owed. The two agreed to relinquish the land contract. That night Liu’s entire face swelled, and he began to groan with pain. A doctor was called, who prescribed some pills. Su-bu-er-gai and A-i-za-su-xia returned with the contract the following morning, much chastened by the sight of Liu’s condition. A-i-za-su-xia even tried to help by draining the wound with a heated china cup, but to no avail. Liu died, and the autopsy determined he had been hit with a wooden object.35

Grim indeed were the dangers of infection in nineteenth-century East Turkestan! More than this, however, these cases reveal the extent to which Chinese retail commerce and banking had penetrated East Turkestan’s rural communities by the early nineteenth century. Indeed, the shopkeeper and moneylender were often one and the same, selling dry goods as well as lending money and grain to East Turkestanis from villages outside of the cities.
Lin Zexu noted the presence of another such enterprise in 1845, a pawnshop run by Shanxi merchants in a small settlement of mixed Han and East Turkestan population between Kashgar and Bugar.26 Resentment at Chinese usury could lead to more serious incidents. About twenty kilometers northwest of Yangi Hisar on the road to Kashgar, in the 1840s there were twenty Chinese shops in an East Turkestan village called Qaraqash. These shops all made high interest, short-term loans, demanding repayment at each weekly bazaar. In early 1845, during a Kirghiz attack on Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Khotan, East Turkestanis rebelled in concert with the nomad raiders and killed nineteen of the Han merchants, whose exploitation had earned them the enmity of the locals. When Lin Zexu passed through Qaraqash soon after this incident, the traders' shops still stood empty, a ghastly reminder of the dangers of their former occupants' profession.27 When beggs became indebted to Chinese merchants, the results could be still more destabilizing. Soon after Wu-er-qing-a first took up his new post as superintendent in Kucha in 1853, his secretary for Muslim affairs presented to him the hakim beg, Mai-ma-si-di-ke, and the other beggs and akhunds of each village in the Kucha jurisdiction. They explained that they were collectively in debt to the Wan Shun Lei and five other name-brand shops to the amount of 49 silver ingots and already owed interest of 4,260,000 pul. The East Turkestanis officials originally took out the loan to finance repairs to the mazar (tomb complex), public buildings, a bridge, mill, irrigation ditches, post stations, and karas, as well as to repay grain debts owed by absconded East Turkestan farmers. (The memorial does not mention this, but the responsibility for these repairs was probably imposed upon the beggs by Wu-er-qing-a's predecessor.) For interest on their debt was accumulating at an alarming rate, the beggs pleaded with Wu-er-qing-a to help them refinance. The superintendent refused, insisting that as the problem predated his assignment, he need take no part in its solution. Mai-ma-si-di-ke and his successor, Ibrahim, were able to collect 6,965,000 pul from the Kucha populace, but continuing exactions to raise the remaining 7,095,000 needed to repay the principal brought the city to the brink of rebellion, and the hard-pressed Kuchaliks went to Yili to file complaints against their beggs. These plaintiffs were then sent to the councillor in Yarkand for a hearing, which resulted in an order to the Kucha hakim beg to cease the exactions. He did not, and the people of Kucha rose. Interestingly, although Wu-er-qing-a was cashiered for mismanaging the beggs' crisis, the Chinese merchants do not seem to have borne any official blame for this turn of events. In fact, they convinced the government to redeem at least part of their loss: one of the principals in the rebellion, Molla Khoja, owed Guang Taiyi and eleven other merchants a total of over 300,000 pul for private loans at the time of his arrest. After the merchants petitioned a captain in the army, He Chaogui, he released 342,000 pul of confiscated funds to the merchants. The captain was later punished for this unauthorized dispensation of official property, but the case reveals the increasing influence, even immunity, that Chinese merchants enjoyed by the mid-nineteenth century in Altishahr.28

The Growing Influence of Chinese Merchants

Jahangir's jihad was the first serious challenge faced by the Qing after 60 years of military rule in Xinjiang. After several years of harassment, in 1826 Jahangir organized an invasion and with the help of sympathetic Afaq East Turkestanis quickly took the four western cities of Altishahr. The following year a Qing army of around 20,000 troops led by Chang-ling succeeded in putting the Khoja attackers to flight and recovering the cities. Nevertheless, the projected cost of maintaining a sufficient defense force in Altishahr (Chang-ling requested an increase of 8,000 men) worried the emperor, and, hoping to withdraw as many troops as possible, he asked upper-level officials in Xinjiang to consider the alternative of devolving control over these four cities (Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Khotan) to native rulers (tusi). The response of Kashgar councillor Ulungge (Wu-long-a) summed up precisely the dilemma that plagued the Qing in Altishahr: "If we retain few troops [in western Altishahr], they will be insufficient to defend [the area]. If we retain many, it will be hard to continue financing them." Since the four western cities, hemmed in as they were by hostile foreigners, remained vulnerable, Ulungge thought "the land not worth defending and the people not worth converting to loyal subjects." Rather than "waste useful salaries on useless land," he advocated a retrenchment to the eastern part of Altishahr, which he believed could be much more economically defended. Chang-ling, too, favored granting more autonomy to the western cities and proposed as tusi a son of Burhan ad-Din named 'Abd al-Khalil, whom the Qing had maintained in Beijing for over 60 years. Unlike the Muslim officials employed by the dynasty in Xinjiang, 'Abd al-Khalil continued to enjoy the affection of Afaqs there, which made this old Khoja the best choice, in Chang-ling's opinion, as native ruler of unruly Altishahr. Having barely concluded a second war with the Makhdumzada Khojas, however, the court was not about to deliver west-
ern Altishahr over to one of their number. Displeased, the Daoguang emperor stripped both Chang-ling and Ulungge of their ranks (while retaining them in office) and sent Nayan-ceng to take over the reconstruction effort.41

Chang-ling soon redeemed himself in Xuanzong's eyes, however, when Qing forces in Kashgar succeeded in taking Jahangir alive. This victory was greeted in the capital with joyous celebration during an otherwise gloomy reign: amid much pomp, the "rebel" Jahangir was taken to Beijing for slicing, the generals and their descendants ennobled in perpetuity, and their likenesses enshrined in the Ziguang Ge (the dynasty's gallery commemorating victorious empire builders). Exam questions, moreover, were set celebrating the pacification of the Muslim frontier. All in all, "this heartening victory provided contemporaries with renewed confidence in the imperial power."42

In Xinjiang and within decision-making circles of the Qing court, however, the Jahangir invasion raised grave concerns that prompted changes in almost every aspect of Qing policy and administration in Xinjiang. For the time being, the court abandoned the idea of retrocession in favor of Nayan-ceng's more aggressive responses, primarily the trade embargo against Kokand and deportation of the Kokandi merchants from Xinjiang.

In the course of his "postpacification" work in Altishahr, Nayan-ceng also devoted a considerable amount of time to what he saw as the problems posed by the presence of Chinese merchants in the area. He investigated Chinese merchants for the dangerous forms of interaction with East Turkestanis discussed above: assimilation and abandonment of the queue, fraternization and intermarriage, and rapacious money-lending.43

It seems somewhat odd that Nayan-ceng should in part blame Chinese merchants for the troubles, but his reaction is completely analogous to Ming-rui's segregation decree after the Ush uprising. In neither case was there any evidence of direct Chinese merchant involvement, either as provocateurs or coconspirators. But this "round up the usual suspects" approach reflects the fundamental suspicion with which officials in Xinjiang during the first 70 years of Qing rule there viewed the presence of Han and Tungan in regions populated by other peoples.

The cases that Nayan-ceng brought were entered as statutes and subsequently published in the Huijiang zhi. This small body of laws involving Chinese merchants and Qing soldiers in Altishahr leaves us a record of the normative structure of interethnic relations in Xinjiang under the Qing. The picture that arises from these cases and statutes suggests an imperial state bent on minimizing friction between its subject peoples by reinforcing cultural differences and prohibiting exploitative conduct by military personnel and the Chinese merchants.44 Moreover, when we recall (see Chapter 4) that

in cases involving Han (or Tungan) perpetrators and East Turkestanis victims, the Chinese criminals were dealt with according to Muslim law by local begis, it seems that the legal system in Xinjiang was stacked against Han and Tungan from China proper.

By the early nineteenth century, however, Chinese merchants seem to have enjoyed more practical latitude than mere perusal of the laws suggests. We have already seen how Ming-rui's decree segregating Chinese from East Turkestan in Altishahr was never enforced and how, despite prohibitions on usurious loans, Chinese moneylenders in Altishahr cities and rural communities operated with little interference from the authorities, even when debts drove East Turkestanis to murder and mayhem. But the most telling illustration of the strength of the Chinese merchants' position in Xinjiang by the early nineteenth century occurred during the Kokand invasion of 1830, in a little-known incident of open ethnic strife.

A Cover-up in Kashgar

That year, in response to the Qing trade embargo, Muhammad 'Ali Khan of Kokand staged another invasion of Altishahr, control over which had long been an ambition of the khanate's. The attackers consisted mostly of troops from Andijan and Tashkent, with some Kirghiz tribesmen and a contingent of the "Andijani" merchants whom the Qing had deported after Jahangir's invasion of 1826. The Khan placed this force under the nominal command of the Khoja Muhammad Yusuf, grandson of Burhan ad-Din, but real command lay in the hands of Haq Quli, the khan's brother-in-law. Soon after the Kokand army moved against Kashgar, Yang Hisar, and Yarkand in the late summer of 1830, the Muslim sections of these cities fell. When news of the renewed hostilities reached the Qing court, it issued orders to Chang-ling and Yang Fang (whose campaign in 1827–28 had captured Jahangir) to return to Xinjiang and once again assume command of the effort to retake western Altishahr. Lengthy logistical preparations for the relief mission were begun in Aksu. Even before the Qing march on Kashgar began, however, early in 1832 Haq Quli withdrew on orders from the khan of Kokand, and Yusuf followed soon after with his men. The Qing citadels in Altishahr never fell.45

In midwinter, as soon as the lines of communication with Kashgar had been restored, Yang Fang received some disturbing news from Jalungga (Zhalong-a), the councilor of Kashgar. The text of the dispatch merely reported that the invaders had retreated; Jalungga's real message was conveyed orally by a young Tungan messenger, Chang Fengqing; the Kashgar assistant super-
intendant, Prince Ishāq b. Muhammad Hudawi, had conspired with Kokand and planned to turn over the city to the invaders.46

This was not the first time rumors had called Ishāq’s integrity into question. Two years before, the censor Lu Yixuan had heard accusations that Ishāq had been secretly in contact with Jahāngīr, but that Ishāq had only revealed his intelligence concerning the Khoja leader after Qing victory was assured. Lu heard further that Ishāq had engaged in extortion and colluded with Kashgar moneychangers to profit from exchange rate fluctuations when the Qing army came to town in 1827. Lu heard all these stories from the Kashgar Chinese community whom, he believed, bore no grudges against Ishāq and hence had no reason to slander the Muslim official. But at least one of the Chinese merchants’ tales was patently false. They told the censor that Ishāq had ordered his followers to bind his (Ishāq’s) hands and feet and lock him in a room during the final days of Jahāngīr’s occupation of Kashgar, so that he could claim to the Qing authorities later that the rebels had held him in custody. In fact, Ishāq had only come to Kashgar in 1827 with the Qing army, after Jahāngīr and his men had fled. Lu believed all these complaints, however, and suggested that Ishāq be removed from frontier duty; Lu’s recommendations were overruled in the capital.47

The new allegations were more serious. According to Jalunaga’s secret report, on returning from a reconnaissance in the mountains in the summer of 1830, Ishāq had spread the false news that a large Qing patrol led by the Manchu officer Ta-si-ha had soundly defeated the Kokandi invaders, when in fact the opposite was true. Furthermore, Ishāq had allegedly urged Jalunaga to send out more troops to welcome the returning Qing soldiers home in an attempt to lure the remaining Kashgar banner forces into an ambush. Soon thereafter, Ishāq was supposedly seen in the company of a fifth-rank beg who had been Ta-si-ha’s guide during the disastrous mission. A search of Ishāq’s yamen revealed Muslims hiding in the yamen buildings and in rooms underground, the messenger told Yang Fang, as well as caches of swords, spears, and other weapons. Jalunaga then had the leaders of this evident plot, including Ishāq and his family, held for questioning and put the rest of the fifth columnists to death—their summary executions necessitated, according to Jalunaga, by the intense attack already underway from the Kokandi bandits.48

Somewhat later, more evidence against Ishāq emerged in Kashgar. Jalunaga provided documents alleging that one of the women in Ishāq’s Kashgar household had been Jahāngīr’s wetnurse.49 Moreover, a letter surfaced reportedly written by the head of the invading army to Ishāq, claiming that Ishāq and other begs of Kashgar had invited the Khojas to return from Bukhara.

Now I’ve come, but you haven’t kept your word and instead remain in hiding in the Chinese city (Hancheng) and haven’t come out to greet me. What does this mean? We don’t want your land. The big and small akhünds say now you’re following the Chinese (zhongyang ren). According to the Qur’an it would be proper for your children to be enslaved. Last night you said several things and had them conveyed to me. Just as you asked, I have waited until today, but again you have not kept your promise. Ishāq, as a leader you should be true to your word. If you come out, Kucha will be your home. I’ll call all your young ones together to be united with you. If you say you have not invited us to come, then what have we come for? I have only come because you and this place allowed it. If by chance what you said does not come to pass, my followers will have your children as slaves. If you come out of the city now, I’ll give you your old lands back. We’ll go to Aksu, Kucha, Yili: [But] if we take the Chinese city [i.e., by siege, without Ishāq’s assistance], that will be of no benefit to you. You were born a Muslim—why do you insist on being a Chinese (zhongyang ren)? I tell you this according to the rules of Islam. If you have a letter in response, send it out to me.50

In 1831, Yang Fang brought these new allegations against Ishāq to the attention of the court. Perhaps it was imperial sagacity, or perhaps the keen hindsight permitted by the belated compilation of the Veritable Records, but in his edict in response the Daoguang emperor expressed doubt at Jalunaga’s version of events. “Ishāq may be extremely muddleheaded, but not to this extent.” Even if Ishāq had been a turncoat, it was questionable to whom he could turn. He himself had arranged the ruse that brought about the capture of Jahāngīr two years previously, and as a result the Afšāqiya hated him.” In

50 “In 1828 Ishāq b. Muhammad Hudawi sent an agent into the mountains with false stories of a Ch’ing withdrawal and bribed Jahāngīr’s Kirghiz father-in-law Taylak, so that the Khoja came back into Sinkiang with 500 men. Realizing that he had been duped, the Khoja fled, but this time the Kirghiz, who feared Ch’ing reprisals, betrayed him, and Yang Fang, a Chinese officer who later played an important role in the Opium War, took him prisoner.” Fletcher, “The Heyday,” p. 566. Ishāq (1782–1842) was descended from Hudawi (E-dul) of Kucha, who had aided the eighteenth-century Ching conquest of Altishahr (According to Fletcher, Ishāq was Hudawi’s great-great grandson; Gao Wende et al. and Ji Dachun give the relationship as grandson.) Ishāq had served as hakim beg in several Xinjiang cities before marching with the Qing army to retake Kashgar in 1827, where he then took up the post of hakim beg. After helping capture Jahāngīr, in 1828 he was appointed assistant superintendent (longbans dachen), the first such native appointment to the Qing military government since Iskandar in the eighteenth century. Fletcher, “The Heyday.”
return for this service, the Qing had granted him the noble title of “prince” (jiuntang), the right to wear the queue, and the position of assistant superintendent—a Qing military post with more authority than that of hakim beg, including the right to memorialize the throne. Ishāq thus seemed to have thrown his lot in firmly with the dynasty. Ishāq’s son Ahmad (AI-ma-te), hakim beg of Akso, donated grain and horses to assist the 1830 war effort and seemed greatly concerned about the welfare of his father in Kashgar. Thus the emperor doubted the conspiracy theory and confined Jalunaga that he would be held personally responsible for Ishāq’s safety. At the same time, Xuanzong ordered Chang-ling to proceed to Kashgar and get to the bottom of the affair.31

The Kashgar Massacre

It was only after long investigation and interrogation of witnesses that Chang-ling uncovered what had really happened in the Qing cantonment during the siege of Kashgar. Chang-ling memorialized with his full report in September of 1834.32

Over a year earlier, Han and East Turkestanis in the Kashgar hinterland began to pick up hints of impending invasion by the Kokandis. Miao, a merchant doing business in the village of Halalique heard early in 1830 of a plot to attack Kashgar. He returned to the city and reported to Governor Jalunaga, but the Manchu ignored his story and sent him back home within the Pass as a punishment for rumor mongering. This dispersive treatment frightened other merchants, who thereafter failed to report the similar stories they heard out in the villages.

