The Culture of War in China

Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty

Joanna Waley-Cohen
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I.B.Tauris Publishers
LONDON • NEW YORK
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Preface

This book brings together more than a decade’s work on different aspects of military culture in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century China, a period generally regarded as having represented the high point of the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1912). Thus by now my argument has become familiar, but when I began research for the project, scholars had yet to consider the idea of military culture, or the militarization of culture, in Qing China. The main body of the book consists of four essays (Chapters Two, Three, Four, and Five) earlier versions of which have already appeared in scholarly journals and in anthologies. I have added a new introduction and a conclusion, so that it is possible either to read each chapter on its own or to read the whole series cumulatively. In publishing updated versions of my earlier work in a single volume, it is my intention to make these studies of Qing military culture accessible to a much wider audience, because as an analytic device it seems to account for so much of everything else.

Work on this study began at a time when what is now a substantial body of scholarship known as the “new Qing history” was still in its infancy; over the years it has both contributed to, and been influenced by, that work. The new history has thrown a completely new light on our understanding of the past two or three centuries, as I explain in the next chapter. Not least, in tandem with other scholarship on the rise of nationalism, it has made us reflect much more carefully on what we mean by “China,” and “the Chinese,” and how the meaning of these terms constantly shifted, including under Manchu rule. Although it has remained difficult in this book not to use such terms as a form of shorthand, the usage is not intended to imply anything fixed or monolithic.

The study focuses on the period from 1636, when the Qing first proclaimed their new empire, to the end of the eighteenth century, which is generally considered to mark the beginning of the end for Qing rule. After a century and a half of extraordinary territorial expansion under three emperors, 1799 saw the death of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-95), who three years earlier had abdicated because he did not wish to appear unfilial by surpassing in the length of his reign his illustrious grandfather, the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662-1722). In fact Qianlong, a com-
petitive man, hoped to outshine his grandfather in almost every respect, including conquering more territory, governing more people, collecting more art, building more palaces, writing more poetry, and so on. It was his particular talent and ambition to excel, to take matters a little further, to go the extra mile—and so, although he was not the initiator of the Qing campaign to transform culture in a manner fully consonant with and reiterative of the martial triumphs that led to unprecedented imperial expansion, it is he who is its true protagonist, and hence whose utterances and actions are the most prominent in the pages that follow.

Like it or not, writers are often influenced by their subjects, and I have often had occasion to think of Qianlong’s close attention to issues of translation between languages and cultures in trying to find the words to describe what I refer to as the “militarization of culture.” There is no really appropriate, unencumbered term in either Chinese or English to express this concept. I have used “culture” to refer to the broad cultural environment, in the sense of ways of thinking and patterns of understanding, as well as more specifically to the fine arts, architecture, written texts, religion and ritual, and so on. “Militarization” refers to the injection of military and imperial themes into almost every sphere of cultural life, broadly conceived. It should be clear that my discussion of the Qing “militarization of culture” is not intended to denote an absolute change. Rather, it is intended to express the recasting of culture by introducing a more military spirit, or ambience, than before, without suggesting that as a consequence some or any of the more familiar forms of cultural life fell into abeyance. This shift often occurred as the direct result of deliberate imperial policy, but sometimes it was a more serendipitous consequence of that policy. It arose in the context of emperors’ quest for universality, which at its simplest meant that they tried to be all things to all their diverse subjects and thereby to rule them all.

I have accumulated enormous debts of gratitude in bringing this project to fruition. I am grateful to the American Council of Learned Societies, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the John M. Olin Foundation for funding crucial portions of the research on which this work is based, and to librarians and archivists at the First Historical Archives, Beijing; the National Library, Beijing; the Stone Carvings Museum, Beijing; the Cultural Relics Bureau, Beijing; the Institut de France, Paris; Yale University Library; and at Bobst Library, New York University. For comments on various versions of this work as it developed, I thank participants and audiences from the many different fora in the United States, Europe, and New Zealand to whom I have presented it in different guises; and my colleagues and students, past and present, at New York University.

I acknowledge permission to draw on the following already-published essays of mine, as follows: “Commemorating War in Eighteenth-Century China,” Modern Asian Studies 30.1 (October 1996, Cambridge University Press); “Religion, War, and

I am indebted for advice, support, and assistance in matters small and large to Kristin Bayer, Richard Belsky, Zvi Ben-Dor Benite, Michael Chang, Michael Crook, Nixi Cura, Dai Yingcong, Nicola di Cosmo, Brad Gallant, Isabel Gallant, Kit Gallant, Jonathan Hay, Anne Higonnet, Ji Yaping, Rebecca Karl, Paul Kennedy, Cary Liu, Liu Yuan, Iona Man-cheong, Susan Naquin, Nie Chongzheng, Geoffrey Parker, Peter Perdue, Evelyn Rawski, Moss Roberts, Jonathan Spence, Don Wyatt, Louise Young, Marilyn Young, and Angela Zito. Dungjai Pungauthaikan typeset the text. Special thanks also to Maggie Clinton for crucial help with the manuscript in its final stages, and for preparing the index.

This book is dedicated to my teachers, who at every turn, like Qianlong, have done so much more than was strictly necessary. In particular I should like to mention Michael Loewe and Denis Twitchett, who introduced me to the intricacies of Chinese language and history when I was an undergraduate at Cambridge, and Jonathan Spence and Yu Ying-shih, who when I was in graduate school at Yale showed me, in so many ways, how to pursue my interests and stay on course. I hope that this dedication will compensate in some measure for my inability to convey adequately in mere language my gratitude to them all.
Map 1: The Qing Empire, circa 1820
Military Culture and the Qing Empire

By the middle of the eighteenth century the Qing empire (1636-1912) had reached its zenith. The most extensive empire ever ruled from Beijing, it ranked among the most powerful polities in the world. Its territorial reach encompassed, in addition to China proper and the northeastern homelands of the Manchu ruling house, Tibet, Mongolia (today divided between an independent state and Chinese Inner Mongolia), Taiwan, and the vast tracts of Central Asia that came to be known as Xinjiang. This achievement marked the culmination of a protracted process of strategic alliance and military conquest.

An intense focus on military affairs was one of the Qing state’s most distinctive characteristics. Beyond the actual conduct of war, this focus materialized most notably in a wide-ranging campaign intended to propel military success, and the martial values that underpinned it, onto the centre stage of cultural life, creating a twin basis of military conquest and cultural transformation for the broader Qing imperial project. In invoking “martial values,” emperors had in mind both prowess in such military skills as archery and equestrianism, that they associated with an idealized Manchu identity, and the plain living and frugality that supposedly accompanied them. They contrasted these values specifically with the scholarly, literary emphasis of Chinese culture in general and the extravagant culture of consumption that had come to characterize the late Ming period. In practical terms, the cultural campaign meant that, at the same time as emperors Kangxi (1662-1722), Yongzheng (1723-1735) and even more notably Qianlong (1736-1795) expanded the empire to an unprecedented extent, they assiduously monumentalized both its greatness and the military might upon which it rested. It became a matter of deliberate imperial policy to co-opt and transform political, ideological, ceremonial, intellectual, spiritual, moral, physical, visual, and material culture in such a way as to draw attention to and command respect for military success, martial values, and their most glorious consequence: imperial expansion. The subtle yet comprehensive transformation that this entailed amounted, in effect, to a militarization of culture.
The chief objective of this policy was to forge a new and distinctive cultural environment that itself would generate and eventually emblematize a shared sense of community among the Qing’s diverse imperial subjects. With benefit of hindsight, we can see that in many ways this process played a crucial part in preparing the ground for the development of the modern, militarized, nation-state, notwithstanding the radical disjunctures brought about as a result of foreign imperialism. Thus while the immediate point is that war and military culture came to define the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century empire, the consequences of this development were of considerably longer-term significance.

Qing rulers would not have been surprised to learn of their empire’s enduring influence for, beyond their immediate concern with power an acute consciousness of history underlay their imperial agenda. In large part this consciousness resulted from the fact that—in conformity with the oft-cited principle of achieving multiple goals through a single means (yi ju liang de)—Qing rulers claimed simultaneous descent from two separate sets of traditions, Chinese and Inner Asian. They used this double heritage both to reinforce and to clarify in complex ways the multivalent identity they sought to project of themselves. Thus in one mode they held themselves out as Confucian sage rulers of China whose authority derived from their benevolence, learning, and moral virtue while in another, they drew variably on the traditions of Inner Asia, as represented chiefly by Mongolia and Tibet, to represent themselves as warrior-khans, and, under Buddhist influence, as turners of the wheel of time toward salvation and the closing of the ages.

This multiple identity both established them as successors of, and placed them in competition with, multiple antecedents, thus opening up a whole range of possibilities. Emperors sometimes claimed adherence to precedent even when they embarked in new directions and, depending on the audience, sometimes pointed to more than one precursor in order to legitimize a single course of action. Sometimes, too, they were able to claim in public reliance on one precedent while privately they depended, either instead or in addition, upon another, although such practices were hardly unique to the Qing.

On the one hand, as rulers of China the Qing explicitly aimed to emulate or even surpass the glorious Tang period (618-906), a time of striking cosmopolitanism, cultural efflorescence, and enormous military power when, among other things, the empire centred on Chang’an (modern Xi’an) had controlled some though not all of what became Qing Xinjiang. The Tang, notwithstanding its Turco-Mongol origins, is usually considered one of the greatest native dynasties of Chinese history, so that the Qing could reasonably assume that success in outdoing this historical exemplar would particularly impress their Chinese subjects. In particular the Qianlong emperor liked to compare the achievements of his reign favourably to those of Emperor Taizong.
of the Tang (626-49), whom educated Chinese traditionally regarded as having embodied an ideal combination of civil (wen) and military (wu) virtues.

That model was particularly appealing because while Qing rulers sought to enhance the image they presented to their Chinese subjects by excelling in the latter's classical culture, on the other hand they also repeatedly called on their followers to resist acculturation to the presumed emasculating scholarly ways of the Chinese. This paradox arose precisely because of the claim to multiple inheritances. That is, at the same time as they claimed legitimacy as rulers in the Chinese tradition, the Qing also invoked the authority of the Chingghisid heritage, in other words that deriving from the great Mongol leader, Chingghis Khan (?1162-1227). In varying degrees such an orientation was shared by a number of other polities across Asia, from nearby Zunghar and Mongol competitors to remoter Uzbeks and Mughals, so that political power within an Inner Asian context appeared to require that specific frame of reference. For the Qing, this orientation functioned in a variety of ways. In particular it led them to mobilize Tibetan-Buddhism in the service of empire, in imitation of a formula originating with Chingghis’ grandson Khubilai, and it spurred their promotion of martial virtue, a cornerstone of the overall cultural campaign.

The attachment to martial values derived in no small degree from emperors’ understanding of history. In their view—a view whose overall premise they shared with the rulers of many other empires around the world—it was precisely the dilution of such ideals through acculturation to Chinese ways (wen) that had brought about the demise of their ancestors, the Jurchen Jin. In the twelfth century the Jin had driven the great Song dynasty out of north China, only to be driven out themselves a century later by the Mongols. Given Qing imperial ambitions, this was a particularly poignant model that made Manchu retention of their martial (wu) skills, and the frugal way of life that supposedly accompanied them, all the more essential to imperial power. More recently, Qing rulers considered that the demise of the Ming had resulted from both the laissez-faire decadence of late Ming society and the marked disempowerment of the military in favour of the civil arm. Promoting martial values represented one way to avoid repeating those mistakes.3

**Wen and Wu**

The growing prominence of military affairs in Qing political culture centred on a shift in the relationship between civil and military, culturally codified as wen and wu. Historically, rulers of China had always perceived a need to maintain a balance between civil (wen) and military (wu) virtues and had tended strongly to favour wen (a term that also denoted “civilization” and, from no later than the tenth-to-thirteenth century Song period, “Chineseness”) over wu. As a general rule, for at least
the preceding millennium emperors of China had taken steps, once they had consolidated their position, to dismantle the military forces that had brought them to power, rarely maintaining standing armies for fear of insurrection. In the same vein, a classical education rather than military achievement had traditionally been the normal path to political power. Emperors of the Qing, especially in their Chinese mode, well understood the importance of a civil-military balance, but more often, inclining towards their Inner Asian mode, they preferred to slant it in favour of military power. Ultimately that seemed a more promising way of maintaining the enormous power they had taken so much trouble to accumulate.  

In the long eighteenth century (1683-1820), although the new martial ambience by no means supplanted the vibrant tradition in which “being civilized” (wen) reigned supreme in China, at least for a time wu dislodged wen from its exclusive position at the pinnacle of political prestige, and shared the limelight on a more nearly equal basis. Both rhetorically and actually, this realignment formed part of a broader trend involving a move away from a strictly hierarchical approach to ruling towards one of broad equivalence, for instance among the Manchu princes and among the principal ethnic groups of the empire. In the particular context of wen and wu, that trend was marked by, for instance, the increasing diminution by this time of meaningful distinctions between candidates for the military and civil examinations leading to official appointment. Finally, the shift in the balance between wen and wu also conformed to a conceptual preference for thinking less in terms of mutually exclusive opposites and more in terms of gradations along a continuum, in which—in this particular instance—martial virtue and scholarly attainment worked to mutual advantage. As we shall see, during this period this approach became manifested in a broad range of different contexts.

In the same spirit, the new emphasis on wu did not necessarily entail a complete devaluation of wen values but rather an inclination towards greater levelling of the balance. Like most of their imperial predecessors, the Qing still aimed to keep control over military elements, and they fully appreciated the centrality of civil culture to the long-term pursuit of their imperial goals. Their hope and expectation was that wugong, military achievement, and wende, scholarly or literary virtue, could and would mutually produce and reproduce one another, in a dialectical process of which imperial power would be the ultimate beneficiary.

It was not that, prior to the Qing, Chinese culture had completely lacked a military element. Popular culture abounded with heroes known for their valour, strategic talent, and loyalty. Among the best known were Yue Fei, loyalist general of the Song period, and the heroes of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms, an epic novel written in the Ming on the basis of historical accounts already circulating widely in oral forms. These heroes were, namely, Guan Yu, the physical and moral
giant who was later apotheosized as god of war; Zhang Fei, the fierce fighter; and Zhuge Liang, the wily strategist. Ubiquitous in popular culture too, were martial arts, and tales of knights-errant and of Robin Hood figures who fought the strong to help the weak. These kinds of themes had formed the mainstay of the tales recounted by storytellers to an audience that extended well beyond the highly literate. It was, rather, the case that “high” culture leaned towards classical texts and sophisticated connoisseurship, and generally regarded martial themes as somewhat lacking in refinement.

Acknowledgment of the centrality of a martial ethos to Qing culture is of the utmost significance because it flatly contradicts the long-accepted scholarly wisdom about the allegedly non-military nature of the traditional Chinese state, regardless of the actual identity of its rulers. In this respect, so it was said, the Chinese state supposedly had remained almost unaltered through at least the end of the imperial period. At different times observers have cited this feature both to praise and to denigrate Chinese attitudes to warfare. For instance, for some time the fact that the Chinese used their highly sophisticated knowledge of gunpowder more for entertainment than for aggression was a source of admiration on the part of Westerners. But by the mid nineteenth century, Western commentators began to disdain China for its presumed lack of interest in military affairs, which seemed the only possible explanation for China’s apparent backwardness and general inability to withstand imperialist violence. This changed estimation was a consequence of the fact that by then the overall balance of European opinion had tilted against China, not least because the West had come to define its own superiority increasingly in terms of technological, especially military, advantage. Undoubtedly by then the series of military defeats China had suffered at the hands of foreigners lent at least superficial credence to such a characterization. But it is plainly inaccurate to read it back to the earlier period when, as we shall see, the expansion of the empire and the accompanying militarization of culture completely negate such a perspective, suggesting, that China’s late-nineteenth-century setbacks may ultimately prove to have been more the exception than the rule. This revised understanding of the military character of the high Qing is indivisible from the new scholarly insights into the crucial role played in Qing policy by the Inner Asian factor, and plays a central role in what has become known as the new Qing history.

The New Qing History
Not long ago, scholarly consensus viewed the Manchus, invaders whose language and cultural background were culturally distinct from China’s, as the last in a line of alien rulers whose wholesale adoption of China’s culture and institutions was the leading reason that they had been able to govern its vast territories and popula-
tions for so long. At its simplest, they were seen as having assimilated almost completely by 1800, and then as having lapsed into a long, slow decline. This process finally came to an end when, illogically, an apparently resurgent ethnic self-interest conflicted with the Manchus’ responsibility as rulers of China to save it from Western and Japanese imperialism. In this account, China’s wide-ranging woes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, woes that were perceived to be a consequence of their relative military weakness, were blamed largely on the Manchus. At the same time, however, the supposed general incompetence that eventually led to Manchu, Qing, and imperial downfall was assumed to apply equally to the entire centuries-long span of Qing rule. The assumption of long-standing Qing military paralysis fit neatly into this perspective.

Recently, however, the much greater accessibility of Chinese- and Manchu-language archives and hard-to-find texts has produced enough new evidence concerning the subtleties and savviness of Qing policies, at least down to the turn of the eighteenth century, to enable us to set aside definitively any notion of total assimilation or of a lack of sophistication. Central to this revised understanding is both the new knowledge of the Inner Asian element in Qing policy, and the attendant revelation that at the height of their power the Qing regarded China not so much as the centre of their empire, either geographically or culturally, as only a part—albeit a very important part—of a much wider dominion.9

The revised narrative offered by the new Qing history has not been without its critics. This is hardly surprising when we consider, first, that even such formerly undisputed matters as the dating of the Qing empire from 1644, have now been changed to conform to a perspective less geared to the history of China. In this case the change of date has taken place because 1636 was the year in which the Manchu leader, Hung Taiji (1592-1643), unambiguously proclaimed his intention of building an empire, and gave it the name of “Qing.” As we shall see in Chapter Five, this leader at once began to accentuate his intentions by underpinning ongoing military conquest with the construction of large-scale public works heavily laden with symbolic references that educated contemporaries would have immediately recognized as an open declaration of imperial ambitions. Only in 1644, eight years later, did the Manchus enter Beijing, establish their capital, and launch their conquest of China. In other words, the founding of the Qing empire preceded the occupation of China by almost a decade, and was largely independent of it. This lapse of time indicates clearly that China, while critical to Qing imperial ambitions, was not their sole focus of attention.10

The habitual disparagement of the Qing also derives in no small measure from the influence of early-twentieth-century Chinese historiography which, inspired by nationalism, reacted as strongly against Manchu rule as against encroaching Europeans and other imperialist-minded foreigners. Derivation
from that period of towering intellectual and political authority has made historical revision a hugely sensitive issue.\textsuperscript{11} For one thing, it has proved difficult to move beyond characterizing Qing China as simply a major victim of foreign imperialism. Imperialist practices have been the arch-villain of the orthodox historical narrative in China for so long that to suggest that rulers of China—even the non-Chinese Qing—themselves once perpetrated techniques of domination not unlike those later visited upon China, has been simply unacceptable in Chinese scholarly circles, although a more general loosening of ideological control has begun to extend to historical interpretation as well. For another, many have found it hard to relinquish the notion, like the victim narrative so long-standing as to have gained the stature of unassailability, that Chinese civilization acted as a cultural sponge, absorbing all who ventured within its orbit. If that had been invariably the case, it would be logical to assume that the Manchus, like other comers, experienced complete sinicization, and in that case that their sinicization was the primary reason for their success as rulers of China. But the new Qing history has persuasively demonstrated that the situation was in fact just the opposite, in other words that it was precisely Qing difference that accounted for its success.\textsuperscript{12}

That difference has been explored from a number of different angles. Apart from my own work on military culture, brought together in the essays that follow, these have included in particular the interconnected questions of ethnicity and gender; the relationship of public and private spheres; empire, expansion, and the techniques of colonialism; multiculturalism; religion and ritual; and material culture. We turn now to a brief consideration of some of the most influential works of this body of work, beginning with the new understanding of the Qing construction of ethnicity.

The question of ethnicity has been central in particular to the work of two scholars, Pamela K. Crossley and Mark C. Elliott. Crossley sees the concept of ethnicity as inappropriately applied outside the context of imperial culture. In her view, the early Manchus were less an ethnic group than a series of tribes. Only later did imperial ideology find it necessary to (re)construct ethnic identities so as to maintain Manchu distinctiveness and to deal with the complicated issue of the “Chinese-martial,” Chinese supporters of the Manchus who initially had formed part of the conquest elite but ultimately were, as it were, ethnically downgraded. Elliott, on the other hand, considers that ethnic identity in the Qing period was tied to institutions. Focusing in particular on the banners, the military-administrative pre-conquest structure that became one of the most visible markers of Qing difference, he argues that the imagined or real “Manchu Way,” the old habits of martiality and frugality, did much to hold bannermen together as a cohesive and effectively ethnic group despite growing cultural disparities.
Although, as Elliott notes, efforts to preserve the “Manchu Way” eventually did fail, this book argues that by then its cultural representations were deeply imbricated into the Chinese world. 13

In the context of military culture, issues of ethnicity played out in supple ways under the Qing. In their relentless promotion of martial virtues, Qing rulers sought to encode such attributes as a marker of Manchu identity, real or imagined, and unquestionably they wished to distinguish Manchus and Han in that respect. Yet they did not simply equate Manchus with the military and Chinese with civil affairs. While they were acutely conscious of ethnic issues, they also were well aware that their blanket attribution of great martiality to the Manchus was somewhat wishful and not altogether grounded in reality. Up to a point, it was a more or less conscious expedient devised to consolidate and enhance imperial power. Thus, while it is tempting to characterize the focus on martial values as a bid to effect a transformation to a “more Manchu” way of life, this would be inexact. It was martiality, often claimed as a uniquely Manchu characteristic, rather than ethnic identity as such, that was essential to the imperial cultural project. While the Qing did not wish to encourage their Chinese subjects to become so militarily minded as to rise up against them, they hoped that Chinese as well as Manchus would embrace the essential desirability of the martial virtue upon which their rulers sought to centre the new Qing culture.

Gender as well as ethnicity constituted a major category in the construction of empire. Building on the work of Dorothy Ko concerning the earlier seventeenth century, Susan Mann has argued eloquently and convincingly both that the Qing made a difference in elite women’s lives and that women made a difference to the Qing. Mann proposes, among other things, that elite women’s writings admitted them to the literary, or wen, world of men, and that “in Chinese culture at that time, women’s homely place in elite public discourse was recognized and articulated by leading intellectuals… [who] acknowledged the dependence of public man on cloistered woman by noting that her words, too, could be ‘everyone’s’ (gong)… the historical record of Chinese women—both their placement in it and their consciousness as recorded there—shows a pervasive awareness of the intimate relationship between family life and public politics.” Thus for this minority at least, the inner, domestic sphere they inhabited formed one end of a continuum, at the other end of which was the ‘outer’, political life of their menfolk.

Women played a striking part in the Qing civilizing mission directed towards aboriginal minorities located on the imperial periphery, a role that brings out with especial vividness their potential for contributing to the public sphere of the Qing imperial project despite their cloistered lives. Such women as the wives of provincial governors and other Qing officials, who often accompanied their husbands to remote postings, acted as essential carriers of proper behaviour to
these outlying regions while, correspondingly, the status and actions of ethnically ‘other’ minority women often were regarded as indicators of the completeness or otherwise of Qing colonization efforts. Thus, for example, elite women engaged in compiling an anthology of poetry written by women from across the empire found cause for exultation when they found that a woman from the remote southwestern province of Yunnan had learned to write well enough for her work to be included in their collection. The achievement measured a facet of the imperial project in which women, too, could share.\(^\text{14}\)

Thus not only was gender important to empire and vice versa, but the understanding of gender relations was closely intertwined with notions of what constituted private and public spheres of life. This worked both ways, for while women’s private sphere may sometimes have spilled over into public life, Qing rulers progressively made it harder to draw a distinction between personal and public actions, drawing potential dissenter inexorably into their ideological orbit.

That orbit was distinctively segregated along gendered lines, as we can see from the following illustrations. First, both Manchu men and women were differentiated by certain significant bodily practices. For instance, both Chinese and Manchu males had to wear the Manchu hairstyle of shaved forehead and long braid as a sign of submission. On the other hand, Manchu women were strongly discouraged from binding their feet as most Chinese women did (an order that, at least in the early Qing, had the effect of making bound feet a cultural marker for Chinese women).\(^\text{15}\) Second, there was a distinction in the way in which the issue of chastity was treated among Chinese and Manchu women. For Chinese widows, the state strongly encouraged chastity, even to the point of inspiring suicide. It often erected commemorative arches honouring the most virtuous exemplars, who might thereby bring glory to their deceased husband’s family and native place. Yet at least until the mid-eighteenth century, for Manchu women such practices were strongly discouraged, not least because they risked drawing attention to pre-conquest practices that smacked of barbarity.\(^\text{16}\) Finally, the colonialism that followed conquest routinely involved the feminization of subject peoples. This impulse was vividly symbolized by the exotic myth of Qianlong’s “fragrant concubine,” a woman from Xinjiang who was brought after its 1760 annexation to the imperial harem. Her refusal to submit to the emperor, and ultimate suicide at the insistence of the emperor’s mother (who feared for the emperor’s safety since the concubine defended herself with a dagger) stood unmistakably for Xinjiang’s intractability and its exoticism in the eyes of many Chinese and Manchus. These examples serve among other things to illustrate the extent to which the Qing, in their own way, were strong “orientalists,” not unlike some of their imperial contemporaries.\(^\text{17}\)
A gendered analysis also might at first glance appear relevant to the relationship of *wen* and *wu*, that is, if one views the martial values (**wu**), identified by the Qing as a defining characteristic of Manchu character, as an assertion of masculinity relative to the supposedly effeminate literary ways of their Chinese subjects. Such an attitude seems evident from Qing emperors’ exhortations to Manchus not to soften up by adopting Chinese ways, and to their Chinese subjects to toughen up by becoming more like the supposedly more martial Manchus, however idealized that image may have been. Such a perspective is also readily comprehensible in terms of the theoretical perspective rooted in the western experience, according to which imperialist states tended to disparage by feminizing their colonial possessions. Yet in traditional Chinese theory **wu**, i.e. martiality, the military principle, corresponded to the dark, female, potentially violent side, while **wen**, civilization, corresponded to the bright, masculine, side, in other words just the opposite. Moreover, as the literary scholar Kam Louie has noted,

> **wen-wu** is a continuum along which masculinity can be correlated with class [and this] was never questioned in traditional times. Those with more **wen** belong to a higher class, but having minimum **wu** is better than no masculinity at all. And to be a really powerful man, it is essential to have both **wen** and **wu**. In gender terms, those without **wen** or **wu**, the women, have no political power [until the twentieth century].

In light of these various and considerable ambiguities, it is difficult, despite its undoubted relevance, to make more than the most contingent sense of the application of gender theory to **wen** and **wu**, which thus is not addressed in any depth in this book. We turn now to consider another relationship, namely that between the different ethnic groups of the Qing empire.

The peoples of Xinjiang were numbered among several substantial ethnic groups that made up the expanded empire. One important aspect of “Qing difference” was the configuration of the relationship of these various groups. Such scholars such as Evelyn S. Rawski and James A. Millward have now made it abundantly clear that one can no longer accept unquestioningly the old conceptions of hierarchy and concentricity attributed to “Chinese civilization,” according to which states and peoples in China’s orbit became progressively less civilized the further away from the imperial centre they found themselves. Such an understanding is consonant with the realization that Chinese culture did not necessarily completely absorb the Manchus and their culture. These scholars have shown that, especially in the Qianlong reign (1736-1795), the “five linguistic or
ethnic blocs [Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims] exist[ed] not in starkly hierarchical, but in something more like parallel relationship to each other.” This embrace of heterogeneity, as distinct from the assumption of an ultimately inevitable homogenization, marked another distinguishing feature of Qing rule. It also bears out the recent proposition that Qing rulers’ attitude to foreign relations diverged from the hierarchical model enshrined in Chinese tributary theory, since relations within the empire generally operated as a microcosm of external relations.

Qing multiculturalism manifested itself in a number of different ways, both textual and visual. One such manifestation was in the use of different languages in different circumstances. Under the Qing, the main languages of state were Chinese and Manchu; a reading and speaking knowledge of both was a necessary skill for aspirants to political power, while for communications concerning what we would now call national security, the Manchu language (in Chinese called qingwen [the Qing language]), was preferred. As we shall see in the next chapter, monuments commemorating imperial triumphs and glories most often were inscribed in four languages, normally Manchu, Chinese, Mongol and Tibetan, although in certain circumstances the fourth language might be, for instance, Uighur, the language of some Xinjiang residents, or Arabic, for Muslims located further to the west but still under Qing political control. The texts were not necessarily identical; rather, each was tailored to the audience in whose language it was written.

This multilinguality formed part of the Qing assertion of universal dominion. It was a variant manifestation of the attempt to claim the authority of multiple heritages, yet another expression of which was represented in visual form by the many different guises in which emperors, particularly Qianlong, had their portrait painted—including as scholar, warrior, huntsman, ruler, ritualist, connoisseur, filial son, ancestor, and as bodhisattva or protective deity at the centre of a Tibetan-style thangka.

The imperial relationship with Tibetan-Buddhism was of enormous significance. It had originated in the thirteenth century with Khubilai Khan, first Mongol emperor of Yuan China and grandson of the great Chingghis. Rather than incorporate Tibet into the empire by force, Khubilai had established a relationship with a senior Tibetan prelate, or lama, that had yielded religious autonomy to Tibet while retaining political control. Manchu emperors’ quest to dominate the Mongols, in part by appropriating the heritage of the great Mongol emperors, meant that the Khubilai precedent was vital to their legitimation as rulers in the Inner Asian tradition. For they had to overcome the competing claims of the Mongols and of the Zunghars for control of the hearts and minds of all the Tibetan-Buddhists in the region. From thence sprang Qing efforts to maintain good relations with Tibet and to avoid allowing the politically priceless charisma
of the Dalai Lama to fall into the hands of their imperial competitors. Thus the Qing incorporation of the Mongols, and their extermination of the Zunghars in the mid eighteenth century, not only made possible the annexation of Mongolia and Xinjiang but also reconfirmed their absolute right to patronize Tibetan-Buddhism. It was in that mode that rulers massively sponsored the production of Buddhist art and architecture and promoted images of themselves as Buddhist deities and rulers, an expedient that, like so many others that they brought into play, boasted venerable precedents. Yet despite extensive imperial patronage, the Qing never wholly identified imperial interests with those of Tibetan-Buddhism, and continued to treat the religion with great circumspection, as we shall see in Chapter Three.

Qing emperors were not the first rulers of China since Khubilai to invoke the lama-patron relationship—at least one emperor of the preceding Ming dynasty had tried it—but they raised it to new levels of sophistication. The same was true of their use of ritual, the military aspects of which are discussed in Chapter Four. Ritual provided yet another forum for combining Inner Asian and Chinese traditions so as simultaneously to appeal to both constituencies or, put differently, for blurring the boundaries between the sedentary agricultural world of China proper and the pastoral nomadic world beyond, where once a strict line had been drawn. Scholars of the new Qing history have recently devoted a fair amount of attention to the many different branches of Qing ritual, including guest ritual, pilgrimage and other ritual pertaining to the Inner Asian lords; grand sacrifice, and seasonal rituals. This work has illuminated among other things the central importance of ritual to Qing rule and the effectiveness of ritual performance for staging Qing imperial power for the edification of observers and participants alike.

Not only performance but also visual culture more generally was a key instrument of the Qing imperial project. The portraits of emperors in multiple identities were one facet of this. Another was the utilization of natural and purpose-built landscape as a medium of power. The summer palace complex at Chengde represented an important illustration of this practice. As Philippe Foret points out, it was integral to the Qing ‘great enterprise.’ The Chengde ‘Mountain Village for Avoiding the Summer Heat’ (Bishu Shanzhuang), located well north of Beijing just where China, Mongolia and Manchuria come together, was built by the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors between 1703 and 1760. It recreated, with subtle modifications intended to express the absolute nature of Qing power, many of the most famous structures and landscapes of the empire. In such ways Chengde not only expressed Qing sovereignty but also drew onto itself some of the often sacred connotations of the models it mimicked. Joining the several authors who regard the Qing as in many ways an early modern state, Foret considers
that the use at Chengde of a metaphorical landscape to support cultural domination—a method reinforced by the many representations of Chengde in court paintings—in many ways shows startling parallels with early modern European practices.23

The suggestion, that some of the practices of Qing China resembled those of early modern Europe, is reinforced in a different context by Laura Hostetler, in her analysis of the representation of newly fixed land frontiers and of conquered territory in maps—some, incidentally, conducted by Jesuit missionaries in the service of the Qing—and the production of detailed ethnographic texts and albums depicting the conquered peoples. Drawing a parallel with European practices, Hostetler argues that it is not so much the geographic location where practices occur as the moment that it takes place; for her, contemporaneity can be tantamount to comparability. As explained below, the forms of representation discussed by Hostetler formed part of the militarization of culture addressed in this book.24

Similar practices feature in Peter C. Perdue’s account of the Qing wars for Xinjiang, informed as it is by many of the principal findings of the new Qing history. Perdue’s explication of emperors’ rather successful quest to control the historiographical record corresponds closely to some of the themes of the propaganda and marketing of empire set out in the pages that follow. In short, the combination of the wars and the propaganda that accompanied them together constituted the mainstay of the vast endeavour that was the Qing imperial project.25

**The Militarization of Culture**

The central argument of this book is that deliberate cultural transformation was as important as military conquest in the consolidation of the Qing empire. The Qing imperial project developed in two main ways, each reinforcing the other. The first was the expansion of the empire by military means. The second was the substantiation of conquest by the introduction of a radically new element into the broad field of culture, although Qing rulers were both too subtle and too sophisticated to try to replace the old aesthetic altogether, even had that been possible. The underlying purpose of the cultural portion of the campaign was to strengthen the empire by uniting its diverse peoples through the creation of a common basis, one that was founded on loyal pride in imperial achievement and in which all could participate.

The imperial cultural project functioned in many different ways, some more obvious, and more deliberate, than others. In the eighteenth century the unprecedented expansion of the empire obviously was tightly linked to military conquest, which itself was as obviously the consequence of the prowess of Qing armies. Warfare, expansion, and military prowess, then, became defining features
of the age and, at the same time, of the three great emperors who directed the imperial project over almost a century and a half. Those emperors possessed such extraordinary stature and such forceful personalities that their goals, concerns and priorities carried an enormous weight of influence. Put differently, in the circles revolving round the emperor, war, martial virtue, and the glorification of empire were topics of the utmost prominence. Not everyone, of course, moved in those exalted circles, but any aspirant to political power—and such an aspiration was very deeply embedded in elite culture—found their magnetic attraction nearly irresistible. Such was the general context in which culture—military culture—became a central weapon in the imperial arsenal.

