In this paper are studied the disruption and resumption of Sino-Vietnamese tributary relations in a period when a new dynastic power was arising in Vietnam.* The events of the period 1788–1790 highlight the basic interests of the two parties in the tributary system. For China it was a clever and economical device for dealing with a bordering country which the Chinese rulers did not consider practical to control directly and yet wanted to keep revolving within the orbit of China’s influence. For the Vietnamese rulers tribute provided a way to remain relatively independent of their giant neighbor, avoiding both excessive cost and Chinese interference in their internal affairs. Yet the Chinese power on Vietnam’s frontier remained a permanent threat, for it could move quickly to chastise a ruler who seemed to contravene the tributary relationship.

The Rise of the Tâyson Rebellion

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, Vietnam underwent one of the most turbulent periods of her history.¹ Since 1620 the country had been divided into two rival “principalities,” governed by the Trinh family in

* With the author's permission but with a sense of shame, we have omitted the proper diacritic marks on Vietnamese transcriptions except for the circumflex. That this action will be welcomed by the printer and no doubt accepted by most readers is a reflection of American backwardness in Vietnamese studies—Ed.
the north, and by the Nguyễn family in the south. Both these families ruled on behalf of the emperor of the Later Lê dynasty (1428–1788), who apparently retained only religious and symbolic powers. Toward the last quarter of the eighteenth century, the power and prestige of the two princely families and consequently of the Lê emperor declined. In both courts, the decline has been attributed to similar problems. First, power had been transmitted to a son of a favorite instead of to the legitimate son. Second, there had been abuse of power by favorite ministers and members of their families, leading to corruption and inefficiency in the administrative system. As a result, the country was practically ungoverned, and, as crops failed, rebellions broke out. The discontent was exploited by three brothers, Nguyễn Nhạc, Nguyễn Lu, and Nguyễn Huế, who in 1771 raised the banner of revolt and called themselves Tâyson (Tây-son), after the name of their place of origin.

The Nguyễn prince who ruled in the south was thus caught between these rebels and the Trịnh in the north, who took advantage of this situation to seize the southern capital, Phủ-xuận, in 1775. However, the Tâyson, having killed the Nguyễn prince and conquered the entire southern region, turned against the Trịnh. Under the slogan “destroy the Trịnh to restore the Lê,” Nguyễn Huế, the third brother, launched a heavy attack against the north. In 1786 he restored the Lê emperor to power and married his daughter. Shortly afterward the emperor died, and Nguyễn Huế settled the succession in favor of the emperor’s grandson, Lê Duy Ky. He then left the capital.

At that time, whereas the northern part of the country was still under the Lê emperor, the south had become three kingdoms: Nguyễn Nhạc, the eldest Tâyson brother, assumed the title of “central emperor” (Trung-uong Hoàng-dế) and ruled the central region from his capital in Qui-nhon; Nguyễn Lu was given the title of Đông Dình vương (the king who settles the east) and governed the region of Gia-dình (near modern Saigon); Nguyễn Huế received the northernmost region with its capital of Phủ-xuần (the present Huế), the ancient capital of the Nguyễn princes. His title was Bắc Bình vương (the king who pacifies the north). Nguyễn Huế deserved his title. Because he was the most powerful and the most able of the three brothers and because his realm bordered on the Lê emperor’s territory in the north, he considered it his responsibility to take care of the emperor’s affairs. For this reason, early in 1788, Nguyễn Huế came to Hanoi to execute one of the Lê emperor’s ministers who had become too pretentious. We are told that his action, with or without reason, frightened the Lê emperor, who fled from the capital while his entire family sought refuge in
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China. Nguyên Huê felt he still lacked sufficient support to take the imperial title, so he installed a member of the Lê family as supervisor of the country's affairs, left one of his faithful generals in Hanoi, and returned to his capital in Huế.

It was at this point that the Ch'ing authorities in China became closely involved in Vietnamese affairs.

*The Ch'ing Intervention of 1788*

The Chinese authorities apparently were not very well informed about developments in Vietnam during the Tâyson rebellion. The first mention of the rebellion came in a report from the governor-general of Liang-Kwang received on October 29, 1787, informing the court that the Vietnamese king had lost the seal given to him by the Ch'ing emperor and that, because he had died, his heir now requested to be invested. The court agreed to grant the request provided that Vietnam send an embassy to Peking.