By September 1830, the invasion had begun in earnest. Early in the morning of the 25th, Ta-si-ha led 1,600 cavalrymen out to meet the enemy. When a day passed with no word from this force, Jalunaga sent his Tungan messenger Chang Fengqing (who apparently spoke Turkish) out in East Turkistan dress to reconnoiter; Chang encountered a small party of Ishāqis’ and a Qing soldier who told how the Qing cavalry had been ambushed by the Kokandis,
shut, the city secured, and the merchant outbuildings surrounding the walls torched to clear the line of fire.\textsuperscript{44}

The following day, September 29th, the Chinese merchants began to grow concerned about the numbers of East Turkestanis within the cantonment. One owner of a Shaanxi name-brand shop went to the yamen compound of Assistant Superintendent Ishq\textsuperscript{a} to retrieve a saddle he had lent to a young East Turkestanis. He noticed the large number of "Muslims" present and reported to the councillor, Liu Shaojun, manager of a Shaanxi name-brand store, dropped by the yamen to borrow a wok to cook in—he had not had time to get together such items before fleeing into the cantonment. In the yamen he too noticed many East Turkestanis, one of whom was having his head shaved. With bandits at the gates why would a man be shaving himself bald? He must be cutting off his queue and planning to rebel, Liu concluded with alarm and rushed to notify the councillor's yamen. Jalungha sent a Manchu secretary and then a Green Standard deputy to investigate. They counted 192 begs and other East Turkestanis in Ishq's yamen, whom they divided up and put under separate guard. They also had a large number of horses driven out of the yamen compound.\textsuperscript{45}

The Kokandis had already occupied the Kashgar native city, and they attacked the Qimgan cantonment that afternoon, only to withdraw after several fusillades from the Qimgan battlements. Just before sunset, three or four Chinese merchants approached Jalungha on the parapet. Someone named Hamama-wa-zi and others were hidden in Prince Ishq's yamen, they said, and they requested leave to go find them.

"What's the point of catching just two or three bandits (fei lei)?" Jalungha asked, and though the merchants failed to respond, he granted them permission to "go ahead, but whatever you do don't cause any trouble (nao shi)."

Before these men descended from the wall, however, a tumult arose from the direction of Ishq's yamen below, where a crowd of several hundred Chinese merchants had gathered. Jalungha sent Jin Xian, his correspondence secretary (yinfang zhangjing), and a Manchu clerk, Feng-shan, armed with a pennant-arrow, to quell the disturbance. Jin and Feng-shan managed to head off the mob in a narrow alley leading to Ishq's residence and ordered them to disperse. Just then, a foot soldier named Yan Xi emerged from the Muslim prince's yamen at a run, shouting "Bandits (you zai)!" The crowd surged past the two Qimgan functionaries and into the compound, where they attacked any East Turkestanis they could lay hands on. Seeing that the secretary and

\textsuperscript{44} The lingqian, a triangular flag attached to an arrow, served as a token of conferred official authority.
cused Liang of supporting the "bandits." They dragged him off to the Guandi Temple, where they were about to string him from a crossbeam when word came that the Kokandis had renewed their attack on the city. Liang was released and took sanctuary in the barracks of the Manchu bannermen.59

The Chinese merchant community in Kashgar clearly distrusted and harbored a grievance against Ishaq, despite censor Lu Yixuan's belief to the contrary. In their testimony before Chang-ling's tribunal, some of the participants in the events of September and October 1830 mention overhearing merchant complaints against the East Turkestan assistant superintendent. For example, Ishaq had supposedly confiscated stocks of tea from the Chinese merchants to prevent them from trading in violation of the embargo and then secretly sold the tea to Kokand himself.60

Other sources of discord lay in the Chinese merchants' perception of Ishaq's role in two past incidents. Early in 1830, Qing authorities in Altishahr had grown concerned about the number of "vagrants" in the region who had accompanied the Qing army from China proper in 1826. Mostly porters or foot soldiers, they had remained behind in considerable numbers when the Qing force returned east. Jalunqua received court approval to round up these men and send them home along the post road to Jiyu Guan, providing them with accommodations and a catty of noodles at each post station. As we saw in Chapter 5, many merchants in Kashgar had arrived there in 1826 or 1827, often under circumstances strikingly similar to those of the "vagrants." Some may themselves have barely escaped this forced repatriation. For some reason, "the masses of Chinese" blamed Ishaq for this policy and "used the claim that he was a traitor as an excuse to loot and kill."61

The second incident was an attempted robbery of Ishaq's yamen sometime in the winter of 1828-29. A group of Han planned the raid, but Jalunqua learned of the plot and apprehended the six ringleaders. During the night of the massacre, one of the Chinese merchants involved was overheard saying, "Last year we wanted to rob Ishaq's house. The councillor [Jalunqua] found out and punished six of us. You think this time we can let him [Ishaq] off?"62

A DARK DAY FOR "BLACK HATS"

But there was more behind the Kashgar massacre than simple animosity toward Ishaq, even fueled as it was by rumors of the prince's treachery (rumors that may well have grown from disinformation planted by Kokand in Jin-li-bu and others). The Chinese merchants knew that large numbers of Han and Tungans had perished when Kashgar fell in 1826,63 and they vented their fear and anger at all East Turkestanis within the cantonment. The merchants did not care to distinguish between Afsa'D and Ishaq, or even recognize

that such a distinction existed. The indiscriminate nature of this violence is well illustrated in the massacre's sequel.

After their determined assault of the 29th, the Kokandis fell back, content to besiege the Qing fort while plundering the old city of Kashgar.64 Fighting resumed after a brief truce. The Qing soldiers and merchant militia launched several successful sorties over the following weeks and held the city until November 25th, when the Kokandis abruptly disappeared.65 Wary of a trap, the defenders remained on alert and kept the city secured. On the 24th a group of Ishaqi East Turkestanis approached the western side of the cantonment, unarmed, bearing gifts of sheep, noodles, eggs, melons, and liquor. They identified themselves as "Black Hat Muslims" and said they had come to offer their congratulations to the amban and the dynasty for successfully withstanding the siege. As the cantonment gates were still shut, the merchants on the walls hoisted these visitors one by one up six meters onto the rampart. As each reached the top, he was taken down out of sight and killed. One of the militia headmen informed a Manchu officer about these goings-on; the officer proceeded to the scene of the killing with a Manchu clerk and, once again, the pennant-arrow. The militia, intent on slaughter, again paid no heed. When Jalunqua heard about these killings, he simply conveyed the message, "There's no need to kill them; just take a few alive for questioning."66

One East Turkestan managed to shout out, before he fell under the knife, that he had saved the lives of several Chinese civilians and soldiers. He then produced a list of their names. Only when these men were summoned and had verified his story was the man released. Finally, a Han who had been trapped in the Muslim city during the siege and had only recently been hoisted into the cantonment himself went to Jalunqua and tearfully attested that his own life had been saved by an Ishaqi and that the merchant militia were thus killing many good Muslims. Jalunqua then sent men to stop the carnage, but only after 70 or 80 Ishaqi men had perished. Later, a lynch mob consisting of "soldiers and people" gathered around the guardhouse where three "Black Hat Muslims" who had been taken alive were locked up. The councillor had men restrain the crowd, saying he still wanted to interrogate the prisoners, but the mob disregarded the councillor's orders and killed the three anyway. On November 29th, Jalunqua sent Chang Fengqiang to Yang Fang in Aksu with his message accusing Ishaq of treason.67

MERCHANT INFLUENCE AND JALUNQUA'S QUANDARY

Why did Jalunqua cover up this murderous insubordination by the Chinese merchants in Kashgar? Why did he permit it in the first place? Were not the loyal East Turkestanis equally Qing subjects? Ha-long-a, a witness to the
bloody events in the city who was also privy to some discussions in the councillor’s yamen, analyzed Jalungga’s predicament in the following way: the Chinese community (minren) in Kashgar hated the prince hakim beg Ishāq, and after Jalungga punished the five Han involved in the raid on Ishāq’s yamen earlier in the year, they hated the councillor as well. In the heat of the battle against Kokand, Jalungga had dared not prosecute the merchants for murdering the beg in Ishāq’s yamen—he needed their support in the defense of the cantonment. So grateful were the merchants for this leniency that they fought especially bravely. Thereafter, the councillor “loved the merchants dearly.” Moreover, it was well known to all soldiers, officials, and commoners in the cantonment that “at this time, the battle to defend the city was in the complete control of the masses of Han, and not that of the councillor” (emphasis added).

After the Kokandi retreat, however, Jalungga had to explain to his superiors why Ishāq’s yamen had been sacked and burned and how so many East Turkestanis had died within the walls. He found these circumstances exceedingly “difficult to memorialize” (nanzou). Because no solid evidence of a plot to betray the Qing city had emerged, Jalungga was forced to suborn witnesses to construct a version of events that justified the merchants’ pogrom of East Turkestanis in the besieged cantonment and concealed his own negligence.67

Chang-ling penetrated Jalungga’s deception and memorialized the throne with the more accurate version of events on which the above narrative is based. The Daoguang emperor meted out the sentences in an edict of August 1831: Jalungga was indicted for failing to obtain advance intelligence of the invasion and thus sending Ta-si-ha and the detachment of cavalry to their deaths; for mishandling the defense of Kashgar, allowing all the beg to take cover in the Qing cantonment and abandoning the Muslim city to the enemy; for standing by “with hands tied and no plan” as the Han mob rioted; for coddling (guizi) these traitorous Chinese (jianmin) after the siege ended; and for crediting tales disseminated by bandits, filing a false charge of treason, and memorializing without substantiation. Jalungga “really should be executed in front of the army as a warning to the forces or brought to Beijing for interrogation followed by capital punishment,” the emperor opined. “This is really what his crime deserves.” But in the end he treated Jalungga leniently in recognition of his service in withstanding the Kokandi siege for three months and postponed his execution until after the autumn assizes. Jalungga did not live to be executed, however; after two months in the cange in Aksu he died of disease.

Ishāq, although vindicated by Chang-ling’s investigation and therefore allowed to retain his ranks and honors, clearly could no longer serve viably in

Altishahr: Xuanzong summoned him to live in Beijing, along with his youngest son, Mai-ma-te. His other son, Ahmad, enjoyed a long career as Aksu hakim beg.69

A SLAP ON THE WRIST

The Chinese merchants in Kashgar resented the manner in which the case was handled, grumbling that “if Ishāq is punished [as well as Jalungga] then that’s all right. If not, then all the Han (minren) are willing to support Jalungga in suing for redress (da guansi).” Despite this unrepentant attitude and despite the fact that Jalungga was in part being punished for his failure to deal harshly with these same merchants, the court decided to let them off with a warning. The emperor pronounced: “As for the Han in Kashgar, who when the bandits surrounded the city medly spread rumors, stole property, slaughtered the innocent and who are lawless in the extreme, fundamentally speaking they should all be executed. But given that they have participated in the three-month defense of the city and have earned merit, let them not be killed. In the future, let them settle peacefully in each locality. If they dare to raise the slightest trouble, no matter in what regard, they shall be executed.”69

Chang-ling, as well as Bi-chang, who was transferred to Kashgar from Yarkand to fill in as councillor pro-tem after Jalungga’s dismissal, likewise saw fit to mollify the Chinese merchants. The ambans therefore assembled the merchant community in order to allay their concerns. After promising to reward those who had fought most valiantly, Bi-chang added, “Like me, you’ve suffered greatly defending your city…. Let the common [Han] people ship goods to the needy; let soldiers ship goods here to make a profit. As for the mistaken killing of Muslims, that was basically a case of picking out the traitors in your midst. You are not guilty in this.” Only after thus “settling the people’s hearts” (ding minxin), Bi-chang believed, could the work of reconstructing the burned-out Muslim city and damaged Qing cantonment begin.70

The Defense of Yarkand and Khotan

Bi-chang’s own recent experience during the Kokandi attack on Yarkand was surely one reason he was well disposed toward Chinese merchants in Altishahr. Han and Tungan played important roles defending Khotan and Yarkand as well as Kashgar; in Yarkand their spontaneous participation resulted in an early and decisive victory for the Qing.

In Yarkand, predominantly Ishāqī territory, it was not a foregone conclusion that the native populace would support the Kokandis. In fact, the Qing
The Yarkandis had truly been fighting with the Qing and were not engaged in a subterfuge. 

Although there were further skirmishes with bands of invaders in the countryside around Yarkand, the city was safe after this event. The Qing rewarded the East Turkestanis with 4,000 taels, distributed by the akhunds. Meritorious Chinese merchants as well as East Turkestanis were commended and awarded the blue feather for their bravery. The regular Qing military was chagrined at having remained within the cantonment during the crucial battle. “After this, officers and troops, Han (min) and Muslims (Hui) were joined into a single entity.”

Merchant auxiliaries were important in the defense of Khotan as well. Shu-lun-bao reported from that city that the wall there was defended by merchants and exiles answering to Han officers, as well as by East Turkestani troops under the command of the hakim beg.

The Shift in Qing Ethnic Policy

Although the anity achieved by the effective resistance in Yarkand stands in stark contrast to the divisiveness of the Kashgar massacre, the experiences of both cities are similar in two respects. First, in both Kashgar and Yarkand, Chinese merchants assumed a leading role, taking upon themselves primary responsibility for the city defense (in Khotan, too, their contribution was important). Although the merchant militia mutinied in Kashgar and merely took initiative in Yarkand, both examples illustrate the strength of the Chinese merchant communities in numbers and in influence with the Manchu authorities.

This leads to the second similarity, the physical location of the merchants during the attack. Theoretically, Han and East Turkestanis all were Qing subjects, and the legal system and official attitude of Qing officials up to this time seems on its surface to have been aimed at protecting East Turkestanis at the expense of Chinese merchants. When faced with invasion, however, like the panicky merchants of Kashgar, the Qing government displayed an implicit distrust of East Turkestanis and left all but a chosen few safe outside the forts, at the mercy of the invaders. Han and Tungan traders, on the other hand, were welcomed into the fortified parts of the city. While this is hardly surprising, given traditional East Turkestan support for the Mughals under Khojas in Altitshah and the local assistance that Jahangir’s jihad had garnered, it is significant that despite Gaozong’s olympian pronouncements on the “great unity” of the five peoples that composed the Qing empire, in prac-
Qing Ethnic Policy and Merchants

tice, by Daoguang times the interests of Qing officials and Chinese merchants in Altishahr had all but converged, at the expense of East Turkestanis.

Turkestan Reunions

Qing recognition of the Chinese merchants' strategic import in Altishahr led to a major shift in the dynasty's policy toward Han migration to the Southern March. The Qing had encouraged merchants to trade in Altishahr from as early as 1759 but did not allow them to bring their families and settle permanently in the southern part of Xinjiang. However, after the incursion of 1830 revealed the bankruptcy of Nayan-ceng's reforms and the continued military vulnerability of Qing rule in the area, the court approved permanent migration of Han merchants and began to establish Han agricultural colonies in Altishahr.

This change in imperial policy evolved in the context of a high-level debate over post-Jahangir Xinjiang, a debate that revisited the same issues about the costs of empire and Xinjiang's place in the realm first raised in the Qianlong reign (and discussed in Chapter 1). Immediately following the Jahangir invasion, it will be recalled, Ulungge had proposed retreatment from western Altishahr. He was rebuked for the idea in 1827, but, even before the conclusion of the campaign against Muhammad Yusuf and Haqq Quli, the argument reemerged, this time in a memorial from E-shan, the governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu. Echoing Ulungge's comment of three years earlier that current Qing policy amounted to "using the dynasty's useful expenditure on useless wasteland," E-shan advocated selecting loyal, capable hakim begs as tusi chiefs to rule Kashgar, Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Khotan and defend the frontier in their own right. In his return edict, the Daoguang emperor, Xuanzong, left the question of retreatment open. The idea was not entirely dismissed in 1838, when a detailed field survey by En-te-heng-e determined that a viable line of defense could not be established at Aksu and that retreatment would simply leave Yili and Urumchi vulnerable to aggression from the west while realizing no actual savings. Indeed, in expanded form, the famous debate in the 1870s over defending continental versus maritime frontiers was simply the continuation of these earlier discussions of Xinjiang retreatment.76

Perhaps to make amends for his impolitic suggestion, Ulungge put forward another idea late in 1827. He proposed that the troops stationed in Altishahr on three-year tours of duty be replaced by soldiers settled there permanently with their families in order to improve morale and realize fis-

cal savings. Moreover, Chinese merchants and farmers should likewise be allowed to bring dependents to Altishahr and farm unused land. Chinese settlers would expand the tax base and eventually fill vacancies in the Qing army in Altishahr. "In this way, as the numbers of [Chinese] soldiers and people increase over time, the Muslims' strength will gradually weaken, and naturally they will no longer entertain ulterior aspirations."