The militarization of culture took many forms. The first was the emergence of warfare, and of the military power from which it was inseparable, as distinct cultural categories. This was perhaps the most fundamental transformation of all. The second involved wide-ranging changes wrought in the culture and style of government, which was increasingly run like a military operation by men whose chief claim to fame was their success in war, in a striking contrast to the long-standing predominance in government of those elected on the basis of competitive examinations on the literary canon. At the same time, the introduction of a hereditary military-administrative system, the banners, profoundly changed the social structure of the empire during this period because it effectively set in place an alternative qualification for elite status. Both these shifts were enormously influential because they gave a more military cast to, and hence affected the context of aspiration to both political power and the elevated social status that went with it.

Third, the definition of what counted as essentially military in nature changed, while whatever did come under that rubric was elevated to a new importance. Thus artists and writers who worked in the service of empire—producing illustrations of military triumphs or helping to compile campaign histories—were seen as footsoldiers in the overall imperial project whose importance paralleled that of the infantrymen in the field. In similar vein, the emperor explicitly sought to heighten the significance of certain events by treating them as though they constituted or resulted from a military triumph. Such was the case with the acclaimed “return to allegiance” of an ethnic group known as the Torghuts or Kalmyks, in 1771-72. This peaceful migration was celebrated as though their “return” either followed military victory or itself amounted to one, when in fact no war was fought over the Torghuts, who had left Russian territory for the protection of the Qing empire mainly as the lesser of two evils.  

These and other imperial triumphs were marked by the construction of new temples and palaces, recorded in imperial pronouncements etched in stone on monuments erected in the capital and elsewhere around the empire, and
incorporated into the very considerable production of words and images created under imperial sponsorship. Enshrinining the empire and its military power in these forms constituted the last important characteristic of the militarization of culture, which involved the pervasive injection of military themes and imperial referents into painting; the decorative arts; architecture; landscape and its representations; religion; ritual life; historiography; and both official and private writings more generally.

For it was not only in imperially-sponsored production that the shift in emphasis began to occur. Following the mid-eighteenth-century annexation of Xinjiang, for example, that region became the chief destination for the banishment of disgraced government officials. A number of well-known scholars were sent there to serve for a fixed term. In keeping with the principles of the fashionable evidential research movement, which promoted above all the gathering of factual information, several of these individuals traveled about the region as far as was permitted and took the opportunity to write about its topography, its inhabitants, its flora and fauna, its customs, its historical relics, and its possibilities, for the edification of their friends and colleagues at home, attracting attention after their return for their familiarity with this exotic region. Most of these writings do not focus on military or imperial matters, but the mere fact that Xinjiang had become a new and somewhat prestigious topic of study illustrates one important way in which imperial expansion found its way into literary work. For *ipso facto* such writings imply assimilation of the idea that Xinjiang’s new status as Qing territory was a consequence of military power. They also suggest the extent to which under Qing universalism it became increasingly difficult for public figures such as these exiled scholars to distinguish their public and private personas.

The following chapters take up the various interconnected manifestations of the Qing military culture campaign referred to above. They are organized thematically rather than chronologically, and consist of a series of essays that cast light on Qing military culture from a variety of perspectives. They may be considered as a set of variations on a core theme, sequentially orchestrated in several different modes or keys.

Chapter Two discusses the multi-layered commemoration of war that marked the conclusion of what the Qianlong emperor later came to call his “Complete Victories,” focusing mainly on monuments and their inscriptions, the events they recorded and the paintings and texts in which they themselves were reproduced. These commemorations took on a life of their own, themselves becoming integral parts of the events they celebrated. Chapter Three focuses on a particular war, the Second Jinchuan War of 1771-1776, fought in the borderlands of western Sichuan near Tibet with the dual purpose of pacifying a region notorious for minority unrest and establishing Qing control of religious activity and clergy in the area. It
addresses in particular the interrelationship between religion, war, and empire-building in the eighteenth century, within a context in which the state did not normally favour one religion over another and in which historically some of the most successful uprisings had originated with religious sects.

Chapter Four takes up in more detail a topic briefly addressed in Chapter Two, namely military ritual. It describes and analyses the performance and broadcasting of a number of Qing military rituals in which the emperor played a pivotal role, ranging from peacetime troop reviews to triumphal celebrations of major victories. Military ritual, staged in performance in accordance with textual prescription and description, was well suited to the militarization of culture because it both constituted the ideal site for the interplay of wen (ritual) and wu (warfare)—civil and military—and offered the perfect opportunity for seamlessly blending Chinese and Inner Asian tradition in the service of the imperial project.

Chapter Five focuses on the transformation, in the course of the imperial cultural project, of both ideological and material space. It discusses in particular changes in political culture, in which as noted above military success came to play a much more prominent role than hitherto, and transformations in the physical forms and meanings of the landscape, both natural and man-made.

Scholars of Chinese history have often commented on the irony, that the nationalists who overthrew the Qing went on to create a modern state whose expansive territorial claims largely resembled those of the empire they so reviled. They have been less ready to grasp the ways in which the cultural transformation that accompanied imperial territorial expansion bequeathed a less tangible legacy to the twentieth century and beyond. That legacy was literally part of the territory bequeathed by the Qing to their republican successors in the twentieth century, and was quite distinct from the static and traditionalistic “Chinese past” that nationalists imagined so as to reject it as unsuited to the modern world. It would form as important a component of China’s evolving modernity as the foreign imperialism usually thought to be primarily if not solely responsible for that transformation. Thus a brief concluding chapter notes some of the long-term relationships between the eighteenth-century Qing empire and the twentieth-century Chinese republic.

Qing rulers and their advisers did not necessarily embark on their cultural campaign with a comprehensive or mature image in their minds of what they were trying to achieve. They experimented incessantly with thinking about imperial power and with creating the appropriate cultural environment to support it, often improvising because matters did not necessarily turn out as they wished or intended. They constantly rearticulated and redesigned what they were doing as they went along, and often retroactively assigned new meanings to past events so as to create a sense of coherence and deliberation that may never really
have existed. Such, for example, was part of the Qianlong emperor’s goal in identifying, late in his reign, his “ten complete victories,” as we shall see in the next chapter. Without doubt the “project” involved considerable serendipity and the seizing of opportunity as well as steady deliberation and successful planning. With this in mind, we turn now to a sketch of the broad chronological framework within which the militarization of culture took place, although Qing emperors themselves may not have understood what they were doing in so continuous or well demarcated a way.

The Phases of the Qing Imperial Project

With benefit of hindsight it is possible to divide the active implementation of the Qing imperial project into three escalating phases. The first phase ran from 1636, the year the Manchus first proclaimed their Qing empire, to 1681, the year when they finally suppressed the eight-year Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (sanfan). The second phase ran from 1681 to 1760, the year in which Qing armies exterminated the Zunghars and incorporated the vast area of Central Asia known as Xinjiang into their empire. In the last decade of the second phase there began a period of transition from the expansion to the consolidation of the empire. The onset of that transition can be dated to 1749, when at least in retrospect we can see that the Qianlong emperor began to promote much more systematically than before the militarization of those areas of cultural life in which the state was directly concerned. The third phase ran from 1760 to 1799, the year in which the Qianlong emperor passed away. After that time the escalating struggle against internal uprisings, dramatic economic downturn, and the western imperialism that resumed in earnest after the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, combined forces to put an end to the extraordinary imperial dynamism of the high Qing era, even though the empire itself lasted for another century.

The First Phase, 1636-1681

1636 marks the onset of the first phase of the Qing imperial project in terms of both military expansion and cultural reinforcement, although Nurhaci (1559-1626), the man who would later be hailed as founding dynast, had already been dead for ten years. Nor would the Qing enter Beijing and claim control over China itself for another ten years. But 1636 was the year in which Nurhaci’s son Hung Taiji proclaimed a new Qing dynasty and openly launched the campaign to bring China into the empire. During this first phase, the creation of a substantive, expansive Qing empire was still more wishful than probable, and the strong emphasis placed on military achievement was as much the logical consequence of the raw fact of conquest as it was part of a self-conscious project linking culture, empire, and martial prowess.
Already during this early phase of empire-building emperors frequently reiterated the critical importance of martial valor to imperial success, not least because of the power of the Jin and Ming precedents, mentioned above. Thus at the very outset of the empire, Hung Taiji expressed what was to become a mantra of his imperial successors: “What I fear is this: that the children and grandchildren of later generations will abandon the Old [Manchu] Way, neglect shooting and riding, and enter into the Chinese Way.” This declaration, which much later Qianlong ordered engraved onto stelae and displayed wherever bannermen underwent military training, set the tone for much of what followed.  

Early Qing rulers also had clearly already grasped the importance of controlling Tibet and its symbolism, as we can see from the inclusion of deities important to Tibetan-Buddhism in the temples and other construction projects undertaken at the pre-conquest capital of Shenyang, and in the invitation extended by the first ruler of Qing China, the Shunzhi Emperor (1644-1661) to the Dalai Lama. That dignitary’s visit to China in 1652 established good relations between the Manchu rulers of China and the Tibetans, although it involved enormously complicated diplomatic manoeuvring in order to satisfy the protocol concerning the respective status of emperor and cleric. 

The superimposition of a new, hereditary elite, the banners, onto Chinese society was one of the most important acts marking the first phase of the Qing imperial project. A pre-conquest military-administrative formation, the banner structure called for eight separate organizations each for Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese-martial” (hanjun)—the latter being originally northern Chinese who had joined the Manchu cause before the Ming fall. It thus delineated new quasi-ethnic distinctions, and created a new elite parallel to but distinct from Chinese whose claim to elevated social status rested on their superior education and literary accomplishments, not on their martial valor. 

Banner distinctiveness also changed the physical landscape through the installation of garrisons that often were located in the heart of existing cities, dislodging Chinese residents to make room for them. Known as the “Manchu cities” (mancheng), these compounds were set aside for the exclusive use of banner troops and their families and households. As the garrison cities became progressively incorporated into the backdrop of daily life over time, they became, literally, “part of the landscape;” as a daily reminder of the Qing’s original status as occupying conquerors, and by their references to military organization, they effectively militarized the everyday physical environment. Thus by the end of the first phase the martial ethos had begun both conceptually and visually to infiltrate the broader cultural arena although no definite programme to transform culture appears yet to have taken shape.
The Second Phase, 1681-1760

During the second phase of the Qing imperial project, wars of imperial expansion became a defining characteristic of Qing rule. Qing victory over the Three Feudatories in 1681 concluded that early period in which their overthrow had still remained an open possibility. Two years later they pacified Taiwan, a last bastion of resistance, and turned their attention to the Northwest. In that region, from the 1680s to 1760, through the reigns of three emperors, the Qing pursued a series of campaigns, first against Russia and then in Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), where the imperial ambitions of the Zunghars threatened their own. During the same period a combination of strategic alliances and armed interventions secured Qing domination of first Mongolia and then Tibet. Eventually the Qing annexed Xinjiang and eliminated the Zunghars for good. This achievement marked the conclusion of the expansionist phase of the Qing empire.

During this period emperors often reiterated Hung Taiji’s classic call for the maintenance of Manchu identity, with the martial virtues that supposedly embodied, and more generally for military preparedness. Both Kangxi and Qianlong, with a nod to the classic military text, *Sima Fa* (The Marshal’s Art of War) explicitly regarded this as the most effective means of maintaining peace in the empire, and made clear that it “could not be laid aside even for one day.”

Qianlong, too, in his very first year as emperor succinctly reiterated what his grandfather Kangxi had often repeated:

> Since ancient times, the way of governing the country has been to manage civil affairs while simultaneously exerting oneself in military affairs. Indeed, soldiers may not be mobilized for one hundred years, but they may not be left unprepared for one day. Although the state has been at peace for a long time, military preparedness should remain a top priority."

The expression of such sentiments may have functioned as a way to recast the origins of a cultural campaign that took coherent form only later.

During this period a whole range of developments took place in political life, in social structure, in ritual activity and in public spectacle, all of which provided cultural support for military expansion. Amongst the most spectacular was the institution of imperial hunts undertaken annually to serve as both military training exercises and full-scale peacetime display of Qing military power. Other important changes from this period took place in the structure and culture of government, which saw increased access to political power as a consequence of successful military service (in the field or on the staff) and a
consequent militarization of the style of government; and in society itself. All these developments are addressed in Chapters Four and Five.

**The Transition Years, 1749-1760**

The 1750s marked a period of transition from the second to the third phase of the Qing imperial project, and from its expansionist to its consolidation phase. In that decade, not only did it gradually become clear that the annexation of Xinjiang would eventually come to fruition, but also the comprehensiveness of Qianlong’s pursuit of military culture first became manifest. In the 1740s the First Jinchuan War, fought in the mountainous borderlands between western Sichuan province and Tibet, had proved more intractable than anticipated; victory was achieved only after the dismissal and dramatic execution of both generals following a trial over which the emperor himself presided. Feeling perhaps that imperial honour had been at stake, at war’s end the emperor launched the first of a series of monumental and historiographical commemorations of Qing wars. Later he would retroactively elevate the first Jinchuan war to first in the series of his “Ten Complete Military Victories” (shì quán wǔ gōng), discussed in the next chapter. The same year saw the formal creation of the Office of Military Archives (fānglìuguān) for the recording and narration in approved form of all the Qing imperial wars, in other words to “spin” the historiographical record, and the establishment of new sets of regulations that institutionalized the performance of various military rituals. 1749 appears, in other words, to have marked the moment when the embrace of military power and a concerted campaign to underpin it in cultural terms emerged into the open for the first time.

During the 1750s, by now espousing war as a defining feature of Qing rule, the emperor began to devote much greater attention to the militarization of culture, in such forms as the erection of numerous commemorative temples and monuments, the institutionalization of military rituals, and the dissemination of innumerable textual references to military success, including in maps of newly conquered regions. The attention Qianlong devoted to accumulating and commemorating military victories may be seen as a variant manifestation of his well-known mania for collecting, which among other things exemplified the propensity of Qing rulers for co-opting cultural practices common among their subjects. In this instance military victories became the object of his passion. In this context it is worth revisiting Qianlong’s famous dictum, made in an edict to the British ambassador Macartney in 1793, that “We possess all things.” The statement has generally been regarded as an expression of undiluted arrogance and superiority, but it is better understood not as descriptive of an attitude but as a prescriptive claim encapsulating a very real desire for total imperial control reaching, simply, everywhere. 33
The escalation of the various fronts of the cultural campaign from the late 1740s on resulted in part from accumulated momentum, and in part from the almost obsessive attention of the Qianlong emperor to matters of war, empire, and history. Qianlong has often been denigrated as more concerned with appearance than substance, but the reality was that his personality, his wishes, and his will were crucial to the conceptualization and realization of empire. Although he was not the original initiator of the project to militarize culture, in the end he was the central actor in its realization.

Qianlong even more than his predecessors was powerfully motivated by a strong concern for histories both past and future. He both cultivated the art of elaborating what came before—seizing and moulding ancient Chinese and Mongol precedents as well as those of such more immediate ancestors as his grandfather Kangxi and great-great-grandfather Hung Taiji to suit his own purposes—and left the empire in every sense very different from what it had once been.

Closely related to Qianlong’s sense of history was a second factor: his commitment to Tibetan-Buddhism. This commitment involved both personal faith and his perception of its traditions of universal rulership as an indispensable instrument of imperial expansion. As ruler of China, however, Qianlong simultaneously claimed inheritance of the kingly way of the Zhou rulers of Chinese antiquity, whose legitimacy rested primarily on their moral virtue. Qing emperors’ goal of embodying multiple traditions in a single ruler has already been referred to. That objective became more urgent in proportion to imperial expansion, so we should not be surprised to learn that Qianlong’s attention to all these matters was greater and notably more systematic than that of his predecessors.

The Third Phase, 1760-1799

Qianlong’s promotion of martial values and celebration of war, already advancing to new heights in the transitional phase of the 1750s, came to full fruition in the third phase of the imperial project. In retrospect we can see that his identification of his military triumphs as one of the central accomplishments of his reign was key to this process. It was implicit throughout the third phase even though the emperor articulated it as a coherent project only as he reviewed his achievements towards the end of his life, in 1792. In that year he styled himself “Old Man of the Ten Complete Victories” (shiquan laoren), to underscore the huge importance he ascribed to his successes in warfare. The ten complete victories were all fought on the frontiers of the empire, and included three wars of conquest in Xinjiang, two fought on the Sichuan-Tibetan borderlands to suppress rebellious Jinchuan minorities; two wars against the Gurkhas in Nepal, and wars in Burma, Vietnam, and Taiwan. This list of ten by no means included all the campaigns of his long
reign.\textsuperscript{35} Thus the period sometimes referred to as “Pax Sinica,” and which might more accurately be called “Pax Manjurica,” not only saw almost constant warfare, but also that warfare was extensively commemorated in art and literature, in monuments and public buildings, in ritual celebration and in rewards, to the point that praise for the military accomplishments of the age became commonplace across the spectrum of cultural production in the last part of the eighteenth century.

Directly or indirectly, these paeans reached a wide audience. For instance, the fact that military motifs were increasingly displayed on porcelains made in the imperial kilns at Jingdezhen may, at the same time as it reflected the promotion of martial virtues, indicate those ideals’ marketability among Chinese and other subjects of the empire.\textsuperscript{36}

To what extent did the militarization of culture affect ordinary people, as distinct from those within the various ranks of the elite? Obviously commoners were unlikely to have seen or appreciated artwork and texts relating to warfare and empire, at least not in the same way as members of the educated elite. Except in the case of palace servants and perhaps their families, they were unlikely to have access to the palaces or other public buildings so central to the imperial project. Yet undoubtedly many were involved in such vital practical work as the manual labour of monument construction, the production and care of textiles, care of horses and other animals, production and maintenance of weaponry, the production of ritual foodstuffs and provisions for the armies, and so on. Ordinary people, too, would have seen and heard the huge, elaborate, and sometimes noisy processions to the sites of such public rituals as seeing off the army, welcoming it back, celebrating victory, and so on. Moreover the great armies that marched across the empire to war and the huge numbers involved in the annual autumn hunts and imperial tours were hardly likely to have passed unnoticed by the general populace through whose lands they passed, and whose food supplies were often severely depleted by military procurement. We cannot ascertain how the display of martiality that the emperors tirelessly promoted changed the way in which the general populace perceived imperial power and its cultural manifestations, but the militaristic emphasis all too evident through the Qianlong era needs to be taken into account as we consider phenomena such as the better understood militarization of local society during the 19th century.

That emphasis was too pervasive to have been invisible, or inaudible within a society where word of mouth typically traveled fast, as in other premodern settings. Thus while the cultural campaign’s immediate audience may have been the relatively narrow circles of the elite who circulated around the imperial centre, its likely audience was as wide-ranging, therefore, as was its probable impact.
Commemorating War

Reviewing his long reign in 1792, the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) hailed his military triumphs as one of its central accomplishments. To underscore the importance he ascribed to these successes, he began to style himself “Old Man of the Ten Complete Victories” (shi quan lao ren), after an essay in which he boldly declared he had surpassed, in “Ten Complete Military Victories” (shi quan wu gong), the far-reaching westward expansions of the great Han (206 BCE-220 CE) and Tang (618-907) empires. Such an assertion, together with the programme of commemoration discussed below, served to justify the immense expense incurred by frequent long-distance campaigning and to elevate all these wars to an unimpeachable level of splendour even though some were distinctly less glorious than others; and to align the Manchu Qing dynasty (1636-1912) with two of the greatest native dynasties of Chinese history and the Qianlong emperor personally with some of the great figures of the past.

Qianlong’s ten victories included the wars of conquest in Xinjiang—the Zunghar, Yili and Muslim campaigns of 1755-1759; two wars to suppress rebellious minorities in the borderlands of Sichuan province and Tibet—the Jinchuan wars of 1747-49 and 1771-76; wars in Burma (1766-70), Vietnam (1788-89), and Taiwan (1787-88); and two wars against the Gurkhas in Tibet and Nepal (1790-92). During Qianlong’s reign Qing armies also three times defeated insurgent Muslims, first at Wushi in Xinjiang in 1765 and then in Gansu province in 1781 and 1784; they crushed millenarian rebels in Shandong province in 1774; and they quelled unruly Miao minorities in Yunnan and Hunan in the 1790s, but the emperor dismissed these domestic uprisings as unworthy of inclusion in his catalogue of ten. Thus the eighteenth century saw almost continuous military activity, albeit mostly restricted to limited areas within China proper or the vitally important imperial periphery.¹

A sequence of multi-layered commemorations marked the conclusion of these wars. These emanated in large measure directly from that most authoritative source, the Qianlong emperor himself. A notoriously prolific writer and poet whose purported personal literary oeuvre amounted to tens of thousands of poems and
essays, Qianlong lent his authorship to some fifteen hundred poems and essays that specifically concerned the major wars of his reign. Authentic or not, the presentation of such texts as the emperor’s own work, published most often in his own instantly identifiable calligraphy, gave his extraordinary prestige to these particular portrayals of the campaigns and made it absolutely clear that, whatever the reality, this was the way in which the wars were to be remembered. To emphasize this even further, the emperor periodically observed that he intended the memorial texts he composed should “instruct and edify later generations into the distant future” (chuishi jiuyuan). These commemorative writings were engraved on huge monuments installed in Beijing and elsewhere, incorporated in paintings, hung as calligraphic scrolls that adorned halls and pavilions within the imperial palace complex, and reproduced in many of the huge imperially sponsored compilations of the time, in a comprehensive effort at mass reproduction that was almost startlingly modern in its conception. Ritual celebrations of victory attended by multitudes of civil and military officials as well as by visiting dignitaries also became an integral component of imperial power. Court painters recorded these events in careful detail, producing a whole genre of documentary painting featuring a series of sets of war illustrations (zhantu) and several groups of portraits of meritorious officials (gongchen xiang) involved in the different campaigns. Together with such trophies as the weapons and personal belongings of defeated rebels, these paintings were displayed in specially designated pavilions, the Zi Guang Ge (Pavilion of Purple Light) and the Wucheng Dian (Hall of Military Achievements), that were located in the heart of Beijing. Additional versions of the paintings also were kept in the imperial palaces for the daily enjoyment of the emperor and his court. Thousands of copper engravings of the war illustrations graced public buildings and were presented to individuals privileged to receive imperial largesse. In short, the official commemoration of war in eighteenth-century China became a major social, cultural and political enterprise, one that was conducted under the auspices and often the personal supervision of the emperor himself.

This chapter describes the different ways in which war was officially commemorated in the Qianlong period, focusing mainly on stelae and their inscriptions, military ritual, and paintings, all of which were closely interwoven. It considers the objectives underlying the production and dissemination of these monuments and records and the extent to which their purposes, articulated or otherwise, were achieved. This essay takes into account a curious phenomenon noted some years ago by Harold Kahn, that is, that in China as at other times and in other places the various memorials and their offshoots took on a life of their own; the accomplishments, “as ritually celebrated and formally recorded, themselves became the triumphs, transcending mere event and historicity.” It focuses on the Qianlong reign because of that emperor’s own particular interest in war and its commemora-
Commemorating War

tion. He displayed this near-obsession with warfare and its trappings and uses, for example, by taking a close personal interest in the direction of campaigns. He left instructions to awaken him immediately at any time upon receipt of dispatches, and frequently referred to extended periods of virtually sleepless nights as he waited anxiously for news from the front. Similarly, he insisted on scrutinizing draft versions of all textual and visual representations of his wars before these circulated among any kind of public audience. In 1760, for example, after reviewing a poem celebrating the end of the Xinjiang wars, Ping Xiyu Shi (Poem on the Pacification of Xinjiang) that had been composed by the favoured scholar Shen Deqian, Qianlong complained that several points were quite inaccurate. He specified very precisely all the changes that he wished made. On another occasion Qianlong sent instructions to Sichuan governor-general Wenshou and provincial commander-in-chief Mingliang, to select the precise spot for a monument and to report on the size of the stone slabs to be used, so as to facilitate his composition of the inscriptions. Thus we can see that he paid extremely close attention to every detail involved in the production of a war memorial.

Closely intertwined with the emperor’s passion for warfare was his preoccupation with bolstering and even reinventing the indigenous culture of the ruling Manchus, in large measure to counterbalance the notorious potency of Chinese civilization. Since martial prowess supposedly was a defining characteristic of Manchu identity, wars provided the context in which that identity could be constantly recreated and articulated. The military triumphs of the Qing and the commemoration of war were absolutely central to this cultural project. Thus in the mid-eighteenth century the production of war memorials and military paintings significantly intensified. We can date this escalation to the 1750s, when Qing armies brought to a triumphant conclusion a long series of campaigns initiated by Qianlong’s illustrious grandfather, the Kangxi emperor (1662-1722). At the end of that decade, the Qing completed their annexation of Xinjiang. That great triumph massively expanded the territorial extent of the empire and dispelled forever the nomadic threat to China’s Central Asian borders, as well as fulfilling the desire of Qianlong, at once filial and competitive, to emulate Kangxi. It also coincided with the moment at which Manchu acculturation was beginning to become too evident to disregard.

As we shall see, the glorification of the conquest was intended to achieve several purposes. At its most straightforward, it demonstrated Qing power and thereby heightened anew the Manchus’ legitimacy as rulers of China, an issue on which the Qing at its mid-eighteenth-century zenith remained keenly sensitive even as they began to transcend it. This sensitivity related for the most part to two different phenomena. First, Qing monarchs suffered from a tricky ambiguity. Ultimately dependent on military power as the foundation of their rule in China, they non-
theless cultivated civilian accomplishments—Qianlong’s mass production of poetry exemplified this tendency—as part of their bid to present themselves as thorough-going Confucians whose authority stemmed primarily from their moral virtue, their scholarly attainments, and their benevolence as rulers. Second, the sensitivity indirectly concerned the real dearth in Manchu culture of any artistic and literary tradition comparable to that of their Chinese subjects, whose attitude to other civilizations bore some analogy to the orientalist power relationship whose identification in western cultures is most closely associated with Edward Said. To some extent, then, the celebration of victories and the commemoration of wars arose out of a sense of cultural rivalry; it was the imperial purpose to demonstrate that martial prowess was a mark of superior civilization, not merely an attribute of bandits, and thus that the exaltation of warfare properly belonged at the centre of the cultural activity of the time.

However, there were still further complexities to all the glorification. The emperor undoubtedly wished to exercise control over the way in which his wars were remembered—to ‘put an accurate spin’ on them and thereby to manipulate the judgment of history. And undoubtedly he hoped to fend off what he clearly perceived as a profound threat to Manchu identity after a century of assimilation. But at the same time he wished to stiffen the sinews of Chinese culture, because he considered its great emphasis on civilian culture inadequate for so extensive and powerful an empire as the one over which he ruled. This was in effect the very opposite of the much-vaunted sinicization of the Manchus: it constituted an attempt to integrate Chinese civilization with the Central Asian khanates that Qianlong also sought to represent, by recasting it in a manner that played up its wu (martial), rather than its wen (scholarly or civil), elements. His ultimate goal, as we shall see, was to draw together his diverse subjects under the overarching umbrella of a uniquely Qing form of “national” ideology. Wars of imperial expansion and the transformation of culture played into all these goals even as they acted to reinforce one another.

**Stelae Inscriptions**

During Qianlong’s reign, war memorials in the form of engraved stelae sprang up all over the empire, especially in the vicinity of the main Qing capitals in Beijing and Chengde and at important battlefields and other centres of military success. The production of such monuments fell firmly within the indigenous tradition, for the Chinese, well known as the inventors of paper, were also past masters at creating more permanent written records in the form of stone engravings. Long known as an art form, such stelae inscriptions had also been a common form of private and public memorial in China since at least the earliest days of the empire. The subject-matter of their inscriptions—here we do not even include figurative ones,
Figure I: Fu Heng’s Tomb (front)

Photo by Author
Figure II: Fu Heng’s Tomb (back)

*Photo by Author*
which were not uncommon—covered an enormous range of topics, including not only the veneration of imperial power and establishment of its territorial extent but also posthumous praise for virtuous women; the construction or repair of an important public building; the dispatch of a fleet; the establishment of a religion; the record of an episode of local history, and so on. A famous and elaborate stone-engraved record was a twelfth-century scaled map of the entire Chinese empire at the time, including major rivers. What was notable about the eighteenth-century production of war memorials was the sheer quantity—they numbered at least in the hundreds—and the empire-wide distribution. In both cases the scale may well have been unprecedented.¹²

Memorial stele often were very large and the effort involved in creating them was colossal. They usually were made up of three originally rectangular pieces; the main body, which rested on the second part, a base set on the ground, and was surmounted by a third stone slab. All three parts, especially the base and the top, might be ornately carved. Apart from the actual composition of the text, in the case of Qing war memorials often done at least putatively by Qianlong himself, a broad range of artisans and specialists was involved in creating every monument, all of whom must have been aware, to a greater or lesser extent, of the larger import of the task in which they were engaged. There was a calligrapher for both the main text and the heading able to write in different scripts, including approximating that of the emperor himself; a stone carver; a geomancer who designated the most auspicious day for actually erecting the monument, and probably the precise location; and workers involved in the physical setting up of the stone, itself no mean feat. In addition, someone had to take responsibility for coordinating all these endeavours. See Figures I and II.¹³

It is hardly surprising that problems sometimes beset the production and erection even of imperial war memorials. In 1761, for instance, the future war hero Agui, then serving as military lieutenant-governor (dutong) at Yüli, the newly established seat of government in Xinjiang, reported that some of these recently erected monuments had already toppled over. Apparently, in more than one instance, not only had the base been too small to support the main body and head piece, but also the latter, instead of consisting of a single block of stone, had been made of separate slabs that had now sundered into several pieces. Qianlong’s response expressed his outrage at this unfortunate turn of events. Noting that he had ordered the stone workers and engravers for the monuments in question expressly selected in China proper and brought out to Xinjiang to work on the project, he ordered Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general Yang Yingju (the highest civilian official in the region) at once to make a detailed investigation. Who had done the work? Who paid them? Who supervised them? How many people had been involved? Heads would clearly roll. Not only did this disaster, coming only a year or two after the conclusion of
the Qing’s most glorious military triumph to date, speak ill of Qing workmanship. It was also a humiliatingly brief life-span for a monument intended to extol Qing imperial might in perpetuity, and harbored in addition the highly undesirable potential of being interpreted as an inauspicious symbol or harbinger of collapse to come. Calamities such as this only rarely came to light. We cannot know whether they were in fact quite common, nor whether perhaps in some cases they may have been the result of sabotage in the form of deliberately poor workmanship or desecration by the disaffected supposed to be edified by the sentiments broadcast. It is quite possible that the very considerable expense undoubtedly involved in creating and setting up memorial stelae gave rise to opposition at various levels of society, but this is something upon which we can only speculate.14

Qing war memorial inscriptions generally presented a very glowing impression. Yet they nonetheless often provided valuable information, both direct and indirect. Such texts included, for instance, detailed accounts of battles and summaries of the main events of an entire war or series of wars, as well as records of related incidents such as the organization of new military forces. An early extant example is a stele erected after what was to become the first of the ten great victories, namely the first Jinchuan war of 1747-79. As was often the case with such monuments, it originally stood in a memorial temple built for the purpose, the Shi Sheng Si (Temple of True Victory), which now no longer exists. Yet the stele still stands in a somewhat overgrown stone pavilion located in the Fragrant Hills area to the west of Beijing, between a ruined guard tower once used for drilling assault troops and the former imperial military inspection grounds (tuancheng yanwu ting). The open-sided stele pavilion has a double-storied roof of yellow tile (the colour of roof-tile reserved for imperial use) supported by red pillars at each of the four corners. Within, the three parts—base, body and headstone—of the square stone stele rise altogether 7.7 metres high, with an inscription in a different language on each of its four sides: Manchu, Mongol, Chinese, and Tibetan. See Figure III.

The inscription on the 1749 Shi Sheng Si, composed and calligraphed by the Qianlong emperor, confirms the proposition that commemorating war had much to do with legitimation and with emperors’ historical consciousness. It makes a point of situating this most recent success in the longer sweep of history, going back not just to the founding wars of the dynastic transition of a century earlier but also making reference to Chinese antiquity. First, the text draws attention to an earlier namesake temple erected by Hung Taiji (1592-1643), venerable second leader of the pre-conquest Manchus. Hung Taiji’s monument, set in the early Qing capital of Shengjing (contemporary Shenyang), commemorated a major defeat of Ming forces. The 1749 text notes that victory over the Jinchuan rebels, who were not even ethnically Chinese, could hardly be compared to the defeat of a massed Ming army—particularly from the point of view of Qing legitimacy—but it makes a
point of associating the two monuments in terms of their commemorative intent: “lest we forget.” Second, referring to the nearby construction of stone towers used for training Qing troops in the art of siege, the 1749 text mentions the History of the Han Dynasty (*Hanshu*), mainly with a view both to displaying the imperial author’s erudition and further to align the Qing with the long sweep of Chinese history. For the *Hanshu* was among the first of a long line of dynastic histories composed by incoming ruling houses about their predecessors; the Ming history project begun in the late seventeenth century was just the latest in this series.¹⁵

Not far away another huge memorial stele, much wider and lower than the Shi Sheng Shi monument, stands in the “Pavilion for Commemorating Success” (*Ji Gong Lou*), set up after the conquest of Xinjiang at the former imperial military inspection grounds. On it is engraved a text entitled *Shi Sheng Si hou ji* (Later Records of the Temple of True Victory), on the front in Chinese and Manchu and on the back in Mongol and Tibetan, in each case side by side. Much of this inscription covers the impressive achievements of the emperor’s crack troops, the *jianruiyìng* or Light Division, founded in 1749 just after the first Jinchuan war.¹⁶

An important still extant series of Qianlong period war memorials consists of several huge stelae inscribed with imperial narratives that marked the conclusion of each of the major wars. These military monuments were set up in pavilions flanking the *Dacheng dian* (Hall of Great Completion) located at the Confucian Temple next to the National Academy (*Guo zi jian*) in Beijing. This was a singularly notable
location to have chosen, given both that the *Dacheng dian* contained the spirit tablet of the great sage and that the Confucian Temple/National Academy complex was the educational centre of the empire. Indeed, this institution represented the central bastion of Chinese civilian culture in the empire. In its courtyards also stood the stone tablets listing the successful candidates for the triennial civil service examinations as well as those inscribed with the thirteen classical texts of Confucian orthodoxy. In other words, the installation of stelae bearing military narratives at this particular location represented a bold effort to blur the traditional separation of civil and military, *wen* and *wu*. As we shall see more vividly in the chapters that follow, that effort lay at the core of the cultural aspect of Qing imperial project.

The inscriptions on each of the *Guo zi jian* war memorials related in both the Manchu and Chinese languages the course of a war and its triumphant completion. Thus, in 1749 a stele inscribed with an account of the first Jinchuan war was raised, with the title of *Yuzhi pingding Jinchuan gaocheng taixue beiwen* (Imperial Stele Inscription Reporting the Successful Completion of the Pacification of the Jinchuan to the National Academy). It was followed in 1758-60 by two inscriptions similarly recording the Xinjiang wars: *Yuzhi pingding Zhunge'er gaocheng taixue beiwen* (Imperial Stele Inscription Reporting the Successful Completion of the Pacification of the Zunghars to the National Academy); and *Yuzhi Huibu gaocheng taixue beiwen* (Imperial Stele Inscription Reporting the Successful Completion of the Pacification of the Muslims to the National Academy); and in 1776 by yet another, this time marking the successful conclusion of the second Jinchuan war: *Yuzhi pingding liang Jinchuan gaocheng taixue beiwen* (Imperial Stele Inscription Reporting the Successful Completion of the Pacification of the Two Jinchuan).