No embassy, however, came to the Chinese capital. This was not surprising, for at that time the Lê king had already been displaced. In July 1788 the prefect of T'ai-p'ing in the province of Kwangsi reported that almost one hundred people had come to Lung-chou, in his prefecture, to seek refuge. These people belonged to the family of the Vietnamese king and were pursued by the rebels who had seized the capital. The king himself had already fled from the capital. But, except for the capital, all other regions remained faithful to the Lê dynasty.

Peking's reaction to this report was normal: orders were given to receive all the refugees. An order was also issued to Sun Yung-ch'ing, the governor of Kwangsi, and to Sun Shih-i, the governor-general of Liang-Kwang, to proceed to Lung-chou to make inquiries about the situation in Vietnam. China's main object was to maintain peace and order in the border regions. For this reason, the Grand Council decided to reinforce the troops along the frontier and to await the results of the investigations into the reason for the rebellion before taking any definite action. Ch'ing policy thus seemed to rely entirely upon the information and assessment of the governor-general of Liang-Kwang.

The policy recommended by Sun Shih-i was understandable, given the personality and career of this official. First, Sun Shih-i had become an official only at the age of forty-two, when he was appointed secretary in the
Truong Buu Lam / Intervention Versus Grand Secretariat. Despite his relatively rapid ascent thereafter, he perhaps felt that he needed to distinguish himself by further achievements. Until his involvement in Vietnamese affairs, he had been active mostly in literary and administrative fields, having been one of the compilers of the *Four Treasuries*; he had variously served as clerk during the Burmese expedition, as financial commissioner, as governor, and finally as governor-general. What Sun lacked was some military exploit in his record. He probably could not but compare himself to the then governor-general of neighboring Fukien and Chekiang, Fu-k'ang-an, who, though first and foremost a civil official, had won fame on the battlefield. Sun's desire for military glory had been apparent at the time of the Taiwan expedition in 1787. As governor-general of Liang-Kwang, Sun had started making preparations for a military expedition, even though he had received no order to do so. When a campaign against the Taiwanese rebels was finally launched, it was commanded by Fu-k'ang-an.9

Shortly after the Taiwan expedition, Sun received the report from the prefect of T'ai-p'ing concerning the Vietnamese rebellion. Possibly he now saw an opportunity to seize. At any rate, he responded to the Vietnamese affair as quickly as he had to the Taiwan rebellion. Upon receiving the report and before any orders reached him, Sun hastened to Lung-chou. What he learned from the Vietnamese refugees confirmed what the prefect had reported. Perhaps it was also what he wanted to hear.

In his memorial Sun reported that the Vietnamese king was not among the refugees. He immediately drew the conclusion that the whole country had not fallen into rebel hands. Further he emphasized that many local officials remained faithful to the dynasty. For these reasons, he asserted, it was neither too late nor too difficult "to think carefully about a restoration." Intervention, however, had to be decided upon quickly in order to protect the people who still believed in the future of the Lê dynasty and to encourage them not to surrender to the rebels.10

Is it possible that Sun also suggested, in a secret and separate memorial, that advantage be taken of the situation to bring Vietnam under direct Ch'ing rule? Wei Yuan, the historian of Ch'ing military campaigns, seems to have believed so when he wrote that, in his reply to Sun, the emperor considered it not decent to "avail of this danger to gain territory," since the Lê kings had served the empire very faithfully for more than a hundred years.11

Sun's report seems to have won the Grand Council over to the idea of intervention. Nevertheless, the court thought it would be better if the
Vietnamese pacified the rebellion by themselves and the Chinese army followed the Vietnamese troops only in order to give them confidence. Therefore, it would be sufficient to dispatch a small army to Vietnam.12

While Sun was carrying out the imperial instructions on the frontier, at the capital the Grand Council tried to find a rationale for justifying Chinese intervention. The main argument of the advocates of direct intervention was that the Lê dynasty had served the empire respectfully for more than a hundred years: “We cannot bear to see this family destroyed.”13 This feeling was based upon the time-honored principle “protect the weak and recover the lost.” Because it was normal for the Chinese to consider the barbarians subjects of the emperor, they thought it legitimate to protect these barbarians and their ruler from rebellious elements. The aim of the expedition was thus to restore the Lê family to the Vietnamese throne.14