Xuanzong read this proposal but deferred judgment until after Nayan-ceng had arrived in Kashgar and could confer with Ulungge. Nayan-ceng, of course, had his own ideas about what should be done. For one thing, he saw Chinese merchants as part of the problem in Altishahr, not the solution. And he believed commercial schemes (commissions and the tea transit tax) could finance a force of up to 10,000 troops in the region. Ulungge's suggestions were shelved.77

In the aftermath of the 1830 invasion, the dynasty decided against retreatment and hoped to avoid further costly emergency outlays (the rescue campaign in 1830-1831 had cost 8 million taels) by strengthening its permanent force in the Southern March to around 50,000 cavalry and infantry. This increase was financed by a 2 percent across-the-board cut in Green Standard allocations in the provinces of China proper.78

Although the court had chosen yet again to grit its teeth and bear the expense of extended empire, it continued to seek ways to make Xinjiang more fiscally self-reliant. Thus officials reconsidered the question of the Chinese merchants, who had provided a valuable supplement to the regular military in Altishahr—in both Kashgar and Yarkand they had in fact proved more effective than bannermen or Green Standard troops. The court began to entertain new proposals to grant permanent residence in Altishahr to Chinese merchants, farmers, and their dependents as a means of consolidating Qing rule in the region and expanding the tax base.

The first such suggestion came early in 1831, when Yu-lin proposed extending the system of state farms worked by soldiers and farmers with their families in the Eastern and Northern Marches to the western four cities of Altishahr. Chinese merchants should be encouraged to settle by the post stations in the west of Altishahr. Yu-lin argued, in order to protect the lines of communication should Kashgar, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, and Khotan be attacked or rebel again. (The Dolsans on the taizhan had rebelled in sympathy with the invaders in both 1826 and 1830.) These Chinese merchants should, moreover, be allowed to bring family members.79

* This is precisely the strategy of which Uyghur and Tibetan separatists accuse the government of the P.R.C. today.
Yu-lin's proposal was superseded by a more wide-ranging reform enacted later in the year. In an edict responding to a memorial by Chang-ling, the Daoguang emperor acknowledged the role of Han (and Tungan) natives of China proper in the defense of Altishahr: "Even the Muslim masses know that the majesty of the military and the strength of the [Chinese] people (kung wei min li) is in fact sufficient to defend the region." Xuanzong approved Chang-ling's proposal to allow Han families to come to western Altishahr to farm unused land and even rent land from East Turkistan, so long as the new farms did not interfere with the livelihood of native Muslims. If this plan proved workable, then the emperor envisioned replacing Green Standard troops, as they rotated out of the south, from this new migrant population, toward an eventual goal of one-half locally settled soldiers and one-half rotating troops. "Naturally, the fiscal savings will not be small."

Once the precedent was set permitting Chinese from within the Pass to settle permanently in western Altishahr, "merchants" (many of the aspiring farmers) elsewhere in Xinjiang pressed for the same privilege. In Karashah, the Tungans at the post stations and the merchants in Karashah city proper, who had all been living under conditions of forced brotherhood, had by 1835 seen many families of "north bend merchants" traveling past, bound for new homes in Barchuk (between Akso and Yarkand). This spurred them to raise a petition to bring out their own dependents. They complained that, under current rules, either their children's upbringing or their businesses suffered, since they could not be in two places at once. Karashah superintendent E-le-jin, after first determining that the Han and Tungan families in Karashah would have little contact with either the Torghut and Khooshu Mongols pasturing near the city or with the East Turkistan towns of Bugur and Korla, recommended that the petition be approved.

Thereafter, Chinese merchants in other cities presented similar petitions, citing the precedent of the four western cities of Altishahr. In Tarbagatai, which unlike Yili had never before permitted merchant dependents, merchants with property were allowed to settle with families after 1836. Kucha followed suit later in the year. Its petitioning merchants lived in a walled compound, paid their rent monthly, and had no trouble with the local East Turkistan. The same principles were applied in 1843 when Chinese merchants in Akso sought permission. After ascertaining that the merchants involved paid rent (to the government) and after conferring with the local hakim beg, the Qing authorities granted family privileges to traders in this city as well. Chinese merchants in Khotan, Yarkand, Yangi Hisar, Kashgar, Barchuk, Akso, Karashah, and Tarbagatai could now be legally reunited with their families. Other Xinjiang cities where Chinese merchants were present in force (such as Yili, Urumchi, and points east) had never restricted dependents. By 1843, then, Xinjiang was almost entirely open to permanent migration by Han and Tungans from China proper.

The change in Han settlement policy was closely linked to a massive new land reclamation campaign carried out in Altishahr in the 1830s and 1840s with fiscal and strategic goals. Starting in 1831 the Qing financed irrigation works and established colonies for Han settlers outside the new city in Kashgar and near Barchuk, farther down the Kashgar River. In Kashgar, the "reclaimed" lands were actually the confiscated property of East Turkistan alleged to have sympathized with the Khojas. The Daoguang emperor was initially somewhat nervous about this new departure. By the early 1840s, however, when Yili General Bu-yen-tai (using the field reports relayed to him by Lin Zexu) proposed reclamation throughout Altishahr, the emperor came to embrace the idea of large-scale Han colonization of East Turkistan. In 1845 the court lifted its limit (previously set at 30 percent) on the numbers of rotational troops allowed to remain in Altishahr to farm after completing their tours of duty. And because there was more newly reclaimed land in the south than people to farm it, exiles, too, were allowed to bring their dependents and settle on the land—likewise a departure from the earlier practice of restricting most exiles to Zungharia. Civil and military officials with exceptional records sending settlers to Altishahr were to be rewarded according to the distance and the number of people they persuaded to relocate. The sentences of cashiered officials who could donate money to the homesteading program were reduced.

Eventually, the Daoguang emperor's zeal for Chinese colonization of southern Xinjiang exceeded even that of Xinjiang officials. In 1844, for example, Xuanzong criticized Akso superintendent Ji-rui for making 100,000 mu of new state-reclaimed land available to local Muslims without memorializing the court first: the emperor had intended the land for Han farmers and their families. The following month, he ordered a halt to reclamation work outside Khotan, pending resolution of these concerns: "Can this piece of land really be opened to cultivation? Will the Muslim households who have been brought in to farm cause trouble in the future? Are there any Han households who could be summoned to reclaim the land?" The emperor only acquiesced to the original plan when Bu-yen-tai informed him that the region in question was "in the middle of nowhere (pianyou zhong de pianyou)" and that it was hard enough to force Khotanese Muslims to go, let alone Chinese households.

Because of the distance from China proper, then, the change in settlement policy and the Daoguang period tenten expansion in western Altishahr established sizeable Han colonial footholds only in Kashgar and Barchuk. Far-
Qing Ethnic Policy and Merchants

of several tens of thousands of frontier drifters, strip them of their livelihoods, and scatter their aspirations would be particularly dangerous.

In 70 years, the Qing government’s attitude toward Chinese in Altishahr had evolved away from the wariness reflected in Ming-rui’s reflexive urge to segregate after the Uighur uprising. Now, the court as well as many officials in the field saw the East Turkestanis themselves as a greater threat to stability in Xinjiang than Han and Tungan merchants from China proper. Chinese traders, moreover, had seized the initiative, effectively circumventing the dynasty’s policy to protect East Turkestanis, ignoring with impunity the official status of beggars, and securing for themselves the right to reside permanently in Altishahr. We catch a glimpse of the culmination of this process in the observation by a traveler in British employ who described Kashgar in 1866:

“The new Chinese Settlement . . . is garrisoned by a Chinese infantry force, numbering 3,000 men. The Chinese shop-keepers, merchants and followers, about 2,000 in number, all reside within the walls. The Kilmak portion of the Chinese force (about 200 sowars), however, have their quarters outside. They are not allowed to live inside, not being trusted by the Chinese.”

By that date, the Kilmak cantonment had become the almost exclusive domain of Han Chinese—a true “Hancheng”—and the Manchu and other bannermen (“Kilmaks”) were banished from their own garrison.

Gansu province is a poor place. Impoverished people, ramblers, the unemployed, all come beyond the Pass in search of a livelihood. Moreover, there are no fewer than several tens of thousands of merchants gathered in the cities of Altishahr, trading with the Muslims, with an influence as if joined in a single entity—just as when Kashgar and Yarkand were surrounded in 1830, these merchants resisted the enemy with a will and achieved considerable honor. If we withdraw from the frontier, they would have to be driven back toward China proper. To take a population
Conclusion:
Toward the Domestication of Empire

My family married me, oh! Off to heaven’s far side.
Dispatch to a foreign land, oh! As the Wusun king’s bride.
A yurt for a room, oh! A felt for a wall.
Meat serves for my grain, oh! To drink? Kumiss is all.
My homesick heart grieves, oh! To abide here so long.
Were I but a yellow crane, oh! I’d take wing back home.

Attributed to the “Wusun princess” (Xijun), Han Dynasty

The stones of Dabancheng are hard and flat, hey! The watermelons big
and sweet.
All of the girls there have long ponytails, hey! And their eyes are
shiny-bright.
If you want to marry, don’t you wed another, hey! You had better
marry me.
Get your millions in cash, bring your little sister, and drive that horse
cart here to me!

“Xinjiang Folksong”¹

These two different Chinese visions of the exotic, two millennia between
them, reflect the changed sensibilities about the Western Regions following
the Qing westward expansion. The modern Xinjiang folksong, whether au-
thentically Uyghur or not (and the rhythm and melody suggest it is not),
has now joined the canon of popular Chinese folksongs: tropes of long hair,
limpid eyes, riches, and polygamy can now titillate, where images of the life
beyond the Pass only horrified before.

The preceding chapters have described the process that laid the ground-
work for this shift. The Qianlong conquest and establishment of military rule
in Zungharia and Altishahr took place in the context of skepticism from Han
scholars and officials, who saw no point in extending direct rule over lands
they considered barbaric wastelands. They used historical arguments against

º 233

expending lives and treasure on distant military campaigns to express oppo-
sition to the emperor’s imperial endeavors in the far west. In response to this
pressure, the Qianlong court issued repeated justifications of its imperial pro-
gram, asserting that by advancing the Qing frontiers further north and west,
as opposed to keeping Gansu as first line of defense, the dynasty had in fact
realized great fiscal savings. Having made such claims, the court pressured
the military officials governing the New Dominion to make good on them,
by striving to “use the Western Regions to rule the Western Regions.”

Efforts in this regard were only partially successful. The Xinjiang garri-
sions’ needs for grain and livestock were quite rapidly met by opening state
farms in Zungharia and establishing trade relations with the Kazakhs. Salaries
and local purchasing still required money, however, and the military govern-
ment in Xinjiang thus continued to rely on xiexiang silver shipments from
China proper to meet annual needs. Tax levels were kept low in Altishahr to
minimize dissent and demonstrate Qing superiority over the Zunghars and
were primarily applied to the costs of local beg administration. Salt and other
governmental monopolies, important revenue sources in China proper, were
unfeasible in Xinjiang. In order to reduce, if not eliminate, reliance on xie-
xiang silver, then, the court encouraged Xinjiang military officials to under-
take innovative monetary and economic institutions in their districts. These
included collection of East Turkestan tax payments in cotton cloth, for trade
with the Kazakhs up north, and creative shuffling of old tea stocks to provide
for the bannermen. Furthermore, under the imperial mandate against “stick-
ing rigidly to the precedents of China,” officials developed an interlocked
network of state commissaries, pawnshops, lumber yards, rental properties,
and endowment funds, the profits from which they applied to extrabudget-
ary needs of the Manchu and Mongol soldiers and their families. Officials
manipulated the complex Xinjiang monetary system and levied commercial
taxes in a manner that far exceeded what was legally permitted their col-
leagues in China proper.

Official and private commerce thus provided an essential margin of extra
revenues to the Xinjiang government. Whether the state gathered them
through taxation or direct involvement in the market, for the most part these
revenues depended on the activities of Chinese merchants, either as suppli-
ers, shippers, investment brokers, or sedentary shopkeepers paying govern-
ment “rents and taxes.” Likewise, loans and cash remittances provided by Chinese
merchants served as a crucial safety net during times of crisis after 1826, since
Qing authorities in Xinjiang were far away from official sources of aid.

The Qianlong emperor had from the start recognized the importance of
Chinese farmers and traders in the business of empire, and he encouraged
them to go to the New Dominion. That importance only grew over the decades. But the presence of Chinese in the predominantly Muslim and Turki-speaking Western Regions raised problems of local control in a multiethnic environment.

Although Qing sources never explicitly articulate an ethnic policy as such, the approach that developed through the first several decades of Qing rule in Xinjiang reflects what might be called the Qianlong ideology of empire. Within this scheme, neither Han Chinese nor Chinese culture was granted privileged position in the Inner Asian parts of the realm. In grand imperial pronouncements, at least, the loyal Muslims and Mongols of Xinjiang occupied a place in the empire side by side with, or even somewhat superior to, the Chinese. On the practical level, this meant that before the late nineteenth century, the dynasty rarely placed Han Chinese (as opposed to Hanjun [Han martial] or bondservants) in positions of authority over Inner Asians. Moreover, while the Qing government permitted and even facilitated Chinese migration and travel to Xinjiang, it monitored their movements with the road-pass system, prohibited their permanent settlement in the Muslim south, and attempted to prevent their exploitation of commercially unsophisticated Xinjiang natives. In 1765, Ming-rui suggested mandatory segregation of Chinese from Muslims in Altishahr urban areas; although in practice no such plan was implemented, following the 1826 Jahangir invasion, a rough, voluntary segregation did result when the western four cities were rebuilt. Nayanceng believed fraternization across ethnic lines to be a cause of local unrest and, in his postpacification reforms of those years, developed legal statutes to limit social interactions of Chinese with Muslims as one means of preventing future incidents.

The second Khoja invasion, in 1830, marked the beginning of a shift in Qing policy from official solicitousness for East Turkestanis toward greater accommodation of the Chinese in Xinjiang. Already the expense of reconquering and protecting the vulnerable four western cities of Altishahr after 1826 had sparked a running debate in the Qing court and among high officials over the intractable security problems posed by Kashgar and the other western cities. Some Xinjiang amans, notably Chang-ling and Ulungge, initially advocated a Qing retrenchment, with control over the four western cities to be devolved to local East Turkestanis rulers. Others, in part inspired by the effectiveness of the Chinese merchant militia during the recent invasions, proposed Han colonization of Altishahr in order to expand the tax base and provide more men and grain for larger Qing armies in Kashgar and Yarkand. By 1835, the court opted for intensified Chinese colonization, lifting restrictions on Han settlement in the Tarim Basin, allowing merchants and homesteaders to settle permanently in the Southern March, and establishing state farms worked by Han soldiers and their families in western Altishahr. Although the numbers of Chinese households that migrated to Altishahr in the years immediately following this policy shift remained relatively small, the dynasty had crossed an important divide in its imperial policy, one presaging a greatly refected conception of empire.

Epilogue: The Xianfeng Fiscal Crisis

Despite the fiscal margin provided by Chinese economic activity, the Xinjiang government's primary source of revenue remained the biannual shipments of xietiang silver to Xinjiang, which, as was noted in Chapter 2, amounted to around 1 million taels by 1830 and rose quickly over the succeeding decades. Shortage of funds for local use was of course a problem shared by all Qing local administrations, not just those in Xinjiang. But Xinjiang's limited tax base and high degree of reliance on silver from the provinces led to more serious consequences when the silver stipends simply stopped coming following the mid-nineteenth-century rebellions in China proper and the imposition of foreign indemnities upon the Qing government. Nor did Chinese colonization of Altishahr prove to be the strategic panacea that proponents of the policy had hoped.

The Silver Lifeline Severed

After around 1853, many provinces in China proper, particularly those in the devastated Jiangnan, began to default on their stipend obligations, and silver shipments to cities in Zungharia and Altishahr fell gravely into arrears. Due to this shortfall, in 1854 Yili authorities were forced to halve the pay of officials and Manchu cavalry in order to provide 70 percent of the Manchu infantry's and Green Standard troops' wages and to pay the Solon, Chahar, and Oirat banners in full; by the summer of 1855, all groups were paid at only 30 percent. Tarbagatay received no stipend at all between 1856 and 1865. By 1856, Kashgar and Yangi Hisar had received no xietiang for four years, despite an 1857 attack led by Khoja descendants Wali Khan and Tawakkul. Yili councillor Fa-fu-li entreated the Board of Revenue to send aid and to instruct the governor-general of Gansu and Shanxi to remit the late funds to Altishahr. The board responded that Gansu itself was dependent on funds from other provinces that were themselves overdue. In Yarkand, as the supply of silver yuanbao ingots declined, their price on the local market rose from 300–400 tängdā to 1,000 tängdā around 1860. Foreign traders in the city knew
that the troops of the Qing garrison were no longer receiving their pay in silver, but in local coin. By 1860, according to a Board of Revenue estimate, the outstanding stipends owed Gansu and Xinjiang amounted to between 10 and 20 million taels.2

Faced with the loss of their principal revenue, Xinjiang officials were left to their own devices. In Yili, officials attempted to compensate by a variety of means. They invested a large amount of official funds with pawnbrokers (see Table 5), but the interest income was still insufficient. Merchant "contributions" between 1853 and 1855 brought in a total of 37,700 silver taels and 300,000 pul. Two small copper mines newly opened in the Yili area produced sufficient copper cash to pay 80 percent of the Manchu garrisons' wages. Yili also revived Nayanceng's currency trick (now being implemented throughout China proper) and began minting large denomination, alloyed copper coins (daqian), as well as iron coins. Shipments of silk from the Jiangnan had stopped, but Yili was able to sell off several hundred thousand bolts of cotton cloth from storage for 121,400 taels between 1854 and 1855. Ush had saved 10,000 taels from silk sales over the years and drew on this sum in 1855 to make up for shortages in the silver budget.