Sometimes, in a time-honoured practice, additional inscriptions were added on the reverse of already carved stones to save the expense and trouble of creating and raising new monuments. Such later texts might or might not relate to the same topic as the original inscription. For example, in 1758 the text of an inscription on the defeat of the Zunghars, *Pingding Zhunge'er leming Yili bei* (The Yili Stele carved upon the pacification of the Zunghars), the duplicate of one engraved on a stele located at the new Qing administrative capital at Yili in Xinjiang, was engraved on the back of one of the stelae that already bore an inscription on a different aspect of the same war: *Pingding Zhunge'er gaocheng taixue bei*. On the other hand, a stele dating from the Qianlong period on the Bell Tower (*Zhong Lou Bei*) in Beijing had an inscription added on the back almost two hundred years later. Not surprisingly the subject matter of the later, Republican period, inscription, had nothing to do with the original text.17

All the above-mentioned monuments were placed in the Beijing area, but war memorials were not limited to the capital region. They sprang up all over the empire in the eighteenth century. An important group was installed at the summer
capital at Chengde, a crucial location for the exhibition of Manchu power and the representation of Qing imperial knowledge. This group included the 1755 Puning Temple stele, the inscription on which was one of many that, in celebrating military victory, claimed divine assistance in defeating imperial enemies. Other Chengde war-related stelae inscriptions include what are presumably replicas of the monuments placed at Yili in Xinjiang to mark the pacification of the Zunghars, Pingding Zhunge’er leming Yili bei (1755) and Pingding Zhunge’er hou leming Yili bei (1758); and the Pu Yao Temple stele (Pu Yao Si Bei) of 1767-68, a record of the constructions as memorials of the various Chengde temples with their stelae. As a record of a record, that account perfectly embodied the multi-layered nature of the Qing commemoration of war. The installation of a series of monuments to Qing military successes at Chengde was a major ingredient of the project to create an ‘imperial landscape’ at the summer capital, discussed in Chapter Five.\textsuperscript{18}

All these war-related inscriptions on stelae at Chengde are engraved in four languages: Manchu, Chinese, Mongol, and Tibetan; the texts sometimes differ from bilingual inscriptions in Chinese and Manchu that bear the same title and are located at the National Academy. Even different inscriptions—in different languages—engraved at the same moment on a single monument were not necessarily exact translations of one another. Notwithstanding the overriding policy of drawing together the different peoples of the empire, with their different cultures, each inscription was more of a “loose rendition” of the other, designed to appeal to its particular audience.\textsuperscript{19}

Amongst the war memorials was a set of monuments commemorating the so-called return to allegiance of the Torghuts or Kalmyks, an ethnic group who migrated eastwards from the Russian empire to take up residence in the Qing empire in the late eighteenth century. The Qianlong emperor elevated this event to the status of a military victory. Stelae at Chengde and in Yili, capital of Xinjiang, record this event in quadrilingual inscriptions; Qianlong referred to it in his 1792 essay on his great victories; and the eighteenth-century compiler of Qianlong’s writings on his military victories saw fit to include the texts of both stelae in his work, clearly reflecting the official view that this immigration represented a Qing triumph analogous to a military victory, notwithstanding the fact that it had been gained without a fight.\textsuperscript{20}

Beyond the imperial capitals at Beijing and Chengde, many more memorials were scattered throughout the provinces and in the newly pacified regions. Some marked the site of key battlefields. In 1776, for example, the emperor ordered preparations made for the placement of stelae at Meino, Lewuwei and Karaï in Sichuan province, strongholds of the Jinchuan insurgents at which, in each case, Qing victories had marked turning points in the hard-fought second Jinchuan war. Some provincial war memorials were situated in similarly remote locations
that were not battlefields but which perhaps needed a literally solid reminder of Qing authority. For example, in 1749 a stele engraved with the inscription on the first Jinchuan war, Pingding Jinchuan gaocheng taixue bei (Stele [Inscription] Reporting the Completion of the Pacification of the Jinchuan to the National Academy) was placed at Guilin in Guangxi province—an area inhabited by a number of unsettled minority populations. The inscription was one of a number of duplicates of National Academy stelae erected in Guilin.21 In Xinjiang after the conquest, a number of commemorative stelae were installed in prominent but remote locations, for instance at Gedengshan (Gädän-Öla), the site of a daring night-time raid that devastated the Qing’s Zunghar enemies in 1755. The presence of a monumental reminder at the very site of this attack was intended to discourage any resurgence of opposition; this newly incorporated frontier region was dotted with many more such monuments.22 Similarly, after the second Gurkha war, most of which was fought in Tibet, the emperor had his essay on his ten great victories engraved in four languages on a monument erected on Potala mountain in Lhasa, Tibet.23

Besides memorials to wars and battles, the emperor sometimes raised a monumental tribute to an individual warrior. Thus, for example, in 1768 a temple was erected in the western part of Beijing in memory of Mingrui, who as commander of the army in Burma lost his life and much of his army after making a series of miscalculations. The inscription on the now lost stele also records the deaths of other officers who had joined Mingrui in fending off the pursuing enemy as Qing forces retreated.24 Such temples might also commemorate those who had died in the service of the state but not necessarily in battle. In 1751 the emperor had built a “Temple of Double Loyalty” (Shuangzhong Si) in memory of Fuqing and Labdon, two Manchu officials who had lost their lives in Tibet after assassinating a local leader inimical to the Qing. Labdon was killed by the Tibetans; Fuqing committed suicide. The inscription on a stele at the temple bore a memorial poem with a preface, both composed by the emperor and calligraphed by Liang Shizheng, a senior metropolitan official.

The fact that the emperor did not see fit to write this inscription in his own hand, as sometimes happened on other occasions, perhaps reflected the fact that in this case Fuqing and Labdon had not died in actual combat.25 Yet the establishment of a shrine honouring an individual was not always done posthumously. Successful surviving generals might also be so recognized, as occurred, for example, after the suppression of Lin Shuangwen’s uprising in Taiwan in 1788, when shrines honouring a number of commanders were erected. Not all were necessarily graced by the imperial calligraphy, yet they certainly followed the imperial line, and expanded the sheer numbers of memorials.26
As noted, inscriptions on war memorials often were engraved in several scripts. Virtually all used Chinese and Manchu, the everyday languages of state, and many added Mongol and either Tibetan or some other script such as Uighur that was relevant to the particular subject matter or to the locality in which the monument was established. Bilingual inscriptions normally used only Chinese and Manchu but in Sichuan, for example, monuments established at key battlefields of the second Jinchuan war were engraved in Chinese and Tibetan, suggesting a hope that local people might actually read and benefit from the texts. Realistically, however, and without regard to the question of the high degree of literacy required to read such texts, the intimidatingly vast size of most such monuments made them almost impossible to read in their entirety on the spot in any case.27

Just outside Beijing a monument erected to record the emperor’s ritual welcome to generals returning victorious from Xinjiang bears an inscription in Chinese, Manchu, Mongol and Arabic (huiwen), presumably in acknowledgement of the prevalence of Islam in major portions of the newly conquered territory.28 In the same vein, a stele (Huiren lipai si bei) (Inscription for the Muslim mosque) located at the Muslim soldiers’ barracks (Huihui ying) on what is now West Chang’an Avenue in Beijing was inscribed for their edification in Chinese, Manchu, Mongol and Uighur, one of the languages of Xinjiang and, presumably, of the troops in question.29

Such multilingual records were by no means new in China. A well-known early example is the Tang dynasty Nestorian tablet engraved in Chinese and Syriac and erected in Chang’an in the year 751 by adherents of the religion, a Christian heresy, to mark its by then already well-established presence in China.30 Under Qianlong, however, multilingual inscriptions became far more common. Of these a majority related to warfare. Exceptions included funerary monuments for Jesuit missionaries employed at the Qing court, which were engraved in Chinese and Latin with an intaglio crucifix above the inscription.31

The use of multiple languages was in part a mark of Qing cosmopolitanism and in part the act of a conqueror wishing to reiterate his dominion. But the purpose went beyond that. In the eighteenth-century Qing context, using multiple languages asserted a claim to universal spiritual as well as terrestrial overlordship. Qianlong inherited these concepts from the Buddhisms of Mongolia, China, Tibet and, in keeping with his goal of simultaneously ruling as khan, emperor, and bodhisattva, he infused them with a distinctively Qing colouration. The Chinese “world order” had for centuries involved claims to universal rulership of the known world, but Qianlong’s ambitions were both more grandiose and, perhaps, somewhat closer to realization, than those of most of his predecessors. He was one of relatively few emperors of China to focus quite to specifically on warfare and its ideological underpinnings in this connection.
Qianlong’s aspirations to universal rulership involved in particular his perceived role as successor to and competitor with a number of distinguished antecedents. The most recent of these was none other than his own grandfather, the Kangxi emperor, as evidenced by both his patronage of the arts and his military exploits. Yet the demands of filial piety, both genuinely experienced and required to be conspicuously displayed, meant that Qianlong stopped short of openly declaring he had outshone Kangxi altogether. It was, of course, in similar spirit that Qianlong formally abdicated the throne to his son in 1796—he wished to avoid reigning longer than Kangxi—but in practice he continued to rule until his death three years later.

More ancient and hence more weighty antecedents included in particular the great Tang emperor Taizong (r. 626-49), traditionally considered by educated Chinese to have embodied an ideal combination of civil and military virtue. Qianlong explicitly and repeatedly sought first to emulate and then to surpass Tang Taizong. Two others were the formidable conqueror Chingghis Khan (?1162-1227), and Chingghis’ grandson, the Mongol Khan of Khans and emperor of China Khubilai Khan (1215-94). All these men had been military giants whose exploits had in different ways brought them control of huge portions of Central Asia as well as of China. In many ways Qianlong’s Mongol forerunners, whose Chinese empire had formed merely part of a larger whole, rather than constituting the core of an empire that radiated outwards, were his most appropriate role models, but their identity as alien rulers meant that in a Chinese context, though not in an Inner Asian one, they were politically less desirable antecedents than Tang Taizong, claimed as Chinese despite his mixed ethnic heritage.

Not just military conquest made Taizong, Chingghis and Khubilai such attractive models. They had functioned as the personification of an epoch and, at the same time, turners of the wheel of time towards the ages of salvation (cakravartin). This Buddhist “kingly way” differed from the kingly way of the legendary rulers of Chinese antiquity, whose claim to sagehood, although not absolutely dissociated from violence, rested mainly on their moral virtue, as Pamela K. Crossley has described:

Around the cakravartin revolved time, spirit, and incarnation. On earth, the turning wheel of the Law (…) represented militant expansion of the empire, the generation of history, and the closing of the ages. This image, unlike the ‘kingly way’ of the [ancient Chinese] Zhou, lends itself to overt military representation, since the vessel of religious universality is explicitly he who is ‘victor over all the cardinal directions.’ It was a unique extension of imperial symbolism, and the portrait of the Qianlong emperor by [Jesuit court art-
ist] Giuseppe Castiglione in his dharani-marked battle helmet is one of very few depictions of emperors as warriors in the entirety of China’s imperial tradition.

Qianlong’s treatment of the two traditions of the ‘kingly way’ as neatly complementary conformed to his quest to fulfill multiple roles as ruler. In the same way, the Manchu conqueror of China and the Qing conqueror of the Zunghars, the Mongols, the Jinchuan, the Gurkhas, the Tibetans, and so on, intended that his deployment of an array of scripts on imperial stelae commemorating war should represent his claim to universal symbolic as well as geographic dominion.32

The proclamation of another illustrious forebear of Qianlong with universalist aspirations is suggestive of a further imperial motivation in appealing to Buddhist symbolism: that of unification. In 581 the founding Sui emperor, Wendi, issued the following edict before embarking on a series of military campaigns:

> With the armed might of a Cakravartin king, We spread the ideals of the ultimately enlightened one. With a hundred victories in a hundred battles We promote the practice of the Ten Buddhist Virtues. Therefore We regard the weapons of war as having become like the offerings of incense and flowers presented to Buddha, and the fields of this world as having become forever identical with the Buddhland. 33

Sui Wendi and his early Tang successors thus made use of Buddhist beliefs in their quest to reunify the cultures of north and south China after centuries of division. Similarly, the Qianlong emperor, accurately construing the multiculturalism of the empire he ruled, took every possible step to domesticate it so as to bind that empire together. To that end he enlisted an ideology pervasive in Mongolia and Tibet as well as in China. This approach, was rather different from the “divide and rule” policy with which the Qing have often been credited: it was an attempt to bring together diverse traditions into a coherent unit under Qianlong’s overlordship, and thereby to rule them all. The creation of the multilingual war memorials was one major means towards forging a sense of national community.

The institution of monuments was, however, only one among many means the emperor deployed in pursuit of these ambitious goals. The commemoration of war also involved well-attended public spectacles, themselves normally the subject of commemorative stelae and of paintings that formed part of an extensive artistic record produced by members of the court academy, somewhat in the manner of official photography in a later age. In the final layer of commemoration, a wide-scale documentary record took the form of reproduction of many of the major
texts on war in a number of the huge imperially-sponsored compilations of the late eighteenth century, many of which apparently had otherwise little to do with military matters.  

**Rituals as Commemoration**

Military ritual (junli), one of five categories of ritual in the Qing institutional tradition, comprised eighteen forms of ritual occasion. These included reviewing and dispatching the troops; issuing instructions to generals; receiving those who surrender; reporting a victory; returning in triumph; holding banquets and granting rewards upon report of a victory; and the presentation of captives. As triumphant affirmations of the power of the Qing dynasty in its diverse capacities, these often spectacular pageants themselves constituted historic events definitive of the moment and the space in which they took place. Thus, for example, a late eighteenth-century description of the Meridian Gate (Wu Men), the main entrance to the Forbidden City where the Emperor presided over these rituals, explicitly notes that the principal association of the place is reverencing military victory by means of the consecutively performed xianfu and shoufu rituals of presentation and execution by quartering of war captives.

Known in some form since antiquity, and particularly associated in the minds of cognoscenti with none other than emperor Taizong of the Tang, these latter rituals, an aspect of victory celebrations, were reserved for major successes. During the Qing, such occasions were limited to Kangxi’s defeat of Galdan in 1697; Yongzheng’s capture of rebel Khoshote leader of Kokonor in Qinghai in 1724, and Qianlong’s victories in Xinjiang (1755-56 and 1760) and against the Jinchuan in 1776. All but the last involved the protracted campaigns waged by the three great Qing emperors in Central Asia. The ceremonies were performed for the last time in 1828 after the suppression of a relatively minor uprising in Xinjiang, in an attempt to resuscitate old glories.

The detailed paintings commissioned to record the Qianlong military rituals combine with the complex regulations governing their performance to give us some sense of the magnificence and pageantry of these occasions. Among the most portentous of the celebrations performed to salute the Xinjiang conquest were the xianfu and shoufu rituals held in 1760 before an international audience. Their significance may well have been cosmically underscored, at least in the eyes of eighteenth-century Qing subjects accustomed to think in terms of connections between the natural and human worlds, by a violent thunderstorm that raged over the capital the night before the ceremony. The ritual scene was painted more than once, for it formed a major part of the project to exalt the ten great campaigns. It was the subject of one of the war illustrations (zhantu), discussed below, and of a separate painting executed by court artist Xu Yang. In Xu Yang’s work, we see towards the
right-hand side the emperor seated high up on the Meridian Gate, surveying the serried ranks of imperial bodyguards in the great courtyards below. Further back (to the left of the painting), three rows of generals and officials kneel in obeisance to the emperor, holding up the head of the defeated rebel. In such ceremonies the movements of each participant were carefully prescribed: on the appointed day, designated officials of the Board of War brought in the prisoners through the right-hand entrance of the Chang'an gate to the Tian’an gate, leading them by a white silken cord fastened around the neck. After offerings were made, the officials from the Board of War announced the victory and the capture of the prisoners, who were then formally turned over to the custody of the Board of Justice officials, to the sound of military bells and drums. The ceremony thus involved many civilian as well as military officials not to mention untold numbers who helped with preparations and saw or heard the performance.\(^{38}\)

In practice, moreover, considerable political manoeuvring concerning extent of participation and order of precedence sometimes took place among senior officials and generals competing to share the glory: who would present the prisoners? Who would occupy the place right next to the emperor? And so on. The Qianlong emperor, preparing to celebrate his troops’ long anticipated victory in the second Jinchuan, in 1776 issued the following directions:

With regard to the Board of Rites’ memorial concerning the shoufu [planned for] the 28\(^{th}\): an annotation has been made to the effect that the generals shall enter in the company of all the officials and shall perform the ritual at the Meridian Gate. But the generals have already carried out rituals twice: once at the greetings ceremony outside the capital and once at the celebratory banquet. The generals and those who returned from the army to the capital and have paraded in Our presence at the Qianqing gate are to join Our retinue on the Meridian Gate; there is no need for them to perform [further] rituals. Only Fukang’an is to bring in the prisoners and perform the ceremony before the Meridian Gate.\(^{39}\)

From this we may infer that, although the main purpose of the ceremony was to enhance the prestige of the emperor and of the dynasty, clearly it also offered tremendous opportunities for major participants to embellish their own stature by association. In the militarized context of the mid-eighteenth century, this kind of chance was just about beyond compare.

A wide spectrum of witnesses attended these celebrations, for the opportunity to display Qing might was, similarly, too good to squander. According to a description of Xu Yang’s painting of the 1760 xianfu ceremony, published in 1793 in the
catalogue of the imperial paintings collection, not only large numbers of civil and military Qing officials attended the event, but also an astonishing range of tribute-paying foreign visitors bearing their national flags. These apparently included French, English, Dutch, Koreans, and Japanese, as well as representatives of numerous Southeast Asian and Central Asian states. This seems surprising, to say the least. Thirty-odd years prior to the Macartney mission, when the kind of homage paid by Britain to China was at issue, is it likely that representatives of King George were “presenting tribute” to the Qianlong emperor? Most Englishmen then in China were traders, but the records of the East India Company for this period are missing, so verification is problematic. Certainly, there were French missionaries living at Qianlong’s court in 1760, but despite their attempts to claim close links with the French crown they were not qualified to act as state representatives or to ‘present tribute’ to the emperor of China. Did the painting really represent the event recorded or is this an example of the record embellishing the event recorded? Given Qianlong’s acute concern with the historical record, it is entirely plausible that the emperor, more keenly aware of international developments than has been credited, might have ordered the adaptation of the pictorial record to suit his own purposes. Given the imperial record of adjusting the historiographical record to make it represent the precise image desired, it is highly likely that emperors were just as ready to embroider the visual record to accentuate such a manifestation of imperial power. In this case, by incorporating the supposed international audience as actors into imperial theatre, and hence implying their consent to overarching imperial goals, the emperor obtained his spectators’ affirmation of the imperial power represented by the ritual celebrations.\(^{40}\)

Another of the rituals associated with warfare involved the formal greeting by the emperor of generals returning in triumph from the war front. Like the xianfu and shoufu ceremonies, this was reserved for important victories. It took place a number of times during the conquest phase of the early Qing but in Qianlong’s reign it occurred on full scale only in 1760, following the conquest of Xinjiang, and in 1776 following the defeat of the Jinchuan. Thus in 1760, as we know both from formal descriptions and from the pictorial record, the emperor rode to Liangxiang county, just beyond the walls of Beijing, to perform ritual greetings to commander Zhaohui and others as they returned from the long campaigns in Central Asia. It was an occasion of enormous pomp and ceremony. As musicians played, the emperor ascended a specially constructed altar arrayed with flags, at least some of which had been captured from the enemy. Together with all the senior generals, in full armour, and a number of senior civilian officials, the emperor made obeisance to heaven, performing the ritual of three kneelings and nine times knocking his head upon the ground, in gratitude for the victory. Afterwards all were formally received by the emperor in a specially erected tent of imperial yellow.\(^{41}\)
War Illustrations, Portraits, and other Commemorative Paintings

Court academicians produced at imperial behest a large number of commemorative paintings, including “Infinite Fortune of the Sage’s Plans,” by Qian Weicheng; “The Western Regions” (i.e. the newly conquered region of Xinjiang), by Xu Yang; “Three Victories of the Red Banners,” by Hong Wu; numerous works by Giuseppe Castiglione, whose Chinese name was Lang Shining, such as a famous series of paintings depicting horses, instantly recognizable to an educated Qing subject as a war referent; such collaborative works as “Dispatch and Victory of the Jinchuan Army” by Yao Wenhan, Zhou Kun and Zhang Weibang; scrolls depicting the imperial hunts, and many more. Especially well known in this category are the series of sixteen war illustrations (zhantu) executed for Qianlong by four foreign artist priests: the Jesuits Giuseppe Castiglione, Jean-Denis Attiret (Wang Zhicheng), and Ignatius Sichelbart (Ai Qimeng), and the Augustinian Jean-Damascène Salusti (An Deyi). The series included scenes of battle and surrender, and of daring raids, as well as the various triumphs and celebrations that followed victory.

When Qianlong commissioned this series he was building on a long-standing Chinese tradition of commemorative or propagandistic painting—a tradition far less well known than landscape or naturalist painting but nonetheless both venerable and significant. He is said also to have been influenced by some European war paintings, done by the German painter Rugendas (1666-1742), of which he learned from his court Jesuits. Perhaps, too, the missionaries had made him aware of such other battle paintings produced in Europe as those displayed at Versailles in France and at El Escorial and Buen Retiro in Spain. Among these the series at El Escorial had been commissioned by King Philip II of Spain, a sixteenth-century monarch who (although Qianlong may well have been unaware of this) had shared both Qianlong’s grand imperial aspirations and the desire to represent himself as performing a divine mission through his military efforts, a resemblance that suggests the neat complementarity of these particular characteristics. The Buen Retiro paintings had been done for Philip IV, who wished to carry on the same tradition.

With a view to further broadcasting Qing military prowess, Qianlong decided to have mass reproductions of the war illustrations made in the form of copper engravings. These were ordered to be made in Paris from copies of the sixteen war illustrations that were shipped from China on French East India Company ships. There were two main reasons for having the engravings made in France. First, Chinese artists had by then lost the knowledge of that art; second, it is likely that the Qing emperor, who had heard a good deal about the military prowess of the French king, wanted to make his own military might known in those quarters. Several hundred sets of copper engravings eventually were shipped back to China, where more copies were then produced. They bedecked public buildings all over
the empire and were distributed to deserving officials as a mark of imperial favour, for instance by way of thanks for contributing their libraries to the great imperial bibliographic project.\textsuperscript{45} Subsequent series were drawn and engraved in China by Chinese artists and craftsmen, who may have learned or relearned the art from the Jesuits. In whatever form, all the war illustrations must have been imaginary versions drawn from eyewitness descriptions, since court artists cannot personally have observed all these far-off battles.

Not all the later series contained as many as sixteen paintings, possibly because not all the wars so commemorated ranked among the ten great victories. They covered the following wars: the suppression of a Muslim uprising at Wushi in 1765; the defeat of the Two Jinchuan in 1776; the conclusion of wars in Vietnam (1788-89) and Taiwan (1787-88); victories against the Gurkhas in Nepal (1792), against the Miao aborigines in Yunnan and Hunan in the 1790s, and against the Central Asian leader Jahangir in the 1820s; and, finally, the bitter Muslim wars of the late nineteenth century. The originals of the paintings are located in the Palace Museum, Beijing; the copper-engravings can be found all over the world.\textsuperscript{46}

The hall where the original war illustrations were hung, the \textit{Zi Guang Ge}, was an old pavilion that had originally been used for parades, archery review and the like. The emperor had it restored in 1760 expressly for the purpose of displaying military art and trophies and for receiving tributaries. Official foreign visitors are still received there today. It overlooks a drill ground located on the west bank of the central lake in Xi Yuan, immediately to the West of the Forbidden City, in what is now the sealed-off government headquarters known as Zhongnanhai.

In addition to the series of war illustrations, the \textit{Zi Guang Ge} housed another series of paintings commemorating war: portraits of meritorious officials (\textit{gongchen xiang}). After the Xinjiang wars, a series of one hundred was made. They were divided into two groups of fifty, upper and lower. The emperor personally wrote eulogies on the upper fifty, while three senior officials—Yu Minzhong, Liu Tongxun, and Liu Lun—did them on the lower fifty. Each eulogy appeared in both Chinese and Manchu.\textsuperscript{47}

At the head of the hundred meritorious officials thus honoured after the Xinjiang was the senior official Fuheng, also credited with the first Jinchuan victory in the 1740s after earlier commanders had been dramatically executed in front of the troops. Notably, Fuheng had not been personally involved in the fighting in Xinjiang but he had been almost alone in supporting the emperor’s decision to pursue his goals in Central Asia. Qianlong’s eulogy on Fuheng’s portrait, which is now in a private collection in the United States, reads as follows:

\begin{quote}
Of noble descent, a distinguished public servant
Your sorrow and joy are linked with the country’s;
\end{quote}
Earlier on in the Jinchuan war
You were noted for exceptional performance,
When I was deciding to send out an army to the far west
You were alone in agreeing with me—
Like the marquis of Zan [an adviser] who had never fought in battles
You deserve to be placed foremost among contributors [to victory].\(^{48}\)

Qianlong’s gratitude indicates that even in an imperial system there was some scope for expressing disagreement with imperial policy. That many of his advisers opposed the Xinjiang venture on grounds of expense is clear from a number of other comments, and made even sweeter the post-war justifications of the decision to pursue the campaign to the end.\(^{49}\) Merit, in other words, was susceptible of definition in accordance with the emperor’s sometimes quite subjective judgment.

The division between the upper and lower fifty was made on the basis of merit and shows no distinction between civil and military officials, thus reinforcing the quest to reward equally any action that contributed to military victory and make the two branches of the bureaucracy more nearly equal. As with the war illustrations, after subsequent wars further series of portraits of this kind were made: one hundred following the second Jinchuan war, forty following the Taiwan war and thirty for the Gurkha wars. Agui and Hailancha, leading generals in several of the emperor’s ten great campaigns, each had their portraits hung in the Zi Guang Ge no less than four times, a distinction rare enough to have been recorded in their respective biographies. Honouring selected generals, soldiers, and military administrators in this way formed part of a deliberate policy of rewards and punishments intended to encourage values of service and loyalty to the Qing cause. That policy also included a notable expansion in the award of gifts and hereditary titles to victorious generals and in the meting out of severe punishment to those whose dedication or success rate were found wanting, as in the case of the two top commanders executed during the first Jinchuan war.\(^{50}\) It was a policy that, as so often, was not introduced by Qianlong but built and elaborated on early practice.

Similarly, and as in the case of the war illustrations, there was a venerable precedent for portraits of meritorious officials. In the latter part of the first century the Han emperor Mingdi (58-75) had commissioned a set of twenty-eight while in the seventh century Emperor Taizong of the Tang—Qianlong’s model again—had ordered a set of twenty-four painted by court artist Yan Liben for the Lingyan Hall and later engraved on stelae.\(^{51}\) Evidence suggests that the Qianlong portraits closely adhered to tradition in format, composition, and content, but on the whole the eighteenth-century portraits are somewhat more lively than the earlier ones and involve the melding of two painting techniques, Chinese and Western. Generally, the hundred Xinjiang portraits show individual figures either frontally
or in three-quarters profile, wearing ceremonial robes or military uniforms and standing somewhat woodenly in front of a neutral background.

The portrait sets were executed in triplicate. One set, in ink and colour on silk, hung in the Zi Guang Ge, while two more sets, in the form of hanging scrolls and handscrolls done on the very finest Anhui paper, were installed in the halls and pavilions of the imperial palace complex. This nonetheless suggests that they had a relatively limited audience, but one can speculate that word of their existence may well have spread beyond the palace.

Castiglione and the other foreign artists who had produced the original war illustrations also were involved with Chinese court artists in the production of the portrait series. In addition they trained quite a few Chinese apprentices as portraitists; many artists collaborated in this project, as in many of the commemorative paintings, in this case not least because once the wars were over Qianlong wanted the portraits completed more or less immediately, that is within four to five months. Such haste was due to the fact that once the army returned the authorities planned to hold the celebratory banquet at the Zi Guang Ge as part of the series of ritually authorized triumphal events, and the portraits just had to be done in time. These portraits were dispersed at the time of the Boxer uprising in 1900-01. Some are in private western collections; others are located in museums around the world, including what is the only one known to be still in China, located at the Tianjin Municipal Museum. Other extant portraits from these series continue to surface intermittently on the international art market today.

Behind the Zi Guang Ge stood the Wu Cheng Dian, the Hall of Military Achievements. This hall seems to have played a less prominent role in war commemoration than the Zi Guang Ge. In its vicinity, however, were displayed further stelae, engraved with several hundred of Qianlong’s military compositions: this was probably the major collection in stone of those writings. At the Wu Cheng Dian, too, were exhibited various war trophies, such as the silver sutra case of Amursana, turncoat and Qing archenemy of the Xinjiang wars, and some captured weapons, and so on. Captured weapons may have been a plentiful commodity immediately after the wars were over. One Jesuit missionary sent a finely worked jeweled dagger, allegedly a trophy from the Jinchuan armies, to his patron, minister of state Henri Bertin, in France. Indeed, the missionaries at Qianlong’s court provided one avenue along which imperial propaganda traveled effortlessly, for correspondents in the French government repeatedly sought out information about the Chinese military from their countrymen in Beijing. Whether missionaries’ striking degree of access to that information was the consequence of a deliberate policy on the part of the Qing emperors, can only be guessed at.
The Documentary Record

The stelae and paintings that commemorated the wars and the triumphs and bore the imperial word on the ten great campaigns were themselves immortalized in numerous compilations made under official auspices towards the end of the Qianlong reign. Here we will mention just five major examples of this tendency. The first consisted of a complete set of Qianlong’s military writings, *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji* (The Qianlong emperor’s Prose and Poetry on the Ten Great Victories), a text that is invaluable for the study of the commemoration of the eighteenth-century Qing wars. Organized by campaign, and subdivided into chapters of poetry and prose, this collection in fifty-four *juan* was presented to the throne by its compiler, Peng Yuerui, in 1794, very shortly after Qianlong had adopted the sobriquet “Old Man of the Ten Great Victories,” and five years before the emperor’s death. Gathering together the imperial writings on war in a single volume gave them yet more visibility and more of an aura of importance, as well as at least theoretically making them accessible to a wider readership.

The extent of imperial sponsorship for Peng’s project is unknown, as is the extent of the volume’s circulation either at the time or later. Harold Kahn has described these writings as the ‘ultimate esthetic word on the mid-Ch’ing military ventures,’ contrasting them to the accounts contained in the official campaign histories, the *fanglüe*. Yet the latter themselves constituted a major form of documentary commemoration rather than the complete and accurate record one might have expected them to be. Published within a few years of the wars they covered, the massive *fanglüe* did make public much illuminating correspondence between the emperor and his generals concerning the conduct of the wars and postwar reconstruction, and of course they incorporated the imperial military writings later assembled by Peng Yuerui. Still, as Peter Perdue has recently demonstrated, they edited the record heavily, and some of the most secret communications were suppressed altogether by the military archives office of the Grand Council, the highest ministry of state. Yet together with the many other compilations, such as those discussed below, they contributed to an overall expansion of military themes in literature that aptly corresponded to the expansion of the empire.

None of the other three remaining works considered here was directly concerned with military matters, which makes it all the more remarkable that Qianlong’s wars featured in them. The first was the 1793 publication of a continuation of the massive and extremely detailed catalogue of the imperial paintings collection, *Shi qu bao ji xubian*, compiled by Liang Shizheng, a senior government official as well as a painter and collector, and one of those whose calligraphy sometimes adorned commemorative monuments. This compilation included descriptions of all the war-related and propaganda paintings as well as reprinting in full all their inscriptions—although such texts were hardly what a person perusing an art catalogue
would expect to encounter. Somewhat earlier, Yu Minzhong, one of those officials who wrote the inscriptions on the lower fifty ‘portraits of meritorious officials,’ served as chief compiler of a detailed description of Beijing, its architecture and monuments. This text, *Rixia jiwen kao* (Study of Ancient Accounts Heard in the Precincts of the Throne), appeared in 1781. It reprinted in full vast numbers of the stelae inscriptions on the wars and other related imperial writings. In the same year a multi-volume history of the National Academy, *Guo Zi Jian zhi*, reprinted the texts of a number of important war memorials located in the precincts of the Academy. By thus reproducing the official word on the wars these imperially sponsored texts on art, architecture, and local history obviously played a part in disseminating the politically correct view to a wider audience. This additional medium for the blending of *wen* and *wu*, civil and military, in written documents ultimately may have had more impact than the stelae inscriptions themselves, which normally are too large to be read on the spot, or than one-time ritual celebrations and paintings with inscriptions whose immediate audience was limited to selected individuals.

**Conclusion**

The range of memorials described above—monuments, paintings, buildings, and written texts, many of which reproduced one another—constitute the main material evidence for the official project of commemorating war in the eighteenth century. They demonstrate how powerfully the Qianlong emperor was motivated by his concern for history, both past and future. For Qianlong’s inscriptions, and the multiple media in which they appeared, amounted to a claim to have competed successfully with, on the one hand, the great sage and cakravartin kings of old and, on the other, those great imperial rulers yet to come, in order to stake his claim to supremacy across space that was just as much temporal as it was symbolic and physical.

The Qianlong emperor thought and made plans on a grand scale. He was an empire-builder who recognized the profound complexities presented by his multi-ethnic domains, and took comprehensive steps to try to harness those complexities in the service of creating a sense of shared community among his subjects. He made the attempt from a highly ambiguous position—that of an alien ruler, trying simultaneously to be all things to all his different subjects. At the same time, always concerned to achieve multiple ends by a single means whenever possible, he recognized the utility of the cultural campaign to his attempts to foster a distinctive Manchu identity. Yet the consequences of these efforts to draw together diverse different groups under the single roof of that national sentiment exceeded even the emperor’s audacious intentions. In successfully drawing attention to the fact that the Qing were Manchus, Qianlong helped create a potent focus for the dissatisfaction among the Manchus’ Chinese subjects, one that surfaced in the century following Qianlong’s death, with
results that were ultimately fatal to the Qing cause and, at least in the long short term, to Qianlong’s grand designs. That is, Qianlong’s schemes indirectly contributed over the next century to the anti-Manchuiism that later developed into a more generalized anti-foreignism, so that Qianlong inadvertently contributed to the decline of his dynasty, a result precisely the opposite of what he sought to achieve.