After much deliberation, the order to move across the border was given to Sun Shih-i.15 This order, however, was not without restraining provisions. The Chinese forces were told not to take any active part in the pacification. Sun Shih-i was to send Hsü Shih-heng,16 the commander-in-chief of Kwangsi, to back the Lê forces but not to intervene unless these forces were defeated. As for Sun Shih-i, he was ordered to remain on the frontier and direct all operations from there.17

On October 21, 1788, when the rains had stopped, the Chinese forces crossed into Vietnam. The expeditionary army was headed by Sun Shih-i (who either disregarded the orders to remain on the border or had received new instructions) and Hsü Shih-heng. This force of some 10,000 men moved from Kwangsi in the direction of Hanoi through the Chen-nan pass, while another army of 5,000 men under the command of Wu Ta-ching, governor of Yunnan, advanced toward Hanoi through Meng-tzu and K’ai-hua.18

Less than a month later Sun entered Hanoi. The population lined the streets of the city to welcome the imperial army. On the same night the Lê king came to Sun’s headquarters and they agreed upon a day for the investiture ceremony.19 Several days later the ceremony took place. The initial aim of the expedition was thus achieved. Upon hearing the news, the emperor conferred on Sun Shih-i the title of duke and on Hsii Shih-heng the title of viscount.20 But these commanders declined the rewards on the grounds that they would not deserve them until they had captured the leader of the rebellion. However, by that time, Nguyen Huê was in Quang-
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nam in the south, where he had fled as soon as he felt "the wind of the imperial army." Sun Shih-i decided to proceed to the rebel nest.\textsuperscript{21}

The Grand Council, however, disagreed with his decision. Since the objective of "protecting the weak and recovering the lost" had been achieved, the court felt that Sun should return to China with his troops.\textsuperscript{22} The court gave several reasons for this view. First, there was the matter of cost. It had already been necessary to establish on the route from Yunnan to Hanoi about forty supply stations. Hanoi was separated from Quang-nam by more than 2,000 li, and it would require over fifty-three additional stations and an additional 100,000 or more men to send an expedition that far.\textsuperscript{23} Second, Chinese soldiers were not used to the climate of Vietnam, and it was feared that if they stayed there through the rainy season they would suffer from various diseases. Third, the court did not want the Vietnamese to misunderstand its real intentions. The intervention had been planned to restore the Lê king, and if the expeditionary army stayed in the country after this objective had been achieved it would raise doubts about China's motives.\textsuperscript{24} Finally and perhaps most important, there were many signs that the Lê dynasty had by now lost the mandate of Heaven (about which more will be said later). And since the emperor never contradicted the will of Heaven, it was thought that he should withdraw his protection from the Lê dynasty.\textsuperscript{25}

But Sun Shih-i was reluctant to leave Hanoi. From Sun's memorials it is possible to speculate that his reluctance was due to the fact that the second army, from Yunnan, was about to join the main army in Hanoi.\textsuperscript{26} It is conceivable that Sun Shih-i hoped this would induce Nguyễn Huệ to surrender,\textsuperscript{27} particularly because, as he thought, the Nguyễn brothers were fighting among themselves.\textsuperscript{28} Sun Shih-i therefore decided to disregard the imperial order and to wait.

He did not have to wait long. A few days after he had made this decision news came to him of a rebel advance. Upon hearing that Nguyễn Huệ himself led the rebel forces, the Lê king fled from Hanoi. Sun Shih-i finally decided to withdraw too. It was too late for an orderly withdrawal however. The retreat was a disaster for Sun's army. More than half his soldiers could not cross the Thi-cau river on the outskirts of Hanoi; under the weight of the army in full flight the bridge collapsed. Hsü Shih-heng and many of the army officers were left behind. As a result of this disaster, Sun Shih-i was removed from his post as governor-general of Liang-Kwang and was replaced by Fu-k'ang-an. Thus ended the first phase of Sino-Vietnamese relations in this period.
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The main question that arises in connection with this phase is why an apparent about-face occurred in Chinese policy toward Vietnam. The expedition to Vietnam had obviously been sent to restore the Lê king. But the Lê king had no sooner been restored than the emperor decided to drop him on the grounds that he had lost the mandate of Heaven.