These were all short-term expedients, however. With the old sources of revenue cut off, cities in Xinjiang, like places in China proper, turned to local commercial and transit taxes to try to prop up their depleted treasuries and replace the steady income the xiexiang stipends had provided.

When Gansu first notified Yili councillor Bu-yantai in the autumn of 1852 that the provincial xiexiang contributions had not arrived that year, he recognized the dire implications of this news. Given the recent deficits run up by the wars in south and central China and the necessity of maintaining a force to defend Beijing, Bu-yantai proposed a new tax as a major revenue source not just for Xinjiang, but for the empire as a whole. He suggested that 0.1 tael (1 qian) per month be levied on all shops with a signboard in order to tax those sedentary merchants directly affected by neither land taxes nor the new likin local customs tax. He also planned to assess rich money-shops at twice this rate. Such a tax, collected throughout the empire, would raise millions of taels per month, Bu-yantai predicted.4

Like Suhe, Nayanceng, and San-cheng, Bu-yantai is another example of a Qing official who, when posted to the New Dominion and faced with the budgetary constraints inherent in Xinjiang's fiscal system, turned to the commercial economy for a solution. In essence, his proposal involved extending throughout the empire the tax on shops of sedentary merchants that had long been levied in Xinjiang. His empire-wide scheme was never implemented, of course, but other officials in Xinjiang adopted more modest forms of commercial taxation to substitute for xiexiang from China proper.

For example, in 1858 Fa-fu-li introduced a tax on Kashgar's exports of cotton cloth both abroad and elsewhere in Xinjiang. When the proposal was enacted after approval by the Board of Revenue, earnings of one to two pul per bolt were explicitly earmarked as "xiexiang for officials and soldiers." Military Governor Zha-la-fen-tai hoped such a tax could be implemented everywhere in Altishahr.5

The Grand Councillor Peng Yunzhang argued that the Kashgar cloth tax would actually help merchants, since systematized inspection, taxation, and application of official seals would prevent extortion by soldiers at the karun and post stations along which commercial packtrains traveled. Nevertheless, as in China proper, local customs taxes in Xinjiang seem to have had a deterritorial effect on commerce when adjoining jurisdictions competed for shares of dwindling commercial wealth and multiple taxation squeezed profitability. This was clearly the case with Hami's new internal customs tax (guanshui), a form of likin or local customs tax like those being implemented simultaneously in the provinces of China proper.

Hami superintendent Cun-cheng implemented the customs tax in the mid-1850s to help defray some of the costs of hosting official travelers. The complex system (which involved a flat rate per camel or per cart but different definitions of a "camel-load" depending on the value of the goods) had been in operation only seven months before the governor of Gansu and banner commander-in-chief wrote to complain about the effects of the Hami tax on their own jurisdictions and tax base. Gansu's licensed tea merchants were already behind in their payments to the government because of poor sales, the governor explained; he requested that Hami lower its tax rates on tea lest the new tax damage the tea administration and licensing system. Urumchi's commander-in-chief, whose jurisdiction included Turfan, similarly pleaded that Turfani cotton be exempted from Hami customs. Urumchi now taxed Turfani's cotton crop to pay for military grain procurement in the Zhendi Circuit, and the circuit revenues would decline as a result of decreased sales of Turfani cotton in China proper. Cun-cheng eventually agreed to a special rate for tea and cotton caravans, but even after this compromise, the customs tax grossed 10,392 taels between late 1861 and early 1863.6

With the outbreak of the Tungan rebellion in Gansu in 1862, however, all three cities lost out. Goods no longer circulated between Xinjiang and Gansu, Shaanxi, or Sichuan. What trade remained between Xinjiang and China proper followed the northern route via Guicheng to Guilhua and Zhang-
jiakou.' And Hami, despite the increased burden of expenditures for billeting troops en route to Gansu, received decreased revenues.

DECLINE OF TRADE WITH CHINA PROPER

In fact, Xinjiang’s commerce with China proper had been decreasing throughout the decade before the outbreak of the Tungan rebellions. As early as 1850 Sa-ying-a noted that “in recent years” there had been fewer Chinese merchants in Kashgar, bringing fewer goods than formerly. A traveler from India reported to the British government around 1860 that the trade between Yarkand, Leh, and Punjab had declined over “the last 15 years,” and that Xinjiang’s staple articles of trade, “bullion (gold and silver coins, silver ingots, ‘Yamboos’ &c.), precious stones, tea, silks, kiri ana (valuable drugs, &c.),” were in short supply, with Xinjiang now exporting mostly shawl wool and hashish—products originating in Xinjiang itself. By the late 1850s merchants in the south were “very few,” and military officials complained of grain shortages—in the past Chinese merchants had distributed grain from Zungharia and elsewhere to towns of the Tarim Basin. Jade buyers from China proper made it to Khotan until the spring of 1861, and in the year 1860–61 they paid 345 taels in internal customs tax. But later that year there were neither Chinese merchants nor goods from China proper to be found in Khotan; any imports that were available were conveyed by “foreign Muslims” (probably Russian subjects) who journeyed from Aksu.9

There are several reasons for the late-Daoguang- and Xianfeng-period decline in the numbers of Chinese merchants in Altishahr. One cause may have been the dangers of operating in a region prone to rebellion and invasion. Many merchants had died in the 1826 and 1830 attacks on the western cities of Altishahr; others as far away as Urumchi had suffered indirectly when the Qing military commandeered or purchased their grain, livestock, and carts at low official prices. Nor did circumstances improve after 1850. During the 1847 War of the Seven Khoras, the Kashgar aqsaqal, together with Kokandi merchants apparently sheltering in the Qing cantonment, opened the gates by night to the invaders, who killed 3,000 Chinese merchants, stole their goods, and carried off their women. When it arrived from Yili and Urumchi 75 days later, the Qing army of Manchu, Sibe, Solon, and Torgut bannermen slew many East Turkestans in revenge for the massacre of the Chinese traders and settlers, but even so, one imagines few merchants would have hastened to Kashgar after such an event. Even without large invasions, moreover, travel in Altishahr had become increasingly hazardous in these years as the Qing cut back on border patrols and karun guards. A caravan of seventeen Chinese merchants was wiped out near Artush, not far from Kashgar, in 1860.10

The increased taxation levied on Chinese merchants in Xinjiang by desperate local authorities may have been another factor behind the attenuation of the region’s commercial ties with China proper. The plethora of customs duties now owed by merchants traveling from Hami westward would have increased frustration and lowered profits for the long-distance trade.

A British Indian scout in 1860 blamed the shortage of Chinese silver and goods in Yarkand’s bazaars on “feuds and dissensions between two Chinese factions, the Majoos and the Kurakhutaes, which have existed for the last 15 years.” The Karakhatay had left the Xinjiang stage long before, but the pundit was right that fighting was involved.11 The primary cause of the decline in the Xinjiang trade was surely the chaos in China proper produced by the Taiping and Nian rebellions, which interrupted supplies of tea, silk, and other goods shipped by private merchants, just as it shut down the Imperial Silk Factories and cut off xiezhang stipends.

With stipends from China proper no longer available and Chinese merchants declining in number and wealth, Qing officials in Altishahr were forced to turn increasingly to the East Turkestans for revenues to feed the garrison troops. This meant allowing the begs to levy new taxes on the native populace, including a new poll tax, a salt tax, a tax on goods sold in the bazaar, and additional levies. The Qing forces were now paid, in some parts of Altishahr at least, by the hakim begs—a trend that boded ill for Manchu power. The authorities also resorted to sale of offices. Chinese merchants and East Turkestans made contributions and received brevet ranks; those who purchased an office attempted to recover their outlay with exactions from the East Turkestans.

Such conditions undermined the Qing policy of light imperial taxation that had been in effect in Altishahr since 1759. According to foreign (including Turki-language) accounts, popular discontent with Qing rule heightened through the 1850s, as East Turkestans grew progressively impoverished from taxes, debt, corveé, and corruption. One French source attests that regularly in Khotan in the 1850s, East Turkestans indebted to Chinese merchants were thrown into the river.12

Furthermore, Qing dependence on local revenue forced officials to give free reign to the begs who could extract it from the populace. For example, in 1857 the Yarkand hakim beg, A-ke-la-yi-du, borrowed over 20,000 taels from Andijani merchants for the defense of the Muslim city of Wali Khan and Tawalikul and then repaid the Andijanis with an advance from Han merchants. Two years later, another beg, Apisi, donated a similar amount after being cashiered. The assistant military governor, Yu-rui, chose not to use this
Domestication of Empire

sum to repay the Han merchants, but instead ordered it invested at interest. A-ke-la-yi-du then levied a special exaction (tanpai) on Muslim Yarkandiks for 20,000 in silver in order to repay his Chinese creditors. The severity of this demand caused an East Turkestanis named Tai-la to attempt suicide. When local akhunds petitioned to be exempted from the exaction (Muslim clerics were traditionally exempt from alban tax), A-ke-la-yi-du had them put in the cage. Finally a mob rose in protest; the new assistant governor, Ying-yun, apprehended the mob leaders and had them strangled or beheaded forthwith ("according to the Qur'an"), without first submitting a request for an imperial judgment as was generally required in capital cases. Fiscal arrangements such as these were clearly not conducive to social stability.13

Most ominous was the gradual enervation of the Qing forces in Altishahr. The troops who were permanently settled in the Southern March after the policy shift of 1831 had not proved to be the bastion of Qing strength that Chang-ling and others had originally expected. Far from providing a pool of men to replace rotational troops, the resident Green Standard force was by 1857 in such poor condition that councillor Qing-yingsheng petitioned for the rotational troops presently in Altishahr to be retained on an additional three-year tour of duty. Over the previous eight to ten years, Qing-yingsheng explained, 30 to 40 percent of the settled force had died of disease, and even the healthy ones were now weak and old.14

By the time the Tungan rebellions reached Xinjiang, such dire circumstances extended even to bannermen in Yili, formerly the New Dominion's elite force, mere word of whose impending arrival had sufficed two decades earlier to put Kokandis and Khojas to flight. According to a Sibe eyewitness to the 1864 rebellion,

The Manchus, having lived quietly in cities for a hundred years, lost all their militancy and were physically weakened so much that they could not even pull the bows; the arrows shot by them did not go far and did not penetrate the thickly quilted clothes of the Taranchis. The effeminated Manchu officials neglected teaching soldiers how to use the bows. They dressed fashionably and led a debauched life. In the battle with the Taranchis and the Tungs their bulky clothes hampered their movement. On top of these, the soldiers were starving since there was no food in Hui-yuan ch'eng. . . . The horses of the Manchus were also emaciated from hunger because they could not get fodder. They could not gallop in deep snow. The Taranchis and the Tungs caught the Manchus stuck in snow and killed them.15

Soft living may have played a part in the loss of the banners' military efficacy, but it will not explain how sleek Zungharian horses became worthless nags.

Domestication of Empire

More to the point is the observation that the banner rank and file were starving in the walled cities. Deprived of both official and commercial sources of revenue, the defense of the Qing empire in Central Asia now came down to just so many famished men, fumbling with their bows and floundering helplessly astride snowbound horses.

Statecraft Thinkers and Qing Xinjiang

Qing power in Xinjiang was decisively defeated in the 1860s. It has thus always been a bit of a puzzle why, over a decade later, given all its other concerns, the dynasty chose to back Zuo Zongtang's plan to reconquer the troublesome territory. One answer to this problem may be found, however, in the changes of imperial ideology and policy that began in the 1820s and 1830s, when proposals for full-fledged Chinese colonization of Xinjiang first emerged.

Significantly, this new direction in imperial policy reflected ideas from a semiofficial quarter. In 1820, when Qing Xinjiang was still at peace, Gong Zizhen (1792–1841), then a 29-year-old provincial graduate (juren), composed an essay calling for Xinjiang to be made a province. Gong had failed the metropolitan examinations twice and was at the time employed at a purchased position as a clerk in the Grand Secretariat. In the essay, Gong addressed a familiar concern: Xinjiang was costing China too much money. But whereas literati critics in the eighteenth century had questioned whether the Western Regions, so expensive to seize and maintain, belonged within the empire at all, Gong favored the inclusion of Xinjiang and explicitly contradicted earlier objections that treasure, effort, or lives expended in the cause of westward expansion constituted waste, toil, or loss. Gong believed that current Qing imperial policy urgently needed reform, but here too differed from earlier critics. It was easy to suggest that the Western Regions be used to rule the Western Regions, he commented, but with the troubles in China proper manifold, and even a province like Guizhou (which had no major military installations) running at a deficit, how could the situation in a remote, strategically vital frontier be expected to be otherwise? Gong thus advocated an initial increased investment in Xinjiang, to level land, erect windbreaks, and divert streams for irrigation and to assist large numbers of unemployed Han and idle Manchu bannermen to migrate and establish farms in the region. Once the land was reclaimed, populated with private Chinese farmers, and put under Chinese-style provincial administration, the expanded agricultural base could be properly taxed. Thus, he promised, would "the center give up people to benefit the west, and the west give up wealth to benefit the center."
The return on such an investment would not come for twenty years. Gong predicted, but would be worth the wait.24

When first written, Gong’s essay was premature; he was not entitled to submit it as a memorial, and it was widely ignored. Its appearance in the 1827 Huguang jingshi wenbian,25 however, proved timely indeed; in the immediate aftermath of the Jiaqing invasion, Gong offered a cogent alternative to those proposing retrenchment from western Altishahr. In 1829, when Gong once again took (and, this time, passed) the metropolitan exams, he was able to answer retrenchment advocates directly in his response to an exam question regarding frontier policy. Reasoning that Xinjiang’s lands had already been incorporated and its peoples made into subjects, he argued that since “center and outer were one family” (zhongwai yijia), the situation was unlike that of past dynasties, when distant frontiers could be casually abandoned.26

Gong’s thoughts on Xinjiang are remarkable for several reasons. While he differs significantly from the earlier (and perhaps contemporary) literati opponents of expansion (he calls them “ignorant scholars with shallow views and degenerate students from squalid hamlets”), he also implicitly repudiates the basis of Qing Xinjiang policy since the Qianlong reign—the maintenance of the territory under military government as a unit distinct from China proper. The bulk of his essay consists of a detailed plan for replacement of Qing military and beg administrative divisions with prefectures (fu), departments (zhou), and counties (xian), each governed by a civil official. In outlining these new administrative divisions, the plan substitutes familiar Chinese or Chinese-style names for the Turko-Mongolian place-names used in Qing official correspondence (Qiangzhou for Yeeerqiang, i.e., Yarkand; Langxian for Yurongkashi i.e., Yuronggash; Suzhou/Suxian for Aksu).27 The military governor, superintendent, banner commander, and other positions in the banner hierarchy were to be abolished, and Manchu and Mongol bannermen would fall under the direct jurisdiction of civil officials. In effect, he proposed dismantling the eight-banner system in Xinjiang. Gong did make two concessions to the elite status of bannermen—they would pay 20 percent less tax than commoners and could not be caned by any official lower than a district magistrate.28

Gong’s essay thus shares a subtext with the eighteenth-century critiques of Qing imperial policy, even while openly propounding an opposite position. Opponents of the Qianlong expansion hinted that the Western Regions were not properly “China” and thus should not be incorporated. Gong argues that the Western Regions must be retained; but he, too, feels they are not “Chinese” enough and proclaims they must be integrated more closely. Though he does not make it explicit, there is also an ethnic thrust to his proposal. Not only would Xinjiang be populated more intensively by Han Chinese; it would be governed by them as well. What civil offices there were already in Xinjiang, such as those in the Urumchi area, were generally filled by Han. In proposing that banner, beg, and jasak government be eliminated and Chinese-style civil administration extended throughout Xinjiang, Gong was proposing the devolution of imperial control from Manchus, Mongols, and East Turkestanis into Chinese hands—the same transition we have seen happening informally in Kashgar after 1830.29