In the quest to militarize culture, it was easier for the emperor to control the means, than the ends to which those means might ultimately be turned. Yet, by its imagining unity among Qing subjects despite their diversity, through the sense of shared achievement that the commemorations sought to inculcate, the eighteenth-century Qing imperial project created the field of possibility from which the new political forms could begin to be envisioned, even though these developed in a set of contexts that Qianlong could never have envisaged.
Religion, War, and Empire-Building

The three great emperors of the high Qing—Kangxi (1662-1722), Yongzheng (1723-35), and Qianlong (1736-95)—were ambitious empire-builders, whose techniques of imperial expansion and domination often rivalled in sophistication those of the European imperialists who later all but completely overwhelmed China and Chinese culture. In pursuit of their imperial goals, these Manchu rulers incorporated diverse peoples and cultures into the Qing polity and ruled them with a combination of patronizing severity and flexible pluralism.

Although the Qing empire is often imagined as a Chinese empire dominated by alien rulers, the reality is that it was, rather, oriented as much towards its Inner and Central Asian dominions of Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) as it was towards China proper, which formed but one, albeit major, part of the whole. In this respect the Qing empire resembled, on a smaller scale, that of the Mongols, who had ruled China as part of their vast empire from 1276 to 1368. The Manchus were quite ready to invoke that precedent as and when it suited them, but they had to proceed with extreme care since their plans for empire required that the Mongols of their own time submit to Manchu overlordship and become subject peoples of the Qing empire. This goal was achieved as much through diplomacy and manipulation as through military force, since in the seventeenth century, when the Manchus first came to dominance, the Mongols had been insufficiently united to pose an effective challenge.

Among the most significant wars of the high Qing (1683-1820) were several that had all either resulted in imperial expansion or the consolidation of Qing control over outlying territories. These included, in particular, the wars against the Zunghars, a sub-group of the Western Mongols with imperial ambitions of their own. These wars began with the Kangxi emperor’s campaigns of the 1690s and continued, intermittently, until 1759. Together with the Ili and Muslim campaigns of the late 1750s, the Qing wars against the Zunghars culminated in the destruction of the Zunghar people, and the annexation of Xinjiang, vast territories in Central Asia that brought the empire governed from Beijing to its greatest extent in history. Tibetan-Buddhism and, to a lesser extent, Islam, played a crucial political
role in that long-drawn-out conflict. Among the several other eighteenth-century imperial wars similarly involving religious issues were the 1720 invasion of Tibet, when Qing troops expelled occupying Zunghars and began a lengthy period of domination from Beijing; a Muslim uprising at Ush, Xinjiang, in 1765; the two Jinchuan wars, fought for control of the Sichuan-Tibet borderlands in 1747-9 and 1771-6; a sectarian uprising in Shandong province in 1774; two more Muslim uprisings, this time located in Gansu province, in the 1780s, and two Gurkha wars of 1790-1792, fought to retain Qing control of Tibet. In every one of these wars, religion played a major role.

Religion under the Qing

In general, the connections between religion and war in China have been pervasive but not always obvious. In the histories of other parts of the world, religious wars occur rather frequently—for example, the Crusades of the European medieval period, the later European wars between Catholics and Protestants, and the various Islamic jihads. Moreover, the “civilizing mission” of empire-building European powers contained a strong religious element; the intention was to Christianize, variously, the barbarous natives of Africa and Asia, including China, if necessary with the backing of armed force. But in China, wars that were specifically wars of religion were virtually unknown, because in China there was no single established religion of state, and those religions that were at one time or another prevalent generally lacked the strong evangelical element of Christianity. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that the tradition of warrior-monks, notwithstanding Buddhist injunctions concerning the preservation of life at all costs, was an ancient one, and that at least in early times the motive of spreading Buddhism sometimes was invoked as a justification for waging war.1

Qing emperors saw no clear delineation between the realms of religion and of politics. Thus they identified religion, unless it was absolutely subject to their control, as a potential menace to their sovereignty—in other words, religion either specifically served the state or it was specifically subversive. For they were accustomed to absolute authority and could not brook competition from any alternative authority, whether located in the unpredictable supernatural world or in the human world beyond reach of their political authority.

With regard to the supernatural world, the Qing state did not scorn it but preferred to monopolize all contact with the spirits who inhabited it, in order to keep them under control. There was some ambiguity here. Religious activity among the people was not banned per se, but anyone who claimed a special relationship with spirits risked contravening the law, because, in effect, their principal source of power was beyond Qing control, and, as such, heterodox (xie).2 The characterization of heterodoxy derived from the fact that there was a presumption that mem-
bers of such sects might gain access to types of black magic that could be turned to treacherous purposes. Such people tended to be regarded as especially susceptible to subversive behaviour. It was in part out of such considerations that the Qing regarded such millenarian groups as the White Lotus and the Eight Trigrams, and any religious individuals claiming supernatural powers, as a potential menace.³

Religions that recognized an authority within this world but beyond the political reach of the empire were similarly suspect. Catholic Christianity, focused on the Pope in Rome; Islam, with its orientation towards Mecca; and Tibetan-Buddhism, presided over by the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, all came into this category. The Kangxi emperor, for example, absolutely resisted Papal attempts to claim authority over Chinese Christians in the first decades of the eighteenth century because, in his view, the possibility that some Chinese would thereby owe allegiance to some other authority than himself posed a clear threat to his dominion over his people.⁴ In fact no actual wars involving Christianity occurred in China for almost another one hundred fifty years, and despite its Christian trappings that war, the Taiping rebellion, was an internal affair that had little to do with outsiders’ attempts to woo Chinese away from their rulers’ authority. Similarly, although the Qing tolerated Islam, they were unusually jittery about the unsettling effect of Chinese Muslims on the imperial order, both in Xinjiang, where there was a strong Muslim presence, and in the northwest of China proper, where two uprisings in the 1780s proved to be a prelude to a series of major Muslim rebellions that rocked the region in the latter part of the nineteenth century.

This chapter concerns the role of religion in the Second Jinchuan War (1771-1776), fought in the highlands of western Sichuan province, on the Tibetan frontier. It argues that the Second Jinchuan War fit into an ongoing pattern of wars concerning religion, in other words that the major wars of the high Qing, of which it was one, all involved the attempt to gain or retain control over populations whose religious beliefs made it imperative to solidify their political allegiance to the Qing emperor.

In this case, the Yellow Hat sect of Tibetan-Buddhism hoped to take advantage of the war to extend their influence into the Jinchuan area, a long-time centre of the indigenous Tibetan Bon religion as well as a minor stronghold of the Red Hat sect of Tibetan-Buddhism, the Yellow Hats’ principal competitor. The Qing were willing to lend their backing to the Yellow Hats, with whom in public they professed an intimate alliance, but ultimately only to the extent that such support did not undermine their own political control over the region. In order to understand the complexities of the situation, therefore, we turn now to the highly complex role Tibetan-Buddhism played in Qing imperial politics.
Qing Emperors and Tibetan-Buddhism

After Buddhism reached Tibet from India in the late seventh century, it gradually came to prevail over the pre-existing indigenous religion, Bon, which itself took on some Buddhist features in order to remain competitive. Over time, several different orders of Tibetan-Buddhism developed, with doctrines that were fairly similar to one another, but with each claiming descent from a different master. One of the most influential groups was the so-called Red Hat sect, a school of the Karma-pa order, but in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, a new school, known as the Yellow Hat sect, came into being. Over time it gradually gained in influence, and by the mid-Qing it was in the process of becoming the predominant religion of Tibet. But not without energetic opposition; competition among the different branches for supremacy—which in that theocratic context meant political as well as religious supremacy—was intense.

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the leader of the Yellow Hats, seeking military reinforcement against the various other sects, especially the Red Hats, with whom they competed for power, formed an alliance with the Mongols, who were regrouping in the hope of reviving the kind of confederation that had once made their forebears so powerful. As part of that alliance, the Mongol leader Altan Khan (1507-1583) converted to Yellow Hat Buddhism and recognized the Yellow Hats’ leader as the Dalai or Universal Lama. Following their khan’s lead, many rank and file Mongols became converted to Yellow Hat Buddhism, so that the Yellow Hats gained a much more broadly based following than previously. In 1639 the Khoshote Mongols under Gushri Khan (d. 1656) invaded Tibet at the invitation of the then Dalai Lama, who wished to use Mongol military power to crush his Red Hat rivals. With Mongol military protection, the Yellow Hat sect then became predominant both in Tibet and among the Mongols; in 1640, the Mongols officially adopted Tibetan-Buddhism as their religion. The net result was that many Mongols as well as Tibetans owed at least spiritual, if not also political, allegiance, to the Dalai Lama, but at the same time the Mongols effectively took over control over Tibet, receiving in this project the support of the Zunghars, who themselves had close ties to the Dalai Lama.5

From the Mongols’ point of view, the alliance with the Yellow Hats also invoked the historically close relationship between the Mongol leader Khubilai Khan, who became emperor of China in the late thirteenth century, and a lama named Phag-pa who was a scion of the most powerful family in Tibet. They had forged a so-called “lama-patron” relationship, in which Phag-pa acknowledged Khubilai as a universal Buddhist ruler, or cakravartin, and, as well, as the reincarnation of the bodhisattva Manjusri, the third member of a Buddhist trinity whose two other members, in their latter-day incarnations, were variously said to be the Dalai Lama and one of the Mongol khans.6 For his part, Khubilai put Phag-pa in charge
of Tibet, in what amounted to a joint secular and sacred rulership of Tibet and Mongolia and, for a time, China. This device had enabled Khubilai to dominate Tibet politically without resort to force, while allowing Tibetan religious leaders a measure of autonomy over the faithful. It predated the development of the Yellow Hat sect, but as a configuration of power it served as a very seductive precedent. Thus the Manchu rulers intended to emulate it in every possible respect, although they did not wish to encourage mass conversions among the Manchu people.

As a political mechanism, moreover, the lama-patron relationship had an added advantage for the Manchus in that it was not associated exclusively with the Mongols. In 1407 the Ming emperor Yongle (1402-1424), himself strikingly preoccupied with military ventures, had followed Khubilai’s precedent by exchanging titles with a senior lama from Tibet titles in return for religious initiation and identification as the reincarnation of Manjusri. This device thus attracted the Manchus as they sought to present different images to the diverse peoples within their empire, drawing, for example, on predominantly Buddhist precedents as part of their schemes to pacify the Mongols, and on Chinese and Confucian precedents to legitimize their rulership of China. In other words, the fact that both the Mongol Yuan and the native Ming had adopted some form of lama-patron relationship with Tibet rendered the precedent doubly valuable: it conformed to the hallowed principle of achieving multiple ends by a single means.

The Mongols submitted to the Manchus before the latter established themselves in China in 1644, encouraging the Tibetan religious establishment to follow suit. In 1652 the great Fifth Dalai Lama paid a formal visit to the Qing emperor, who for the time being recognized Mongol authority in Tibet but also appointed his own administrative official to reside in Lhasa. At that time the Dalai Lama recognized the emperor as patron, setting the stage for successive emperors to claim to have supplanted the Mongols in the relationship with Tibet. To that end emperors also began to identify themselves with Manjusri, in which guise each had his portrait painted at least once.

The representation of the emperor as bodhisvattva—as Manjusri—was of the utmost political significance. For assumption of this “persona” carried in visual and symbolic terms the implication that the Manchu emperor had superseded the Mongol khans as the “new Khubilai,” with the consequence that the Qing empire (into which Mongolia was subsumed) and Tibet had a special relationship that echoed that of Khubilai and Phag-pa. It even left open the possibility that the Qing emperor and the Dalai Lama were, respectively, reincarnations of the earlier pair.

The extent to which, at this juncture, the Manchus were interested in Tibetan-Buddhism from a strictly religious, as distinct from a political, or politico-religious, point of view, remains somewhat unclear. Doubtless it differed both between individual rulers and as the need to dominate Tibet became more pressing. For
instance, Hung Taiji (1592-1643), who had first proclaimed the Qing empire, disparaged the Mongols’ adoption of Tibetan-Buddhism, suggesting it had undermined their martial prowess. This implies that, had any pre-conquest rapprochement with the Tibetan religious leaders taken place under his auspices, it would have been for strictly pragmatic reasons, not out of any religious impulse. Yet under the Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century, imperial interest in the rituals and initiations of Tibetan-Buddhism was so overwhelming that, even taking into account Qianlong’s customary spirit of universalism, it does seem to have far surpassed what was strictly necessary for purely political purposes. Even if, as has been suggested, imperial willingness to accept Tantric initiation may have arisen in part out of a desire to acquire some of the magical powers associated with lamas, in the end the Qianlong emperor does appear to have become a true believer in Tibetan-Buddhism, notwithstanding Hung Taiji’s conviction about its potentially enfeebling effects.

From the outset, the Manchus had objected to the dual political and religious alliance between the Mongols and the Tibetans, because they feared that the Dalai Lama—an extremely influential religious leader considerably nearer than the Pope in Rome—might become a focal point for opposition to their own hegemony and that he could throw his support behind their Zunghar rivals. The Manchus intended that they themselves should supplant the Mongols in any arrangements with Tibet, that is, they envisaged their rulership in terms of a joint secular and sacred authority shared with Tibetan Buddhist leaders, along the lines of the device once employed by Khubilai Khan. As the early building of an alliance with the Dalai Lama suggests, they did not intend to allow anyone else to usurp that initiative.

Yet until the 1680s, when the successful conclusion of the campaign to suppress the rebellious Three Feudatories enabled the Manchus to consolidate their hold over China proper, in military terms they paid relatively little attention to the Mongols and Zunghars located to their northwest. By then those groups, particularly the Zunghars, had begun to take advantage of the Qing focus on the rebellion to the south, mounting a series of attacks on Qing territory in northern Mongolia. To protect their security, in the 1690s the Qing launched a series of campaigns against the Zunghars, whose leader, Galdan, (1644 (1632?) -1697) had once been a Yellow Hat lama resident in Tibet and retained close ties to the Tibetan religious establishment. During these campaigns, at the latest, the Manchus came to realize that from a political point of view it was essential to construct a tighter system of control over Tibet and its religious establishment, because such control was in turn critical to the long-term dominance of Mongolia and Zungharia, and hence was the key to the extension of imperial power in the north and northwest.
This goal became integral to the Qing campaign to eliminate the Zunghars. In 1717, the Zunghars invaded Tibet, in the course of a highly complex dispute over the Dalai Lama succession, the details of which need not concern us here. In 1720 the Qing drove the Zunghars from Tibet, nominally to support the “true” new Dalai Lama but in reality to consolidate their control over Tibet and dislodge the Zunghars. The net effect was to place the Qing in a position of dominance in Tibet, at the expense not only of the Zunghars but also of the Mongols, who had dominated Tibet for most of the preceding century. It was a major milestone in the push to expand Qing imperial control in Inner and Central Asia.

Although the Qing emperors were more or less equal to the Dalai Lamas in the competition for power over their Tibetan-Buddhist subjects, a category that as noted included both Tibetans and Mongols, the relationship between them was much more than a simple struggle for supremacy. As James L. Hevia has suggested, both emperor and Dalai Lama were concerned to make a public display of authority over the other, while at the same time privately purporting to acknowledge the other’s superiority. Here Tibetan and Chinese accounts often diverge, the Tibetan accounts indicating that the emperor respected the Dalai Lama as his teacher, while the Chinese accounts indicate that it was the emperor who was displaying condescension to the Dalai Lama. Such ambiguities become clear in the context of warfare, when emperor and Dalai Lama sometimes vied with one another for authority over the Mongols, although, equally, they were quite capable of joining forces to try to stop the Mongols from feuding with one another. Moreover, the Kangxi emperor was ready to invoke the common religious ideals of himself and the Dalai Lama when this seemed expedient, yet he was almost obsessed by achieving the destruction of the Dalai’s loyal disciple, the Zunghar leader, Galdan. These seemingly inconsistent approaches arose out of the desire to be all things to all the diverse subjects of the Qing empire.

Qing imperial politico-religious aspirations also prompted them to consecrate numerous Tibetan Buddhist temples, among the most notable of which was the Yong He Gong (Lama Temple) in Beijing. As discussed in Chapter Two, the erection of temples and stelae was a staple feature of the Qing imperial project; it occurred, for instance, to commemorate military victories, as well as to convey a particular point of view. The Yong He Gong had been the residence of Qianlong’s father before he became the Yongzheng emperor—Qianlong had been born there—but Qianlong had it converted into an important religious centre, part of the purpose of which was to express Qing hegemony over Tibet and Tibetan-Buddhism. Within it stood, among other imperial proclamations, a stele engraved in four languages (Chinese, Manchu, Mongolian and Tibetan) with the Qianlong emperor’s inscription, Lama Shuo (Pronouncement on Lamas), dating from 1792. This text sought to locate the connections between emperors of China and Tibetan-Buddhism in the long-stand-
ing tradition dating back to the Mongols, and, in altogether unambiguous terms, affirmed Qing claims to imperial authority over Tibet and the Yellow Hat sect (including the right to nominate the successor to the Dalai Lama), proclaiming the relevance of such protection to the maintenance of peace in Mongolia. Another major Tibetan-Buddhist site of imperial patronage was the complex of temples at Mount Wutai, near the border of China proper and Mongolia. Mount Wutai was closely associated with Manjusri and therefore became a potent component in the quest for religious power.

As discussed in Chapter Five, the Qing also expressed their hegemony over the various parts of their empire by building reconstructions of famous landmarks and landscapes at their various capitals. The leading example of this practice was located at the palace complex at Chengde (Rehe), the Qing summer capital on the edge of Mongolia and Manchuria, north of Beijing. The Chengde complex was virtually a theme park of empire—it has now, in the twenty-first century, become exactly that. It included, among other things, temples and palaces that replicated those in Lhasa, Tibet, along with others built in the Tibetan style, and man-made landscapes that resembled such distinctive parts of the empire as the Mongolian steppe and scenic spots in south China. Especially prominent at Chengde was a smaller-scale version of the Dalai Lama’s palace in Lhasa, the Potala, which Qianlong hoped would provide a beacon of legitimacy for the Mongol princes. Other Chengde temples modeled on Tibetan originals included the Puning temple, built in 1755 to echo Samye, Tibet’s oldest monastery which itself combined Chinese, Indian and Tibetan architectural styles, and Xumifushou temple, built in 1780 for the visit of the Panchen Lama and modeled on that cleric’s monastery in Tibet, the Tashilunpo. In these ways the imperial project mobilized architecture in the service of its overall goals, making little secret of their intent to exert control over the faith and the faithful. It was in that broad context that the two wars against the Jinchuan, with their strong religious context, assumed so much weight in imperial reckoning.

The Second Jinchuan War
The Jinchuan or Giarong area of western Sichuan province was inhabited by largely self-governing ethnic minorities with hereditary chieftains, over whom the Qing claimed authority but in fact exercised little control. It was something like a fiefdom or series of fiefdoms within the empire, with frequent disputes between tribes over territory, interspersed with marriage alliances among their rulers. The Qing generally left them alone unless one chieftain displayed an inclination to increase his power at his neighbours’ expense. That was what had happened in the first Jinchuan war of the 1740s, when Qing armies had moved in to stop the advance of the chieftain known to them by his religious title, Shaluoben.
In the 1740s, the Qing had suppressed the Jinchuan with some difficulty, in what the Qianlong emperor later named the first of his ten great campaigns, but within twenty years the Jinchuan rose again. This time two leaders, cousins who were the grandsons of Shaluoben and respectively the leaders of the Greater and Lesser Jinchuan tribes, formed an alliance and jointly attacked their neighbours with a view to taking over their territory and steadily aggrandizing themselves. Their success was bound to be the Qing’s loss, so again the Qing intervened. Eventually Lesser Jinchuan was defeated, but not before the annihilation of a Qing army at Muguomu, in one of the Qing’s worst defeats in years.

It took several more years before Qing armies were able to capture the two cousins, Suonuomu and Senggesang. The troops had a very rough time in mountainous terrain, where the weather was extremely unpleasant and the natives both extraordinarily hostile and highly effective at resisting Qing assaults on their lofty stone fortresses. But in the end, at considerable cost and with the help of foreign-designed artillery, the Qing won the war and brought the area more fully under centralized control. One might end the story here, but for the question of religion.

At its outset, the Qing themselves characterized this particular war simply as a campaign to bring rebellious minority groups, loosely referred to as “the Jinchuan,” under Qing control. Initial reports made little suggestion of any religious connotations, suggesting that Qing authorities did not at first grasp the full scope of the situation, or at the very least that they were unwilling to make open reference to any religious component. But as the war dragged on, the Qianlong emperor and his advisers came to grasp with greater clarity that much more than purely political authority or territorial control was at stake.\(^\text{14}\)

In the Jinchuan area, a centre of the still competitive Tibetan Bon religion, native chieftains often held positions of religious as well as secular authority. Such was the case with Shaluoben, to whom some Qing officials at first referred as though this were his given name even though in fact it was a religious title denoting the principal master of a Bon monastery. This distinction became clearer in the course of the second war, as Qing generals at the Jinchuan front noted that it was customary for the younger sons of the Jinchuan rulers to become monks of the Bon religion, and that as such they automatically took the title Shaluoben. This was true of the chief holdout against the Qing in the second Jinchuan war, the leader of Greater Jinchuan, Suonuomu. Great-nephew of the nameless earlier “Shaluoben,” Suonuomu was sometimes referred to as Shaluoben Suonuomu, indicating his religious authority.\(^\text{15}\) However, not all the tribes in this area were Bon adherents, nor were they all on the side of Suonuomu in the war, and it must be said that the Qing were fairly adept at seeking out divisions among the different political and religious groups and using them against one another.
One of the Qianlong emperor’s close advisers was a Mongolian scholar-politician-cum-religious figure known in Chinese as the Zhangjia Khutukhtu and in Tibetan as Lcangskya Rolpay Dorje (1717-1786). A former classmate of the emperor’s, as a young man he had studied with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa and become closely identified with the Yellow Hat leadership, by whom he was ordained in 1735. Returning to Beijing, he played a dual role, on the one hand advising the emperor on Tibetan and Mongolian affairs, including religious matters, and sometimes acting as his personal emissary to the Tibetans and the Mongols, but on the other also sometimes acting as a semi-official representative of the Dalai Lama at the Qianlong court. In Beijing he used his unusually close relationship to the emperor, whom he was said to have initiated into the mysteries of Tantric ritual, to promote the cause of the Yellow Hats.  

Rolpay Dorje’s support for the Yellow Hats led him to despise their rivals of the Bon religion. From the perspective of the Yellow Hats, the Jinchuan war may well have appeared as an unforeseen bonus, in the sense that just as the Mongols had once helped them fend off Red Hat power, now Qing military power could help the Yellow Hats to destroy the Bon challenge to their supremacy. There is no doubt that it was partly owing to Rolpay Dorje’s influence that the Qianlong emperor was willing to try to suppress the Bon religion in the Jinchuan area. By doing so, he could ingratiate himself with the Dalai Lama and the Yellow Hats, with whom it was preferable to maintain as cordial relations as possible in order to discourage any attempt by the Mongols, or others, to supplant the Qing in Tibet. He also, allegedly, made use of Rolpay Dorje’s skills in invoking magic to win the war.

**Magic and War**

What the Qianlong emperor found objectionable about the Bon religion, perhaps more than its status as a religious competitor of the Yellow Hats, was its adepts’ ability to perform magic, which proved just as effective as gunfire in undermining his armies’ morale, already under severe assault. The Qianlong emperor, who liked to attribute his own military victories to divine assistance, could not allow others to do the same. Both Chinese and Tibetan sources suggest that magic, deployed by the Bon against the Qing and on behalf of the Qing against the rebels, played a significant role in the Jinchuan war.

The use of magic, especially against enemies, had long been a prominent feature of the Bon religion. Whether or not the Qianlong emperor himself believed in supernatural forces, to him what mattered was whether his troops believed that they were being undone by magic. Thus we find him, while making routine assertions of the power of the orthodox (zheng) to overcome the heterodox (xie), complaining about Bon monks chanting magical incantations against the Qing army, and about certain types of demon-traps (zhenyawu) that, when ritually buried by
Bon monks, might cause trouble to Qing armies, at the very least by unnerving them. The Qianlong emperor issued instructions that, if his armies unearthed any of these traps at the monasteries over which they were gradually assuming control, they should at once throw them into fire or water in order to destroy their magical power and to do it in such a way as to convince the troops that the devices no longer posed any danger. Even if they found none, they should still pretend to have done so, and should go through the motions of destroying them, so that the troops would once more take heart. Imperial credulousness was less important than imperial credibility, and in short, maintaining troop morale was a military issue for which no effort would be spared. The use of another Bon magical technique, thought to be an effective way of destroying one’s enemy, allegedly was ordered against the Qing by none other than Suonuomu of Greater Jinchuan himself. The technique involved inserting rolled-up papers inscribed with magic formulas or drawings of certain animals, such as foxes, eagles, snakes, and horses, thought to possess magical powers, inside hollow ox horns which were then buried in the ground.

But the Bon were not alone in calling on supernatural aid to win the war. According to Tibetan sources, the Qing responded in kind. Rolpay Dorje himself was said to have conjured up fireballs and dust-clouds that confounded the enemy and, in the end, enabled the Qing to pacify them. No such reference, however, has yet come to light in Chinese sources, which suggests that the Qianlong emperor may have preferred to attribute his victories, in public at least, to the greater military prowess of his armies and to divine aid.

Other Chinese accounts of the war suggest indirectly that the Qing used religion in the Jinchuan war in another way, one that had nothing to do with magic and the supernatural but came into the category of deploying extraordinary means to attain victory, perhaps also invoking the idea of using one alien religion against another. The emperor sent Félix da Rocha (1713-81), the Portuguese Jesuit director of the Imperial Board of Astronomy, to the battlefront to make more accurate surveys that would enable the Qing artillery to fire more effectively, and to supervise the casting of cannon on the spot, an expedient to which the Qing were driven by the precipitous terrain of the area. One of the Qing’s difficulties in the Jinchuan war was the insurgents’ ability to build tall stone towers that were virtually impregnable without effective artillery. Shortly after da Rocha reached the front, new cannon were built and fired, apparently in accordance with his directions, leading to the successful destruction of rebel towers, and thus making a direct contribution to the eventual Qing victory. See Figure IV.

Qing generals in the field suspected that local specialists in weather magic were also deploying their skills against their armies. One of the many problems encountered by Qing troops in the Jinchuan area was snow during May and June, biting winds, whirling hail, and torrential rain that turned roads into mud that came up to
Figure IV: Jinchuan Tower, Xiangshan

Photo by Liu Yuan
their horses’ bellies, making progress impossible. Throughout the war, the Qing forces felt that the atrocious weather had in some way been deliberately brought on by magicians. Adherents of the Red Hat sect of Tibetan Buddhism were, for some reason, thought to be particularly adept at using zhata or jada rain magic which, throughout Central and Inner Asia, was believed to be a potent weapon that could tip the balance in battle. One of its best-known invocations had been against Chingghis Khan himself, and belief in its efficacy prevailed among many Turkic and Mongol groups, including those whom the Qing generals fighting the Jinchuan had earlier encountered in the wars fought to conquer Xinjiang.

In 1772, three generals, possibly seeking to account for their inability to report much success in the war, addressed the emperor as follows:

At the beginning of the fourth month, it rained and snowed continuously on the troops on the southern front; really, in this uncivilized territory the weather is mostly cold and rarely warm; since….early spring there has been a biting wind every day, and driving rain that starts and stops without warning. We suspect that the Xiaojinchuan, who habitually practice the Red Religion, are using zhata rain magic.

The emperor’s response was ambiguous, reflecting the difficulty rulers felt at dealing with such a potentially sensitive issue. At first he acknowledged that conditions were so appalling as to constitute practically definitive proof of witchcraft; but then he fulminated about the dangers of letting people believe in this kind of thing:

These kinds of heterodox methods are bound to strike fear into people’s hearts, but the more we succumb to fear, the more outrageous their methods will be; if you confront spirits [by denying them spirit-hood], then the spirits naturally will be overcome…Wenfu and Agui must issue a proclamation to all the officers and men so that they all know my views on this.

He authorized bonuses or extra rations to keep up the troops’ morale regardless of the expense. No wonder, perhaps, that the second Jinchuan war was one of the costliest of all his campaigns.

In any event, whatever the effectiveness of the magic, it constituted an important weapon in the arsenal of both sides in the Jinchuan war. One side claimed that the Yellow Hats, represented by Rolpay Dorje, were confounding the insurgents through supernatural means in order to help the Qing side and, by association,
the Yellow Hats, while the other side claimed that the Bon and the Red Hats were using magic to undermine the Qing. There was a firm belief that magic was being used, accompanied by an uneasy feeling that it might be having some effect, as well as a clear sense that resorting to magic was not playing fair.

The religious significance of the second Jinchuan war partly stemmed also from the involvement of local lamas who, to imperial fury, took an active part in the fighting, reminding us of the fallacy of the modern view of Tibetans as a historically peaceable people. Not only did they advise the insurgents, they also sheltered them and fought with them. During the campaign, for example, Jinchuan troops frequently took refuge in monasteries, which Qing forces had first to expend considerable effort in capturing, and then to leave garrisoned with precious troops to prevent re-occupation by the enemy. Often, lamas produced supernatural weapons. The Qianlong emperor particularly resented those who chanted incantations against his armies, although he also objected to their joining in the fighting. In some instances too, it seems likely that lamas surrendered themselves, in the hope that Qing troops might hesitate to attack them in the same way that they would have done ordinary soldiers, or at least that their clerical status might save them from the severest punishment. On one occasion in early 1776, for example, no less than sixty lamas emerged from a monastery to surrender to the Qing, providing enough distraction to enable Jinchuan fighters who had been hiding there to escape.24

After the War

After the war, the emperor specified that the lamas must be moved out of the area to anticipate further trouble. Allowing the lamas to remain was both too risky and would be conniving at a breach of imperial law, for the utterance of imprecations against the emperor’s troops amounted to the practice of heterodox religion (xiejiao).25 Some were executed while others were transported to Beijing in cage-carts under tight security. Some of these prisoners were unlucky enough to find themselves part of the elaborate victory rituals in which among other things Suonuomu’s severed head was presented to the emperor in front of a vast audience arrayed before the Meridian Gate (Wu Men). The Jesuit father Amiot sent a detailed account of this episode to his correspondent in France, minister of state Henri Bertin, as we shall see in the next chapter. Other more fortunate lamas were transferred from Beijing to monasteries or temples within China proper or at the summer capital, Chengde, which were ordered to accommodate the lamas as probationers. If they tried to escape, they were subject to immediate execution. This relocation was, presumably, a form of forcible conversion, if we assume that the lamas sent away from the Jinchuan region were mostly Bon or Red Hats and the Chengde temples were Yellow Hat. It was analogous to another aspect of post-war
‘reconstruction’ in the Jinchuan region: the transformation of Bon monasteries into Yellow Hat monasteries.  

After the war, the Qianlong emperor attacked the Bon religion as a set of heterodox practices that could not be condoned. But, although such an attitude must have pleased Rolpay Dorje and the Dalai Lama, the emperor was hardly likely to deliver the Jinchuan region into the latter’s hands after a costly six-year war to regain control of it. He preferred instead to let the Bon and the Red Hats serve as a counterweight to Yellow Hat power in the region. Hence he rejected suggestions that he should allow lamas to be sent from Tibet to help resuscitate religious life in the war-torn area. As he saw it, where there were lamas, sooner or later there would be whole religious communities, and past experience strongly suggested that these always led to trouble. Monasteries destroyed in the war had been turned into military barracks and were to remain so, and any monasteries permitted to revive in the Jinchuan region would be manned by lamas sent from Beijing, presumably after careful government vetting. Alternatively, lamas from the De’ergeqing monastery, who had shown their loyalty by visiting Qing military encampments during the war to recite sutras on their behalf, would be installed in a revitalized monastery after conversion during an imperial audience held in Beijing for loyal subjects. In short, even as the Qianlong emperor expressed his support for the Yellow Hats, he had identified them as a potential threat to imperial security, and he regarded the other sects, the Bon and the Red Hats, as a means of checking the Yellow Hats’ advance. Moreover, just as the Yellow Hats used Rolpay Dorje as their unofficial representative at court, so the emperor placed carefully selected lamas in the Jinchuan region to act as his intelligence. It was possible for the rivals for power to play the same game against each other even as they pretended to be on the same side.

The Qianlong emperor’s attempts to eradicate the Bon religion in the Jinchuan area were not altogether successful. Perhaps they were not intended to be. In fact, the Bon religion was practiced there until the late twentieth century, when it appears to have been eradicated in the course of Communist campaigns against “superstition.” The Qing’s two-pronged approach—professions of whole-hearted support for the Yellow Hats accompanied by a series of steps that demonstrate his clear intention not to facilitate their path to exclusive power in the Jinchuan region—was an integral part of a policy designed to co-opt and control the Tibetan-Buddhists, itself vital to the establishment, expansion, and maintenance of the Qing empire. In the same way, the attacks on “black magic” were designed partly to improve military effectiveness and partly to remind the people that religious observance could easily drift over the line into sedition.

Imperial ambivalence about the combination of magic, religion, and warfare was not limited to the Jinchuan war. For instance, as Susan Naquin has described,
an observer on the government side in the Wang Lun uprising of 1774 (a war fought in an eastern province at the height of the second Jinchuan war in the west), recorded that rebels, chanting “guns will not fire,” appeared able to deflect government bullets. Certainly the chants were unnerving, and thought to have caused government troops to miss their targets consistently, although that may, of course, not have been the real reason. It sometimes seemed that only when Qing forces countered magic with magic were they able to overcome the enemy. So, with some success, at least in the realm of raising their own troops’ morale and demoralizing the others, they sent naked prostitutes onto the ramparts to deploy the yin force of their urine and menstrual blood (in fact the blood of chickens and black dogs) in the hope of terrifying and immobilizing their adversaries.\(^{28}\)

The Qianlong emperor’s attitude towards the use of magic in war may have hardened with time. His reaction to claims, made in yet another war, that rebels were using magic against Qing troops gives us a fairly clear sense of the imperial position by the 1780s, several years after the end of the second Jinchuan war. This later campaign also involved a religion with foreign connections, in this case an uprising staged by Muslims of Hezhou in Gansu province. The governor-general reported to the emperor that:

> When Qing troops fired their guns, [rebels] used swords and circulated charms so that the bullets fell to the ground in confusion. Only when they shot down Wang Fulin were they able to kill the rest of the enemy.

It is worth quoting the Qianlong emperor’s furious response at some length:

> Guns [wuqiang] are a valuable part of our arsenal and there is no match for them when they are fired properly. In other words, if our troops do not practice so as to become more accurate, when the time comes to fire they will often fire too high, and that is how they come to miss the enemy, or maybe the enemy starts firing before [our men] see them, or when the enemy arrives we run out of bullets or powder. This is a common and pervasive disease of the Green Standard Army. Just think! If the enemy can recite charms to avoid gunfire, why don’t they do it to avoid [our] arrows? [In that case the whole thing] would be much more credible [but since this is not in fact the case] there is absolutely no logic to this. Yet the common gunner of the Green Standard army is unskilled and relies on excuses to put the blame on others, without thinking that he might practice so as to be [well] prepared. Moreover, it means that any
residual devotees of heterodox religion (xiejiao) will hear it and in their turn rely on [such] words to mislead the masses.\(^{29}\)

Although it was clear that the Qianlong emperor did not believe in this type of magic, and regarded it as nothing more than an excuse, for military purposes he could not take a chance on others’ claiming to believe in it.\(^{30}\)

In the above diatribe Qianlong identified the Green Standard troops as chronic slackers, prone to blame their own incompetence on forces beyond human control, and he contrasted them unfavourably with the Manchu and Mongol banner forces. Such a claim draws attention to his long-held view that in military terms Manchus and Mongols were more reliable than Chinese. Qing military forces were divided into two main blocs in which despite their names ethnic separateness was not strictly maintained. The main armies used to fight wars in theory were drawn primarily from Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese-martial banner troops (the latter originally composed of northern Chinese families who had gone over to the Manchus before the conquest), while Green Standard forces, at least putatively composed primarily of Chinese, served as a kind of constabulary that could be used as auxiliary reserves in time of war. In the Second Jinchuan war the presence of the Green Standards on the battlefront made them a useful scapegoat.