There are two possible interpretations of this shift. One is that the edicts ordering the withdrawal were forged after the event in order to make Sun Shih-i wholly responsible for the disaster, which stemmed from his failure to withdraw. This theory presupposes that the Chinese initially intended that Chinese troops remain in Vietnam after the restoration of the Lê in order to control the country's affairs. In other words, the expedition had imperialist motives behind it. Such a possibility should not be ruled out, and, in fact, Vietnamese historians tend to accept this interpretation. It would not have been the first time the Chinese had occupied Vietnam under the pretext of restoring a deposed king.

The second interpretation is that the Grand Council was not very eager to intervene in Vietnamese affairs and did so only under pressure from Sun Shih-i. It did not want Chinese troops to remain in Vietnam any longer than absolutely necessary and consequently ordered the withdrawal after the objective of restoring the Lê king had been achieved. This interpretation seems to me more acceptable for two reasons. First, it is likely that the court decided to intervene, despite its hesitation, because it felt that the emperor had certain obligations toward the tributary king and that these obligations had to be honored. However, once this had been done, the emperor may have considered his commitment fulfilled and wanted no more involvement in Vietnamese affairs. Second, whatever the precise reasons for the intervention, it is certain that the emperor's desire to terminate Chinese involvement in Vietnamese affairs stemmed from the court's judgment that the Lê dynasty had lost the mandate of Heaven. From the court's viewpoint, there were good reasons for this judgment. In the first place, it knew that the Vietnamese king had not dared to return to the capital of Hanoi before its reconquest by the Chinese army. Next, Sun Shih-i informed the court that among Vietnamese officials he had met no worthy people.

To sum up, the expedition may have been necessary in order to observe certain principles in Chinese relations with tributary states. However, once these principles had been observed, the Chinese no longer had any reason to stay in Vietnam, especially in view of the unworthiness, as they saw it, of the dynasty they had restored to power.
If the second interpretation is correct, then it follows that Sun Shih-i did in fact receive orders to withdraw. If so, it must be asked how a commander like Sun could have disobeyed imperial orders. Several explanations may be advanced. First, he may not have had sufficient time to prepare his withdrawal; no more than six weeks had elapsed between his arrival in Hanoi and his expulsion. Second, it is possible that he counted on the capture of the rebel leader to counterbalance his disobedience. Moreover, it is conceivable that he relied upon his court connections and especially on Ho-shen, Ch’ien-lung’s chief minister, to come to his rescue in case of failure. If so, he was apparently proved correct. Shortly after he was removed as governor-general, he was appointed president of the Board of War at the capital and was concurrently made a grand councillor. For his failure he merely lost his title of duke.

Third, Sun’s disobedience may have been prompted by the fact that the expedition was a financially profitable affair. It has been suggested that the mid-Ch’ing campaigns were lucrative enterprises and that “the large allocations of imperial funds necessary in each case seem to have created a vested interest in the expansion or, more commonly, the prolongation of operations.”32 The financial element could, in fact, have been an important incentive for the prolongation of the Vietnamese operation, for it is known that in addition to putting the Kwangsi treasury at the disposal of Sun Shih-i, the emperor had ordered the Board of Revenue to transfer to him 500,000 silver taels from neighboring provinces.33 More important, Sun had received what amounted to a blank check for the expenditures of the campaign and particularly for taking care of the local population which had remained loyal to the dynasty.34

Whatever the reasons for Sun’s disobedience, it brought him defeat. After his expulsion and the flight of the legitimate king, Nguyễn Huệ became the actual sovereign of Vietnam35 and he was now responsible for the country’s relations with China.

The Settlement of the Incident

The appointment of Fu-k’ang-an, a famous military commander, as governor-general of Liang-Kwang36 and of several veteran officers of the Taiwan campaign37 to replace those who had been lost in Vietnam, seemed to inaugurate a warlike policy. However, although troops were
massed at the frontier, orders to move them never came. For this inaction there seem to have been three reasons.

The first is related to an earlier experience of an unsuccessful campaign against Burma. From 1766 to 1770 China undertook several expeditions designed to bring Burma under control, but all resulted in disaster. The court's explanation was that the Chinese soldiers were exhausted by Burma's climate and by the diseases they had contracted there. The implication was that the same thing could happen in Vietnam, where climatic conditions were similar.