Other out-of-office scholars issued proposals on Xinjiang following the 1826 troubles, all opposing retrenchment from the western four cities. Shen Yao (1798–1840), a young Zhejiangese, wrote such an article in 1828. Although Shen was not yet a degree holder (he would never pass the provincial exams), his “Personal Proposal for Xinjiang” (Xinjiang si yi) was read by Xu Song, the former Hanlin compiler, Yili exile, co-editor of the Xinjiang zhi, and author of three other works on the New Dominion. Since his return from Yili in 1820, Xu had formed a small but influential salon of scholars in Beijing who shared his interest in frontier studies and taste for mutton. Shen wrote that Qing control over Altishahr could be consolidated by colonizing lands in the western four cities with Muslims imported from elsewhere in Xinjiang or with willing Chinese, who would farm and train as a local militia. He also stressed the importance of eliminating corruption and sexual predation by Qing officials in Xinjiang. Xu Song approved of Shen’s ideas.30

Wei Yuan, a friend of Gong Zizhen’s, likewise held strong opinions on the Western Region empire. His account of the Qianlong conquests, Sheng wu ji, can in fact be read as a celebration of high Qing imperialism (see Chapter 3). Sheng wu ji was published in 1842, but Wei mustered economic arguments against the advocates of retrenchment as early as 1826, in a letter included in the Huguang jingshi wenbian. “Some say [frontier] lands are vast and useless, that officials’ food and soldiers’ rations each year cost several hundreds of thousands [of taels], which diminishes the center to serve the frontier. [They say] there are only losses, no gains. . . . Well, to disperse and add is the way of Heaven, to decrease [where there are] many and increase [where there are] few is the warp of governing.” In this passage (which appears, slightly modified, in the Sheng wu ji as well) Wei alludes to the problem of overpopulation in China proper and then recites the many attractive features and valuable resources of Xinjiang: sparsely settled lands, inexpensive food, fertile and well-watered lands, profitable commerce, not to mention gold mines and low taxes. Poor Chinese who exit the Pass all stay to raise children and grandchildren—not one in a hundred returns. Those who wish to discard such a great resource, he notes, cannot be considered wise.31

Like Gong, Wei Yuan believes that the Western Regions have required
transformation to render them habitable by men. He alludes to a chapter from Mencius that discusses the successive reclamation of China from natural and manmade chaos in ancient times. "Mencius says: 'The world has existed for a long time, now in peace, now in disorder.' The Western Regions have been disordered for several thousand years, from high antiquity until the present. It is Heaven's wish that the thorny thicket be transformed into busy highroad, the canyon's gloom into brilliant daylight, the treeming jungle into [a populace dressed in proper] caps and robes, the felt tent into village and well."24

Wei argues that just as ancient China underwent periods of order and disorder, there would be setbacks in the process of ordering Xinjiang; the present military troubles could be overcome, however. In the first episodes of disorder described in the passage by Mencius, chaos among humankind is accompanied by the encroachment of nature: before Yu drained the floodwaters and leveled the earth, aquatic reptiles forced people to live in nests and caves. Later, the tyrants who rose to power upon the death of Yao and Shun pulled down houses to make ponds and turned fields into parks, thus inviting another infestation of harmful beasts and birds. King Wu punished the tyrants and drove "tigers, leopards, rhinoceroses, and elephants to the distant wilds," at which the empire rejoiced. Mencius clearly equates misrule and wilderness, as does Wei Yuan in the above passage. The restoration of appropriate political control and the taming of nature are one and the same, and Wei proposed that the former could be achieved by means of the latter in Xinjiang, invoking the ideas of Gong Zizhen and other proponents of expanded colonization: "It has been said that the Muslim frontier of the Southern March is also suited to agricultural reclamation by military garrisons, as in the Northern March. To call in Chinese people (huamin) and turn this rich loam into China proper (neidi) would greatly ease the exercise of our authority and greatly increase our profit. Someday, this idea will have to be implemented" (emphasis added).25

The statecraft movement of the nineteenth century, of which Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan are two of the most famous exponents, is generally understood to have been a response to increasingly apparent fiscal and social troubles domestically and to growing commercial and military pressure along the maritime frontier. Statecraft is thus considered a discourse on national defense. These passages, however, also express a new, expansionist ideology, for Gong and Wei advise defense by assimilation. Implicit in these arguments is a critique of the Manchu model of empire, under which Xinjiang had not been rendered domestic on the proper terms. That is, the Qing had not created a Chinese empire in the Western Regions. The military crisis in

Altishahr from the 1820s, and its origins in the fragile economic basis of Qing imperium in Xinjiang, provided the opportunity for scholars such as Gong and Wei (and, to a lesser degree, Shen Yao as well) to lobby for a radical departure from previous policies. In effect, these statecraft thinkers advocated nothing less than the political, demographic, economic, and even ecological remaking of the Western Regions in China's image.

The Question of Qing Imperialism

In the introduction, I applied the term "imperialism" to the Qing enterprise in Central Asia, defining the word in intentionally general fashion in order to examine the Qing empire on its own terms. We are now in a position to hazard some conclusions about the nature of that imperialism in Xinjiang.

The motives underlying Qing expansion into Central Asia, are, like the motives of imperialism everywhere and at any time, complex and shifting and did not operate in isolation. Most obvious in the Qing case was the strategic goal of neutralizing the Zunghars, whose empire in Inner Asia threatened the Qing across a vast crescent-shaped front. Stable Qing relations with Tiber, Mongol peoples, and Russia depended on resolving the Zunghar threat, and Gaozong's conquest of Zungharia can be seen simply as the culmination of the efforts toward this end that began with the Kangxi reign. Nonetheless, one senses other contributing factors as well, especially in the edicts, prefaces, and poems of the Qianlong emperor. His personal frustration with Amursana and chagrin at having withdrawn Qing forces too soon on several occasions seem to contribute to the ferocity of the solution that Zhao-hui found to the Zunghar problem. These, as well as a sense of destiny, consciousness of Han and Tang (and Mongol?) precedents, naked opportunism, and perhaps even a desire to control the major source of nephrite, seem to have spurred on the Qing conquest of Zungharia and annexation of East Turkestan. We cannot discount the influence of the "great man" Gaozong on the course of Qing imperialism.

Economic motives loom large in explanations of European expansion. For the Qing, I have found no justifications of empire that cite extraction of natural resources or commercial wealth as a goal until Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan suggest this possibility after 1820. Nor does the need to secure markets for Chinese products feature as a reason. In fact, Qing authorities were most interested in making the territory self-sufficient. However, the court did maintain that moving the Qing defense perimeter from Shaanxi-Gansu to the far northwest yielded substantial indirect fiscal savings (the "forward
defense dividend"). This economic argument became the core of Qianlong-era justifications for holding Xinjiang. A case could likewise be made that the desire for lebensraum, another motive commonly expressed by imperialists and examined by scholars, motivated the Qing to some degree. Gaozongg himself suggested as early as 1760 that the growing Chinese population could profitably expand into the vastnesses of the New Dominion, and similar arguments reappeared in nineteenth-century debates over whether to reconquer or relinquish lost areas of Xinjiang.

Was the Qing enterprise in the Western Regions characterized by any particular ideology? In its first phase, Qing imperialism in Xinjiang demonstrates little missionary impulse. Qing authorities in Xinjiang did not greatly interfere with local religion or customs (though Confucian-influenced sentencing within Islamic law is perhaps an exception to this). Although eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Qing sources occasionally refer to native inhabitants of Altishahr and Zungharia as “stupid,” the same was said of commoners in China proper. Ranking East Turkestan Qing officials were entitled to wear the queue and participate in state rituals, but this was not required of the non-Chinese commoners of either Altishahr or Zungharia. There was certainly no attempt at incinerization during this phase; rather, the maintenance of cultural boundaries was the goal. The Qing court intended that China and Xinjiang, both components of the empire, remain distinct from each other, even as people flowed relatively easily across the Jiayu Guan.

The new policies in Xinjiang after the second Khoka invasion and the statecraft writings of the early and mid-nineteenth century foreshadow an ideological shift, however. If not yet contemplating cultural or racial assimilation of non-Chinese peoples, both Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan hope to meta morphize the landscape and displace Xinjiang peoples with massive Han immigration. The Han colonization efforts undertaken by the Qing in Altishahr after 1830 were a step in that direction, though they remained modest in scope and restrained in their cultural goals. After the Tungan rebellion, however, Zuo Zongtang echoed Gong’s blueprint in his own proposals and predicted that following an adjustment period, not only would the new Xinjiang province be less expensive to govern, but that Xinjiang peoples would naturally adopt Chinese language and customs.

And what of the effects of Qing imperialism? First and foremost, by the conquest and occupation of Xinjiang, along with the establishment of control over Mongolia, the Qing precluded any further strategic threat from steppe nomads. Likewise, by eliminating the Zunghars as rival patrons of the dGe-lugs-pa religious establishment, the dynasty strengthened its position vis-a-vis Tibet.

Economically, the results of Qing imperialism are harder to assess. Overall, Qing Xinjiang presents a negative balance sheet: claims of a “forward defense dividend” aside, the immediate costs of the administration and defense of Xinjiang far outstripped tax revenues realized from native Muslims or immigrant Han farmers and merchants. These costs could not be met without annual shipments of silk textiles and bulk silver from China proper. With one exception, the Qing state took little of tangible value out of Xinjiang. During the 1759-1864 period, among the products of the industries the Qing developed in Xinjiang (cotton cloth, staple grains) and the resources the Qing extracted (copper, salt, lapis, lumen, iron, sulfur), jade was the only item of economic value transported back to the court in Beijing. But the jadestone shipped from Khotan by the thousands of caravans annually between 1760s and 1821 (mostly with corvée labor) was a valuable commodity indeed—particularly as the jade could be resold by palace offices, the profits accruing to the private treasury of the imperial household. It remains a mystery to exactly what extent these resale revenues, and the prized stone itself, might have compensated Qing emperors for Xinjiang’s drain on the general treasury.

Strangely, the Qing never adopted the age-old and seemingly obvious expedient of direct taxation on the caravans that passed through Xinjiang—a departure from the practice of the Tang and other powers that had controlled this hub of the Silk Route. Rather, the dynasty charged only nominal import tariffs, and even these they eventually ceded to Kokand. The main form of Qing commercial taxation in Xinjiang until the 1850s (with the exception of small fees for road passes and the sporadic collection of customs duties at Hami) was directed almost exclusively at sedentary Chinese merchants, whereas much of the region’s trade was in tea, rhubarb, and other goods destined for export and thus handled primarily by itinerant traders. Some officials recognized this wealth passing them by. Nayanxeng and Bu-yen-tai proposed extensive transit taxes during their postings to Xinjiang; San-cheng sought to raise commercial tax rates and to subject East Turkestan as well as Han merchants to the levies. However, none of these proposals to tap the Xinjiang commercial economy more fully was ever approved.

There was considerable wealth there to be tapped, and private Chinese merchants generally did so more effectively than the Qing government. By the turn of the nineteenth century rich Shanxi houses were well represented in Zungharia and Altishahr, trading tea via Inner Mongolia to Gucheng and Urumchi, whence it was transshipped throughout Xinjiang for export and local consumption. Or they purveyed luxuries to exiles and bannermen in the growing urban centers of Urumchi and Yili. Other “north bend traders,” many from well-known firms, opened large shops in Xinjiang cities and prof-
Domestication of Empire

ited from retail sales and interest on credit extended to their customers. More impressive for their numbers than for their individual economic stature were the "west road traders," who traveled along the Gansu corridor from the northwest provinces of China proper to sojourn in Xinjiang cities or exchange their goods and return home. This diverse group of peddlers, journeymen, day laborers, teamsters, cash-croppers, shopkeepers, smugglers, and snack vendors included both Tungans fleeing hard times in Gansu and Shaanxi and a few prosperous Jiangnan merchants trading textiles and other products of the Chinese core for Khotanese raw jade. (Other rich merchants from Soochow and elsewhere in central China joined in the Xinjiang trade from the relative convenience of Suzhou, Gansu.) Chinese merchants were present throughout Xinjiang, including some of the more remote villages in Alitshahar, and were numerous in the major cities.

Can the Qing imperial presence in Xinjiang, in either its official or its private capacities, be considered exploitative or extractive? Was East Turkestan underdeveloped and colonized by the Qing in the Marxist sense? The record of local economic conditions is inadequate to answer this question in any depth for the 1739-1864 period and answers may in any case depend on the perspective of the researcher. The evidence I have provided here is mixed. On the one hand, Qing taxes in Xinjiang were relatively low, and the stability of pax Manchurica was good for trade. Although much of this trade was handled by Chinese and foreign Central Asian merchants, the Xinjiang economy may have been stimulated by this increased commerce, as well as by agricultural expansion and the continuous influx of Qing silver. The gradual rate of inflation, despite increased copper pun and bulk silver in circulation in Xinjiang, is an indication that Alitshahar's economy grew steadily under Qing rule. Chinese scholars today argue, moreover, that the Qing commutation of the head-tax to cotton cloth in western Alitshahar stimulated the cottage weaving industry.

On the other hand, extortion by beg officials, tacitly permitted by the Qing, could be crushing to poor East Turkestanis peasants. Moreover, as the cases discussed in Chapter 6 indicate, Chinese loans and sale of goods on credit were a source of hardship. Chinese moneylenders demanded high rates of interest and often expropriated land and other property when East Turkestanis defaulted. Although the situation does not seem to have been as severe in Xinjiang as in Qing Mongolia, such economic factors no doubt increased East Turkestanis' discontent with the Qing and contributed to the violence of the anti-Han and anti-Manchu rebellions in the early 1860s.

Exploitation or no, it does not appear that superprofits were being repatriated from Xinjiang. The long-distance trade was to a great extent bifurcated, with such border cities as Suzhou and Gucheng acting as entrepôts where merchants based in China proper sold goods that other Chinese merchants, based in Xinjiang, relayed to the interior of Zungharia and Alitshahar. The two main trade routes that linked Xinjiang to the metropole, one across Mongolia and the other via the Gansu corridor, carried mostly items of high value relative to weight and bulk (tea, rhubarb, silks, china, medicines, and silver moving westward; jade, silver, medicines, fine hides, and furs moving east), but it was primarily small merchants, working on their own, or at most quasi-independent operators of "name-brand" general stores who moved these goods. The Qing fielded no "Western Regions Company," official or private, to dominate the Xinjiang trade.

A century of Qing imperial control did not integrate Xinjiang's economy closely with the Chinese metropole. In another, less tangible way, however, links were drawn, at least for one party in the imperialist discourse. By this I refer to the psychological effect of Qing imperialism on Chinese elites: a changed notion of "China." This process was not complete by the mid-nineteenth century, when we leave the story, but the beginnings of a significant shift are already evident by the 1820s and 1830s. This study has maintained that the debate over the economic costs of empire, which was a constant refrain running through Xinjiang policy making, often cloak fundamental differences over the "proper" cultural and environmental limits of the realm. It would be too simplistic to depict this difference over imperial policy as ethnically determined, with Han and Manchu mechanically lining up on either side. Nevertheless, the use of such code words as "inner" and "outer" or "wasteland" by eighteenth-century critics suggests that they assumed the realm should be contiguous with their notion of the natural limits of China, a notion received from history and literature and defined by linked moral and environmental parameters. The Qianlong emperor, on the other hand, envisioned his realm very differently. Gaozong's conception of the empire, which he articulated quite plainly in his preface to the Xiyou tongwen zhui and elsewhere, included cultural and territorial China as but one of five main components in an imperial system centripetally focused not on China proper or "Chinese" culture, but on the Qing imperial house. The Jiayu Guan, while still a boundary within this scheme, represented for Gaozong a division between cultural blocs of Qing subjects—not the limits of civilization.

By the end of the third decade of the nineteenth century, however, the ground of this debate had shifted remarkably. Some officials in the Qing court and in Xinjiang could now entertain, for practical reasons, proposals to abandon part of the Western Regions. At the same time, however, two groups of Han Chinese were adopting an aggressive stance with regard to Xinjiang. In
Altishahr. Chinese merchants fought off invaders, massacred native Muslims, and clamored for permission to make permanent homes there. In a very different social venue, but thinking along parallel lines, an elite group of Han scholars adopted the Qing imperial territory as their own and lobbied to transform it into a full-fledged Chinese colony. It is impossible to say how representative the ideas of these statecraft thinkers were of contemporary opinion among other Han groups. But Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, and Xu Song and his circle clearly enjoyed some influence at court, for the Qing did not retreat from Western Altishahr, and elements of their statecraft proposals began to be implemented in the 1830s.