The Qianlong emperor particularly raged against the Green Standard troops after the Muguomu debacle of 1773, a major disaster for the Qing military in which, as well, his son-in-law, commander Wenfu, died. In a particularly chilling episode that was too humiliating to be widely broadcast, Jinchuan forces reportedly had buried Wenfu up to his neck and galloped back and forth over his exposed head. Official accounts blamed the Muguomu catastrophe on the pusillanimity of deserting Green Standard troops, although the precise details of who first turned tail were not altogether clear. Still, imperial pronouncements repeatedly suggested that Manchu and Mongol troops banner would not have run away as the Green Standards were said to have done. In addition, Qianlong also took the opportunity to aim another dart at his armies’ claims about the enemy’s magical techniques by implying that banner troops would have drilled properly and simply would not have felt the need to claim that supernatural forces had made them miss their targets. Pursuing this tack, in later references to Green Standard ineptitude he specifically ordered that their soldiers must use the same illustrated drilling manuals as the crack Manchu troops.

Finding Chinese troops wanting in the martial prowess attributed to their Manchu and Mongol counterparts confirmed Qianlong’s worst opinion of their fighting abilities and justified his ongoing attempts to toughen them up, at the same time conveniently sparing the banner troops from ignominy. It also made it pos-
sible to turn a blind eye to the very real failings of the regular forces. Yet within a few decades these would become only too apparent.\textsuperscript{31}

**Conclusion**

The major wars of the high Qing—those that directly related to the great imperial project—all contained a significant religious element. In pursuit of empire, it was crucially important for the Qing to co-opt and control religious beliefs, particularly those with an external source of authority. The Qianlong emperor’s view of himself and his imperial aspirations were centred on a secure empire and one that exercised comprehensive power and control. In that regard, the secret of success, as he repeatedly noted both by quoting ancient Chinese texts and by urging on his officers the merits of rigorous training programmes, lay in military preparedness.\textsuperscript{32} Whatever claims Tibetan sources might make for the magical contributions of Rolpay Dorje, and though the Qianlong emperor might have felt that he had at least to appear to be paying attention to the enemy’s purported deployment of magic because of its devastating effect on morale, there was no room for any kind of religion that was not firmly under Qing control. There was too great a risk that it might interfere with his overall scheme of creating an effective army to extend and protect the great Qing empire. The religious basis of Qing rule allowed no latitude for even potential rivals, and hence formed an integral part of the wars of imperial expansion.
Military Ritual and the Qing Empire

In 1993, Christie’s auction galleries in New York City sold two eighteenth-century Chinese scrolls out of an original set of four. The scrolls depict certain awe-inspiring ceremonies held in Chang’an (modern Xi’an) to mark the departure of imperial troops on campaign. The collaborative work of several artists of the imperial painting academy, each scroll included an imperial poem, eleven collectors’ seals of the Qianlong emperor (1736-1795), and a jade catch engraved with the title of the scroll and the words “Qianlong nianzhi” (made in the Qianlong period).

If Qianlong could have known of the presence of scrolls such as these on the international art market almost two hundred years after his death, he would have been enormously gratified. The emperor, a Manchu who generally thought and functioned in military fashion, devoted a good deal of attention both to directing a series of wars and to orchestrating a cultural campaign that aimed to reinforce the martial emphasis of his reign. Specifically, this campaign was intended to create a distinctively Qing culture that would be founded on the bedrock of Manchu martial (wǔ) ideals, to which such more “civilized” (wén) virtues as literary and artistic accomplishment, traditionally dominant in Chinese culture, would yield at least some of their extraordinary prestige.

Commemorative art, such as the Christie’s scrolls, was produced to achieve these ends. Not only did it serve to document and publicize the news of Qing military (wǔ) successes, but also, as we will see, the rituals themselves that the paintings portrayed marked an important intersection of wén and wǔ. Finally the scrolls, the rituals they depicted, and—although the emperor could scarcely have imagined the context of the international art market—their appearance in late-twentieth-century New York, fulfilled two of the emperor’s most cherished wishes. The first was the accomplishment of multiple goals by a single means (yi ju liang de). The second was the instruction and edification of later generations into the distant future (chuishi jiuyuan), although the extent to which latter-day art connoisseurs grasped or experienced the scrolls’ original didactic function is open to question.¹

The centrepiece of the Qing cultural campaign was an intense focus on the value of military preparedness and the concomitant virtue of martial prowess,
attributes specifically associated with a Manchu culture that was more or less invented during the Qianlong era. The campaign had begun to take shape loosely by no later than the time of the Kangxi emperor (1662-1722), but escalated sharply from about 1750, when Qianlong began to raise the celebration of war and of martial values to new heights. He did so in part because of his passion for warfare and all its trappings, and his delight in military success—even when this was more rhetorical than real—and in part because he profoundly grasped the utility of both public display and ritual symbolism to the overarching project of imperial expansion. Military ritual, with its vast and highly visible theatricality, became an integral part of the process of cultural transformation.

The Qing empire reached its height in the second half of the eighteenth century. By that time the Manchus, who had taken over the rulership of China in 1644, had successfully built an empire that brought the territories ruled from Beijing to the greatest extent in history. In addition to China itself, it encompassed not only the Northeastern homelands of the ruling house (Manchuria), but also Mongolia, Tibet, and East Turkestan, known as Xinjiang. Embracing the diversity of the lands and peoples they controlled, the Qing drew on cultural traditions deriving from Inner Asia as well as from China to reinforce and legitimize their rule. In general, therefore, it should be borne in mind that “Qing” does not necessarily mean the same thing as “Chinese.”

The chapter contains two main, intersecting threads. The first describes and analyses a variety of Qing military rituals, each anchored by the emperor as cosmic actor and central powerhouse. Specifically, it discusses peacetime troop reviews held primarily to exhibit military might (*dayue*); ceremonies that marked the launching of a new campaign, such as those depicted in the Christie’s scrolls (*mingjiang*); and the series of triumphant celebrations that attended the successful conclusion of a war (*kaizu*). I have selected these particular examples of military ritual among many possible choices mainly because each illustrates the interplay both of *wu* and *wen* and of Inner Asian and Chinese elements, and because each involved both spectacular performance and detailed textual prescription. Furthermore, a notable abundance of visual sources supplementing the written record indicates these rituals’ unusual prominence. The second thread of the chapter explores the dissemination of military ritual to an audience extending well beyond participants and other eyewitnesses. What nowadays we might call the Qing propaganda machine exploited all available means of promoting the new Qing culture as broadly as possible. Yet the performance and broadcasting of military ritual also involved much more than mere propaganda. Beyond simply expressing or symbolizing imperial power, military ritual and its dissemination itself constituted an essential component of the accumulation and reiteration of imperial power. In Of Body and Brush: Grand Sacrifice as Text/Performance in Eighteenth-Century China, Angela Zito persuasively
made the case that the symbolic construction of imperial rule relied on both ritual texts and ritual performance. My investigation of military ritual of the same period, an aspect of imperial ritual not touched on in Zito’s work, in general confirms her findings, demonstrating further how the Qing utilized both the texts and performance of military ritual to promote their imperial and cultural objectives.3

Military ritual was of special relevance to the promotion of Qing culture not least because of its obvious pertinence to the relationship of civil and military, wen and wu. As the result of the close connection of ritual texts and performance, and of the systematic production of commemorative writings, paintings, and monuments, it offered an almost perfect opportunity for the achievement of two closely related goals. These goals were, first, the deployment of wen in the service of wu rather than the other way around, which was the more traditional way in which wen and wu tended to operate and, second, a virtually seamless integration of wen and wu in a context that could scarcely fail to advance the emphasis on and prestige of the latter. Military ritual thus helped tilt the balance between civil and military in favour of the latter.

Military ritual also offered a number of other advantages within the broader context of the cultural campaign. First, at a time when state censorship sought to limit the proliferation of theatre and drama as a hedge against their supposed corrupting influence on members of the elite, the spectacle of military rituals in some sense offered a state-sanctioned alternative, intended to educate by projecting the power of the Qing state and the martial prowess upon which it rested. Second, by injecting a markedly more military ethos into the mainstream of Qing culture, it promoted the enforcement of rule by bringing into being a new collective self-imaginary, in a manner somewhat reminiscent of eighteenth-century England as described by Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, despite the profoundly different historical context.4

Both the highly visible drama of military ritual, and the production and dissemination of written accounts and pictorial images of the drama, were of central importance to this process, which is reminiscent of the “theatre of majesty” that Foucault and others have regarded as an effective means of reifying and reinforcing political power.5 The deployment of highly theatrical and symbolically charged spectacle to reinforce political power offered matchless possibilities for making Qing power and its military foundations at first acceptable and then a source of pride to an audience that was, in effect, indispensable to the overall production.

These techniques recall in at least some respects those described by Chandra Mukerji in her discussion of the Versailles gardens of Louis XIV of France, whose military engineers designed and built his pleasure gardens in a highly militaristic style—trees in military formation, buildings like fortifications, and so on—to emphasize French military power by making it a backdrop for state occasions.
Qianlong may well have been aware of all this—the Yuanmingyuan palace his Jesuits designed were partly modeled on Versailles—but we cannot state with any certainty that the French example actually influenced his decisions. In the mid-eighteenth century, as Qianlong raised the cultural campaign to a new level of intensity, the reconfiguration of texts on the theory, the practice, and the history of ritual more generally, became a major focus of scholarly attention, both that functioning under imperial sponsorship and that undertaken privately. In the early to middle Qianlong reign, three seminal texts on ritual were published within a few years of one another. These texts were, first, \textit{Daqing tongli} (Comprehensive Rites of the Great Qing) (1756); second, \textit{Wuli tongkao} (A Comprehensive Investigation of the Five Rites) (1761); and third, \textit{Huangchao liqi tushi} (Illustrated Regulations and Models of Ritual Paraphernalia of Our August Dynasty) (1766). The first and third of these were published specifically under imperial auspices, while the \textit{Comprehensive Investigation} was privately compiled with the help of contributors who included men affiliated in one way or another with the court and the government. With such connections, this work was as susceptible to imperial influence as the overtly imperially-sponsored compilations, so that we should not be surprised to discover that within it, as much as in the other two, military ritual featured prominently.

\textit{Daqing tongli}, the official handbook for rituals, lays out in detail the regulations for each individual part of every ritual activity, including all the audiovisual effects: who should participate, what each person should wear, where they should stand, in what direction they should face, how they should move, precise timing, musical instruments to be played, specific pieces of music appropriate for different stages of the ritual, number of cannon-shots to be fired, and so on. It is divided into sections according to the five rituals of the Chinese institutional tradition. Among these, military ritual appears as the third category of rituals that claimed venerable ancestry, in some cases dating back as far as the classical period of the Zhou (12\textsuperscript{th}-3\textsuperscript{rd} centuries B.C.E.). The other categories are, in order, auspicious rituals (jili); joyous rituals (jiali); guest rituals (binli), and funerary rituals (xiongli).

Under the imperatives of the Qing cultural campaign, in the \textit{Daqing tongli} military ritual had advanced its position in the hierarchy of ritual categories from fourth to third, on the grounds that this better conformed with ancient practice. The claim was disingenuous, however, for these structural changes also gave strikingly greater prominence to those rituals pertaining to military matters. The shift in emphasis was, of course, fully intentional. To leave no room for doubt, the introductory remarks prefacing the section on military rituals declared, in what were becoming formulaic terms, that the military accomplishments of the Qing guojia (“state”) far surpassed those of antiquity.
In the second text, *Wuli tongkao*, whose principal compiler was the ritual authority Qin Huitian (1702-64), military rituals occupy fourteen out of two hundred sixty-two chapters (*juan*). The subject-matter covered is as much historical as prescriptive, including for instance a chronological account of the military system as it had evolved since Zhou times. The subheadings address a number of topics, such as equine administration (*mazheng*), and hunting (*tianlie*), that, although they were favoured Qing pursuits explicitly linked to Inner Asian martial prowess, were excluded from the sections of the institutional compendia on military ritual, which were based on Chinese precedents.\(^1\)

The third text, *Huangchao liqi tushi*, illustrates ritual paraphernalia and provides detailed specifications. It is divided into six sections: 1) ritual vessels and objects in jade, porcelain, bronze and lacquered wood; 2) astronomical instruments used to determine the dates for rituals; 3) costume; 4) musical instruments; 5) imperial insignia; and 6) armour and weapons, under the revealing heading of “military preparedness” (*wubei*). It was somewhat unusual to include the sixth category in such a collection. Both the imperial preface to this text, and the eighteenth-century authors of its entry in the annotated index to the imperial bibliographical collection (*Siku quanshu zongmu*), explicitly justify the inclusion of weapons (and astronomical instruments) among the ritual paraphernalia by reference to their intrinsic importance to governance as well as to the practices of the Zhou period of antiquity.\(^2\) At least some of the weapons illustrated in this text were certainly used in battle as well as for ritual purposes in the Qing, suggesting that in this case at least, no clear functional distinction was drawn. This fuzzy demarcation underscored the way in which, under the Qing, military ritual increasingly possessed practical as well as symbolic attributes.

By reconfiguring the hierarchy of rituals to give greater prominence to military ritual, by diluting their Chinese pedigree with the introduction of elements from the Inner Asian tradition, and by including weapons among ritual paraphernalia, these texts helped transform traditional ritual into composite forms more suitable to the new cultural emphasis. Even when the texts did reiterate classical Chinese forms, once a means of claiming the virtually unimpeachable sanction of antiquity, they edged into a cultural minefield, since devotion to recovering the authentic ritual texts of old once had signified the expression of anti-Qing sentiment on the part of Han-Chinese scholars. In these texts, however, the Qing themselves had co-opted this formerly autonomous scholarly trend to serve imperial purposes, in a form of manipulation that was integral to their style of ruling. In doing so, they transformed these texts into legitimizing documents of Qing culture.\(^3\)

For present purposes, the term, military ritual (*junli*), refers to formal, public, ceremonial events listed in such institutional compendia as the *Daqing tongli*.\(^4\) As in the Qing, the term does not encompass the worship of the god of war, Guandi,
a cult increasingly widespread during the Qing period, and with whom the apo-
theosized Qing founder, Nurhaci (1550-1626) came to be associated; nor does it
cover in any detail reverence for the god of artillery (paoshen), an important figure
ranking in the lower echelons of the popular pantheon to whom, for instance, road-
side sacrifices might be made en route to a war. The junli listed in the institutional
compendia did not include shamanic rituals relating to war, which thus are referred
to only very briefly here, nor did they include the annual hunts held at Mulan in
Manchuria, because these were not Chinese but Inner Asian in origin. The latter,
however, are addressed below; first, because of their military content and purpose;
second, because they provided a subtle means of drawing diverse imperial subjects
together in a military context; and third, because like the Chinese military rituals
they provided material for artistic production. In all these ways they served the
Qing cultural campaign. We turn now to examine the stipulated procedures and
actual practice of some of these rituals.

**Grand Inspections (Dayue)**

Grand Inspections were the first listed under the general heading of military ritual
in the Daqing tongli, in a Qing innovation giving greater prominence to these periodic
peacetime troop reviews than they had previously enjoyed. This shift may well
have related to the fact that after the 1690s, when Kangxi rode out on campaign
against the Western Mongol leader Galdan, no emperor participated directly in
battle. After that time, therefore, the several formal categories of imperial ritual
involving personal campaigning by the emperor became, in effect, anachronistic,
and emperors had to find other means of showcasing their martial skills. The
Qing rearrangement of the order of military rituals may also have borne some
relationship to the adjustment of hierarchy among the various categories of ritual
discussed above.

What later became ascribed as the first Qing dayue—although at the time it may
not have been performed with the deliberate intention of setting a formal and spe-
cific precedent—took place prior to 1636, under Hung Taiji (1592-1643), son of
dynastic founder Nurhaci and originator of Qing imperial ambitions. Subsequently
dayue became a regular feature of public ritual performance, although it took
some time before it reached a fixed form and became a regular event. In 1685, for
instance, when the Kangxi emperor noted, as he often did, the vital importance of
conspicuous military preparedness, he also proposed that drills and training take
place annually. He further ordered that Inspections should be performed for the
specific edification of the Inner Asian vassal states. Eventually he called for the
triennial performance of dayue, although in practice they seem to have taken place
rather less frequently.
In Beijing, Grand Inspections took place in the park of Nanyuan, a hunting preserve located to the south of the city. Others were performed in the pre-conquest capital of Shenyang. The choice of these locations, physically and symbolically close to imperial power, lent the occasions a special awesomeness that helped enforce Qing rule; conversely, Nanyuan in particular became known (beyond the already martial connotations of a hunting-ground) chiefly for its association with dayue.

The sheer scale of a dayue was enormous. Over a period of several months, it absorbed ritual experts; workmen who erected the necessary temporary structures; participating troops and officers (and no doubt members of their families who must have been aware of what was taking place); and members of the imperial household; as well as a range of civil servants—from the Boards of War, Rites, and Works (bingbu, libu, gongbu), the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu), the Grand Secretariat (neige), the Imperial Equipage Department (huanyiwei), the Imperial Armoury (wenbeiyuan); the Imperial Board of Astronomy (qintianjian), the Court of State Ceremonial (honglusi) and the Music Bureau (yuebu)—who were involved in practical planning and preparation. It was a piece of political theatre in which the act of viewing effectively incorporated spectators into the performance. Beyond this, the transfer of so much manpower, ritual accoutrements, and weaponry to and from the training ground, and along the almost ten kilometres route to the Nanyuan, helped to hammer home the notion of the state as repository of massive military strength. None of those involved, directly or indirectly, can have failed to grasp on some level that what they were involved in was a hugely authoritative affirmation of Qing military power. In a variety of ways, then, the dayue became, literally, a force to be reckoned with in the lived experience of substantial numbers of people.

The preparation and actual ceremony of a dayue absorbed several months. It began with orders to the various military divisions within the Eight Banners to get their weapons, armour, drums, flags, and banners into good repair. The Imperial Board of Astronomy determined the appropriate day for the ceremony. Two months ahead of the date set, the various divisions undertook training at the military inspection grounds (yanwuchang), practising every drill and manoeuvre until it was ready for perfect performance on the day of the ceremony. One month ahead, the place where the ritual was to be performed was formally selected and purified. In final preparation, the soldiers were brought by the supervising civil officials and military officers to work on the choreographic details and practise their drills in situ. The directors of the Imperial Armoury also began to prepare the setting for the ceremony as a military encampment, installing a circular tent in which a throne was placed dead centre. Inside the tent they placed the equipment the emperor would use, including his ceremonial armour, bow, and arrows.
Soldiers of the Eight Banners were ranged on two sides, with bordered yellow, plain white, bordered white and plain blue on the east side, and plain yellow, plain red, bordered red and bordered blue on the west side. Silence was required. Each division set up its flag, gong and drum, and weaponry until everything was deemed to be exactly right. One day before the actual ceremony, ritual experts of the Imperial Equipage Department set out the imperial insignia. The imperial route having first been appropriately purified, the emperor entered his carriage and proceeded to his temporary palace, escorted as always both ahead and to the rear. Meanwhile members of the imperial family and officials welcomed and paid their respects to the insignia.  

The Comprehensive Rites specified in detail who participated in the Grand Inspection, giving quotas for each banner and its military divisions. Participants ran to tens of thousands of people including—aside from the emperor—officers, armed soldiers, musketeers, cannoneers, drummers, beaters of the gong, bearers of the various regimental and ceremonial colours, horse managers, and so on. Each banner was to present ten shenwei (wonderful and terrible) cannon, for a total of eighty; other weapons, such as the zimu (mother and son) cannon, were also on display. Some, as we will see, were fired in the course of the ceremony. At the appointed moment, each man took up his precisely prescribed position, while senior officials of the Board of War (staff positions normally filled through the civil appointments process) went to report to the emperor at his temporary palace. The cannon fired three times and musicians performed a form of military music, naoge dayue, that had venerable antecedents dating back to the Han empire (206 B.C.E.-220 C.E.) The spectacle of such a throng of people and weaponry and the sound of cannonfire and martial music gave unambiguous visual and auditory expression to the triple mantra of military power, combat-readiness, and devotion to martial ideals.  

The emperor, clad in ceremonial armour with a helmet whose Sanskrit inscription referred to a form of universal rulership derived from the Inner Asian tradition, rode out of his temporary palace to the imperial encampment where the ritual would take place. He was escorted by some sixty officers, armed with muskets, swords or quivers with bows and arrows, and when he reached the encampment the president of the Board of War formally requested that he inspect the troops. The main ceremony then began. 

Officials of the Imperial Armoury carried a golden-dragon canopy in front of the emperor as, already armed with a sword, he donned a ceremonial quiver and bow-holder and rode out, escorted by the president of the Board of War and two vice-presidents, and followed by various other senior officials and bodyguards. The emperor passed down the middle of the precisely-arrayed troops, with the Guards (hujunying), Vanguard Division (qianfengying), and Corps of the Line (xiao-
jiying) in front of him and the Artillery and Musketry Division (huoqiying) behind. Then the emperor returned to the front of the encampment, dismounted, removed his quiver and bow-holder, and proceeded to the tent. The various officials in attendance dismounted and followed, each standing in his prescribed position and facing in the prescribed direction beside his horse, with golden-dragon pennants and great banners aloft. To avoid any possible disturbance to the ritual sequence, thirty Manchu, Solon, and Mongol guards experienced at handling horses were assigned to each group, ready to calm them in case any should become startled.  

Upon a signal from the emperor, the princes and officials performed an obeisance and sat down. Then the president of the Board of War stepped forward and requested that a horn be blown to commence the drills. He returned to his position once this was granted, and the Imperial Equipage Department led forward the hornblowers, who blew the Mongolian great horn in front of the encampment. Conch-shell and drum were sounded, and cannon fired. Different groups passed in and out of a deerhorn barricade erected for the purpose, performing drills in swordplay, firearms, archery, and other martial skills. The conclusion of the ceremony was announced by the president of the Board of War. The emperor removed his armour and helmet, followed in short order by the various attendants, and, now clad in semiformal dress, they followed the imperial carriage back to the temporary palace. The cannon fired three times and to conclude, more martial music played. After the ceremonies were over, the emperor bestowed gifts of wine and other delicacies on the assembled officers and bureaucrats.

A few examples, drawn from the above description, suffice to demonstrate how Grand Inspections neatly incorporated elements from the Inner Asian tradition into an originally Chinese military ritual. For instance, the inclusion of horses in the ritual was an encoded reference, unlikely to have escaped anyone, both to the military power to which horses were essential, and to the Inner Asian regions from which horses were imported and with which Qing martial prowess was closely associated. The emperor’s ceremonial helmet, marked with references to Inner Asian traditions yet simultaneously capable of linkage to ancient Chinese notions of universal rulership, served a similar function. The inclusion of the Mongolian horn, in addition to the more usual conch-shell horn, and the prominence of archery in the displays of military skills—a routine marker of Manchu martial prowess yet also one of the “six skills” (liuyi) of Chinese antiquity—illustrate some other ways in which it was possible for the Qing to impress their mark upon Chinese practice. The multiplicity of meanings kneaded into the dayue were, simply, emblematic of the new Qing culture.

Grand Inspections were the subject of at least two documentary paintings done by court artists, whose function often resembled that of official photographers in our own times. A famous example done by the Jesuit artist Castiglione (Lang
Shining, 1688-1766) depicts the Qianlong emperor at a dayue. He is mounted on a skewbald horse, wearing armour and helmet, and carrying a bow and a quiver of arrows. Another dayue painting, an anonymous handscroll on silk, thought on the basis of archival evidence to have been done by court artist Jin Kun in 1746, gives a fine sense of the serried troops awaiting inspection, their different-coloured banners aloft. Both these paintings are now in the Palace Museum, Beijing. In particular the former, reproduced from art catalogues to T-shirts, has in modern times become the signature image of the Qing empire.

The Qianlong emperor wrote a number of poems describing dayue, the general tone of which promoted the goals of the campaign to militarize culture. Thus one that refers to the first Grand Inspection of his reign, held in 1739, is rife with metaphors drawn from hunting, and expresses the wish to spread word of the fine imperial troops throughout the empire. Another, dating from 1758, draws attention to the roaring of the cannon, testimony to Qing military strength. Such ritual-related texts were another way of inserting reference to military power into the written record beyond the ritual compilations and institutional compendia. They surfaced in a wide variety of contemporary works, including collections of imperial poetry, a history of Beijing (in the section on the Nanyuan park), and the catalogue of the imperial paintings collection. This type of widespread reproduction enlarged the scope of the Grand Inspection, not least by the range of scholars who worked on, heard about, and actually read such works but who might otherwise have had little direct contact with the ritual. In other words, the dayue became a part of the wider artistic and literary record of the period and enlarged the scope of cultural memorabilia of this era, imbuing them with a specifically Qing character; in other words, they resonated with the power of armed force and martial skills.

Dispatching Generals Embarking on Campaign (Mingjiang)

Like Grand Inspections, mingjiang shows how extremely adept the Qianlong emperor could be both at melding wen and wu and at invoking apparently legitimizing precedents drawn from either or both Chinese and Inner Asian traditions. In 1616, Nurhaci had solemnized his declaration of war on the Ming by performing a ritual ceremony at the Tangse, the site for state shamanic rituals, in his capital at Hetu Ala, burning a written oath to Heaven upon a yellow altar and enumerating his causes for war. This act, later solemnized as a key moment in the Manchus’ assumption of the Mandate of Heaven, was invoked by Nurhaci’s successors as a precedent for the performance of some form of ceremonial act on occasions of this nature.

Some such sense may have prompted Nurhaci’s son, Hung Taiji, to perform ceremonies at the Tangse in Shengjing, by this time the new (interim) Qing capital, when he dispatched his brothers, Dodo (Duoduo, 1614-49) and Ajige (1605-51),
to do battle against the Ming in 1636. Later he went personally to bid them farewell. Hung Taiji’s ceremonies themselves later were cited as early examples of the performance of *mingjiang* by a Qing ruler, but this assertion may have formed part of the retrospective elevation of Hung Taiji to the rank of first emperor of the Qing, made after the anticipated empire had become a reality. In any event, Hung Taiji’s rites formed a bridge between those of his father, Nurhaci, and those claimed in the eighteenth century as direct descendants of the practices of Chinese antiquity.

Under Qianlong, as the emperor steadily appropriated and institutionalized the more fluid practices of his forebears so as to create a Qing tradition, *mingjiang* assumed a fixed form that drew on both Chinese and Inner Asian traditions. Qing rulers came to regard these polyvalent rituals as necessary legitimating acts. Qing rulers came to regard these polyvalent rituals as necessary legitimating acts.

*Mingjiang* involved a range of civil as well as military officials. The imperial insignia were set out, with stone chimes for musical accompaniment, and a table was set up in the Taihedian (the Hall of Supreme Harmony, located in the Forbidden City, where important state rituals were held) for the imperial credentials sent by the emperor. Princes, lords, and officials, clad in formal ceremonial clothing (*mangpao*) decorated with different dragons depending on rank, and bearing their rank badges, stood in order of precedence.

The general and officers who were actually going on campaign waited on the east side facing west, similarly attired. Senior officials from the Board of Rites proceeded to the Gate of Sovereign Purity, (*Qianqingmen*)—in the heart of the Forbidden City—to request the emperor’s attendance. At the Meridian Gate (*Wu Men*)—the front entrance of the Forbidden City, bells and drums were sounded. Clothed in full imperial dragon robes, the emperor rode out in his carriage as far as the north side of the Taihedian, then alighted and entered the hall. A prescribed piece of court music was played until the emperor had ascended the throne; then the whipcrack sounded three times, followed by more music.

Surrounded on either side by those who were going on campaign, all kneeling, the commander-in-chief was then led forward to receive the credentials, which were passed from official to official and eventually handed over with great ceremony by a Grand Secretary, to a musical accompaniment. After he and the other officers preparing to go on campaign performed three kneelings and nine obeisances, the music stopped. All left and the whipcrack sounded. The emperor rose as more music was played, and then returned to the palace.

On the actual day of departure, the emperor went through the Meridian Gate to the Tangse, preceded by the imperial insignia. There horn and conch were blown, and ceremonies took place in which emperor, commander-in-chief, and princes going on campaign all took part. Then the emperor proceeded to a specially erected yellow tent outside the Chang’an Gate in the south wall of the Imperial Palace, where he personally handed wine to the commander-in-chief from a tem-
porary throne. After ritually partaking, the commander led the other campaigning officers in performing the three kneelings and nine obeisances. Armed with their bows and arrows, they took their leave of the emperor, mounted their horses and set off. After the emperor had passed back through the Meridian Gate, he sent an official to give a farewell feast with tea and wine outside the gates of the capital. After the feast, which involved further ceremonial, they made obeisance towards the capital to thank the emperor for his beneficence.

As in the case of the dayue, court painters were commissioned to record mingjiang so as to popularize them as far afield as possible. The aforementioned Christie’s scrolls, for example, were produced to mark just such an occasion, in this case the departure of troops under Fuheng (d.1770) to fight the Jinchuan peoples in western Sichuan in the 1740s. Military rituals such as these, with their impressive ceremonial and spectacle, were ideal subject-matter for a visual record of the military preparedness and martial prowess that formed the centrepiece of Qing culture.

Welcoming a Victorious Army upon Return (Jiaolao)

Jiaolao formed the most important and most spectacular portion of the series of rituals classified under the umbrella term of “returning triumphant from war” (kaizu). The term, jiaolao, denotes the practice of emperors who rode out beyond the limits of the capital city to welcome and applaud generals returning victorious from a campaign, bestowing on them such favours as rewards and feasts. Jiaolao was known in theory from the canonical books of the ancient Zhou rites (the Zhouli and the Yili) and from the Zuozhuan commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals (Qunqiu) attributed to Confucius, and hence laid claim to the most venerable of classical Chinese origins. As in the case of mingjiang, this ceremony also had specifically Qing antecedents and could trace its origins to Nurhaci, who in 1621 had held a formal celebration to mark the capture of Liaodong. As the wars to gain control of the Ming empire gathered momentum, such ceremonies became almost commonplace among the Manchus. At least ten times, between 1627 and 1642, Hung Taiji had ridden out to greet triumphant returning armies. As we have already seen with both dayue and mingjiang, these earlier jiaolao ceremonies may have been specifically identified only later as formal military rituals conforming to Chinese tradition, although it is also possible that Hung Taiji adopted the practice after learning of it from Chinese officials and commanders who had transferred their allegiance to the Manchus.

During the Kangxi reign, some form of ceremony resembling jiaolao took place several times during and upon the conclusion of the war against the Three Feudatories (sanfan, 1673-81). Jiaolao also marked Kangxi’s defeat of Galdan in 1697, and the capture of rebel Khoshote leaders in Qinghai in 1724, under Kangxi’s successor Yongzheng. But, as we have seen in other instances as well, it
was only the Qianlong emperor who institutionalized *jiaolao*, in a series of regulations issued in 1749.

The first major military victory of the Qianlong reign—albeit achieved only with considerable difficulty and after the execution for incompetence and dishonesty of both original commanders—was the defeat of the Jinchuan in 1749. Although the emperor had formally seen the troops off to war, as depicted in the Christies scrolls, he did not personally ride out to greet Fuheng, the victorious general, that year. Instead he sent others to do so in his place, while limiting himself to holding a banquet and bestowing rewards, perhaps because he had not yet fully grasped the infinite potential of *jiaolao* in terms of the cultural campaign. It was only later that Qianlong retroactively elevated the first Jinchuan war to a position of particular significance. He included it in the list of the ten complete victories (*shi quan wu gong*) to which he laid claim when towards the end of his reign he assumed the sobriquet *shi quan lao ren* (old man of the ten complete victories) towards the end of his reign.\(^{36}\)

Nonetheless, 1749 was the year in which Qianlong began to set the stage for the spectacular celebration of his subsequent victories by establishing a series of regulations that institutionalized the form of *kaizu* (returning triumphant from a war) rituals for the future. From then on, when a commander-in-chief sent word of victory, it became the rule that sacrifices and a formal, ritual announcement were performed at the temples of Heaven and Earth, the Temple to the Imperial Ancestors, the national altars, the imperial tombs, and Confucius’ tomb. Furthermore, a commemorative text was to be engraved on a stele that would be installed at the National Academy (*Guozi jian*). At the same time, the form of the rituals (*xianfu, shoufu*), in which war captives were presented to the emperor and disposed of, was established. These rituals, covered in Chapter Two in the context of commemoration, are discussed in detail below. Further regulations implemented in that same year of 1749 prescribed the formal ceremonies at which a victorious commander would return his credentials to the emperor and attend an imperial feast. The Board of War would scrutinize the record and propose rewards for meritorious acts on the part of the commander-in-chief, officers, and soldiers who had gone on campaign. Rewards would then be distributed as appropriate. Finally, a new sub-agency of the Grand Council was created. It had special responsibility for the production of official campaign histories (*fanglüe*), earlier versions of which had been produced in a relatively ad hoc manner by senior scholars. This historiographical office not only produced official histories of all subsequent major campaigns but also compiled an account of the wars of dynastic transition of the preceding century.\(^{37}\)

Major ritual victory celebrations, including a full-scale *jiaolao*, marked the mid-century conclusion of the wars for the conquest of Xinjiang, the major military achievement of the Qianlong reign. Thus in 1760, accompanied by all the
senior officials in the capital, attired in ceremonial garb, and preceded by the awe-inspiring imperial insignia, Qianlong rode out to a temporary palace set up at Huangxinzhuang in Liangxiang county, located outside the city walls approximately thirty kilometres from the imperial palace. There, in person, he ritually welcomed back commander-in-chief Zhaohui (1708-64) and his army, including Muslims who had fought in the campaign. A yellow tent was set up with an imperial throne in the centre, facing south, flanked on each side by eight blue tents. Beyond, a special platform was constructed, adorned with flags, at least some of which represented trophies captured from the enemy. As musicians played the appropriate ritual music, the emperor ascended the platform, and together with all the senior generals in full armour, and selected senior civilian officials, he made obeisance to heaven, performing the ritual of three kneelings and nine obeisances in gratitude for the victory, which was formally attributed to divine assistance. Afterwards, the emperor received each man in the yellow tent.