The second reason given by the court was that the Vietnamese people were rebellious. An expedition would be costly of men and money, and the best that could come of it would be the annexation of Vietnam. But then, what would China profit from the conquest of a country impossible to control, unless, as in Sinkiang, the imperial government should send there a large number of officials and troops? Furthermore, argued the court, in Vietnam, unlike Sinkiang, the military garrisons and the administrative apparatus would very soon turn out to be useless because in Vietnam "the history of past dynasties has demonstrated that Chinese occupation of that country has never lasted for more than one or two decades."

Third, the court felt that even if China could control Vietnam directly it would be necessary to appoint a viceroy to administer the country. With this in mind, an imperial decree noted that in such a case, there would be no difference between a Ch'ing viceroy and Nguyên Huê, for the new Vietnamese ruler might now be viewed as an imperially appointed official. The Chinese emperor had indeed been entrusted by Heaven to administer the entire world and he delegated officials to take care of the internal affairs of the various distinct territories. The notion underlying this view was that "Heaven divided the territories but not the people."

Thus the court was in no hurry to send Chinese troops into Vietnam. The Ch'ing now felt no overriding obligation toward the Lê king because by twice fleeing from Hanoi he had shown himself to be an unworthy ruler. Peking, therefore, was now ready for a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese problem. The court hoped that the appointment of a famous military leader to settle it would intimidate Nguyên Huê and induce him to offer his submission.

Nguyên Huê, on his part, was no less ready for a peaceful solution. Even before launching his attack against the Chinese expeditionary forces, he had been worried about China's subsequent vengeance. His worry
was exacerbated by the fact that the Siamese, incited by the survivor of the former Nguyễn princes, Nguyễn Anh (who eventually was to unify and rule over Vietnam under the reign title of Gia-long), were threatening his new kingdom from the south and west.44

Thus the way was paved for negotiations. A few days after Fu-k'ang-an's arrival on the frontier, an important embassy bearing tribute arrived from Hanoi to offer Nguyễn Huế's submission.45 It was exactly what both the court and Fu-k'ang-an had expected. The court, as we have seen, had desired a peaceful settlement,46 whereas Fu-k'ang-an was particularly eager not to antagonize the court because he had been involved in irregularities in his former post.47 Moreover, Vietnamese documents state that the governor-general was not indifferent to the numerous presents offered by Nguyễn Huế.48

In addition to all this, Nguyễn Huế's submission and apologies were perfectly acceptable. The tone of his petition was respectful and obedient, as were the manners of his envoys. Nguyễn Huế stressed many times that his attack on the imperial army had been nothing but an accident; it had occurred because in the early hours of the morning his soldiers could not distinguish the Chinese from the local forces. In other words, he would not have dared to attack the imperial troops.49 Thus Chinese prestige was saved.

It is not surprising that Fu-k'ang-an imposed only two conditions for peace: all Chinese prisoners were to be handed back to China and Nguyễn Huế himself was to come to the Chinese capital to offer his apologies and submission. Nguyễn Huế accepted these conditions with one slight modification: he would come to the capital only in the following year in order to participate in the celebration marking the emperor's eightieth anniversary.50 In the meantime he sent an important embassy to Peking, headed by his nephew, to present tribute.51

The Vietnamese crisis was thus virtually over, and the only condition to be fulfilled was Nguyễn Huế's visit to Peking.

The Vietnamese King's Visit to Peking

It was in the tradition of Sino-Vietnamese relations that China require Vietnamese rulers who had opposed the Chinese to come to the capital to beg for pardon.52 It was also in the tradition that Vietnamese rulers were afraid to go to the Chinese capital. Other kings before Nguyễn
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Huế had declined such an invitation, sending in their stead a golden statue of a man. The gold statue may have been intended to replace the Vietnamese king who did not want to come to the capital, or it may have represented the Chinese general or generals who had been killed by the Vietnamese. Because the sending of this statue had always been connected with these two circumstances together, there is no way of knowing the intended symbolism. Reluctance to come to China's capital may, in any case, have been rather characteristic of tributary kings—hence the infrequency of their visits.