It is a well-known aspect of China's modern history that Han Chinese officials, commanding new provincial Chinese armies, successfully repressed the Taiping and other rebellions in China proper and thereafter exercised increasing influence on Qing domestic and foreign affairs. There was a less well-known but parallel process underway on the peripheries of the Qing empire, however. Han colonization and implementation of Chinese-style administration of frontier regions, from Xinjiang, Mongolia, and Manchuria to Taiwan, became standard dynastic policy as foreign pressures mounted in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Exactly how this policy was implemented in Xinjiang is properly the subject for another book, but the story may be roughly outlined. Following Zuo Zongtang's reconquest, Xinjiang was made a province in 1884 with its capital in Dihua—the Chinese name officially replacing the old Mongol one, "Urumchi." The first governors (xunfu) thereafter implemented reforms like those suggested by Gong Zizhen, and, more recently, by Zuo Zongtang. A new Xinjiang civil administration was created and divided into circuits, which were in turn subdivided into the standard units: prefectures, counties, independent subprefectures, and independent departments. The new officials in charge of these jurisdictions included many Han as well as Manchus—indeed, until after the fall of the Qing, the Xinjiang governors were, with one exception, all Han. The tax structure was revised to make it more like that in the other provinces. Bega, whose assistance was still essential to the minority regime, were placed under greater official supervision and renamed "elders" (xiangye) in the hope that they would function as local gentry in China proper. The civil administration established Confucian free schools throughout the Northern, Southern, and Eastern Marches in an attempt to teach the Chinese written language and didactic texts to East Turkestanis children.17

Moreover, after Zuo's reconquest Chinese immigration to Xinjiang increased greatly, with groups from Hunan and, later, Yunnan and Tianjin prominent among the new merchants and settlers by the Republican period.

Despite another wave of Muslim resistance in the 1930s, this trend of increased Chinese migration has continued to the present day. Han comprised 5.5 percent of the Xinjiang population in 1949; by 1970, they comprised 40 percent. [Many of these are soldiers settled in "Production and Construction Corps"—farms reclaimed near Tarim oases, like the military tuntian of Qing times. Others are educated urban Chinese relocated during the Cultural Revolution. Still others are resettled convicts and political prisoners.] Most recently, in a proposal that echoes Gaozong's hope to relieve overpopulation in Sichuan and Gong Zizhen's proposal to have "the center give up people to benefit the west," the Kashgar government announced that it would resettle 100,000 Chinese from poor areas along the Yangzi River who would lose their homes following completion of the Three Gorges Dam project.18

During its last decades the Qing dynasty struck a bargain to remain in power in China and for security on the borders. The price of that security might be called "Hanization" of the empire. This was not sinicization, the idealized notion that peoples in propinquity to China spontaneously acculturated to its superior civilization, but rather a concrete and traceable process by which Han replaced Manchus and Mongols in positions of authority (even in Inner Asia, where Han officials had played little role in high Qing times) and Han Chinese population settled frontier regions in increasing numbers.

The Jiayu Guan retained its complex liminality well after the Qing expansion brought lands within and beyond it under a single imperial aegis. This was due in part to the pull of a long Chinese tradition regarding the Western Regions as a terrifying ultima Thule and in part to the Qing imperial ideology that maintained cultural barriers between Chinese and non-Chinese subjects, even as it broke down geographic and economic ones. But the Jiayu Guan (like "China") could take on new meanings in new eras, even if the old associations were never entirely sloughed off. To see this, we need only revisit the Pass at a different, post-Qing moment.

The journalist Fan Changjiang, known for his tough-minded and patriotic reporting, journeyed northwest from Jiuquan early in 1936 on a tour through poverty-stricken Gansu. The Jiayu Guan then served as a tax barrier, where merchants arriving from Xinjiang were forced to pay a "customs" tariff, a fact that made Fan indignant. "Xinjiang is China's own land," he snapped. "Customs should be levied at the Chinese-Soviet border. Why have they established them at Jiayu Guan?"19 (That Xinjiang was in fact Chinese due to the imperialism of Manchus either did not occur to Fan, or he did not deem it significant enough to mention.)

Fan found the fort itself in sorry shape: the roof had blown off the main
tower, and the structure was propped up by a few remaining beams. A large hole pierced the center of the gate, around which were scrawled the graffiti of countless travelers. Good reporter that he was, Fan surveyed these writings. Sure enough, they were verses, nine out of ten on the same old theme—homesickness and the bitter frontier. Fan quotes one such bit of doggerel in his newspaper dispatch, then sarcastically comments, "It's as if the Jiayu Guan were the passage between life and death!" Like Qi Yunshi over a century earlier, Fan combs his memory for poems by Chinese of earlier epochs, but unlike his Qing predecessor, Fan impatiently dismisses their cultivated self-pity. He has no time for timid scholars. "I don't understand," he wonders. "Why do they always want to sit around at home?"

Much more to Fan's taste was a robust verse written by Chinggis Khan's Khitan advisor, Ye-liu-chu-cai, while campaigning in the west.

The kiss of fermenting wine,
The sight of olives flowering—
Fill up on chicken's tongues,
Share a horse-head melon!
If a man's belly's full,
What's to stop a desert crossing?

As he gazed out toward Chinese Xinjiang in the February cold, surrounded by war-wrecked reminders of China's present, Fan could soothe his wounded nationalism with the balm of imperial tradition.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Character</th>
<th>Pinyin</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-gui</td>
<td>À-güi</td>
<td>阿桂</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-long-a</td>
<td>À-lón-gá</td>
<td>阿隆阿</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ahong</td>
<td>àkʰhuːn-dí</td>
<td>阿荷</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>alebaru</td>
<td>Àlēbàru</td>
<td>阿勒巴鲁</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amursana</td>
<td>Àmùrsàna</td>
<td>阿勒巴羅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-ji-yan</td>
<td>Àn-jí-yán</td>
<td>安集延</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aocha</td>
<td>Ào-chá</td>
<td>蒿茶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ba-ha-bu</td>
<td>Bā-hǎ-bù</td>
<td>巴哈布</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baihao</td>
<td>Bái-hào</td>
<td>白раст</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banshi dachen</td>
<td>Bànshí dāchēn</td>
<td>辨事大臣</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bantu</td>
<td>Bàn-tú</td>
<td>騰闓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baojia</td>
<td>Bào-jǐɑ</td>
<td>稱鞏</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baizong</td>
<td>Bāi-zǒnɡ</td>
<td>倍聲</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beg</td>
<td>Bēi</td>
<td>伯克</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boile</td>
<td>Bō-ě</td>
<td>貝勒</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beitaoke</td>
<td>Bēi-tāokě</td>
<td>北泰客</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beizi</td>
<td>Bēi-zǐ</td>
<td>貝子</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ben</td>
<td>Běn</td>
<td>本</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-chang</td>
<td>Bì-chānɡ</td>
<td>倍昌</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>biaozun</td>
<td>Bī-zōn</td>
<td>倍駸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bin-jing</td>
<td>Bīn-jīnɡ</td>
<td>發靜</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bing wei min li</td>
<td>Bīnɡ wèi mín lǐ</td>
<td>兵威民力</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bingcheng</td>
<td>Bīnɡ-chénɡ</td>
<td>兵城</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bingtun</td>
<td>Bīnɡ-tún</td>
<td>兵屯</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bitieshi</td>
<td>Bì-tíe-shi</td>
<td>僖體士</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>boke Huizi</td>
<td>Bò-kē Hùzī</td>
<td>伯克回子</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu-la-ni-dun (Burhan ad-Din)</td>
<td>Bù-là-ní-dùn (Bù-hán ad-Dīn)</td>
<td>布拉呢敦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu-lu-te</td>
<td>Bù-lù-té</td>
<td>布魯特</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bu-yan-tai</td>
<td>Bù-yān-tài</td>
<td>布彥泰</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buhao de Huizi nüren</td>
<td>Bù-hào de Hùzī nǚrén</td>
<td>女人</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buhaolé! Chengneide</td>
<td>Bù-háolé! Chēng-nei-de</td>
<td>不好了! 城內的百姓要殺我呢!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>baixing yao sha wo nei!</td>
<td>Bā-xīnɡ yāo shā wǒ nèi!</td>
<td>不好了! 城內的百姓要殺我呢!</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

1. This translation of Li Bo’s Guanshan Yue [The borderland moon] is abbreviated and adapted slightly from that in Herdan, trans., Three Hundred Tang Poems, pp. 60–61.


3. The most influential discussion of boundaries in this sense is Michel Foucault’s The Order of Things, the introduction of which invokes an outlandish assemblage of categories from a “Chinese encyclopedia” to highlight the importance of categorization in structuring human knowledge. For a stimulating and eclectic exploration of this concept with regard to things Chinese, see Hay, ed., Boundaries in China, especially Hay’s introduction.

4. Although yi has generally been rendered into English as “barbarian,” this translation may exaggerate the negative connotations of the term as it was used during Qing times. See Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, pp. 120–21. Dilip Basu has uncovered a debate over the term among British East India employees and other China hands in the 1830s, with those favoring an aggressive, military approach to trade complaining indignantly translating the term as “barbarian,” while others (including Sir George Staunton, a member of the Macartney mission) argued for the more neutral sense of “foreign,” citing Robert Morrison’s dictionary (1825) as an authority. Dilip Basu, “Barbarians,” pp. 6–8.

5. The exceptions are noteworthy, however, and include Owen Lattimore and Paul Pelliot. Fletcher’s foundational work, especially that published in the Cambridge History of China, informs and inspires many of the questions considered in this study. More recently, Forbes treats political events in Republican Xinjiang, and Benson analyzes the last Muslim movement for independence from China before the Communist takeover.


7. Two recent studies revise key aspects of Lattimore’s work. Barfield’s The Perilous Frontier tackles the question of the interaction of steppe peoples with China on a Lattimorean scale and with a similar overarching
model modified to stress the importance of the northeast (Manchuria) in this interaction. However, Barfield affords greater significance to the eighteenth-century conquests and implementation of a rigid administrative structure on Inner Asia by the Qing. Barfield credits such factors as the successful coopetion of the Chinggisid aristocracy, the spread of monastic Buddhism, and Chinese economic exploitation—not firearms or modern transport—with effecting the permanent decline of the Mongols as a military threat to China. He thus dates the breakdown of the pattern of steppe—Chinese interaction a century earlier than Lattimore. Waldron's *The Great Wall of China* argues forcefully that walls were a device deployed by Chinese states only at certain periods as defensive expedients, not an eternal, emblematic feature of Chinese history and culture. Although Lattimore is always careful to distinguish between the Great Wall frontier and the Wall itself, he emphasizes and dehistoricizes the concept of the Great Wall in such general statements as "The Great Wall may therefore be described as an effort on the part of the state to fix this Frontier and to limit the proper field of Chinese activity as well as to exclude the peoples of the steppe" (Inner Asian Frontiers, p. 471).

8. On tradition/modernity and impact/response, see Cohen, *Discovering History*. On sinicization, see Crossley, "Thinking about Ethnicity." On the tribute system and Chinese world order, see Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar*, especially pp. 9–15, chaps. 2 and 5, as well as his "A Multitude of Lords" and "Lamas, Emperors and Rituals"; see also Rossi's introduction in Rossi's, ed., *China among Equals*. Wills has been refining notions of the tribute system for some time (see his *Embassies and Illusions*) and has recently contributed a forceful critique of the notion: see "How We Got Obsessed" and "Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency," On Qing frontier studies in Chinese and American scholarship, see Millward, "New Perspectives on the Qing Frontier."

9. The *Chinese World Order* statement recognizes more directly the important role that military force played in the Qing order. In Fairbank's most recent, and final, synthesis of Chinese history, he writes that the maintenance of the tributary system ideology was one of the requirements of Manchu Son-of-Heaven in China proper, but does not argue that this worldview characterized Manchu relations with Inner Asian territories. See Fairbank, *China: A New History*, pp. 149, 204. For summaries of the tribute system theory, see Rossi, ed., introduction to *China among Equals*, pp. 1–4, and Hevia, *Cherishing*, pp. 9–15.


19. These approaches characterize many of the papers presented recently at the "Conference on Ethnic Identity and the China Frontier" at Dartmouth in May 1996. One of the insights to emerge most strongly from this conference was that on frontiers in south China the distinction between Han and others was not as clear-cut as has generally been imagined. Lattimore, of course, portrayed the boundary between Chinese and steppe nomad as permeable and given to defections in either direction.

20. In framing the discussion of the philosophical links between Han thinkers of the late Ming and later Qing in this way, I have substantially followed Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror*, "Postscript." See also Dreyer's analysis of Sun Yat-sen in *China's Forty Millions*, pp. 15–17.
22. In treating national identity as discursively constructed, I am of course following Anderson. In *Slim Mapped*, Thongchai goes further than Anderson in stressing that the concrete physical dimension of nations is itself a cultural as well as a political artifact, one with a history of changing shapes and meanings. Also germane here is Duara's point (stressed in *Rescuing History from the Nation*) that historical narratives of modern nation-states, as teleological accounts of the emergence of a national subject, suppress other counter-narratives. In treating the Chinese nation as unified through time and the Chinese state's current boundaries as primordial, what is suppressed is none other than the narrative of a Qing—as opposed to Chinese—imperial expansion.

In a concise summing up of the problem of defining China, Wang Gungwu recognizes that "the Chineseness of China" is not something historians may take for granted. No definition, whether it treats China as a place, as a people, or as a civilization, is adequate unless change over time and variation over space is taken into account. Rather, "Our understanding of Chineseness must recognize the following: it is living and changeable; it is also the product of a shared historical experience whose record has continually influenced its growth; it has become increasingly a self-conscious matter for China; and it should be related to what appears to be, or to have been, Chinese in the eyes of non-Chinese." *The Chineseness of China*, p. 2.

24. Important discussions of these concepts by anthropologists include Barth, Bentley, and Keyes. For applications to the Qing and China, and more bibliography, see Crossley, *Orphan Warriors* and "Thinking about Ethnicity"; Elliott, "Resident Aliens"; Gladney, *Muslim Chinese*; Harrell, "Introduction"; and Lipman, *Familiar Strangers*.

25. A complete list is impossible, but some scholars whose work has shaped this emerging approach to the Qing include Chia, Crossley, Di Cosmo, Elliott, Föret, Hevia, Lipman, Newby, Perdue, and Rawski (much of their work is still in progress; available references are in the bibliography). The 1994 NEH Summer Institute on the Qing retreat at Chengde, in which several of the above were participants, did much to focus my thinking along these lines. Nor am I the first to use the term "Qing-centered" (see Elliott, "Resident Aliens," p. xx); in her masterful essay on the state of the Qing field ("Presidential Address"), Rawski uses "Manchu-centered," a term similar in intent if different in nuance. Finally, I have not mentioned here the many Japanese scholars of Qing China and Inner Asia for whom my heralding of this paradigm shift will seem little more than a statement of the obvious. They are acknowledged in the notes and bibliography.

26. For a handy compendium of theories of imperialism, see Harrison Wright, *The New Imperialism.*

27. On the debate over imperialism in China, see "Imperialism: Reality or Myth?" in Cohen, *Discovering History,* pp. 97–147.

28. See collections edited by Gruen and by Harris for examples of Romanists claiming the concept of imperialism.

29. In his *Culture and Imperialism,* Said takes up the "cultural resistance" to European imperialism, a subject he "left out of Orientalism" (p. xii). For a trenchant critique of Said's work, especially *Orientalism,* see Ahmad, *Orientalism and After.* For a brief and accessible survey and critique of the practitioners and intellectual genealogy of postcolonial theory, see Jacoby, *Marginal Returns.* For a rumination on the applicability of the notion of subalternity to the China field, see Hershatter, "The Subaltern Talks Back.

30. A truly comparative history of imperialisms or empires will require a chronologically general definition and improved specific knowledge of such non-European empires as the Qing or the Ottoman. Eisenstadt took such a general approach but went astray in adopting an ahistorical, grossly generalized concept he called "the Chinese Empire from the Han period to the Ch'ing" as a principal analytical archetype. For Europe during the same period he distinguishes the Hellenistic and Roman empires; the Byzantine Empire; Western, Central, and Eastern European states from the fall of feudal systems to the rise of absolutism; and European conquest empires outside Europe—yet he assumes China to have remained essentially changeless over 2,000 years. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires,* p. 10.


CHAPTER 1

1. The term Xinjiang came into common official use within a few years of the conquest; it appears in memorial by 1768 (Wu Dashan memorial, QL 33.2.16, GZZZ vol. 28, pp. 654–55). A dispatch in 1776 defines it nicely: "jiayu guan wei xinjiang menhu" (jiayu Pass is the gateway to Xinjiang). Le-er-jin memorial, QL 43.12.16, GZZZ vol. 46, pp. 190–91.

2. Material on Xinjiang geology and tectogenesis may be found in Norin, "Tarin Basin"; Wang Gongque, "Geologic Overview," and Molnar et al., "Geologic Evolution." I am grateful to John Olsen for these references.