There can be little doubt that the spectacle of the emperor, clad in full ritual garb, displaying the elaborate imperial insignia, journeying with a huge retinue of troops, officials and musicians, over several kilometres to a location beyond the city walls, attracted enormous attention. This political theatre surely riveted the attention of all who came into contact with it. Moreover, the triumphant atmosphere in this case undoubtedly meant that jiaolao surpassed in impact both the military display of troop reviews and the general optimism surrounding the launch of a new campaign, precisely because it reconfirmed the martial core of Qing culture at the same time as it promoted it. Overall, jiaolao contributed signally to the identification of the entire ritual sequence as integral to the accumulation of imperial power in ways that texts, paintings, and monuments could not achieve alone. At the same time, the opportunity to share in imperial glory helped foment a desire to belong to the new Qing collectivity, whose defining ethos was, increasingly, military prowess and the triumphs it could and did achieve.

Qianlong took a close personal interest in jiaolao, as we can see from his correspondence with general Agui (1717-97) upon the successful conclusion of the second Jinchuan war in 1776, a victory that the emperor had long and anxiously awaited. In that correspondence we see the emperor, for instance, fretting about the precise timing of the jiaolao in relation to the announcements of victory that had to be made to the ancestors and at Confucius’ tomb in accordance with the 1749 regulations, both because of his own schedule and because Agui needed to stay in Sichuan for some time to attend to matters arising from the conclusion of the war. Although originally the emperor had proposed that Agui make his way to Huangxinzhuang—once again the site for the jiaolao—by the middle of the fourth month, eventually he postponed the ceremony until the end of the fourth month to allow everyone plenty of time to get there.
The emperor explicitly noted that the purpose of the *jiaolao* ceremony was not merely to honour the victorious returning general, but to manifest the substantial quality of his martial valour (and, by implication, that of the Qing themselves) and his exceptional loyalty and merit (*yi zhang ding wu hong xun*). In other words, since the personal glory of the victorious Qing general endowed the state with splendour in its wake, *jiaolao*, by identifying the military commander with the state, marked the exaltation of both.\(^{39}\)

Fully conscious of this identification, the emperor composed commemorative poems for the *jiaolao* marking the conquest of Xinjiang in 1755 and in 1760 and for that following the suppression of the Jinchuan in 1776. At least one of these (that of 1760) was engraved on a monument installed at Liangxiang, where Huangxinzhuang was located, to mark the celebration of the *jiaolao*. Liangxiang thus assumed a special place in the imperial history with which it was indelibly associated. And as the imperial last word, the text of the inscription assumed an almost sanctified status; it was reprinted in local histories of Liangxiang county, in a history of Beijing, in the catalogue of the imperial paintings collection, and elsewhere.\(^{40}\) In such ways, word of Qing military triumph was disseminated to a broad, albeit a primarily elite, readership, reinforcing the message conveyed by the performance of *jiaolao*.

**The Presentation and Reception of Captives (*xianfu, shoufu*)**

As noted in Chapter Two, the twin ceremonies of *xianfu* and *shoufu* involved the presentation and disposition of war captives, and were reserved for important victories. Known in some form since antiquity they were particularly associated by cognoscenti of the Chinese ritual tradition with emperor Taizong of the Tang, a model whom Qianlong explicitly and repeatedly sought first to emulate and then to surpass. *Xianfu* and *shoufu* not only signaled major victories, but defined the moment and the space in which they occurred, which was of course precisely the emperor’s intention: he wanted military success to be the defining characteristic of his reign and everything minutely associated with it.

During the Qing, *xianfu* and *shoufu* were performed less than a dozen times, for the most part in connection with the protracted campaigns in Central Asia, coming to an end after the ceremonies marking the suppression of an uprising in Xinjiang in 1828.\(^{41}\) They formed part of a prescribed sequence that was not always followed in practice. In theory the two ceremonies routinely followed *jiaolao* and a formal banquet held for the victorious army, succeeding one another within twenty-four hours, but in practice the sequence appears sometimes to have been interrupted or altered. In 1776, for instance, when as we have seen the emperor personally attended to the timing of the series of rituals marking the end of the second Jinchuan war, *xianfu* took place on the 25\(^{th}\) of the fourth month, and then,
without the *shoufu* being performed, the emperor departed for Huangxinzhuang the following day for a *jiaolao* that took place on the 27th. The celebratory banquet took place the same day—the emperor himself pouring wine for his generals in the presence of the Grand Councillors—and included dancing performances and some tribal displays by captive Jinchuan children, perhaps to the accompaniment of music played on Jinchuan instruments. *Shoufu* was performed on the 28th, a full three days after *xianfu.*

The emperor sometimes thought strict adherence to the letter of the regulations governing the series of celebratory rituals as unnecessary as adherence to the prescribed sequence of ceremonies, as we can see from his Instructions relieving most of the generals from playing a direct part in the rituals, quoted in Chapter Two. In 1776 he required the participation only of Fukang’an (d.1796), then a relatively minor official who had distinguished himself in the war against the Jinchuan. Fukang’an later enjoyed a stellar military career, which included command of Qing troops against the Gurkhas in Tibet, and the governor-generalship in Guangzhou. Possibly he was singled out in this way as the result of his association with the rapidly rising star of the imperial favourite, Heshen.

As with all rituals, the participants’ every movement in *xianfu* and *shoufu* was strictly prescribed. On the day appointed for the *xianfu,* designated officials of the Board of War brought in the prisoners through the right-hand entrance of the Chang’an gate to the Tian’an gate, leading them by a white silken cord fastened around the neck. They waited by the outer gate of the Temple to the Imperial Ancestors. They formally announced the victory and capture of the prisoners, who were then turned over to the Board of Justice (*xingbu*) for punishment.

An eyewitness account of the 1776 *shoufu* ceremony that followed the eventual suppression of the Jinchuan was sent to France by Father Amiot (1718-93), one of the leading French Jesuits at the Qing court, where he remained from 1751 until his death in 1793. His description is worth quoting at some length for the vivid image it presents of a highly theatrical ceremony:

...The *shoufu* consists of receiving war captives and deciding their fate. For this occasion the empire brought together as much that was grand and august as possible. This ceremony takes place in the third court of the Palace bordered to the north by the gate known as Wu-men. The emperor is [seated upon] a throne installed in a raised gallery on a twenty-five-foot high terrace, surmounted by a building that might be as much as fifty feet tall. Next to the emperor are the senior officers of the Crown, while below are the Princes, Dignitaries (*Régulos*), Counts, and great Mandarins. Up and down this immense courtyard, as far as the eye can see, are
the imperial insignia, flags, standards, pikes, maces, clubs, dragons, instruments, symbolic figures and I know not what, two parallel lines, on the east and west sides, going on ad infinitum. The bearers are dressed in red silk embroidered with gold; a second line is made up of the imperial officials (tribunaux), and a third consists of the Imperial Guard armed as for war.

In the forward courtyard are the emperor’s elephants, bearing gilded towers, with war chariots to either side of them. Musicians and their instruments flank the two sides of the gallery that borders the great courtyard to the north where the emperor is seated upon his throne. The Board of Rites had set the ceremony to begin at seven in the morning but the emperor issued a counter-order during the night: he wished the ceremony to begin at half past four.

The Emperor appears on his throne when he hears the sound of the music and of all the extremely noisy instruments. First he receives homage and congratulations, then a Mandarin from the Board of Rites shouts loudly: “Officers who have brought the captives here, advance, prostrate yourselves, kowtow!” Once this ceremony has been performed to the sound of the instruments, the victorious generals withdraw and at once the same Mandarin shouts again: “Officials of the Board of War and Generals, come and present your prisoners!”

Seven unfortunate Jinchuan prisoners appear from afar before the emperor and this entire, redoubtable assembly, each with a kind of white silk cord around his neck. They advance several steps, then are ordered to kneel. Beside them is placed a cage containing the head of Seng-ge-sang, one of the rebels [whose brother is among the prisoners]. Behind them are one hundred military officers; to their right fifty civil officials and metropolitan troops; to their left, fifty officers of the “Tribunal des Princes”. To this display, which is replete with terror, one of the prisoners, a Jinchuan general, cannot restrain himself from a slight movement that appears resentful but can be seen only by those close to him. Even so he knocks the ground with his forehead with the other prisoners, and then they are at once removed to a side chamber. The emperor again receives congratulations from every important dignitary in the empire, then he withdraws to the sound of music and the noisy instruments, having made no decision as to the fate of these illustrious captives, but it soon became known that they were lost.  

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Amiot concluded his account by describing the grisly execution of all seven. His description of this impressively staged ritual performance leaves little doubt about Qing uses of the theatre of majesty to impress the extent and nature of their power on all who observed it.

It is perhaps worth noting that, if one of the reasons Amiot was permitted to attend this ritual was that Qianlong hoped to impress upon foreigners the fearsome fate that awaited those who opposed the great Qing empire, it backfired. Amiot’s Parisian correspondents expressed outrage when they read his account of the shoufu, implying that if Amiot regarded such behavior in a favourable light he must have lost his finer European sensibility through too long a sojourn in China. The Frenchmen—all unknowing of the fate that awaited many of them only a few years later at the guillotine—concluded that the Qing general was “perfidious, and his master a cannibal!” [emphasis in original]

**The Autumn Hunts at Mulan**

The autumn hunts at Mulan were explicitly intended by Qing emperors as the martial (wu) counterpart to the civil (wen) agricultural rituals (qin geng) central to the Chinese ceremonial calendar. The hunts were not listed among the eighteen military rituals in the compendia that recorded the Chinese ritual tradition, because, as Chia Ning has shown, they were Inner Asian in origin. Unlike Chinese military rituals, which took place only intermittently to mark specific moments surrounding imperial military campaigns, the hunts were distinguished by their regular, seasonal occurrence. Yet hunting rituals also had been known in China since distant antiquity, and also were associated with military preparedness. In important respects, the annual Qing hunts did resemble other military rituals, both because of their theatricality and because one of their principal purposes was to impress the centrality of military preparedness in the Qing polity upon an audience that was both domestic and foreign. They were, in short, another form of ritual in which the Qing sought to draw together the different traditions from which they derived legitimacy and to make each meaningful to the other, in the process creating a new, specifically Qing, cultural context.

The Kangxi emperor instituted the annual hunts at Mulan in 1681 and hunted there annually, except when on campaign, until his death in 1722. After a hiatus during the reign of the Yongzheng emperor—who expressed his regret at his failure to maintain this important ancestral practice—Qianlong re-instituted the tradition a few years after his accession, and held more than forty hunts at Mulan over the course of his long reign. Many imperial princes took part in the hunts, and troops from the capital were chosen to participate on the basis of such military skills as archery, that were tested earlier in the year. The emperor required Inner Asian lords to participate in rotation, making it possible both to cultivate impor-
tant personal relationships and to assemble the desired audience for this implicitly intimidatory parade of military power.

Beyond the display of power, a major function of the hunts was to provide an opportunity to practise making war. Among the diversions offered during the month or so spent annually at Mulan were mock battles, archery displays, and wrestling contests. The most famous of the various forms of hunt involved the formation of a huge circle by mounted troops who surrounded the quarry—sometimes deer, sometimes tigers, sometimes other animals or birds—and drove it towards the waiting marksman, often the emperor himself.\(^48\)

Given the massive scale of the arrangements for the provisioning, accommodation, and choreography required for the smooth functioning of the entire operation, these displays of military prowess, like the rituals described above, involved logistics as much as they did skills. The hunts involved tens of thousands of people, most of whom would have traveled the seventy-five miles from the summer capital at Chengde to Mulan each year. The mobilization of the emperor and his primarily military entourage, and the temporary palaces erected along the way, created an extraordinary spectacle that must have caused a tremendous stir among all who beheld it.

As in the case of the other military rituals discussed above, the annual hunts were commemorated in numerous paintings produced by artists of the court painting academy. The hunts thus further expanded the imperially-sponsored artistic production whose main purpose was to focus attention on the high degree of military sophistication in Qing culture and the imperial power that rested upon it.\(^49\)

**Documenting and Disseminating Military Ritual**

As we have seen, by the mid-eighteenth century a number of military rituals, like the wars from which they derived their *raison d'être*, were the subject of paintings executed on imperial commission by court painters, with the intention of glorifying Qing power and martiality and proclaiming its accomplishments to generations yet to come. Examples include the two *dayue* paintings done by Castiglione and Jin Kun, discussed above, the collaborative scrolls depicting the send-off of troops, Xu Yang's *xianfu* painting, and numerous others, such as much of Castiglione's oeuvre—his many paintings of horses spring immediately to mind—and Yao Wenhan's "An Imperial Banquet at the Zi Guang Ge," now in the Palace Museum in Beijing.\(^50\) Yet such paintings generally remained within the palace, which limited the scope of their usefulness as propaganda.

The dissemination of some texts and pictures with military content or at least referents was markedly broader in scope. The foreign missionary artists Castiglione, Attiret, Sichelbart and Salusti produced a set of sixteen illustrations of the Xinjiang wars for the emperor. The originals were hung in the Pavilion of Purple
Light (Zi Guang Ge), a pavilion reconstructed by Qianlong in 1760 in the centre of Beijing specifically to display military art and trophies and to receive foreign tributaries. Copies of these paintings travelled to Paris to be engraved in copper by the best engravers that could be found, while artists trained by one of the court missionaries later made further copies in China. These copper-engravings eventually adorned public buildings all round the empire and were distributed to deserving officials as a mark of imperial favour. They thus enjoyed a wide circulation and were likely seen by a geographically far-flung and socially diverse audience.

While some of these war illustrations (zhantu) depicted battle scenes others, specifically the first and the last three in the series of sixteen, showed episodes connected to the victory that technically came into the category of military ritual. These included scenes of enemies surrendering, a tableau of a celebratory banquet held at the Zi Guang Ge, the jiaolao home-welcoming ceremony, and the xianfu and shoufu ceremonies.

The Xinjiang series of war paintings set a precedent. Most of the subsequent campaigns that qualified as one of the “ten great victories” were recorded in sets of paintings produced collaboratively by court artists, though apparently never again by any of the Jesuits. Several of these later series included military ritual among the subjects depicted. For instance, the last three of a set of sixteen paintings that marked the suppression of the Jinchuan rebellion in 1776 depicted the jiaolao involving Agui, the shoufu held at the Meridian Gate, and the celebratory feast, part of the kaizu ritual, given for the victors at the Zi Guang Ge (all described above). Almost all the others showed scenes of specific battles said to have played a pivotal role in the long-drawn-out war to overcome Jinchuan resistance to Qing rule. Another series, only twelve paintings in all, produced to celebrate victory in Taiwan in the 1780s, included a celebratory banquet as the last of its series. The several series of war paintings were significant tools of propaganda because, following the precedent of the Xinjiang series, they were engraved in copper for mass distribution. All later engraving work, however, was done in China rather than in Europe.

The wide-ranging dissemination of these images, and the message of Qing military might that they bore, was augmented by the reproduction of their inscriptions, which appeared, for instance, in the catalogue of imperial paintings and in collections of imperial writings. These latter appeared in a variety of forms. A collection of stelae engraved with hundreds of examples of imperial commentaries on military affairs was erected near the Wucheng dian (Hall of Military Achievements), behind the Zi Guang Ge. Like the imperial commemorative inscription engraved on a monument installed at Liangxiang to mark the celebration of the jiaolao, the accounts these inscriptions presented were completely authoritative. They were widely reprinted. All the stone-engravings also could be mass reproduced in the
form of rubbings, liable to be circulated as much as an example of imperial calligraphy as for their content, from which they were, of course, inseparable. Many, in addition, referred to the divine assistance that had brought about Qing victory, thus giving imperial power a cosmic inevitability.

Mass production, for commercial or ideological purposes, or simply for the sake of manufacturing efficiency, was far from new in China. Lothar Ledderose has recently argued that much Chinese art can be broken down into a series of modules that could be and were endlessly re-assembled in multiple combinations. The large-scale production of copperplates of documentary paintings or rubbings of imperial inscriptions, while not precisely modular, developed from these kinds of precedents. Nor was Qianlong by any means the first to use the mass production and reproduction of words and images for ideological purposes. Illustrated Buddhist and Confucian texts had enjoyed a wide circulation for centuries, while by the late sixteenth century, illustrated explanations of a Ming sacred edict on proper behavior circulated through “a number of reproductive processes, with painted pictures...being subsequently transferred to stone, from which rubbings were made, which in turn were repainted and transferred onto woodblocks for printing.” At about the same time, pictorial biographies of Confucius were made in multiple media: paintings on silk, woodblock prints, and engraved stone tablets. Qing China had recourse to most of these techniques as the dissemination of cultural products and motifs was relentlessly reiterated: a commemorative monument was mentioned in a local history, its inscription was reproduced in a variety of printed texts, an imperial stele inscription was reproduced as a rubbing, and a rubbing was converted into a woodblock print. Similarly, paintings of military rituals were reproduced en masse as copper-engravings, their inscriptions reproduced in catalogues, and so on.

Thus when Qianlong arranged to circulate propaganda on military power in a wide variety of media, he was able to draw and build on an existing precedent, so that although the shift in cultural orientation he was seeking to bring about was in many ways revolutionary, the methods and forms employed to achieve it did not seem altogether unfamiliar. In this way, they stood a better chance of acceptance. This technique recalls that noted by Corrigan and Sayer in their discussion of the central role of cultural change in English state formation: “As so often... revolutionary transformations were accomplished (and concealed) through new uses of old forms and the tracing of a thousand lineages from the past.”

By such mass production and reproduction, Qianlong availed himself of a two-fold opportunity. First, by sending his war illustrations to Paris for engraving he managed to convey to the French, of whose power he was well aware through the accounts of resident Jesuit missionaries such as Father Amiot, the clear impression that the Qing were militarily formidable. Second, he was able to exert a strong
influence over the direction of an early form of mass culture in both senses of a culture that reached most of the people and of a culture mass-produced by “industrial” techniques.\textsuperscript{35} In this way, the Qing could push a much broader spectrum of people to pay more attention and respect to martiality and to hold military power in far higher esteem than previously, even though most direct participants in and audience of military ritual were members of the elite. The broadly simultaneous and empire-wide dissemination of pictorial images and written documents all promoting the same range of views created a new common cultural ground whose driving force was the deployment of military power, and whose ultimate objective was empire.

**Conclusion**

By the end of the eighteenth century, military rituals in many ways epitomized the special hybridity of Qing culture. They also bore the unmistakable imprint of the Qianlong emperor’s desire to achieve multiple goals with a single means and to leave a lasting historical record of the imperial achievements of his reign. First, military rituals brought together the ritual traditions of China and Inner Asia, blurring ethnic or national cultural differences beyond meaningful distinction. Second, through their highly theatrical celebrations of Qing military power, they staged the consequence of that power, the great Qing empire, for a twofold audience. Its international component consisted chiefly of Inner Asian vassals but also included Europeans and other peoples of whose more long-range menace the Qianlong emperor was certainly aware. Its domestic component consisted of the diverse subjects of the empire, both those who took part in the rituals as participant or spectator and the much wider audience of the textual and pictorial record. Ritual texts and monuments, documentary paintings and copper-engravings, stele inscriptions and their rubbings all combined with performed rituals to effectively disseminate a single, tripartite message: Qing, military success, and empire.

Finally, Qing military rituals embodied the relationship of *wen* and *wu* as this was cultivated under the Qing, a period in which warfare thoroughly permeated the world of cultural production. It appeared in ritual texts, it was reproduced in paintings and copper-engravings, it expanded the musical repertory, and it occupied great numbers of officers and soldiers in the imperial armies as well as those responsible for provisioning and transporting them. As we will see in Chapter Five, it also began to assume a pervasive significance in the work of the vast numbers of scholars and civil officials involved in the organization of military rituals. More broadly, scholarship—in the most expansive sense of the literary and artistic tradition—more often than ever before concerned itself with matters of war and empire. Even those who wished to criticize or ridicule the Qing imperial project, however obliquely, could not help but operate within the same general idiomatic
In the long run, the shift of emphasis in the Chinese cultural world, promoted by the concerted campaign of their Inner Asian rulers, endured beyond the fall of the Qing empire to affect in subtle but profound ways the nature of the post-imperial nation-state.
In eighteenth-century China the cultural campaign that accompanied imperial expansion extended to the material world as much as it affected the symbolic realm. A calculated imperial policy infused political life, the physical landscape, and material culture with an assemblage of new meanings intended to draw attention to and command respect for military success and imperial power. In this deliberate programme of cultural metamorphosis, the familiar acquired new implications: government adjusted its practical and symbolic orientations; social distinctions were reconfigured; physical surroundings and the ways in which people experienced and interpreted them changed; and literature and art launched in new directions. In a nutshell, the new culture of the high Qing (1683-1820) accorded prestige to the virtue of martiality (wu) and to that of “being civilized” (wen) on a much more nearly equal basis than before, so that a military frame of reference featured much more prominently and significantly in the cultural landscape than had been the case during the preceding Ming dynasty.

A common theme of much recent scholarship on Chinese political and institutional history is that there was a substantial separation between public pronouncements and actual practice: between what was said and what was done. Among the most famous examples of this dichotomy is the misleading statement from which much of Western (mis)understanding of China has been derived, namely the Qing emperor’s disingenuous 1792 declaration to the ambassador of King George III of England that his empire was absolutely self-sufficient, although we know from his actions that he was keenly interested in, among other things, foreign military and other technology. This episode indicates how clearly we have become seduced by the authority of language in Chinese culture. That is, in order to understand how things really were, we must look as best we can at what actually happened and at the broader range of evidential materials, and not rely exclusively on what was said or written. When we adopt this approach, many former assumptions about Chinese history and civilization are discredited. To give a few examples: we now know that, contrary to what was once believed, imperial China had a thriving civil as well as criminal system of law, and that ordinary Chinese people were quite litigious
and often invoked the legal system to enforce their rights against one another. In foreign relations, despite rigid Chinese assertions that their empire was the centre of the world, and a determined insistence that others acknowledge its superiority, the reality was that Chinese foreign policy was highly pragmatic and often adapted to circumstances as necessary. As for commerce, despite professions of disdain for trade, Chinese across the social spectrum have in fact energetically and enthusiastically engaged in commercial exchange, as attested by flourishing maritime and transcontinental trade (e.g., along the so-called Silk Roads) since antiquity. In military conflicts, notwithstanding much rhetoric about preferring peaceful solutions, China rarely hesitated to use force when necessary to achieve its political ends. Finally, scholars have begun to demonstrate that the traditional view of the perennially overwhelming predominance of the civil, or civilized, over the military, or martial is amply due for revision.¹

The Qing Promotion of Martial Values

As is well known, Qing China was the victim of Western imperialism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet in the two centuries before the advent of the West, the Qing itself pursued an ambitious and sophisticated programme of imperial expansion that, despite structural differences, bore in its outward appearance and practices some considerable resemblance to the Western version. The programme was already germinating by no later than 1636, even before the Manchu conquest of China, but it began to take a more clearly demarcated shape under the Kangxi emperor (1662-1722), continued during the short reign of the Yongzheng emperor (1723-1735), and reached its height under the Qianlong emperor (1736-1795), a man obsessed by empire and the military power necessary to attain it. With an intensity that increased with time, these emperors underpinned massive military expansion by implementing an ambitious programme of cultural transformation. Aiming to create an all-new hybrid Qing culture, indissoluble from the project of empire and based on Manchu martial ideals, they anticipated that a new shared consciousness of and high regard for military success and its consequences would help mute the chauvinism of Chinese culture, at the same time as it counteracted the partial sinification of the Manchus. We can no longer, therefore, confidently apply to this period two long-held assumptions about Chinese history—namely, the uniform predominance of a civil ethos over a military one, and the completeness of Manchu sinicization.² The two are closely connected, as will become apparent below.

Two principal reasons underlay Qing emperors’ quest to transform the culture of their imperial subjects. First, ever alert to the resonance of history, they wished to avoid repeating the mistakes made by their predecessors. In the thirteenth century their ancestors, the Jin, had succumbed to Mongol power as a consequence,
so Qing legend had it, of their acculturation to Chinese ways and loss of their own martial values. In more recent history, the Qing aimed to steer clear of the fate of their immediate dynastic predecessors, the Ming, in two respects. First, they were intent on discouraging any return to the late-Ming culture of consumption that Qing rulers regarded as unsuited to the kind of frugal empire they intended to build. Second, they understood that the late-Ming allocation of excessive powers to the civil arm of government at the expense of the military had resulted in such a widespread disaffection and defiance of civil authority as to contribute substantially to the fall of the dynasty. The Qing rulers, who owed their presence as emperors to military force, wished, in short, to adjust the civil-military balance to give greater influence to the latter, rhetorically as well as actually. This did not, however, entail a necessary devaluation of \textit{wen} values, because they still intended to keep military elements under firm control and, moreover, they fully appreciated the centrality of civilian culture to the long-term pursuit of their imperial goals. In other words, they understood the relationship between the civil and military principles not in terms of mutual exclusion but as two poles along a continuum in which \textit{wende}, scholarly or literary virtue, and \textit{wugong}, military achievement, mutually produced and reproduced one another, to the ultimate advantage of imperial power. Ever alert to situations that could be turned to imperial advantage, they understood both that their successful wars of expansion offered rich material for cultural representation, and that a culture that was more military in its emphasis would in turn help to impress upon their subjects the centrality of war to the Qing ethos.

A second, but not secondary, motivation underlying the plan to promote greater attention to martiality and military success was that the Qing emperors aimed thereby to forge a more closely aligned set of cultural preferences among the diverse peoples they ruled—Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Uighurs, Muslims and Buddhists, as well as Chinese. Rather than seeking to draw their Inner Asian subjects into the orbit of Chinese civilization, the Qing rulers sought to promote values associated with the cultures of Inner Asia among their Chinese subjects, in a process that was just the reverse of the sinicization routinely claimed as inevitable. The purpose was to bring together diverse traditions within a single polity, in other words to unite and rule their multiethnic and multicultural empire.

The long-term Qing strategy to inculcate an awareness of and appreciation for military success into the mainstream of Chinese culture was not constructed in a vacuum, nor did it encounter an unreceptive audience. Not least, it rested on the foundations of a popular tradition that accorded enormous importance to martial values and political loyalty, as attested by the perennial popularity of such epics as \textit{Romance of the Three Kingdoms} (\textit{Sanguo Yanyi}) and \textit{Outlaws of the Marsh} (\textit{Shuihu Zhuan}); the pervasiveness of martial arts; and religious cults centred on such military heroes as the warrior Guan Yu (162-220) and the loyal minister Yue Fei (1103-1141).
*Kingdoms* was, notably, among the earliest works of Chinese literature to be translated into Manchu, and was frequently reprinted. Typically the underlying narratives in these types of story-cycles might include dramatic swordfights, magical fire-weapons, sudden mysterious mists, or storms that rained blood, exploding battlements, deadly rays of light, and so on, often within a context of conflicts fought for such morally uplifting purposes as dynastic preservation.

Such tales, often the subject of story-telling performances, held great appeal to ordinary people, for whom such lore became part of their everyday cultural environment. But they also appealed just as much to members of the elite, who had read widely on theories of war and their implementation in the golden age of antiquity, in the classical texts they studied for the civil service examinations. For the elite, furthermore, civil-military interaction in the cultural sphere had long been far greater in other ways than is sometimes imagined, taking such forms as the patronage of artists by army generals, and the appreciation of elegantly decorated swords by fashionable aesthetic connoisseurs. From a more practical point of view, scholars often developed a keen interest in military matters as the result of the fact that—as leaders of local communities and as officials—they frequently had to cope with such matters as bandit suppression and combating the threat of rebellion or invasion, latterly including that of the Manchus themselves. Thus, the distaste for military matters often attributed to the traditional Chinese elite has been gravely overstated.

Finally, for many members of the elite the timeliness of the high-Qing imperial project was an important factor in generating a generally favourable reception. The crisis of elite identity occasioned by the Ming fall, combined with the Qing introduction of a hereditary military-administrative elite—the banners—into the social hierarchy, had meant that the traditional Chinese scholarly elite gradually realized it would become necessary to seek new ways beyond education and scholarship through which to legitimize itself and maintain the elevated status to which it had become collectively accustomed. The pride in empire and the new sense of community fostered by the imperial cultural programme offered one possible new means of self-definition for the elite. On the whole, it was more expedient for them to cooperate than to resist.

By the late eighteenth century, war itself had become, in effect, a major Qing institution. The successful conclusion of the wars of dynastic consolidation in the 1680s was shortly followed by a series of campaigns, first against Russia and then against the Zunghars, whose imperial ambitions in Inner and Central Asia matched those of the Qing. These wars culminated in the mid eighteenth century when the Qing assumed political control over what became Xinjiang, and exterminated the Zunghars who had occupied much of its eastern portion. From this time on, if not even earlier, Qianlong vigorously promoted the notion that military triumphs were
one of his reign's central accomplishments. Toward the end of his life, in 1792, he even began to style himself “Old Man of the Ten Complete Victories” (shi quan lao ren) after an essay enumerating his “Ten Complete Military Victories” (shi quan wu gong) that, in addition to the wars for Xinjiang, included those in the Tibetan borderlands in the 1740s and 1770s (the Jinchuan wars), campaigns in Burma, Taiwan, and Annam (Vietnam), and the Gurkha wars of the 1790s.

Evidence of the intentional reshaping of culture to give prominence to a more markedly military ethos can be discerned throughout the records of Qing China. Areas affected included what we may call the culture of government, dress codes, religion, art, ritual, literature, drama, and landscape. In this chapter I address the two aspects of this cultural recasting that cover both the organization of ideology and its transformation into physical space—namely, the institutions and cultural ambience of government, and landscape and its representations.

Militarizing Government Culture and Institutions

As the Qing waged these wars and simultaneously set out to recast culture in a more martial mould, government institutions were one key object of their attention. They introduced two major innovations. The first was the development of the Grand Council (junji chu). Created in the early eighteenth century to run military campaigns in the northwest, it became the highest privy council of state, with its members effectively running the country in the emperor's name (although always under his authority). A substantial proportion of grand councillors ran military operations or commanded armies during their tenure—it was usual for them to hold concurrent positions elsewhere in the government—while some came to the Council fresh from military success. Thus civil government came to be dominated by an originally military agency, one which never altogether lost its primary character. Over the course of time, moreover, increasing numbers of bureaucrats owed their appointments to military exigency, as the sale of degrees and appointments intensified as a fund-raising mechanism in wartime.

In such ways, a close interrelationship developed between military and political success in the high Qing, as well as an increase in mobility between civilian and military posts. By the mid-eighteenth century, some connection to military success, whether through soldiering, strategizing, logistics, historiography, or otherwise, was acknowledged to be instrumental—if not prerequisite—to the achievement of a successful political career. Scholars drafting imperially authorized biographies for the official history of the period explicitly noted this, stating, for instance, that “in the middle and later years of the Qianlong reign, many people used military achievement as a means to bring about political success.” This observation comes at the end of a chapter of biographies whose principal subjects were the editors of the “Four Treasuries” imperial bibliographic project (Siku quanshu). In other words,
the definition of military achievement was ample enough to embrace contributing to the cultural project by recording imperial successes. Four Treasuries Editor-in-Chief Ji Yun (1724-1805) had already endeared himself to the Qianlong emperor by composing a poem on the so-called return to allegiance of the Torghuts who had migrated from Russia to Qing China, an episode the emperor regarded as akin to a military triumph.

It would be overstating the case to characterize the shift in favour of military success as a path to political power, as a bid to make the bureaucracy more “Manchu,” even if in fact the preponderance of Manchus in senior Grand Council positions may have presented that appearance. The analogy between, on the one hand, civil and military affairs and, on the other, Chinese and Manchus was far from being an exact parallel, as Qing rulers well understood. They knew—Kangxi and Yongzheng perhaps more clearly than Qianlong—that this collective designation had always been prescriptive rather than descriptive and that it had everything to do with the construction of imperial power. Moreover, in general the separation of Manchus from their supposedly characteristic martial ethos had only deepened with the passage of time, as the conquest receded into the realm of history. Thus the progressive militarization of the culture of government did not represent a straightforward attempt by the Qing emperors to downgrade Chinese and promote Manchus within the central administration. It was martiality, a theoretically Manchu characteristic, rather than ethnic identity as such, that emperors regarded as essential to the cultural project.

The issue was delicate and sometimes led to unexpected results. For instance, in the early eighteenth century the Kangxi emperor, in arbitrating political conflicts, was increasingly severe towards Manchus and relatively lenient towards Chinese, although the ultimate results of this differential treatment were often indistinguishable. According to contemporary historian Dai Yingcong, moreover, even within the Qing military establishment the Kangxi emperor sought to create an ethnic balance between Chinese and Manchus. Among his army officers, certainly he showed marked favour towards Chinese, perhaps in part to acknowledge how essential they were to the imperial project. That their role was critical was glaringly evident not only because of their earlier participation in the armies of conquest—Chinese artillermen, for example, had played a critical role—but also because in the more recent Three Feudatories (Sanfan) rebellion of 1673-81 Manchu troops had performed quite inadequately. The Grand Council’s creation by Yongzheng itself derived from some of these ethnic issues. Yongzheng wished to find an effective means of combating the threat posed to the Qing imperial project by the interference in government of certain Manchu princes, although, even so, a majority of those in whom he placed most reliance continued to be Manchu.
The careers of several grand councilors illustrate some of the subtleties involved as the culture of government leaned inexorably towards a more martial ethos. Zhang Tingyu (1672-1755), a rare Han Chinese among the early grand councilors, was said to have been appointed as the result of his display of absolute political reliability, the consequences of which some scholars have likened to a military victory. Zhang had edited the *Veritable Records* (*Shilu*) of the Kangxi reign to conceal Yongzheng’s maneuvering for the succession. Another early member of the Grand Council, O’ertai (1680-1745), was well known for having pacified aboriginal groups in Yunnan in the 1720s when he was governor-general in the region, prior to his Council appointment. Later he served as a supervisor of military supplies in the northwest, before concluding his career in civilian work. Bandi (d.1755), Qianlong’s ethnically Mongol son-in-law, led a number of campaigns in the field, first against Miao rebels in Huguang in 1739-40 and later against the Zunghars in the mid-fifties. In the interim, Bandi served as a grand councillor, and was concurrently quartermaster-general for the first Jinchuan campaign (1747-49), performing similar duties in the northwest in 1754. Liu Tongxun (1700-73), like Zhang Tingyu, was one of relatively few ethnically Han grand councilors in the early years of the agency’s existence. Liu had held civilian jobs prior to his elevation to grand councillor in 1753, but in the following year he was sent west in a staff position relating to the Xinjiang wars. He later served in the quartermaster’s office. As we have seen in Chapter Two, Liu also was involved in the cultural side of the imperial project, helping to compose some of the eulogies on the portraits of meritorious officials. Another Chinese councilor, Sun Shiyi (1720-96), was involved first in fighting rebels in Taiwan and later (with rather mixed success) in Annam, before his appointment to the Grand Council in 1789, apparently his only year in the office. Sun’s flair for logistics was a major factor in Qing success against the Gurkhas in the early 1790s. At the time of his death, he was involved in attempts to suppress White Lotus (*bailian jiao*) rebels.