Perhaps for this reason, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor was much flattered by and most enthusiastic about Nguyễn Huế's promise to participate in the celebration marking his eightieth birthday. The Ch'ing Veritable Records are full of his instructions concerning this visit. The president of the Board of Rites was ordered to compile a new chapter of protocol concerning the reception to be given to the king at every level. The Chinese envoys to Vietnam were instructed to describe the king's clothes in order to enable the emperor to have such clothes made as presents for Nguyễn Huế. The local officials all along Nguyễn Huế's route were told to impress upon him the achievements of the empire in order to reinforce his desire to "come to be transformed." Fu-k'ang-an himself was ordered to escort the royal embassy and to make sure that all Nguyễn Huế's needs were satisfied. Finally, the visit of the Vietnamese king was such an important event that all punishments for misdeeds committed by Ch'ing officials involved in the preparations for the visit were suspended.

At the same time, the emperor seemed to comply with the requests put forward by Nguyễn Huế, who appeared to be testing out Ch'ing good will. First, he asked his ambassadors to request some ginseng for his mother; both Fu-k'ang-an and the emperor sent it to him at once. After that Nguyễn Huế sent an embassy to Peking with two other requests. The first was that the Chinese calendar, which the tributary states had to use and for which they had to send an embassy every year to the Chinese capital, be sent to him. The emperor quickly consented. The second was that the trade between the two countries which had been suspended since the outbreak of hostilities be resumed. In response to this request the emperor ordered that the frontier be reopened and emporia established in order to provide the Vietnamese population with all that it needed.

The sincere intentions of the Ch'ing court were further evidenced in the way its authorities handled the Lê refugees. The Lê king was ordered to
shave his head and wear Manchu dress. After that he was transferred to the capital, to be enrolled in a Chinese banner as a captain, with the third-grade rank in the official hierarchy. The other refugees were sent to Kiangnan, Chekiang, or Szechwan: some were enrolled in the banners of the local governor-general and some became simple citizens, for whom means of subsistence were to be provided by the local officials.

In part these measures were motivated by the desire to take care of those Vietnamese who had remained faithful to China. In part, however, they stemmed from the desire to prevent any Vietnamese attempt to restore the Lê dynasty, so that Nguyễn Huệ could come to the Chinese capital free of worry and confident that China had no intention of restoring his rival.

Nguyễn Huệ did not fail to appreciate these evidences of a friendly attitude, but the internal situation in Vietnam could not by any standards be considered sufficiently settled to allow the king to be absent from his country for almost eight months. The king was thus faced with a dilemma. If he left Vietnam for an extended journey the Siamese, with the cooperation of his internal rival, the descendant of the Nguyễn princes, would probably seize the opportunity to make their move. If he failed to go to Peking the Chinese government would be deeply insulted and Sino-Vietnamese relations could be fatally injured. It is possible, though by no means certain, that Nguyễn Huệ solved his problem by the unique method of sending his double to Peking.

On May 28, 1790 (Ch'ien-lung 55), the Vietnamese embassy headed by the king—or his double—arrived at the Chinese frontier. They were immediately met by Fu-k'ang-an and proceeded to the capital. At Lianghsiang, south of Peking, they were welcomed by the vice-president of the Board of Rites who, in the name of the emperor, offered the traditional tea and led them directly to the summer capital in Jehol.

During this trip there occurred three incidents that revealed Ch'ien-lung's magnanimous attitude toward his tributary king, Nguyễn Huệ.

It seems that, according to the regulations of the empire, all the correspondence of an ambassador to his country had to undergo Chinese censorship, and copies of this correspondence were even sent to the Grand Council. Fu-k'ang-an applied this rule to the first three letters sent by Nguyễn Huệ. However, as soon as the emperor discovered this, he ordered that Nguyễn Huệ's correspondence should not be censored, since this was hardly the ideal way of expressing confidence in dignitaries coming from remote countries.

When the emperor learned that Nguyễn Huệ was accompanied by his
son, he immediately invested the son as crown prince. Ch’ien-lung wrote to Nguyễn Huế: “You did not mind covering the distance of more than ten thousand li to come to greet me. It is because you consider me your master and your father. If you regard me as your father, how can I not regard you as my son? Your son, by his coming, proves that his loyalty to me is only equal to the good education he receives from you.”

The third incident occurred when the Vietnamese embassy arrived in Kiangsi. The emperor discovered, from a note sent in by the governor, that the daily expense of entertaining the embassy amounted to four thousand silver taels. At first unconcerned about these large amounts, the emperor became worried that if Nguyễn Huế was so well treated by the local authorities, it would be difficult to improve upon that treatment at the capital.