3. See, for example, map 52–53 in Tan et al., eds., *Zhongguo lishi ditu ji.* The ambiguities over Chinese territorial claims in this region have roots in the Qing period.

4. There is evidence of agricultural settlements in Zungharia dating from as early as the late bronze and early iron Ages. Di Cosmo, "Ancient Inner Asian Nomads," pp. 1105, 1108.


8. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers,* p. 172. The desert may be crossed...
from north to south (and vice versa) along the channels of the Aksu and Yarkand Rivers, which reach the Tarim when in flood. The rest of the year, the dry riverbeds provide a flat route through the dunes suitable for travel on foot. Herders and merchants willing to share with their camels the water from desiccating pools may make the trip from Aksu to Khotan, for example, as late as October.


10. Although Chinese sources gloss over this fact, Tibet seems to have controlled the Tarim Basin oasis states from 670 to 692 (Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire, pp. 37–54).


12. For a recent study of the Torgohus's experience in Russia, see Khodakovsky, Where Two Worlds Meet.

13. On these events and the influence of Naqshbandi Islam in Xinjiang, Gansu, and Qinghai, see Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," pp. 68–79; and "The Naqshbandiyaa in Northwest China."


15. Edict to the Grand Secretariat, QL20.6.7, from Zhongyuan yanjuyuan, Ming qing shiliao, geng bian, vol. 10, p. 91.8, cited in Zhaung, Qing Guozong, pp. 40–41. The emperor identifies Ce-ling and Suhe-de as the cowards, but at least one other official (Chen Hongru) had earlier expressed concern about attacking Dawachi. See the section "Liber i Decision, imperial response," below.

16. For useful surveys of the historical interactions between China and Inner Asia outlined above, see Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, and Mano, Nakami, Hori, and Komatsu, Nairiku Ajia.

17. On the circumstances surrounding the production of the engravings of the Qianlong conquests, see Beurdeley and Beurdeley, pp. 79–88; Pelliot, "Les conquêtes de l'empereur de la chine"; and Enoki, "Researches in Chinese Turkestan," Appendix 1.

18. General accounts of the Zunghar wars and conquest of Xinjiang may be found in Barfield, The Perilous Frontier, pp. 277–94, and Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, pp. 141–49. See also Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 9–14, and Halkovic, The Mongols of the West. Other important works in Western

languages include Courant, L'Asie centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, and Zlatkin, Istoria Dzhungarskogo khantina, 1635–1758. See also the English notice of this book, Zlatkin, "The History of the Khante of Dzungaria," which includes a discussion of the Mongol, Kalmuk, and Russian sources.

The basic Chinese source is Fu-heng, comp., Qinding Zhungra'er fanglie, which assembles official communications from the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong campaigns. Several of the major Xinjiang gazetteers contain capsule histories of this period, such as Song-yun, Zhunga'er quanbu jilie, in Qinding Xinjiang zhilue juan shou, 570–594. Wei Yuan (Sheng wu ji) and Zeng (Zhongguo jingying Xiyu shi) offer longer versions. Zhungra's highly detailed narrative is based on archival documents as well as the published Qing sources (the account of the Qing conquest of Altishar given here is primarily based on Zhungra's). The "Weilai Menggu jianshi" bianzhe zu ("Concise History of the Oirat Mongols" editorial group) presents an official P.R.C. line, which winds carefully between admiration of the Oirat and Zunghar ming (which suffered "nationality oppression and class oppression" at the hands of the Qing) and criticism of Zunghar leaders. The group's bibliographic includes Russian, Oirat, Mongolian, and Tibetan works, in addition to Chinese published and archival sources.

In Japanese, Haneda's Chita Ajia shi kenkyuu provides informative coverage. Chiba's Kora Bukan is a popular history of the Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong Zunghar campaigns and the Qing conquest of Zungharia and East Turkestan, presented in a dramatic style.

19. On the local administrative system, see Saguchi, 18–19 seiki Higashi Torkishitan, chap. 3; Haneda, "Iminzoku tochujo," and articles by Saegusa.

20. The Qing likewise introduced Chinese civil administration on the Taiwan frontier as a control measure only after Han settlement there was established. See Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy, pp. 198–208. A similar pattern arose in Manchuria, where zhou, xian, and ting governments were established alongside the military government to accommodate an expanding Han civilian population. See Lee, The Manchurian Frontier, pp. 73–74.

21. Jasak (Mo. jasaq; Ch. zhasake) was the Manchu term used by the Qing for the heads of the eight Mongol banners and other hereditary chiefs. Fuller descriptions of Qing administration in Xinjiang may be found in Fletcher, "Ch'ing Inner Asia," pp. 58–83; Zeng, Zhongguo, part 2, chap. 2; Luo Yunchi, chap. 3–5; and Katoa, Shinkaishi Shinhoku, pp. 59–75.


25. Yu-lin, ZPZZ MZSW 556-12, DG11.2.25; En-te-heng-e, ZPZZ MZSW 009-31, DG18.5.2.
28. Dikötter, Discourse of Race, p. 27. For a somewhat more detailed analysis of Wang's thought on these questions, tending to the same conclusions, see Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism," pp. 361-65.
32. See, for example, Waldron, The Great Wall, p. 42.
35. Guozong took punitive action against Liu Tongxun, recalling him to the capital, arresting him and his sons, and confiscating the family property. Liu learned his lesson; after the emperor pardoned him the following year, he redeemed himself in a variety of important positions. Qingshi liezhan, j. 18 (vol. 5, p. 1392): Hummel et al., Eminent Chinese, p. 533; Enoki, "Researches in Chinese Turkestan," pp. 6-7.
36. GZSL 543:128-16a, QL22.7 dingwe. I have been unable to locate any further information on Zhang Zhieyi. The Guoqiao qixian leiheng contains a biography of a Zhang Rulin (7087-69), a native of Henchong county, Anhui province. In 1735 Zhang was put forward as a tribute student (gongsheheng) by the local Confucian school and the following year was recommended for a post as district magistrate. He served in several Guangdong counties and enjoyed a career full of typical magistrate's concerns (water conservancy, restraining powerful families, quelling unrest) and a few less typical ones, including instructing Hainanese in agriculture and proper marriage rituals and dealing with Western traders in Macao. His request to remain in Macao upon retirement was denied, and he returned to Hengcheng (Li Huan, comp., Guoqiao qixian leiheng j. 253, pp. 36a-37a). This account does not mention the memorial regarding the Zanghar campaigns—although we would not necessarily expect a formal biography to do so. It may concern the same man.

38. GZSL 612.2b-22a, QL25.5 renzi Hua, "Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi," p. 46. See also her "Qianlong nianian jinian chuqian.
39. GZSL 649:34, QL26.13 jiazhi. See also GZSL 612.2b-22a, QL25.5 renzi.
40. GZSL 920:23a-24a, QL37.11 guimao.
41. See Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition, pp. 47-49.
42. Song-huan, comps., (Qingming) Xinjiang zhilie 2:28-3a.
43. Ibid.

CHAPTER 2

1. HYXYTZ 39-2a, hingfang.
2. Huang Tinggi, ZPZZ QL23.12.10, quoted in Li Xiaoxian, "Qianlong chao...sichou maoyi," p. 5. GZSL 557:12a-12a, QL23.2 denghou, 556:19, QL23.2 gengzou.
3. On Tea and Horse Agencies (Chama Si) in the Song, see Smith, Taxing Heaven's Storehouse; on the Mong border trade, see Rossabi, "Tea and Horse Trade," and Kano, "Chama bokkizukai," Millward, "The Song-Qazakh Trade and the 'Tribute System,'" includes a brief comparative discussion of frontier horse markets from Tang through Qing times.
4. The Imperial Silk Factories were monopolies of the Imperial Household Agency (Neiou Fu), locally managed by Manchu bondsmen in much the same fashion as the salt administrations in Yangzhou and Changlu.

With origins in the Yuan Dynasty, the three Jiangnan factories were the last of around 25 such centers that had operated throughout China during the Ming, when silk played a more important role in dynastic financial and taxation systems. In early Qing times, the three factories were employed primarily in the production of silk for use by the imperial clan as well as of satin and brocaded tributary "gifts in return." After 1759, however, the factories were mobilized to produce trade silks, and from then on almost all the silk exchanged officially for Kazakh livestock was processed through the three factories, although only luxury fabrics were actually manufactured in-house, the more common varieties being produced through an outsource-
Huangchao jingshi wenbian edition of Gong's essay does not include the sinicized names in his list of prefectures and districts. The names are included in the version in Gong Zizhen chuanji, vol. 1. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 105–12. On place-name politics, see Chou, "Frontier Studies," p. 49.


21. In somewhat contradictory fashion, given the overall assimilationist and integrative thrust of this piece, Gong stipulates that an inspector be established at Jiayu Guan to tax outgoing commerce and to allow only grain, salt, tea, rhubarb, and cotton and silk textiles to be exported. No "marvelous and corrupting" Chinese goods could exit the Pass, in order to bolster "their" (the Muslims?) culture. Nor could anything besides leather goods or melons be imported from Xinjiang, in order to "enrich" their economy. Gong Zizhen, 87:6a (2892).

22. Shen Yao and his essay are discussed in Kataoka, Shinchō Shinkyō, pp. 97–100; On Xu Song, see Hummel et al., Eminent Chinese, pp. 321–22. On Xu Song's Beijing coterie and frontier studies, see Chou, "Frontier Studies," p. 86.


24. Sheng wu ji 4:10b. The quote is from Mencius 3b:3; Lau, p. 113.

25. Wei Yuan, Sheng wu ji 4:13a. Wei began the Sheng wu ji in 1829 and completed it in 1842 (Leonard, Wei Yuan, pp. 16–17). It seems clear that he refers in this passage to the colonization plans of Gong Zizhen and others, but it is uncertain exactly when he wrote this section of the book.


27. Dillon, "Xinjiang," pp. 31–32. The Kashgar proposal was quickly retracted, following "a national and international outcry."


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Beckwith, Christopher I. The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia: A History
Bibliography


———. "Qingdai Tianan men neibei de maoyi" (Trade north and south of the Tianshan in the Qing dynasty). Shihuo yuankan (Economics monthly) 6, no. 3 (June 1976): 85–94.


Chen Zhongnan and Xia Limbo. "Qiaoduo tiangong de Yangzhou yuyi" (Yangzhou's superbly crafted jades). Yangzhou wenshi ziliao (Historical materials on Yangzhou) no. 9 (1990): 104–10.

Chia, Ning. "The Lifanwan and the Inner Asian Relations in the Early Qing (1644–1795)." Late Imperial China 14, no. 1 (June 1993): 60–92.


———. “Thinking about Ethnicity in Early Modern China.” Late Imperial China 11:1 (June 1990): 1–35.


Fuheng (Fuheng) et al., comps. (Qingding) pingding Zhongga’er fanjiu (Imperially commissioned military history of the pacification of the Zungars). 3 vols. (qian, zheng, xin). 1768. Repr. Xizang hanwen wenxian huike


Gao Pu si yu yushu an (The case of Gao Pu’s illegal private jade sales). Shiliang ziyuan (Historical materials tri-monthly), nos. 19-28 (Feb. 1930 to Mar. 1931).


———. “Shinchō no Kaikyō tōchū in tsuitte ni, san no mondai” (Two or three questions concerning the Qing dynasty’s control over Altishahr). Shinshaka zasshi, no. 3 (March 1979): 1–36, 137–38.


———. “Lin Zexu yu Nanjiang renfen” (Lin Zexu and land reclamation in


—. “Qianlong nianjian yimin chuguan yu Qing qianqi Tianshan beilu nongye de fazhan” (Migration to Xinjiang in the Qianlong period and agricultural development in north Xinjiang during the early Qing). Xibeishi shidai, no. 4 (1987): 119–31.
—. “Qing zhongye Xinjiang yu neidi de maoyi wanglai” (Commercial relations between Xinjiang and China proper during the mid-Qing). In Ma Ruheng and Ma Dazheng, eds., Qingdai bianliang kaifa yanjiu, pp. 275–304. Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chuban, 1990.
—. “Qingdai Xinjiang nongye kaifa shi yanjiu.” Ph.D. diss., Zhonggou Renmin Daxue (China People’s University), n.d.
Huijiang zhi. See Yong-gui.
Ji Dachun et al. “Xinjiang xiancun fangzhi gailan” (Extant gazetteers of Xinjiang). Photocopy from Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu (Research on social sciences in Xinjiang, an internal circulation journal). n.d.
—. “Ke’ian shiryo yori mitaru Shinhō no Kaimin seisaku: hosetsu” (The Muslim policy of the Qing dynasty: A look from the perspective of criminal cases—supplement.) Rekishi kenkyū (Osaka Kyōiku daiyōkai) 21 (June 1986): 137–45.
—. “Shinhō no Kaimin seisaku no mata kentō—Shinshitsu roku o chūshin ni” (Another study of the “Muslim policy of the Qing dynasty”: Focus on the Qing Veritable Records). Rekishi kenkyū (Osaka Kyōiku daiyōkai) 13 (Mar. 1976): 59–79.
Legge, James, trans. The Shoo King (Shangshu). In The Chinese Classics, with a translation, critical and exegetical notes, prolegomena, and copi-
three south China Imperial Silk Factories and silk trade with Xinjiang in the Qing dynasty). Liaoning shifan daxue xuebao (shenhui ban) no. 3 (1986): 67–73.

——. “Qian jia shi neidu yi Xinjiang de shichu maoyi” (Silk trade between China proper and Xinjiang in the Qinglong and Liaojing reigns). Xinjiang daxue xuebao no. 4 (1985): 45–54.


——. “Qingdai Jiangning zhidao yi Xinjiang de shichu maoyi” (The Jiangning Imperial Silk Factory and silk trade with Xinjiang in the Qing dynasty). Zhongguo minzu zhexue xuebao no. 3 (1987): 76–83.

——. “Qingdai Qian jia nianjian Sushou yi Xinjiang de shichu maoyi” (Silk trade between Soochow and Xinjiang during the Qianlong and Qiaoying reigns). Suzhou daxue xuebao (shenhui xiezhe xuebao) no. 4 (1985): 9–14.

——. “Qingdai Xibe minzu maoyi shi” (Inter-nationality trade in the Northwest during the Qing period). Beijing: Zhongyao minzu zhexue chubanshe, 1991.


Ling Tingkan. “Yu Yuan Boyuan gexue lun Huafang lu shu” (Letter to Ruan Yuan on Yangezhu Huafang lu). In Jiaoliang wenji (Collected prose from the Jiaoli Hall), 21:12–13a, n.d. (c. 1797).


Bibliography


Luo Yunzhi. Qing Gaozong tongzhi Xijiang zhengde de tantao (Investigation into the Qing’s Qianlong-period control policies in Xijiang). Taipei: Liren zhuzhu, 1983.


Mu Yuan. “Zai tai Baoyu de jie shì wèn” (Several questions regarding the Baoyu, reconsidered). In Xijiang jinrong (Xijiang finance), second meeting of the Xijiang Numismatics Society, special number (1991): 100–102.


Pan Zhiping. “Lun Qianlong Jiaqiang Daoguang nianjin Qian zai Tianshan naru tuixing de minzu zhenge” (Regarding the nationality policy followed by the Qing dynasty in Altishahr during the Qianlong, Jiaqing, and Daoguang reigns). *Minzu yanjiu* (Nationality studies), no. 6 (1986): 37–41.


Pan Zhiping and Wang Xi. “Qing qianjia Kashi ‘er Ye’erqiang duiwai maoyi” (The foreign trade of Kashgar and Yarkand in the early Qing period). *Xinjiang shehui kexue yanjiu* joint number 7–8 (1988): 18–32.


Bibliography


---. "Roska to Ajia sōgen. Yūresia bunka shi sensho, no. 3. Tokyo:
Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1967.


---. "Sōsekki Shin hakkokusei kara mita Kashgariya oshihau shakai" (Oasis society in Kashgaria as seen from the Qing beg administrative system at the time of its foundation). In Nairiku Ajia, nishi Ajia no shakai to bunka, pp. 437-58. Tokyo: Sansen shuppansha, 1983.


Song-yun, Wang Tingkai, Yi Yunshi, and Xu Song, comps. (Qing) Xingjiang zhili (Imperially commissioned gazetteer of Xingjiang). Beijing: Wuying Dian, 1821.


Su-er-de et al. Xinjiang Huibu zhi (Gazetteer of the Muslim region of Xingjiang). Qinlong period manuscript. Repr., Zhongguo fangzhi congshu, xinhua dian, no. 10. Taipei: Chengwen, 1968.


Tuo-jin et al. (Qing) Da Qing huidian shi (Imperially commissioned statutes and precedents of the Qing dynasty, Jiaqing edition). 1818.


——. "Qing Qianlong nianjian Xinjiang de 'Huibu' maoyi wenzi" (The question of "Muslim cloth" in Xinjiang during the Qianlong period of the Qing dynasty). Xinjiang shehui kexue no. 5 (1987): 113–32.