Grand Council military connections were not limited to the grand councilors alone. Grand Council clerks (*zhangjing*) who, in Beatrice Bartlett’s words, “were entrusted with high-level discretionary tasks,” also bridged the theoretical divide between civilian and military roles. One such clerk was Zhao Yi (1727-1814), best known to posterity as a historian. Zhao’s work as a Grand Council clerk in the late 1750s included drafting military communications from the Council to the armies on the northwestern front in the wars for Xinjiang. In 1768, he served for a time with the army in Burma, later being seconded to help in the war in Taiwan in 1787-8. Among his writings is an important study of Qing wars, *Record of the Military Achievements of this August Dynasty* (*Huangchao wugong jisheng*), which draws both on his personal experiences and his familiarity with the government perspective.
Zhao also was involved in compiling the official campaign history of the Zunghar campaigns produced by the Office of Military Archives (Fanglüeguan).¹¹

That office, one of several subordinate agencies controlled by the Grand Council, was formally founded as a permanent entity in 1749, when earlier separate archival and publishing functions were brought together under its single aegis.¹² While these publications appeared under the names of grand councillors, the bulk of the actual work was done by large teams of scholars, copyists, translators and so on. They produced massive, detailed official histories of the many campaigns of the eighteenth century, accounts that of course depicted these wars in the most favourable light possible, as well as such compilations as a history of the Qing palaces and a gazetteer of the entire empire, works that included pointed references to Qing victories.

The production of the campaign histories bridged the civil-military divide in more ways than one. Men whose chief distinction was military achievement (usually current or future grand councillors) gained the opportunity to lay claim to literary accomplishment while, conversely, scholars, including some of the most distinguished of the realm, thereby acquired a new variety of state-sanctioned literary merit by joining the Qing project to glorify military success. An example of the councillor/warrior-turned-literary man was Shuhede (1711-77), a veteran of several military campaigns, whose name appears in a number of campaign histories—he is listed as chief compiler of the official work on the suppression of a 1774 sectarian uprising in Shandong. Conversely, examples of the scholar assigned to military historical work included Wang Chang (1725-1806), a leading scholar, poet and official, and Lu Xixiong (1734-1792), joint chief editor of the Four Treasuries project. Both the sheer quantity and the often high caliber of the educated men working on the campaign histories, beside the fact of official sponsorship, lent these works weighty authority and influence, as well as impressing the military campaigns onto the minds of the histories’ compilers. All this, combined with the mere fact of their addition to the literary corpus, could not but affect cultural norms. This mode of melding wen and wu, therefore, helped set in motion new ways of conceptualizing status and identity, and marked the recasting of indigenous cultural forms to place greater emphasis on military themes.¹³

It also filtered into literature more generally, reflecting a progressive blurring of the division between public and private spheres of action. Scholars involved in the production of the campaign histories, along with such other huge compilations related to war and empire-building as ethnographies depicting newly conquered peoples, geographies of new imperial territories, and multilingual dictionaries, began to write about war and about the empire in their own private works. Wang Chang, the above-mentioned man of letters and chief compiler of the official history of the Second Jinchuan campaign, offers one illustration of this tendency.
Wang was assigned to serve on the staff of Agui, one of the leading generals of the age, by way of punishment after he became involved in a corruption scandal. Accompanying Agui first on the Burma campaign and later in western Sichuan in the second Jinchuan campaign, Wang both wrote home about his experiences at the front and kept diaries about his experiences. Doubtless he also brought his first-hand knowledge to bear as he directed the compilation of the official history. In a different mode, the scholar Ji Yun, banished to the “wild west” frontier of Xinjiang soon after its annexation for involvement in the same corruption case, both described Xinjiang and incorporated it as a topos into his literary oeuvre. As Qing military campaigns and imperial expansion found their way into the writings of mainstream scholars such as Wang, Ji, and others, they became naturalized elements in the culture of the age.\(^\text{14}\)

Related to these trends was the growth of an esteem for martial values in the Qing style of government. This style included the maintenance of a standing military presence and favoured mass mobilization in times of crisis. R. Bin Wong’s recent characterization of eighteenth-century government in China as “campaign-driven,” or underwritten by a military style of management, seems apposite here. In this view, the enormous effort devoted to handling such periodic crises as flood and famine relief was organizationally akin to military campaigns.\(^\text{15}\) To these crises one might add the several imperial Southern Tours (nanxun), major feats of logistics consciously conceived as peacetime counterparts to the military campaigns and designed as a material allusion to Inner Asian martial prowess. Indeed, Qianlong, sensitive to the need to extend imperial power and its aura beyond the northern regions—where the imperial capitals made these all too evident—explicitly ranked his Southern Tours as equal in significance to his military victories in the achievements of his reign.\(^\text{16}\) In sum, Qing rulers permeated political culture with a military aura, both by making military success a leading factor in political power and by tending to run government as though it were a military operation. The fallout from these shifts of emphasis percolated throughout the bureaucracy and across the empire.

**The Eight Banners**

The other major institutional innovation of the Qing period—one that dated from the pre-conquest period and hence long preceded the creation of the Grand Council—was the Eight Banner (baqi) system, a military and administrative structure that in effect created a hereditary aristocracy to parallel the Chinese merit-based civil service elite. As is well known, the basic system called for eight separate banner organizations each for Manchus, Mongols, and “Chinese-martial” (hanjun)—the latter being originally northern Chinese who had joined the Manchu cause before the fall of the Ming. The Qing maintained a standing army drawn principally from
the banners and consisting both of garrison troops stationed across the country and armies deployed in the various campaigns. As time went on, however, many banner descendants ceased to have much real connection to the military and effectively lost their elite status while, conversely, some ethnic Han successfully infiltrated the banners, whether through adoption, promotion, or enterprising subterfuge with a view to personal advantage. In practice, therefore, it became difficult to categorize individuals in ethnic terms in any meaningful way. But the key point is that, whatever the precise status of individual bannermen and their families, from a systemic point of view the creation of the banners grafted a military-based social structure onto existing social hierarchies, altering China’s social framework.

Moreover, in the Qianlong era the status of Chinese-martial was gradually downgraded, as the emperor progressively excluded them from the advantages of banner membership and made it more of an exclusive Manchu-Mongol preserve. In this context, the case of Grand Councillor Sun Shiyi, whose career was outlined above, is instructive. For somewhat ambiguous reasons Sun expressed a dying wish to enter the banners; this request was granted his grandson along with other posthumous honours but subsequently withdrawn. Sun’s wish suggests the possibility that the Qing had successfully produced a desire among its Chinese subjects not just for banner status as such, but for the greater social standing that positioning within the military-administrative hierarchy might bring.17

Members of the twenty-four banners lived, whether in Beijing or in the provinces, in insular walled garrison compounds located right in the heart of existing cities. As Mark C. Elliott has pointed out, the banners were arranged protectively around the imperial palace in just the same way as soldiers’ tents surrounded the imperial yurt in the field. That is, the organization of garrison cities owed at least as much to Inner Asian traditions and concerns about security as it did to the geomancy usually associated with Chinese city planning. The separation of the banners was also marked by the massive funding the central government allocated to the preservation of the banner system as a marker of ethnic identity. Known as the “Manchu cities (mancheng),” these compounds were set aside for the exclusive use of banner garrison officers and soldiers, their families and households. Within them individual banners were assigned living quarters by reference to the colours assigned to different points on the compass, in an arrangement that echoed standard battle formation. As described by Evelyn S. Rawski in relation to Beijing, the plain and bordered yellow banners occupied the northwestern and northeastern parts of the inner city, plain white and bordered white the eastern and southeastern portions, plain and bordered blue the southern portion, and plain and bordered red the western and southwestern portions, respectively. They were divided into left and right wings, with, on the right, the plain yellow, plain red, bordered red and bordered blue, and, on the left, the bordered yellow, plain white, bordered white,
and plain blue banners. These living arrangements were reduplicated in every garrison across the empire.\textsuperscript{16}

In certain locations the garrisons’ high visibility as a sign of Manchu occupation was marked with especial clarity. For example, in Nanjing, formerly the Ming capital, the garrisons initially were located right in the precincts of the former imperial palace itself, while on the northwest frontier dual Manchu and Chinese cities became a characteristic marker of Qing expansion. Yet, over time, many of the garrison cities became progressively incorporated into the landscape of daily life, thus, as it were, naturalizing the militarization of the physical environment.\textsuperscript{19}

The banner garrisons marked the intersection of the transformation of government culture and that of the physical landscape. In the remainder of this chapter, I address ways in which Qing cultural reconfigurations were expressed in physical and material form through transformations of the natural and man-made landscape and of its meanings.

**Militarization of the Landscape**

The Qing accomplished these transformations of landscape through a variety of overlapping methods. These methods included the creation of completely new natural landscapes and the erection of new structures on existing ones. Even without new construction, another type of transformation involved the attachment of new significance to an existing landscape—for example by ensuring its long-term association with a particular event or ritual, or by drawing new attention to it, or by bestowing fresh meaning on a landscape or location by the very fact of imperial presence there. As noted in Chapter Four, some of these techniques were strongly reminiscent of those implemented by the French king Louis XIV, who drew designs and engineering techniques from the military sphere in the creation of the gardens at his palace at Versailles. The Qing emperors and Louis XIV shared the desire to draw domestic and international attention to their military power and to the central role it played in the formation of a newly formidable state, but we cannot be certain that either was conscious of the other as they pursued these goals.\textsuperscript{20}

Perhaps the most conspicuous high-Qing transformation of the landscape was the expansion of the imperial borders to their greatest extent ever. Emperors quickly took steps to portray their conquests in cartographic form so as to confirm their permanence through textual representation. Among the earliest and best known of these cartographic efforts resulted in the imperially-sponsored map of the empire produced by Jesuit missionaries over a ten-year period. It was completed in 1718, although subsequent additions were made to keep pace with fresh conquests. Although for security reasons these maps were not widely circulated, so that the technology used was not immediately influential, some of the information they included appeared almost at once in a number of relatively accessible ency-
clopedia compilations. In a parallel development, during the eighteenth century, Chinese cartographers also produced a number of “world maps” that incorporated those changes in the contours of the empire that resulted from Qing military conquests. Each edition of every such map begins with a formulaic proclamation that the extent of the territory controlled by the Qing was unprecedented throughout history. Moreover, the use of European cartographic techniques was rhetorical as well as practical, because they made the point about Qing empire in a more widely legible language. In other words, even those who could not read Chinese could understand what these maps represented, namely both a claim to territory and a display of imperial power. By thus authoritatively associating their fixing of territorial expansion in textual and visual form with military success, cartographers not only created a new picture of “the world” but thereby helped perpetuate, in apparently full consciousness, the normalization of the changed imperial landscape. The question of audience inevitably arises here; while it is hard to assess the availability of maps to eighteenth-century Chinese with any precision, scholars believe that some may have been fairly widely circulated. Finally, in a variant of the cartographic enterprise, the production of massive illustrated ethnographies depicting conquered peoples constituted a variant of this enterprise.

A distinctive feature of Qing rule was the practice of maintaining multiple capitals. As Evelyn S. Rawski has described, this practice, derived from such earlier ‘alien’ empires as the Liao, Jin and Yuan, served the important purpose of establishing an imperial presence in more than one location. All Qing capitals were located in the north, a fact that lends force to the argument that the imperial Southern Tours, as well as other imperial excursions, were intended at least in part to make imperial power felt across the empire.

Manchu founder Nurhaci (1559-1626) did not maintain multiple capitals simultaneously, but moved his capital several times between 1587 and 1625, when he settled in Shenyang, which as Shengjing, also known by its Manchu name of Mukden, became the capital from which the Manchus conquered China. Both Nurhaci and his son, Hung Taiji were buried there, in elaborate imperial tombs that became an important ancestral site for later Qing emperors. Mukden remained an imperial capital even after the move to Beijing in 1644, although somewhat eclipsed in importance by both Beijing and the summer retreat at Chengde (Rehe). Both Kangxi and Qianlong visited Shengjing several times to pay their respects to the imperial ancestors and confirm its continued prestige and imperial significance. These northern, somewhat less ostentatious versions of the imperial southern tours were known as “Eastern Tours (dongxun),” in an indication of the continued importance accorded Shengjing as a sacred space of empire. Ever conscious of the uses of imperial spaces, Qianlong also instigated large-scale renovation and expansion of the palaces during the later eighteenth century.
The Shengjing palace complex built by Nurhaci and Hung Taiji offers a prime example of the infusion of martial references into architecture at an early stage of Qing imperial expansion. This militarization of architecture, a phenomenon by no means limited to or invented by the Manchus, was most prominent in the eastern of the three main sections of the palace. In this portion of the palace was built an octagonal structure, the Hall of Great Administration (Dazheng dian), located at the head of ten pavilions, five on either side of the courtyard. See Figure V. Of these, eight were assigned to the banners and one each to the banner commanders of the left and right wings. Perhaps the eight-sided shape of the Hall of Great Administration, which recalled a structure built in Nurhaci’s earlier temporary capital at Dongjing, near Liaoayang, was also intended on one level to evoke the eight-banner military-administrative system. One may also speculate that it simultaneously made deliberate reference to the characteristic octagons favoured by the royal house of Liao, whose tenth-through-thirteenth-century empire had coincided with some of the territory now controlled by the Manchus, and as such was intended to legitimate Hung Taiji’s imperial ambitions. In other words, architectural reference to imperial stature coincided with and supplemented military motifs. It has also been suggested that the almost parallel arrangement of the rows of pavilions was intended to resemble the Chinese character ba, meaning eight, in a further reference to the Eight Banners. At any rate, the disposal and shape of the structures both symbolized and substantiated in material form the close relationship of early Qing rulers to their military establishment, and set a clear early precedent for subsequent Qing architectural manifestations of military prowess and imperial power.

Further, the Mukden imperial palace expressed in architectural form the interconnection of wen and wu. This type of physical blending of civil and military was by no means new; but harked back to both Chinese and Inner Asian precedents. Thus we find that two arches (pailou) located on either side of the main entrance to the imperial palace in Mukden, and dating from 1637 (soon after Hung Taiji’s 1636 proclamation of a Qing empire) bore some resemblance to the Forbidden City in Beijing. In Mukden the arches are labelled respectively as the Arch of Literary Virtue (Wende fang) on the eastern side and the Arch of Military Achievements (Wugong fang) on the western side, while in Beijing there are two halls, the Hall of Literary Glory (Wenhua dian) located on the eastern side and the Hall of Military Prowess (Wuying dian) on the western side. This arrangement dated back at least to the Ming. The architectural expression of balancing wen and wu thus appeared to evoke Chinese practice but, as with the octagonal shape of the Hall of Great Administration, further signification may also have been intended, given that precedents could also be found in the architectural arrangements of such early non-Han empires as the Liao. It is possible, furthermore, that the layout of the Dazheng
dian and pavilions may have been intended both to reflect the collegial nature of early Manchu rule, marking the key role played by the banners in Nurhaci’s rise to power, and to facilitate communication between the ruler and the various banner leaders, originally all family members with a claim to share power. The military and imperial architectural subtexts at Mukden were not limited to the palaces and banner structures discussed above. In 1635, Hung Taiji set in motion the construction of a major Tibetan-Buddhist temple-and-stupa complex dedicated to the cult of Mahakala, whose martial power and protective ferocity were linked to the tradition of Mongol emperorship and their cachet in the region. Such public works not only provided a key means to proclaim simultaneously imperial devotion and affirm Qing power. In addition, monumental evidence of Hung Taiji’s support for Tibetan-Buddhism in general and Mahakala in particular reiterated his intention of claiming the specific heritage of the Mongol empire, most crucially its military prowess and its political relationship to religion. In short, Hung Taiji’s imperial pretensions required him to co-opt the patron-lama relationship that had enabled Khubilai Khan (1215-94), who had ruled China from 1279 until his death, to dominate Tibet by means of a joint secular and religious rulership with the lama Phag-pa, as described in Chapter Three. When in 1634 the Manchus had
defeated the Mongol leader Ligdan Khan (1604-34), cutting off his claim to power, a golden image of Mahakala originally cast for Phag-pa was brought to their capital at Mukden where it became a central image of the Qing dynasty. This imagery and symbolism were central to eventual Qing domination of both the Mongols and Tibet. As with the palaces, the (1635) date of this temple construction at Mukden indicates that the political and religious aspirations of the Qing surfaced very early on. Whether Hung Taiji and his successors were devout believers or simply cynical politicians is less important than the point that they acutely grasped the political utility of manipulating their subjects’ beliefs to suit their own purposes.

The principal shrine of the Mahakala complex, the Temple of True Victory (Shi Sheng Si), which commemorated the military successes of the Manchu rulers, conformed architecturally to certain principles associated with Chinese building practice (e.g., facing south) but at the same time certain elements, such as the placement of four subsidiary temples at each of Mukden’s cardinal directions, appear to have derived from such other traditions as Hindu temple design (Mahakala being originally a Hindu deity). These four, which formed part of the overall complex, each bore a Chinese inscription reiterating the intent of enlisting the Buddhist gods to protect and support the nascent Qing empire. This architectural representation of the Buddhist cosmological order celebrated the succession of their “first emperor”, Hung Taiji, as a universal monarch (cakravartin) in the Buddhist tradition, a heritage addressed in Chapter Two. That this custom-made sacred space specifically linked martial prowess, religious devotion, and empire could hardly be more clear.

Another important religious site with overtones of empire was Mount Wutai (Wutaishan) in Shanxi province, thought to be the central field of action of the politically important Buddhist figure, the bodhisattva Manjusri, of whom emperors claimed to be the living reincarnation, as had Khubilai Khan and the Ming Yongle Emperor before them. Emperors particularly favoured the cluster of temples associated with Manjusri at Mount Wutai, favouring it with repeated imperial visitations and lavish donations. Thus they cast this long-time sacred site in a new light; to make the point crystal clear, the Kangxi emperor wrote or at least lent his name to a new preface to the local history, Qingliang Shan zhi. Like the claim to the protection of Mahakala at Mukden, the assumption of the ‘persona’ of Manjusri was critical to Qing imperial pretensions because it implied that the Manchu rulers had superseded the Mongols as the legitimate successors of Khubilai, whose power had extended over just the same areas now claimed by the Manchus.

Attention to the building, consecration and advancement of temples that supported Qing claims to universal overlordship continued throughout the eighteenth century. Another major Tibetan-Buddhist site of this period was the Yonghe Gong, earlier the princely residence of the future Yongzheng emperor, and the birthplace
of Qianlong. Under the latter the Yonghe Gong, located in the centre of Beijing, became the fifth most important Tibetan-Buddhist site in the empire as well as the site where the emperor chose to install the famous stele on Tibetan-Buddhism entitled *Lama shuo* (On Lamas). In its four languages the inscription upbraided in forceful terms—each with nuanced differences tailored to its audience—whoever might criticize or interfere with the imperial claim to overlordship over Tibetan-Buddhism in both the religious and secular realms and asserted the state’s even-handedness in dealing with its different subject peoples.\(^{30}\)

Qing emperors’ sense of the potency of place, vividly deployed at Shengjing, Mount Wutai, and the Yonghe Gong, also manifested itself pointedly at the ruined former Ming palace in Nanjing. Kangxi deliberately left this site unrestored because he wished to imbue it with new, politically charged meaning. Although the ostensible purpose for his visit to the ruins of the palace and the Ming imperial tombs in Nanjing in the 1680s was a simple act of respect, Kangxi used the occasion to claim connection to the former emperors supplanted by his forebears, and to draw attention to Qing power. It was a subtle and skilful way in which to mobilize for Qing purposes a site that otherwise offered rich potential for subversion because of its strong Ming associations.\(^{31}\)

Shifting our attention from the former Ming capital of Nanjing to the Qing summer capital at Chengde, we find an even more striking example of the alteration of terrain to manufacture an artificial landscape that was intended to convey a particular meaning. Qing emperors spent several months at Chengde each year, and transformed it from a culturally insignificant outpost into an empire in miniature. The Chengde complex included architecture and vistas that closely replicated those in Lhasa, Tibet, and temples specifically dedicated to the deity Manjusri, as well as man-made landscapes that resembled the Mongolian steppe and scenic spots in southern China. By thus reconstructing famous landmarks and landscapes from throughout the empire, and once again reiterating their connection to Manjusri, Qing emperors found multiple ways of expressing their hegemony over the various parts of their empire and reiterating their close association with and derivation of legitimacy from Tibetan-Buddhism, at the same time publicizing their technical accomplishments. The construction of replicas in this manner was not wholly unfamiliar to the Chinese cultural tradition—indeed it dated back at least to the time of the first emperor of Qin (r. 221-210 B.C.E.)—but the extent, the inclusion of so many references, and the strong Tibetan-Buddhist inflection, all marked a strikingly new departure. In this way, the Qing staked their claim to a place in history—past and future—as creators of an empire that was at once in many respects quintessentially Chinese and yet one that by openly incorporating elements from other traditions—far surpassed anything Chinese had ever accomplished.\(^{32}\) Such transformations represented the essence of the new Qing culture.
As we have seen in Chapter Two, at Chengde high-Qing emperors also erected temples and monuments that commemorated the military triumphs of the age, for the edification of the Inner Asian princes who regularly came to pay their respects. Many of these structures contained huge monuments with imperial inscriptions engraved in the several languages of the empire. As a consequence of both their massive size and the imperial imprimatur these played a central role in transforming the landscape both physically and metaphorically.33

Some 120 kilometres north of Chengde lay the imperial hunting preserve at Mulan. Kangxi hunted there for about a month almost every autumn from 1681 until 1722 (he missed annual hunts only when he was absent on campaign), while Qianlong also held more than forty hunts there during his long reign. Both emperors explicitly regarded the hunt as a peacetime surrogate for military training, particularly Qianlong, whose intense military focus was partly attributable to the fact that, unlike his grandfather Kangxi, he did not personally go out on campaign, and presided over a period in which warfare was fought to expand rather than preserve the empire. Mulan was reserved exclusively for hunting, and its name became virtually synonymous with the exposition, review, and rehearsing of Manchu martial skills. The amount of time spent by Kangxi and Qianlong at Mulan almost justifies describing it as a subsidiary Qing capital, characterized by its devotion to the military rather than the civil arts. Moreover, the transfer of the emperor and his entourage to Mulan was akin to a military parade, albeit conducted over long distance and over about a month’s duration. The logistical arrangements required for this imperial journey called for military precision and close attention to detail. And for those whose home areas were traversed each year by the huge imperial retinue of attendants, officials, and troops, the material evidence of an empire that rested on a foundation of military power was absolutely unmistakable.34

As noted in Chapter Two, monuments commemorating war were erected in many parts of the empire: in the palaces at Beijing and Chengde, in temples and shrines erected for the purpose on the sites of battlefields, particularly on the imperial periphery, and in newly conquered regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. This proliferation of monuments permanently changed the very appearance of the landscape. At the same time, it literally inscribed it with texts whose content was intended to forge a basis for the creation among their diverse and multilingual audience of a united community, under Qing overlordship. As we have seen, the propagation of the imperial last word on the campaigns was, moreover, not limited to stele inscriptions: the monuments, including reproduction of their inscriptions in toto, were also incorporated in paintings, while the texts themselves were also hung as calligraphic scrolls that adorned halls and pavilions within the imperial palace complex and recorded in a variety of catalogues and other texts that probably reached most educated circles. Amongst the many other locations both inside
and outside the capital that acquired very visible links to Qing military prowess and, by association, imperial power, those commemorating imperial wars in the National Academy, in which a number of imposing war memorials were erected, were among the most impressive.  

Outside Beijing, the Qing transformed the scenic area of the Fragrant Hills (Xiangshan) into a military site, which indeed it remains today, guarded by armed soldiers. In that area in the eighteenth century were erected, for example, a guard tower once used for drilling assault troops, and the former Imperial Military Inspection Grounds (Tuancheng yanwu ting), essentially consisting of a set of covered platforms with military-patriotic names—such as the Pavilion for Commemorating Military Success (Ji Gong Lou) filled with commemorative stelae. From these carefully contextualized heights, the emperor regularly inspected the troops below. As we have seen in Chapter Two, in 1749, a temple called Temple of True Victory—modeled on the much older Mukden temple of the same name that commemorated earlier glories—was also built nearby to commemorate victory over the Jinchuan. This choice of name plainly implied that the Qing considered themselves to have joined the ranks of imperial-luminaries-cum-military-heroes who were worthy of emulation.

Other parts of this complex included hundreds of replicas of the tall stone towers that Qing armies had found so redoubtable in the Jinchuan wars. At least some of these last were constructed out of stone, possibly from towers destroyed by the Qing, that was laboriously transported to the capital from its original location in remote Sichuan province. Erected partly for drilling and training purposes, these towers also served as a material reminder of what Qing armies had achieved (and perhaps to camouflage their less glorious moments). Similarly, after the Burmese wars of the 1760s, Burmese-style pagodas were built in this area, representing perhaps more wishful thinking than substantive military success, for the Qing commander in that war had perished while covering his troops’ ignominious retreat. Whatever the realities, the net effect of all these installations was to transform a scenic area within reach of the capital into a sprawling military and commemorative site, one that effectively incorporated typical architectural features from a range of conquered areas, somewhat in the manner of Chengde, but without the palatial environment. Colonial architectural styles, war memorials, commemorative temples, and halls of military fame—all contributed to a transformation of space within the empire that was intended as a permanent reminder of Qing military power.

**Conclusion**

Thus, by the late eighteenth century, the external shape of the Qing empire had changed dramatically to include Mongolia, Tibet, and the vast area of Central Asia that the Qing called Xinjiang (and Taiwan, a topic that lies beyond the scope of this
chapter). These changes, with the exception of that part of Mongolia that fell into Russian hands and then became independent, provided the foundations for the territory today claimed as Greater China by the People’s Republic. Within the empire, both conceptual spaces (such as government and society) and actual landscapes that formerly had had no particular connection to military success and imperial expansion acquired such associations as the result of deliberate Qing strategy. In a physical, material sense, *wu* came to occupy a far more conspicuous and significant position than previously, although wisely the Qing did not seek to have *wu* eclipse *wen* altogether.

The consequence was that a major part of the legacy of the high Qing was to have bequeathed some of the ground on which twentieth-century Chinese states have been built. While it would be tendentious to claim a direct intellectual trajectory from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries, the transformations described in this chapter suggest that the physical and cultural relationship between empire and nation, and the military ethos that informed them both, as well as the “isms” commonly associated with them—imperialism, nationalism, and militarism—neither appeared in a vacuum nor arose exclusively as the result of the complicated “encounter with the West.” In sum, the seventeenth- and particularly eighteenth-century Qing cultural policies referred to above—even if subsequent events prevented their maturing to full fruition in the way the high-Qing emperors would have wished—were relevant and significant precursors of the development of modernity in China.
Conclusion

This book has described the ways in which both military power and the associated virtue of martiality were crucial to the self-image of the Manchu Qing (1636-1912), which at its zenith ranked among the most powerful polities in the world. Indeed, a particular focus on military affairs was one of the defining characteristics that distinguished the Qing from other ruling houses in China’s imperial period, which historically had preferred to subordinate military (wu) to civil (wen) matters.

The military focus of the Qing comprised two parts, which were mutually interdependent. The first, not unexpectedly, was the series of wars that led to the unparalleled expansion of the empire. The second was a corresponding cultural transformation designed to propel Qing military success, and the martial values that underpinned it, to the very centre of attention of all who came into contact with the empire, as subjects or interlocutors, as friends, or as enemies. Thus from 1636 to 1800 Qing emperors introduced a broad range of changes across the entire spectrum of cultural life, broadly conceived, that taken together served to reflect and promote a military ethos. They created a new Qing culture organized around that ethos which, in the opinion of the emperors, was both appropriate and necessary as a foundation for their wars of expansion and, more generally, was a suitable basis for their empire. Put simply, emperors considered that if the defining characteristic of the Qing was to be war and empire, then culture in its every manifestation should promote and reflect those attributes. Since at the moment of its launching, the culture or cultures inherited by the Qing did not fully meet that condition, emperors accordingly undertook its transformation.

The deliberation with which they undertook this cultural side of their imperial project intensified with time, reaching its apogee under the Qianlong emperor in the eighteenth century, especially after 1750. Even so, the extent to which even Qianlong followed an actual plan of action is hard to assess, and our understanding of the cultural campaign as a consistent and coherent programme is certainly affected by his retroactive articulation of his military victories as the greatest achievement of his reign.
The central purpose of this book has been to demonstrate that cultural transformation was as important as military expansion in the building of the Qing empire. Qing emperors lucidly grasped culture’s potency as a political tool. In particular they understood only too well both the power of display and the ability of representation to enhance or even de novo produce reality. Moreover, aiming to incorporate into their empire not just China but also large portions of Inner Asia, they drew in sophisticated and effective ways on the separate political traditions of both. Furthermore, their understanding that the scope of their rulership was universal led them not only to pursue dominion over extensive territories and peoples but also to seek ways in which they might comprehensively penetrate into and control every aspect of their subjects’ lives. The principal mechanism by which they pursued that goal was by effecting cultural change.

One of the most striking aspects of the Qing campaign to transform culture was not just its almost infinite reiterations of the same themes of military prowess and imperial power but its replication of the same texts and visual imagery in multiple media. Thus, for example, the many imperial writings on war were engraved on huge monuments installed in Beijing and elsewhere, reproduced in paintings, incorporated as the texts of imperial calligraphy scrolls that hung in halls and pavilions within the imperial palace complex, and reprinted in many of the huge imperially sponsored compilations of the time. This multi-layered effort at mass reproduction demonstrated a firm grasp of the insidious power of relentless repetition, and was startlingly modern in its conception.

A consciousness of history, both past and future, informed the Qing imperial agenda in general and the militarization of culture in particular. The emperors responsible for implementing the Qing imperial project were motivated by a powerful desire to demonstrate their comparability to the greatest of their predecessors, whose achievements they then intended to surpass. Mindful of their own present role as a bridge between time gone by and that yet to come, they set out to create a sense of shared connections among the various imperial subjects, that could be bequeathed to their successors along with the empire itself. They intended that those shared connections should revolve around three concepts that they hoped would become increasingly synonymous: Qing, military power, and empire. Thus the quest for supremacy, in keeping with Qing universalist goals, embraced space that was just as much temporal as it was symbolic and physical.

Whether or not we regard the campaign to militarize culture as a concerted effort planned in advance, as an ad hoc amalgam, or as falling somewhere between the two, to what extent can we evaluate its success in meeting its objective of establishing a military ethos as one of the central elements of Qing culture? Although historical consciousness does not lend itself to precise quantification, we can safely say that by the time the cultural campaign was at its height, in the
middle to later eighteenth century, unquestionably the sheer comprehensiveness
and ubiquity of military referents and themes in Qing political and cultural life
added up to a totality that could not be ignored. Awareness is, of course, different
from wholehearted embrace which, given the immense influence of the imperial
will, is difficult to determine with any precision. But it was certainly impossible
for Qing subjects, however they might otherwise have defined their identity—as
Chinese, Manchus, Tibetans etc— to be unaware of what was, in so many dif-
ferent ways, the spirit of the age. We can see this, for example, in the way that
imperial expansion and, by association, the military power upon which it rested,
seeped into the writings of public figures not otherwise known for their interest in
war and martiality. Similarly, the context of war and empire was so all-embracing
that even those who wished to criticize or ridicule the Qing imperial project, how-
ever obliquely, found it impossible to avoid operating within the same idiomatic
parameters. Finally, the sheer labour involved in the production and maintenance
of the many different expressions of the new Qing culture, along with the great
visibility and frequency of military parades and expeditions, and imperial tours
and journeys, meant that the military ethos of the new Qing culture cannot but
have impressed itself upon the consciousness of many ordinary people as well as
members of the elite targeted more directly.

The larger question is the extent to which the effects of the cultural campaign
endured for the long term. We have seen that it is clearly wrong to assume, because
Qing China in its waning days was militarily weak and seemed unable to resist
foreign attack, that weakness or the lack of interest in military affairs that was
supposed to have caused it had prevailed throughout the earlier period. To the
contrary, even a cursory look at Qing China in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries demonstrates that just the opposite was in fact the case.

The same analytical approach, and the caution for which it calls, should apply
to the question of the long term effects of the Qing campaign to militarize culture.
When we look at China’s twentieth-century experience we can certainly see that
it was a time of unending war and the increasing militarization of society. That
militarization emerged from the almost incessant conflict of the time, beginning
with the warlord period of the early post-imperial years. It continued with, among
other things, the undeclared civil war between the Nationalists and Communists;
the fascism of the 1930s; the Japanese occupation and World War Two; the 1945-
49 civil war; the Korean war; the campaign-driven politics of the 1950s and the
Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. Knowing all we now know about the Qing
imperial project might lead us to claim a direct trajectory from the military ethos
of the earlier period to the twentieth century. Yet that would be tendentious, for
too much time and too momentous a series of events both global and local inter-
vened in the course of the century that separated them.
Yet it is not too much to suggest that some relationship between the two did, in fact, exist, for the militarization of culture under the Qing created a richly fertile ground of possibility. It would take the right climate, and the introduction of any number of external factors, for the seeds planted in the eighteenth century actually to germinate. For a long time their growth seemed to have fallen into abeyance, and what they eventually did grow into was nothing like what emperors had anticipated or desired. But it should not be forgotten that despite sinocentric, and later eurocentric, denigration of the skills and sophistication of the Manchu emperors, high Qing rulers were very serious contenders indeed in the global power stakes. It may yet turn out that China’s past approximately two hundred years of weakness on the international scene have been a protracted aberration rather than a normal state of affairs.
Chapter One


1 Tang rulers, at least in the early days of the dynasty, distinguished themselves from their Chinese subjects in language and culture while for purposes of legitimation they held themselves out as completely “Chinese.” In fact, of course, at no time was there a “pure” Chinese or “pure” Inner Asian identity, nor was either heritage as monolithic as the usages suggest.

2 See Mark C. Elliott, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China.* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 9, noting how the rulers of many empires have shared fears about the fate awaiting those who fail to maintain their military ethos, citing also the fourteenth-century chronicler Ibn Khaldun.


7 See Craig Clunas, Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997) for an account of the way in which elite aesthetic theory disdained by disregarding the nonetheless enormously vibrant decorative, pictorial culture with which it coexisted.


10 See Samuel Grupper, “The Manchu Imperial Cult of the Early Ch‘ing Dynasty (Ph. D. diss., Indiana University, 1980); Crossley, Translucent Mirror.


On spectacle, see Philippe Foret, *Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 24; on landscape and metaphor at Chengde, see ibid., 121-22; see also Chandra Mukerji, *Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). On the Qing as early modern, see also Hay, *Shitao: Painting and Modernity in Early Qing China*.


Perdue, *China Marches West*.

On the return of the Torghuts, see James A. Millward, “Qing Inner Asian Empire and the return of the Torghuts,” in James A. Millward et al., eds., *New Qing Imperial History*, 91-106; Berger, *Empire of Emptiness*, 14-22.


For a suggestive example of a rather similar project in quite a different context, see Mukerji, *Territorial Ambitions*.