Upon arrival at Jehol on August 20, 1790, Nguyễn Huế was immediately given an imperial audience. From then on he accompanied the emperor at all public functions, which culminated in the celebration honoring the emperor’s eightieth birthday. In his writings connected with the celebrations, the emperor did not fail to mention the presence of the Vietnamese king during these festivities.

Sino-Vietnamese relations during the reign of Nguyễn Huế, as reflected in the number of embassies sent from Vietnam to China, appear to have been unusually close. From 1661 to 1911, over a period of 250 years, embassies were sent to China in only forty-five years—an average of about one embassy every five years. However, during the period from 1789 to 1793, that is, during Nguyễn Huế’s reign, there was at least one embassy every year. But this frequency only reflects relations on the ceremonial level. As one Chinese historian has noted, Nguyễn Huế’s close contacts with China on the official level did not prevent him from pursuing an independent policy designed to further Vietnamese interests as he saw them, even when it antagonized the Chinese.

This policy was manifest in several instances. First, he reportedly gave certain Chinese pirates official Vietnamese ranks and then sent them to raid the South China coast. Second, he is said to have aided the rebel Triad Society (T’ien-ti hui) in Kwangsi. These moves were meant to pave the way for the reconquest of Liang-Kwang which, according to Nguyễn Huế, had belonged to Vietnam in ancient times. Third, instead of using Chinese characters as the official writing system, as previous dynasties had done, Nguyễn Huế adopted the nôm characters, a combination of Chinese characters designed to transcribe the Vietnamese spoken language.
Fourth, he made preparations for conquering Siam, which was helping his internal rival, although Siam was also a tributary of China.79

The Pattern of Sino-Vietnamese Relations

We have briefly surveyed Sino-Vietnamese relations during an eventful period in which the operation of the tributary system was particularly significant. Against this background let us now try to highlight certain characteristics of the tributary relationship.

The peculiarity of this relationship distinguished it from the kind of tie that could normally be expected between two independent states. It was a complex arrangement not clearly expressed in any treaty but containing such elements as personal relations between the rulers, an implicit obligation on the part of China to render assistance to a tributary in time of need, and a tacit acceptance of certain ceremonial duties by both sides.

Equally striking is the fact that the relationship was not between two equal states. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that China was the superior and the tributary state the inferior. The Vietnamese kings clearly realized that they had to acknowledge China's suzerainty and become tributaries in order to avoid active intervention by China in their internal affairs. Thus the Lê king as a tributary ruler turned to China for protection when his rule was endangered. This reaction was indeed normal, in terms both of legal justification and of military strategy. As suzerain, China was committed to protect the legitimate dynasty recognized by her. Again, among Vietnam's neighboring states, China was obviously the only one in a position to accord effective military aid. It was no less normal a pattern of conduct for Nguyên Huê, upon seizing the throne, to request the Son of Heaven to legitimize his rule. This was without any doubt the only way to secure peaceful relations with the Chinese empire. In short, it was in the interest of the Vietnamese kings to surrender part of their sovereignty in return for the assurance that in case of rebellion they would be protected by China and that in time of internal peace they would not be conquered and directly administered by China.

On the other hand, it was in the Chinese interest to keep Vietnam within the tributary system. China felt that she could not govern this area directly; at the same time, she wished to avoid trouble in frontier regions. Hence, however aware the Chinese may have been of their cultural and military superiority, they did not take the tributary status of their inferior
neighbors for granted but carried on an active policy based upon "the imperial way of managing the subordinate states." This way was to treat them on "an equal basis of benevolence" in order to encourage them willingly "to come and be transformed." Ch'ien-lung's policy toward Nguyên Huê was merely one example of this attitude.

Tributary status was granted by China not to a country but to a ruler. This status could only be granted after the foreign ruler had manifested his acknowledgment of China's superiority in the respectful language of his petitions, in the reverent manner of his envoys, and in the expression of his desire to come "to be transformed." Only then was he invested as king by the Chinese emperor and his tribute accepted. Thus, the tribute offered to Ch'ien-lung by Nguyên Huê was refused until Nguyên Huê had been recognized by China as the ruler of Vietnam, even though for centuries Vietnam had been part of the Chinese tributary system. Moreover, because the granting of tributary status was a personal matter, this status was not transferable. Upon the death of a tributary ruler, his heir, even if he was the legal and undisputed successor, had to go through the same process of acquiring Chinese recognition.