——. Qindai Xibei tuntian yanjiu (Research on agricultural reclamation in the Western Regions in the Qing dynasty). Lanzhou: Lanzhou Daxue chubanshe, 1990.


——. "Qindai Xinjiang kuangye shulue" (Survey of the mining industry in Qing Xinjiang). Shehui kexue (Gansu) no. 6 (1986).


Wechsler, Howard. "Kao-tsung (Reign 649–83) and the Empress Wu: The Inheritor and the Usurper." In Denis Twitchett, ed., The Cambridge His-
Bibliography


Walumunqi zhenglue (Gazetteer of Urumchi). Manuscript edition in Gansu Provincial library. 1778.


Xie Zhining. “Qinglong shiji Qing zhengfu dai Xinjiang de zhiyi yu kafa” (The Qing government’s rule and development of Xinjiang in the Qianlong period). Master’s thesis, Beijing University, 1990.

Xinjiang lishi yanjiu (Historical research on Xinjiang) no. 2 (1985): entire issue. Special number containing excerpts on Xinjiang from the Zhongguo lishi da cidian (Large dictionary of Chinese history).

Xinjiang shehui kexueyuan lishi yanjiu suo (Historical Research Institute, Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences), ed. Xinjiang difang lishi ziliao xuanji (Collected materials on Xinjiang local history). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1987.


Wright, David. “Translation of (Gong Zhenzhen’s)‘A Proposal for Establishing a Province in the Western Regions.’” Seminar paper, Princeton University, n.d.

Bibliography

Xu Ke. Qinghai leichao (Categorically arranged unofficial sources on the Qing). Shanghai: Shanghai, 1937.


Yi-xin et al., eds. (Qinding) pingding Shaan Gan Xinjiang Huifei funglue (Imperially commissioned military history of the pacification of the Muslim Rebels in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Xinjiang). Preface 1896.

Zhao Yuzheng, Xinjiang yünfen (Xinjiang agricultural reclamation).
Zhongguo renmin daxue Qingshi yanjiusuo (People’s University of China, Qing History Research Center) and Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu zhongxin (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Chinese Borderlands History and Geography Research Center), eds. Qingdai bianjiang shidi lunzhuzi suiyun (Index of books and articles on Qing-period borderland history and geography). Zhongguo bianjiang shidi yanjiu ziliao congshu (Series). Beijing: Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe, 1998.
Index

Cohen, Paul A., 7, 10, 13-14
Collection of the Substances of Muslim Xinjiang (Huijiang zeli), 174
colonialism, 17
commissions (guanju), 8-9, 29-36, 103, 209, 215; anthropocentric
and, 84, 89, 110, 226; growth, 226; domestic, 226; internal,
and, 226; dominance, 39, 86, 110, 112; domination, 84, 125,
substitute for, 226; stimulation, 226
(see also guanju)

Cao Zhi, 167
Castiglione, G., 36
central-place theory, 10-11
Chabut, 77, 79
Chang Fengqing, 171, 213-14, 216, 231, 307
Chang-lin, 109, 112, 216, 220, 222f, 228
chauzou, 154
"chased the camps" (goyiay), 114
Cheh-su-ling-chu-bu, 31
Chen Liang, 37
Cheng, G.C., 76
Chiang Kai-shek, 23
China: Chinese-centered history of, 24, copper cash to silver: coinage transition, 67, definitions of, 12; failure to respond to West, 49; imperialism, 16; macro-regions, 10; national landscape of, 37; overpopulation, 143; Qings difference from, 12; silver value, 62
China among Equals, 200
Chinese: barbarian vs., 36, defined, 12; as fixed ethnic category, 14; frontier strategy, 5; history, 56; history, 56; immigration to Xinjiang, 250; moneylenders, 248
Chinese merchants, 215, 223, 259, 130, 138, 247-48, 152, 160-69, 228, 230; as Alt shahr problem, 227; commercial property available to, 258; influence of, 212-13; innovation of, 212; in Kashgar, 223; laws governing, 203, 231; liaisons with East Turkistan women, 207; north, 260, 165-66; luxury of, 238; taxation on, 255; west road, 160, 165-68. See also merchants
"Chinese world order," 5, 155, 199, 201
Chinese World Order book, 9, 200, 262
Chou, Nai, Jihong, 196, 197
cloth shops, 83, 89; revenue use, 89-90; Urumchi, 83, 89. See also commis-
raries (guanju)

Index

Cokus, 114, 156, 168, 169, 176, 203, 230, 236; corridor, 166, 177, 177, 248; merchants, 149, 160, 237
Cao Pu, 161, 187, 281, 301
Chiao Tsun, 27
Gansu, 21, 26, 271, 381, 40-41, 43, 51, 63, 117, 157, 173, 190, 246, 249, 268. See also Qianlong emperor
Goubard, Pierre, 290-91
Gobi Desert, 118
God of Literature (Kuixing Lou), temple to, 127
God of Medicine, temple to, 127
God of War (Wu Miao), temple to, 127
God of Wealth (Alain), temple to, 127
Gong E, 123
Gong Xizheng, 35, 244f, 248f, 250f, 313
Gongjing, 312
Gracious Appropriation (Encheng Dong), 85
pawshop, 85
Gracious Benefit (Encheng Dong), 84
pawshop, 84
Gracious Relief (Encheng Dong), 84
pawshop, 84
grain, 51, 238; collection, 53; tax demand, 222; supply, 70, 52; tax, 53-54
Great Wall, 5-6, 256
Green Standard troops, 23, 33-42, 27, 21, 77, 89, 24, 245, 240; contributed to, 19; farming, 20; frontier duty, 27; relocation of, 228; taxation, 53; wages, 253, 316
Gu Yanwu, 33
Guang Xi, 132
Guandi temple, 172-73, 141, 143, 146, 210
Guang Teng yi, 211
Guangzhou, 62
"guanju," see commissaries
gruan ("beyond the pass"), 153
Guicheng, 130-31, 176, 241, 249; garrison population, 177; Manchu caddies, 130; tea shipments, 150
Ha-ban-i, 139
Ha Baomei, 137
bakhim beg, 33, 159, 165, 204, 210, 219, 239
Ha-long, 221
Ha-na-wa, 218
Ham, 23, 116, 25-29, 258, 261; cantonment, 128; colonists, 230; customs barrier, 100; merchants, 227; "Muslim City," 27; segregation, 127; shops, 127
Index

New Dominion, 20–21; defined, 20; financing, 44–47; See also Western Regions
Nian Dengxi, 168
north bend traders, 160, 161–66, 218, 247; defined, 160; imperial bond-servants and, 165; representation, 165; structure, 162–65; trade routes, 161. See also Chinese merchants
Northern March (Tsianhan belu), 135–38; banermen, 135; business, 136. See also Tarbagatay Yili; Zungaria

“north-south trade,” 99

"official tea," 92

Oirat, 27, 25, 45, 77, 91, 196, 305
optim, 191–92

Orientalism, 16

“outer domains,” 201

passport office (piaochuo chu), 120

patriarchal, 13

pawns, 84–89, 109, 133, 278; Barkol, 86; Gracious Attainment (Encheng Dang), 85; Gracious Benefit (Engi Dang), 84; imperial, 75, 101, 278; Karakol, 139. See also commissaries (guanmu)
Peng Yunzhong, 237

Pijian, 116

Polish, James M., 15

poll tax, 239

population, 37, 133, 271

post stations (faizhuan), 117, 139, 145.

218; distance between, 119–20; functions and routes, 284; supervision, 219; supplying, 219

Priska, Omeljan, 99

Przevalskii, M. N., 24

pul, 61, 64–71, 247; defined, 64; inflation, 72; minting, 65–66; Qing, 65; stabilization of, 65; wages in, 66; “worth ten,” 71–74; Zungaria, 65, 71. See also copper; tael

pul-tele exchange rate, 66–70, 276; in Altsahan, 67; in China, 67; copper cloth and, 71–72; East Turkestani, 69; fluctuation, 66; manipulation of, 69; multiple, 68, 72; Zungaria, 68–69, 70

Qi Yunshu, 1–4, 18, 38, 265
Qianlong emperor, 1, 5, 14, 21, 35, 29, 385f.

426, 50, 86, 91, 109, 113, 186, 193, 202, 245, 249. See also Gaozong

Qiu-mu-shi-ding, 160

Qing, 231; administration, 7; agricultural reclamation, 271; ambans, 49; China’s differences, 12; diplomacy, 6; domestic political competition, 15; ethnic policy, 225–26, 234; fiscal policies, 209; foreign relations, 9, 45; frontier garrisons, 40, 44; images of Xijiang peoples, 94–97; imperialism, 15–16, 59, 145–55; imperial policy, 202, 241; Inner Asia expansion, 8; institutional innovations, 7; Jesuit Guan function, 38; law, 121–22; military planners, 45; pul, 65; Qing-centered history of, 43–5; retrenchment, 234; tax policy in Western Regions, 122, 247; territorial administration, 12; troops, 76, 79, 236, 246; Xijiang policy, 242; Yili occupation, 77; Zanghtar rivalry, 28–29

(Qing) Dazong huijian shi, 272, 286

(Qing) huangyu Xiu zhi, 20, 79

(Qing) pingding Shann Gan Xijiang, 273

(Qing) pingding Shann Gan Xijiang Huiji fanglue, 159

(Qing) pingding Zhongguo fanglue, 275

(Qing) Xijiang zhilue, 42, 267

Qing-Kazakh trade, 45–48; ceremonial component of, 49; haggling, 46–47; livestock, 45, 47–48; official, 47; silk, 436

Qing-ying, 240

Qin unification, 5

Qi-hi-yi, 126, 143, 146, 178, 195f, 284, 294, 305

qunru, 204, 295, 305

Record of Things Heard and Seen in the Western Regions, 216

regional systems approach, 10

relay stations, 118–19

rental properties, 233

"rents and taxes," 203–4, 109, 233, defined, 103; in Urumchi, 104

Renzung, 183. See also jiajing emperor’s righthand men, 178–80, 247; embroils; 178; government restriction on, 179–80; "great yellow" (dashun), 178; shippers, 178; value of, 178–79; Zungaria and, 178

Rites of Zhou, 37, 200

road-pass system, 100, 120–21
Wang Fu-zhi, 13, 36f
Wang Gangwu, 263
Wang Ming, 167
Wang Xi, 71
Wang Xian, 312
Wang Yeh-chien, 209
Wang Zhonghai, 209
Wang Mang interregnum, 26
Wan Shun Lei, 210
Wei Gining, 219
Wei Yuan, 43, 76, 79, 150, 243ff, 250, 278–87, 293, 302, 311, 313
Wei Zhongxiao, 167
Wei Gong Cun, 266
Wen-shou, 41, 217, 310
Western Regions, 20, 25, 42ff, 110, 115, 126, 246; abandonment of, 249; disorder, 244; Qiu tax policy in, 112; Qiu troops in, 76; using to rule, 44, 111, 241. See also New Dominion
west road traders, 160, 166–68; defined, 160; post-station trade route, 168; trade routes, 161. See also Chinese merchants
West Turkestan merchants, 155
“worth ten” pul, 73–74
Wu Erqi, 203
Wu-er-qing-a, 210
Wu Qi Qianwun Jian, 197
xiangyue, 131, 170, 172
Xichu yuhe, 79
Xichu zongtong shihue, 154, 196
Xie Zizeng, 79
xiezao, 56–61, 74, 79, 95, 108, 129, 144, 175; budgets, 63, 89, 174; defined, 58; funds allocation, 59; funds transfer, 58; loans against, 89; for officials and soldiers, 217; quotas, 60; reliance on, 109; empires, 87, 110, 233, 238; subsidies, 236, 239; substitution for, 237; Yili allotment, 83. See also silver
Xiguan ("New city"). 150
Xing Sheng, 167
Xinjiang, 265; agricultural reclamation, 50, 271; Chinese money-lending, 208–11; commissaries, 83–92; communications infrastructure, 118; conquest of, 4, 29–31; currency exchange rates, 68–69, 70; customs revenues, 281; economic reports, 84–95; expenditure from central lands, 44; finance policy, 42, 110; fiscal crisis, 56; fiscal regulations, 45; geology, 265; high Qiu, 33–36; imperial expansion into, 42; in Inner Asia definition, 2; military budget, 88; military deployment, 77–80; official monetary revenue in, 112; outer for surplus population, 51; Qianlong-period personnel in, 80; Qiu administrative system, 33; Qiu garrisons in, 40, 44; Qiu policy, 242, 269; Qiu troops in, 76, 79; revenue sources, 72–96, 236; segregation policies, 124–25; silver hoarding, 62; size of, 21; tax revenues, 63
Xinjiang zhihui, 196, 243
Xin-shu, 71, 140
Xiongnu, 25, 40, 76
Xu-ling, 123
Xuqiu tongwen zhi, 197, 202, 249, 303
Xu Song, 243, 250
Xuanzong, 26, 227f
yambu, 62
Yan Liangguo, 167
Yan Xi, 218
Yang Fang, 213, 215, 221
Yang Yingji, 66, 86, 115, 126, 243, 244, 271, 278, 284
Yang Guan, 3, 25
Yang Hsi, 144f, 190, 210, 227; cantonment, 145, 232; defined, 329; divisions, 249; hsin pao of, 129; merchants, 145, 228; shops, 145. See also Southern March (Tian Shan nanlu)
Yu’s Beg, 36, 140
Yarkand, 31, 55, 69, 71f, 75, 79, 97, 145–49, 182, 192, 227; defense ed, 223–25; divisions, 249; free-spirited nature of, 246–47; Guandi Temple, 146; guanpu, 96–97; hakim Beg, 239; jade, 182; Kokandi attack on, 233–35; life in, 247; merchants, 93, 146f, 128f; mint, 58, 72; prosperity of, 146; resistance, 224–25; shops, 248, 284; silver yuanzao, 335; trade decline, 338; trade pavilions, 95–96. See also Southern March (Tian Shan nanlu)
Ye-li chu-cai, 292
yi, 4, 36f, 196, 215
yihi, 254
Yili, 48f, 52, 53, 76, 87, 89, 136–37, 247; apothecary, 84; barbersmen, 83, 135f, 240; funds transferred to, 30; garrison, 102, 136; grain collection, 53; guanpu, 84, 88; merchants, 136; military complex, 78; military governor’s headquarters (jiangjun fu), 77; mint, 65, 73, 276; official investments, 136; population, 136–37; Qiu occupation of, 77; shops, 103; trade pavilion, 97–98; xiezao allotment, 83, zhijian, 65. See also Northern March (Tian Shan belu)
Yidi, 149
Yi River, 21, 23f, 38, 77
yinlang (water depots), 118
Yi-shan, 73
yitshen, 118f
Yong-bao, 143, 273, 289
Yong-chang, 30, 58
Yongqing, 141
Yongzheng emperor, 5, 14, 33–34, 86, 91, 272
Yu, 37
yu, see jade
Yu-de-ke, 288
Yu-lin, 227, 228
Yuwen Guan, 3, 25
Yungui, 81, 116–17, 202
Yu-qing, 139, 283–84, 301
Yu-tui, 239–40
Zelin, Madeleine, 179
Zeng Wenwu, 59, 149–50, 272
Zha-la-len-tai, 73, 237
Zhang Bao, 167
Zhang Bojun, 19
Zhang Dabai, 165
Zhang Liang-te, 119
Zhang Luan, 121, 163f, 170, 187, 189, 191
Zhang Qian, 25
Zhang Rulin, 29, 268
Zhang Wei, 113, 126
Zhang Zhuye, 39
Zhao Junbi, 170, 187
Zhao Guangzai, 123
Zhao Yongfu, 170, 174
Zhao-hui, 10–11, 34, 54, 64–65, 156, 194, 245–45
Zhonggong emperor, 27
Zhi Kunyu, 65
Zhih, 148, 162
zhiquan, 61ff
Zhongguo (central country), 153, 294
zhongyuan (central plain), 153
Zhou Renji, 115
Zhou li, 200
Ziguang Ge, 21f
zhao ("name brand"). 16ff
Zhungharia, 21, 50, 102; agriculture, 13, 40, 43, 265; city construction, 45; communication with China, 25; conquest of, 29–30, 245; geography of, 21–22; military expenditure in, 40; Qiu investments in, 87; Russian presence in, 35; Yang influence in, 26; tea trade, 178
Zhunghara, 21, 26–29, 73; barbarians, 20; campaigns, 4, 25f, 41, 45, 50, 114, 266, 268; khans, 21, 23; pacification of, 114, 245; herd, 65, 72; Qiu rivalry, 27–28; Qiu superiority, 233; rubab and, 178; taxation, 54, 100, 114; trade, 28–29, 266; tribal groups, 27
Zuo Zongtang, 41, 241, 246, 250, 275