See Elliott, *Manchu Way*: 9, 276, citing *Jiu Manzhou Dang* vol. 10, 5295 (Chongde 1/11/13). The idea of keeping martial values at the forefront of their subjects’ attention perhaps partially foreshadows Mao Zedong’s notion of permanent revolution, devised to keep revolutionary spirit intact forever in the postrevolutionary period.


*Qingchao tongzhi* (Comprehensive Annals of the Qing), (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936): 7013, Kangxi 24 (1684), a comment made shortly after the suppression of the Three Feudatories and pacification of Taiwan. The notion of simultaneities was proposed by Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*.


Qianlong’s western-style palace, the Yuanmingyuan, also represented this quest for universal ‘possession.’

See Berger, *Empire of Emptiness*.


**Chapter Two**


2 On the significance of a power-holder’s calligraphy, see Richard Curt Kraus, *Brushes with Power: Modern Politics and the Chinese Art of Calligraphy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991)

3 See, for example, *Shang yu dang* (Archive of Imperial Edicts) (Beijing). QL 41/8/20 (October 2, 1776): 293.


5 *Shang Yu Dong* QL 25/3/5 (April 20, 1760): 149. For another example dating from sixteen years later, see ibid., QL 41/12 n.d., 506. See also Yang Xin, “Court Painting in the Yongzheng and Qianlong Periods of the Qing Dynasty, with Reference to the Collection of the Palace Museum, Peking,” in Chou and Brown, eds., *The Elegant Brush*, 343-57, at 356-7.

6 *Shang yu dang* QL 41/8/20 (October 2, 1776): 293


11 On the inscriptions of the first emperor of Qin, see Martin Kern, *The Stele Inscriptions of Ch’in Shih-Huang: Text and Ritual in Early Chinese Imperial Representation* (New Haven, CT: American Oriental Society, 2000), who notes (145) that it was only later that commemorative as distinct from eulogistic stele inscriptions developed into a distinct genre.


14 *Shang yu dang* QL 26/2/13 (March 18, 1761): 103

15 Rubbings of all four sides of the stele inscription are at the National Library in Beijing: jing 6049; for a photograph, see *Beijing tushuguan cang Zhongguo lidai shike huaibian* (Copies of Rubbings of Historical Stelae Held in the Beijing Library) vol. 70, 98-101. See also ibid., 96-7. For the text, see Yu Minzhong et al., comps., *Rixia jiwen kao* (Investigation of Ancient Accounts Heard in the Precincts of the Throne), 1774, Reprint, (Beijing: Beijing Guji chubanshe, 1983) juan 102, 1690. On Hung Taiji’s Shi Sheng temple, see Chapter Five.

16 A rubbing of the *Shi Sheng Si hou ji* stele inscription can be seen at the National Library, Beijing: jing 6041; for a photograph, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 71, 191; for the text of the inscription, see Yu, *Rixia jiwen kao*, juan 102, 1691-2, which also reprints the text of some imperial verses on the first Jinchuan and the Xinjiang campaigns, namely *Yuzhi shi sheng si ba yun* (Eight Imperial Rhymes on the Temple of True Victory) dating from 1761.

17 Hansen, “Inscriptions,” 17. For a photograph of the earlier of the Xinjiang inscriptions, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 71, 119, where it is erroneously identified as “Pingding Zhunge’er hou leming Yili bei” (The Yili Stele carved upon the second pacification of the Zunghars). For the text, see Liang Guozhi et al., comps., *Qinding guo zi jian zhi* (Imperially Authorized History of the National Academy), 1781, (Photoprint of the Wen Yuan Ge copy of the 1781 *Siku quanshu* (Complete Library of the Four Treasuries) edition (Taibei: Shangwu, 1974), 5, 15a-17a; Peng, comp., *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji* 5, 40-41. For the Bell Tower inscription, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 70, 9.

18 See Philippe Foret, *Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000); see also Anne Chayet, *Les Temples de Jehol et leurs modèles tibétains* (Paris: Éditions recherches sur les civilisations, 1985); see also essays in Millward et al., *New Qing Imperial History*. For a comparison of Qianlong-period palace construction and reconstruction efforts at Chengde and at the older imperial capital at Shengjing

19 For photographs of rubbings of these inscriptions, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 71, 61-4, 68-71, 119-22; and vol. 72, 175-8; for the texts, see Peng, comp., *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji* 5, 41-3; 5, 40-1, 11, 127-9, and 11, 117-21. For the notion of “loose renditions,” see Berger, *Empire of Emptiness*, 34.


21 For a photograph of the rubbing of the inscription, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 70, 43. The inscription on the Guilin monument is identical to the National Academy one; I have not been able to check whether the actual monuments themselves are identical. For other duplicates of National Academy stelae commemorating war that were located in Guilin, see, for example, ibid., vol. 71, 59, 161.

22 On this episode, see Ka Bo Tsang, “Portraits of Meritorious Officials; Eight Examples from the First Set Commissioned by the Qianlong emperor,” *Arts Asiatiques: Annales du musée national des arts asiatiques—Guimet et du musée Cernuschi* 47 (1992): 69-88, at 77; for the text of the stele inscription, see Peng, comp., *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji* 5, 41; for other stele inscriptions relating to the Xinjiang campaigns see Zhang, Liang et al., *Shi qu bao ji xubian* (*Imperial Paintings Catalogue, First Supplement*) 1793, Reprint. (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1969-71) vol. 6, 3095-3104; Peng, comp., *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji yuan 4-21*, passim.

23 See Lu Zhengming, “Qianlong di ‘shi quan wu gong’ chu tan,” 240. Two closed pavilions located in the square below the Potala Palace in Lhasa were said in 2001 to house these stelae, but verification proved impossible.


25 Liang Shizheng also wrote out the emperor’s composition for the *Pingding Jinchuan si bei*. See *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 70, 43; this was in 1749 when the commemoration project was only in a fledgling state and had not yet reached its full swing. A rubbing of the *Shuangzhong Si* stele inscription, which stood in Beijing and apparently was done only in Chinese, is at the National Library, Beijing: jing 2536; for a photograph, see *Beijing tushuguan*, vol. 70, 166; for the text, see also Yu et al., *Rixia jiwen kao*, jian 48, 759-60. A rubbing of the bilingual inscription on Labdon’s tombstone, located in another part of Beijing, is also at the National Library, Beijing; for a photograph, see...

26 See, for example, the biography of E’huì in Qing shi gao (Draft History of the Qing), 1928, Reprint (Beijing, Zhonghua shuju, 1977), juan 328, 10902, which records the erection of shrines honouring E’huì and a number of other commanders from this war. E’huì was a meritorious official who fought in several of the ten great campaigns and whose portrait, now in a private collection in the United States, once hung in the Zi Guang Ge hall of military fame (see below).

27 For a photograph of the inscription on a monument erected at Meinuo, a Jinchuan battlefield site in Sichuan, see Beijing Tushuguan, Gedi 7890, inscription dated QL 41/2 (March, 1777). This rubbing is in very poor condition—the central portion is virtually illegible—but the text is also reproduced in Peng, comp., Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji juan 31, 404-5, which also reprints the texts of the Lewuwei and Karai (other Jinchuan battlefields) stelae.

28 See Beijing tushuguan, vol. 71, 167. Written Uighur is based on Arabic script, with some adaptations. On the occasion for this monument see below, and see Chapter Four.

29 On this establishment, see James A. Millward, “A Uyghur Muslim in Qianlong’s Court: The Meanings of the Fragrant Concubine,” Journal of Asian Studies 53.2 (May 1994): 427-58, at 428-9; for a photograph of a rubbing of the inscriptions, see Beijing tushuguan, vol. 72, 59-60. An example of the use of Sanskrit in some inscriptions is furnished by the Fan xiang si bei at the Buddhist Fan Xiang Temple in the Fragrant Hills northwest of Beijing; for a photograph of a rubbing of these inscriptions, see Beijing tushuguan vol. 70, 121. To be Muslim in Qing China was not necessarily to be exotic: see Ben-Dor Benite, Zvi, The Dao of Muhammad: A Cultural History of Chinese Muslims in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).


31 In Europe the crucifix was in relief, not intaglio. A number of such stelae are now displayed at the Beijing Stone-Carvings Museum. For some photographs, see Beijing tushuguan, vol. 72, 146 (Castiglione’s stone); vol. 73, 140 (Benoit’s stone); vol. 67, 62 (Amiot’s stone). For photographs of rubbings taken from monuments engraved in Russian and Chinese, see ibid., vol. 71, 52, and vol. 72, 189.


35 *Qinding Daqing huidian* (Imperially Authorized Collected Institutes of the Great Qing), 1899, Reprint (Taipei: Xinwenli, 1976), 26, 8b-9a.


37 The main accounts are at *Qinding Daqing huidian shili* (Imperially Authorized Collected Institutes and Precedents of the Great Qing) 1899; Reprint (Taipei: Xinwenli 1976), 414, 10b-21a; Yu et al., *Rixia jiuen kao*juan, 10, 143-4, which cites *Qinding Daqing huidian* and reproduces imperial verses on the ceremonies with contemporary annotation. On the incidence of the ceremonies, see also Hummel, *Eminent Chinese*, 68, which omits to mention the 1760 xianfu ceremony recorded in Xu Yang’s painting discussed above. According to *Huidian Shili*, (414,12b), shoufu routinely followed xianfu, but in practice these does not seem always to have been the case. These ceremonies occasionally took place during the Ming dynasty; see Long Wenbin, *Ming hui yao* (Collected Essentials of the Ming) (Canton: Guangya, n.d.), 6b-8a.

38 On this and other military rituals, see Chapter Four. See Zhang and Liang, *Shi qu bao ji xubian*, vol. 2, 788; see also Nie Chongzheng, “Qingchao gongting tongbanhua ‘Qianlong pingding Zhunbu Huibu zhan’” (The Qing Court’s Copper Engravings of the ‘Battle Pictures of Qianlong’s Pacification of the Zunghars and Muslims’), *Gugong Bowuyuan Yuankan* (Palace Museum Monthly) 4 (1989.4), 55-64, at 59. For an illustration, see Evelyn S. Rawski and Jessica Rawson, eds. *China: The Three Emperors, 1662-1795*, (Exhibition Catalogue. London: Royal Academy of Arts, London, 2005), 181, figure 55. There is some question about this ceremony: *Shi qu bao ji xubian* states that it took place in the first month of Qianlong 25 (1760), and Nie, discussing a painting of the same name done by Jesuit artist-priests as part of the series of war illustrations, follows this. The 1760 date is likely correct since the wars were not completely over until 1759. On the other hand Hu Jing, a contemporary observer intimately familiar with the imperial paintings collection, state that Xu’s work dates from 1755. See Hu Jing, “Guochao yuanhua lu” (Record of the Academy Painting of the Reigning Dynasty),
in Huashi congshu (Collectanea of the History of Painting) 1816, Reprint (Shanghai: Renmin meishu, 1963), 52. I thank Nie Chongzheng for making a copy of this text available to me.

39 Shangyu dang QL 41/4/27 [June 13, 1776], 169.

40 See Zhang and Liang, Shi qu bao ji xubian, vol. 2, 788; see also Morse, H.B., The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1634-1835 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), vol. 1, 295. For another occasion on which a court painter depicted the attendance of a range of foreign ‘tribute-payers’ at an imperial celebration, see the anonymous, undated hanging scroll of “Envoys from Vassal States and Foreign Countries Presenting Tribute to the Emperor,” illustrated in Rawski and Rawson, eds., Three Emperors 180, figure 54. On exchanges made between British colonial representatives and Mughal rulers and the interpretations of authority involved, see Bernard S. Cohn, Colonialism and its Form of Knowledge, especially Chapter Five. For a suggestive comparison with ceremonial occasions in ancient Rome, see MacCormack, Art and Ceremony, 9-12.

41 On the prescribed ceremony, see Daqing huidian shili 413, 14-20; for a description of one of the paintings of this event, see Zhang and Liang, Shi qu bao ji xubian, vol. 2, 810; see also Nie, “Qingchao gongting tongbanhua ‘Qianlong Pingding Zhunbu Huibu Zhantu,’” 59-60. For a partial illustration (of the copper engraving), see Christoph Müller-Hofstade and Hartmut Walravens, “Paris-Peking: Kupferstiche für Kaiser Qianlong,” in Europa und die Kaiser von China, ed. Hendrik Budde, Christoph Müller-Hofstade and Gereon Sievernich (Frankfurt am Main: Insel Verlag, 1985), 163-72, fig 163. I thank David Mungello for sending me a copy of this article. The ritual greeting was also performed in 1749 following the first Jinchuan war but the emperor did not personally ride out to greet general Fuheng on that occasion.

42 See Zhang and Liang, Shi qu bao ji xubian, vol. 2, 735 (“ Infinite Fortunes”); vol. 2, 789 (“ Western Regions”)—on this see also Hu Jing, Guochao yuanhua lu 52, where he notes the painting was based on Western missionary surveys; vol. 2, 572-3 (“ Three Victories”)—these were the three major turning points of the second Jinchuan campaign; see above, text following note 12); vol. 4, 1869-70 (“ Dispatch and Victory”). For an illustration of the latter work, see Christie’s New York, Fine Chinese Paintings and Calligraphy (1993), 149-53; and see Chapter Four.

43 Hu Jing, “Guochao yuanhua lu,” preface, 2-3, uses these paintings to compare Qianlong’s achievements to those of his predecessors, particularly during the Tang dynasty, and the clear implication, one that was admittedly formulaic at the time, was that although these court paintings do have their antecedents they have surpassed them. For information on the extensive earlier links between art and warfare in China, I am grateful to Robert E. Harrist, Jr. On the repetition of the formula, see Chapter Five, especially note 21.

On the battle pictures, see Waley-Cohen, “China and Western Technology”, 1542-3, and accompanying notes. See also Nie, "Qianlong pingding Zhunbu Huibu zhantu' he Qingdai de tongbanhua" (The War Illustrations of Qianlong’s Wars to Suppress the Zunghars and [Xinjiang] Muslims and Qing copper-engraving), Wenwu (Cultural Affairs) 4 (1980): 61-4; and Nie, “Qingchao gongting tongbanhua ‘Qianlong pingding Zhunbu Huibu zhantu.” See also Paul Pelliot, “Les Conquêtes de l’Empereur de China,” T’oung-pao (1921), 183-275; (1931), 502. For illustrations, see Rawski and Rawson, Three Emperors, 169, figure 75.

Some of these copper-engravings were ‘colourized,’ both in France, where imperial stipulations for exclusivity were disregarded, and in China, at Qianlong’s request. There are examples in the Beijing Palace Museum and in private collections in the West.

This discussion is indebted to Ka Bo Tsang, “Portraits of Meritorious Officials;” see also Ka Bo Tsang (Zeng Jiabao), “Ji feng gong, shu wei ji: Qing Gaozong shi quan Wugong di tuxiang jilu,” (Record meritorious deeds, relate glorious achievements: on paintings of the Qianlong emperor’s ten great victories). Gugong Bowuyuan Yuankan (Palace Museum Monthly) 93 (1990): 38-65.

The reference to the Marquis of Zan is to Xiao He, advisor to Liu Bang, who became first emperor of the Han dynasty in the third century BCE. Like Fuheng, he never actually fought in the war.

See, James A. Millward, Beyond the Pass, 30, 40-43, 76.

See Lu Zhengming, “Qianlong di ‘shi quan wu gong’ chu tan,” 253-5; see also Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 43-5.


See, e.g., Sotheby’s Amsterdam, Catalogue of Chinese and Japanese Ceramics and Works of Art sale 604 (23 October 1994) (thanks to John Finlay for this information); for another example, see Wendy Moonan, “Heroic Commanders, Heroically Depicted,” New York Times (March 25, 2005), E32. See also Ka Bo Tsang (Zeng Jiabao), “Ji feng gong, shu wei ji.”


See Bartlett, Beatrice S., Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China, 1723-1820, 225-8; Perdue, China Marches West, 463-94.
Chapter Three


2 See, e.g., Xue Yunsheng, Duli cunyi (Concentration on Doubtful Matters while Perusing the Substatutes); (Beijing: Hanmaozhai, 1905). Reprint. (Taibei, Chengwen, 1970), no. 162.


4 See Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), Chapter Two, especially 75-76.

5 The following section on the early Qing draws on the work of Dai Yingcong, “The Rise of the Southwestern Frontier under the Qing, 1640-1800,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1996).

6 A Bodhisattva is a superior spiritual being who, having already attained Buddhist enlightenment, postpones personal nirvana in order to help those still trapped in the cycle of suffering that defines human life; a bodhisattva periodically reappears among men in a new reincarnation.


10 Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar, especially Chapter Two.


12 See F.D. Lessing, Yung-Ho-Kung: An Iconography of the Lamaist Cathedral in Peking, with Notes on Lamaist Mythology and Cult (Stockholm: Reports from the Sino-Swedish Expedition, 1942): 57-62. On the “Pronouncement on Lamas,” see also Berger, Empire of Emptiness, 35-36, 196, for an illustration of a handscroll with some of the text, see Rawski and Rawson, Three Emperors, 144-3, cat. 49.


18 Gu Zucheng et al., ed., Qing shilu zangzu shiliao (Historical Materials on Tibetans in the Qing Veritable Records) (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe 1982), vol. 5, 2591, QL 40/5/30 (June 27, 1775); ibid., vol. 6, 2823, cited by Mansier, “La Guerre du Jinchuan,” 132.


21 References to atrocious weather appear in every account, official and private, of the war. For some examples, see Wenfu, Jinchuan zougao, juan 1, n.p., Nayancheng, A Wencheng, vol. 1, 463-7, QL 36/12/27 (Jan 31, 1772); vol. 2, 653, QL 37/12 n.d. (Dec 1772/Jan 1773); vol. 2, 751-2, QL 38/4/1 (May 30, 1773).


On the punishment of the lamas see, e.g., *Daqing gaozong shilu* (Veritable Records of the Qianlong era of the Great Qing) 1007, 10b-11a; QL 41/4/22 (June 8, 1776).

Gu Zucheng et al., *Qing shilu zangzu shiliao*, 6, 2808, QL 41/3/9 (April 26 1776).


*Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe* (Secret Palace Memorials of the Qianlong Era) (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1982-6), 42, 75-6, QL 43/2/10 (March 8, 1778).

For another case in which the emperor (in this case the Qianlong emperor’s successor, the Jiaqing Emperor), had to take seriously supernatural events regardless of whether he actually believed they had taken place or meant anything, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Politics and the Supernatural in Mid-Qing Legal Culture,” *Modern China* 19.3 (1993): 330-353.

See, e.g., *Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe* (Secret Palace Memorials of the Qianlong Era) 42, 639, QL 43/4/13 (May 9, 1778).


### Chapter Four

1 For some imperial references to *yi ju liang de*, see *Daqing lichao shilu* (Veritable Records of Successive Emperors of the Great Qing) (Tokyo: Okura shuppan kabushiki kaisha, 1937-38), 599, 17b-18a, QL 24/10/21 (December 10, 1759); ibid., 716, 16a, QL 29/8/2 (August 28, 1764); *Qinding Daqing huidian shilu* (Imperially Commissioned Institutes and Precedents of the Great Qing) (hereinafter HDSL) 1899. Reprint (Taipei: Xinwenli, 1976), 729,16a-b (1761, n.d.), and the discussion throughout Joanna Waley-Cohen, *Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1758-1820* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991). For chuishi jiuyuan see, for instance, *Shangyu dang* (Archive of Imperial Edicts), (Beijing), QL 41/8/20 (1776), p. 293, and Chapter Two. On the scrolls—themselves, of course, the product of *wen* skills—see Zhang Zhao and Liang Shizheng et al, comp., *Shiqu baoji xubian* (Imperial Paintings Catalogue, First Supplement), 1793, Reprint (Taipei: National Palace Museum,1969-1971), vol. 4, 1869-1870. For illustrations, see Christie’s New York, *Fine Chinese Paintings and Calligraphy*, sale 7790 (1 December 1993), 149-153. *Shiqu baoji xubian* dates the scrolls to 1748, but lists them as depicting the “First Jinchuan War” so the title must have been added after 1776, when the Qing again defeated the Jinchuan. The other two scrolls in the set apparently depicted aspects of the victory celebrations discussed below.


7 Zito’s analysis of these texts (primarily in Part Two of *Of Body and Brush*) disregards—since it is irrelevant to her argument—their military component.

8 *Qingding Daqing huidian*, 26, 6a.

9 See *Qingchao tongdian* (Comprehensive Institutions of the Qing) (Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1936), 58, 1423; see also *Siku quanshu zongmu* (General Catalogue of the Library of the Four Treasuries) 1782, Reprint (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1992), 82, 707.

10 Laibao, comp., *Da Qing Tongli* (Comprehensive Rites of the Qing). 1756, n.p., 41, 1a.


12 See Fu Long’an et al., comps., *Huangchao liqi tushi* (Illustrations and Models of Ceremonial Paraphernalia of This August Dynasty) 1766, especially 3b-4a, and see *Siku quanshu zongmu*, 82, 706-707.

For a complete list of the categories of military ritual, see Qinding Daqing huidian, 26, 8b-9a; Daqing tongli, 41-45; HDSL 411-14.


See Qingchao tongdian, (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1936), 58, 1423. Idem., 58, 1424.


The precise location of the military inspection grounds is uncertain. Possibly it was located where the current drill grounds of Beijing are now, some two kilometres south of Xiangshan Park outside Beijing, although surviving structures at the latter location date only from 1749. It may, however, have been much closer to the centre of the capital.

There were four varieties of imperial insignia used on different occasions during the Qing. On this occasion the dajia lubo was the insignia used. For detailed descriptions, and illustrations, of its various components, see Huangchao liqi tushi 10; for the musical instruments of lubo, see ibid., 9. See also Grace Wong and Goh Eck Kheng, Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty: Treasures from the Shenyang Palace Museum, China, (Singapore: Landmark Books, 1989), 48-51, 118-119; and see Wan Yi and Huang Haitao, Qingdai gongting yinyue (Court Music of the Qing Dynasty), (Beijing: Gugong bowuyuan zijincheng chubanshe, 1985), 23.

Daqing tongli 41, 3b-12b. For an account of the different types of cannon, see Giovanni Stary, “The ‘Manchu Cannons’ Cast by Ferdinand Verbiest and the Hitherto Unknown Title of his Instructions,” in Ferdinand Verbiest (1623-1688): Jesuit Missionary, Scientist, Engineer and Diplomat, ed. John W. Witek, (Nettetal: Steyler Verlag, 1994), 215-25. For illustrations, see Huangchao liqi tushi 16, especially 6a-8b, 16a-17b.

On naoge dayue, see HDSL 540, for the particular piece played, zhuang jun rong, see ibid., 7a-8a. See also Daqing tongli 41, 13a-b. See Huangchao liqi tushi 9, 64a-69b, for illustrations of naoge instruments used in rituals celebrating military success (kaizu; see text accompanying notes 38-41). See also Wan and Huang, Qingdai gongting yinyue 21-23, 82-83; and see Rawski, “The Creation of an Emperor,” especially 161-169. In most instances a particular piece of music was associated with an individual ritual.

For a description and an illustration of these quivers and bow-holders, elaborately decorated in silver and gold thread, see Huangchao liqi tushi 14, 1a-b; see also Bowers Museum of Cultural Art, Secret World of the Forbidden City: Splendors from China’s Imperial Palace, exhibition catalogue (Santa Ana, CA: Bowers Museum of Cultural Art, 2000), 87. For a photograph of the emperor’s ceremonial armour, and heavily padded and covered with gilt metal plates bordered by brocade, and “designed for actual warfare,”
see Wong and Goh, *Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty*, 49. This armour, said to have been used in the early years of the Qianlong reign, appears different from that shown in Lang Shining’s painting (see note 30 and accompanying text) possibly because the painting dates from a later period. It closely resembles a suit of ceremonial armour illustrated in Bowers Museum, *Secret World of the Forbidden City*, 91, that dates from the Xianfeng period (1851-1861) and may never have been used.

24 The Solons were a Tungusic tribe who had migrated south from the Amur region and eventually submitted to the Manchus. They fought on the Qing side against the Russians and became incorporated into the banners.

25 For an illustration of an elaborately mounted “conch shell military horn’ see Wong and Goh, *Imperial Life in the Qing Dynasty*, 25. According to this work, conch shells used to signal advances and retreats, and especially in ritual performances, were heard so frequently that a new idiom developed, referring to those who talked nonsense as ‘those who blew the conch shell’. See, however, Patricia Berger, *Empire of Emptiness: Buddhist Art and Political Authority in Qing China* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2003), 184, on the very detailed symbolism of conch-shell gifts in Tibetan-Buddhism.

26 *Daqing tongli* 41, 12b-18a. On the particular types of music played at this point, *changhuangwei* piece of *naoge qingyue*, see HDSL 541; Wan and Huang, *Qingdai gongting yinyue*, 88-90.

27 A helmet supposed to have belonged to Qianlong, and somewhat resembling the one he wears in this portrait, is now in the Arms and Armour Collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. However, it bears Tibetan rather than the Sanskrit script of the *dayue* helmet depicted in Castiglione’s painting. For specifications of helmets used in *dayue*, see *Huangchao liqi tushi* 13, 1-5, which indicates the introduction of a new version of the helmet in 1756, around the time that the Xinjiang wars were coming to an end.

28 Gugong Bowuyuan (Palace Museum), *Qingdai gongting huihua* (Court Paintings of the Qing Dynasty) (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1992), no. 83.


30 For the poems, see Yu Minzhong, comp., *Rixia juween kao*, 74, 1240-1. 1781. Reprint. (Beijing: Guji chubanshe, 1983), 74, 1240-1. For an illustration see the cover of Bowers Museum, *Secret World of the Forbidden City*. The painting’s date remains somewhat unclear; it seems to have been done between 1748 and 1758. For a detailed description of the ritual performance of a Grand Inspection (in this case that of 1739) in the imperial paintings catalogue, see Zhang and Liang, *Shiqu baoji xubian*, vol. 4, 1871-1875. The painting to which this description relates apparently hung in the Zhonghua palace within the Forbidden City; *ibid.*, vol 1, 105.
31 For a composite description of these ceremonies under Nurhaci, see Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 135-6. The Manchus built a new Tangse in each capital. See Rawski, Last Emperors, 236. Hetu Ala was located in modern Jilin province.

32 On Manchu rituals and national culture, see di Cosmo, “Manchu Shamanic Rituals,” 351-396. I am indebted to Michael Chang for his articulation of the notion of polyvalence in the context of Qing rule. The moment at which the earlier episodes were reified as precedents is difficult to pinpoint with any precision, although the 1740s are the latest likely date. In any event, this was probably a gradual process rather than a sudden change.

33 On court robes, see Rawski, Last Emperors, 41-42. Ibid., 243, discusses the performance in front of the Hall of Supreme Harmony of shamanic rituals featuring Nurhaci’s success in combating his enemies.

34 For illustrations of the musical instruments involved, see Huangchao liqi tushi 8. The type of music played was, first, the longping piece of zhonghe shaoyue music, and second, the qingping piece; see HDSL 535, 24a-b; Wan and Huang, Qingdai gongting yinyue, 62-63; and Rawski, “The Creation of an Emperor.”

35 HDSL 412, 1a-5a. The type of insignia in this case was fajia lubo.

36 See Chapter Two.

37 HDSL 413, 14a-15b; 414, 12b. Further research might establish that Qing emperors’ decision to make use of stele inscriptions to further their cultural agenda was prompted in part by a revival of scholarly interest in epigraphy. Such a finding would certainly conform to the pattern of imperial co-optation of independent intellectual focuses of interest.

38 HDSL 413, 15b-19a. Earlier Qing jiaolao took place at Lugouqiao (Marco Polo Bridge) southwest of the capital.

39 See Nayancheng, comp., A Wencheng gong nianpu (Chronological Biography of Master A Wencheng), 1813, Reprint (Taipei: Wenhai, 1971), vol. 4, 1849-50 (QL 41/1/n.d.); see also idem., 1872-3 for a document dating from the twenty-fourth day of the first month, proposing the 27th for the jiaolao.

40 See, e.g., Yu, Rixia jiwen kao, 133, 2136-7.


42 For a description, see Qinggui, comp., Qing gong shi xu bian (History of the Qing Palaces, continued) 1810, Reprint (Beijing: Gugong bowuyuan tushuguan, 1931) 43, 2b. Court music included several subcategories of music that appear to have related to the Ten Great Victories. Amongst these “fanzi yue” (barbarian music) was played on instruments identified as of Jinchuan origin; such music may have featured at the celebratory banquet. See Wan and Huang, Qingdai gongting yinyue, 19.

For the quotation, see ibid., at 1942-43. Heshen rose to power in 1775 after attracting the emperor’s attention while serving as an imperial guardsman. He exercised enormous influence until the latter’s death in 1799.


Bibliothèque de l’Institut de France, volume 1522, p. 154. This letter to Amiot from the great sinophile Henri Bertin quotes the words of an unnamed third party.

Wuli tongkao 242, 1a-b; Ning Chia, “The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals,” 62, 69.


For a detailed account of some of these paintings, now located in the Musée Guimet in Paris, see Michele Pirazzoli-t’Serstevens and Hou Ching-lang, Mulan tu.

Gugong Bowuyuan, Qingdai gongting huihua, no. 82.

Zhang and Liang, Shiqu baoji xubian, vol. 2, 806-16 lists the sixteen war paintings relating to the Xinjiang wars, and reproduces their inscriptions and other related material, much of it eulogizing the war effort. For a list of the Jinchuan battle pictures of the late 1770s, see ibid., 817. I am grateful to Nie Chongzheng for letting me see these in the Palace Museum in 1994. For a list of the Taiwan battle pictures, see ibid., 823; those for the Annam and Gurkha wars are listed at ibid., 827, 837.


Corrigan and Sayer, The Great Arch, 92.

This working definition of mass culture is adopted from James Naremore and Patrick Brantlinger, eds., Modernity and Mass Culture (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 2. Despite the wholly different context, this definition seems applicable to eighteenth-century China.


### Chapter Five

1 On law, see Philip Huang, Civil Justice in China: Representation and Practice in the Qing. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996); on foreign relations, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, The Sextants of Beijing: Global Currents in Chinese History (New York: W.W. Norton,


7 For the text of the essay, see “Shi quan ji” (A Record of Ten Great Victories), in Peng Yuanrui, comp., *Gaozong yuzhi shiwen shi quan ji* (The Qianlong emperor’s prose and poetry on the Ten Great Campaigns), ed. Xiong Hui (Taibei: Heji Shilin, 1962-3), 671.

8 National Palace Museum, Taipei, draft biographies of Ji Yun and Lu Xixiong, no. 7763; see also *Qingshi gao* 320, 10772. I thank Iona Man-cheong for providing me with this reference. See also Iona Man-cheong, *The Class of 1761: Examinations, State and Elites in Eighteenth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), chapter five, particularly the discussion of narrating the empire.


11 Quotation is from Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, 201. For a summary of the careers of Bandi, O’ertai, Liu Tongxun, Sun Shiyi, and Zhao Yi, see Hummel, Eminent Chinese, 15-16, 601-3, 533-4, 680-2, and 75-6, respectively. For a tabulation of grand councillors, see Qian Shifu, comp., Qingdai zhiguan nianbiao (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), 135-56. See also Man-cheong, The Class of 1761, particularly on Sun Shiyi and Zhao Yi and, on Zhao Yi’s military writing; Perdue, China Marches West, 500-501. Perhaps the most powerful man in the empire in the late eighteenth century was the imperial favourite Heshen, who had risen from a position as imperial guardsman although his only battlefield experience was a brief and disastrous sortie in the suppression of a Muslim uprising early in his career. Although he never again went to the war front, as a senior grand councillor through most of the last part of the Qianlong reign, he undoubtedly played an important role in strategic decision-making and the control of staff operations in subsequent military campaigns.

12 On the Office of Military Archives, see Bartlett, Monarchs and Ministers, especially 225-8.

13 See, e.g., Fuheng et al., comp., Pingding Zunke’er janglue (Record of the Pacification of the Zunghars); Laibao et al., comp., Pingding jinchuan janglue (Record of the Pacification of the Jinchuan); Shuhede et al., comp., Pingding jiao hu Linqing nifei janglue (Record of the Suppression of the Linqing Sectarian Rebels); Wang Chang et al., comp., Pingding liang jinchuan janglue (Official History of the Suppression of the Two Jinchuan). As for Lu Xixiong, it was at the end of his draft biography that the observation accompanying note 8, above, occurred.

14 Wang Chang, “Shu jiao ji wen,” (Record of Things Heard in the Borders of Sichuan) in Xiaofanghu zhai yudi congchao (The Little Square Vase Studio Geographical Collectanea), ed. Wang Xiqi. (Shanghai: Zhuyi Tang, 1877-97), 8, 6a-21a; “Dian xing ji lie,” (Outline Record of Travels in Burma), in idem., 10, 233a-240b; for Wang’s correspondence, including letters from the front, see his Chunrong tang ji (Records of Chunrong Hall), 1807, Reprint (Zhuxi Wenbin, 1892), juan 30-32. For some of Ji Yun’s Xinjiang writings, see his “Wulumuqi zashi,” (Miscellaneous poems from Urumqi), in Ji Yuewei cao tang biji (Notes from the Yuewei Hall (Beijing: Yuewei cao tang biji n.p.,1800); see also Joanna Waley-Cohen, Exile in Mid-Qing China: Banishment to Xinjiang, 1759-1820 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), 155-62.


16 “Yuzhi nanxun ji (Imperial Account of the Southern Tours),” Qinding nanxun shengdian (Siku quanshu zhenben, vol. 11), comp. Sazai, juan shou, lb. This imperial observation has been cited by various scholars, including Zu o Buqing, “Qianlong nanxun,” (The

For an important study of the southern tours, see Michael G. Chang, “A Court on Horseback: Constructing Manchu Ethno-Dynastic Rule in China, 1751-1784” (Ph.D. diss, University of California, San Diego, 2001).


See Nasser O. Rabbat, *The Citadel of Cairo: A New Interpretation of Royal Mamluk Architecture* (Leiden: EJ Brill, 1995), especially 292-4, on the militarization of architecture under Mamluk rule in Cairo in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, ironically in part by way of celebration of victories against both Christian Crusaders and the Mongols. One might also, of course, readily draw analogies with the military and militarized architecture of the Roman and other empires.


28 Zhen Cheng, comp., *Qingliang shan zhi* (Gazetteer of Mount Wutai); this text is also cited by Sun Wenliang et al., *Qianlong di* (Jilin: Wenshi Chubanshe, 1993), 171-4.

29 See Grupper, and see Chapter Three.


31 Hay, “Ming Palace and Tomb in Early Qing Jiangning.”


35 One of the compilations in which the text of the inscriptions appeared was the records of the Guo Zi Jian itself—an unexpected location for such propaganda. See Liang et al., comps. *Qinding guo zi jian zhi* (Imperially Authorized Annals of the National Academy), 1781. Reprint (Taibei: Shangwu, 1974), 5, 15a-17a. The author was a grand councillor.
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