The investiture of a tributary ruler was apparently viewed by the Chinese emperor as similar to the appointment of an official within the empire. Hence investiture could be withdrawn if the ruler failed in his duty—that is, if he failed to maintain peace and order, as did the Lê king. In such a case the tributary king could be punished just like any other high official of the empire. It was expressly stated that the only reason the emperor had refrained from punishing the Lê king was that his family had served the Chinese empire for more than a hundred years. Similarly, it was stated that one of the reasons for recognizing Nguyên Huê as ruler of Vietnam was that he was not different from an imperially appointed official managing the affairs of a conquered country. Such rationalizations, of course, justified Chinese pragmatism while providing its ratification by a myth.

In short, the principle of "Heaven has divided up territories but not peoples" set the pattern of China's relations with foreign countries, particularly with neighboring countries. This subtle notion gave China a highly flexible tool with which to conduct her external relations. She could recognize independent rulers because territories could be independent, but she could also intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary because the Chinese emperor was responsible for all the peoples under Heaven and because their rulers were viewed as his appointed representatives.
Notes to Intervention versus Tribute in Sino-Vietnamese Relations, 1788-1790  TRUONG BUU LAM

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Bibliographical note: Materials for studying Sino-Vietnamese relations are neither extensive nor various. One has to rely upon the Chinese official histories and Collected Statutes, together with the published documents listed below for the Ch'ing period. Vietnamese materials include the official publications such as Dai Việt su-ky toan thu 大越史記全書 (Complete history of Dai Việt; 1697; rev. and enlarged ed., 1880; Japanese ed., 1884); Khâm định Việt-su thòng giam cuong-muc 鈞定越史通鑑冊目 (Text and commentaries of the complete mirror for the history of the Việt; 1884); Dai-Nam thuc-luc 大南實錄 (The veritable records of Dai-Nam); Dai-Nam lié-truyễn 大南列傳 (Biographies of Dai-Nam), and encyclopedias such as Lich triều hiến-chương loài chi 歷朝憲章類志 (Essays on the regulations of various dynasties; completed in 1821). One may also glean valuable information from diaries and memoirs of members of Vietnamese embassies to China, although these consist mainly of maps, of itineraries, or of poems inspired by landscapes.

From the beginning of the nineteenth century, the sources on Vietnamese relations can be fruitfully supplemented by the archives of the Nguyễn dynasty (1802–1945), the greater part of which has been preserved. See Ch'en Ching-ho, “The Imperial Archives of the Nguyễn Dynasty,” Journal of Southeast Asian History, 3.2:111-128 (1962).

Abbreviations used in the notes:

CSK: Ch'ing-shih kao 淸史稿 (Draft history of the Ch'ing dynasty)
CSL: Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 大清歷朝實錄 (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty; Tokyo, 1937–1938)
HTSL: Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 帝國實錄 (Collected statutes of the Ch'ing dynasty; Precedents)
MCSL: Ming-Ch'ing shih-liao 明清史料 (Historical materials of the Ming and the Ch'ing periods), keng pien 庚編
SH: Shih-ch'ao sheng hsun 十朝聖訓 (Sacred instructions of ten reigns; Dairen, 1934)
THL: Tung-hua lu 東華錄 (Tung-hua records) for the Ch'ien-lung reign


2. It is difficult to adopt a single term for the Vietnamese rulers because they called themselves “kings” in their relations with China and “emperors” within the borders of their own territory.
3. Tây-son: a hamlet in the prefecture of Hoai-nhon 婉仁, province of Qui-nhon 归仁. The province was renamed Binh-dinh 平定 by Emperor Gia-long (1802–1820), after he had pacified the Tây-son movement. Actually the three brothers were born not with the surname Nguyễn but with the surname Hồ 湖. We do not know exactly why they changed their surname; some historians think they wanted to take advantage of a surname that had great prestige in the south (see Trần Trọng Kim, Viêêt-nam su luoc (Brief history of Vietnam; Saigon, 1951), p. 345; and Lê Thanh Khôi, p. 297.

4. SH, 274:3b.


6. CSL, 1307:5b-6.

7. Ibid.


9. Sun was nevertheless several times praised by the emperor and at the end of the expedition he was granted the hereditary title of Ch'ing ch'e tu-yu 額車都尉 with the sixth grade of hereditary rank. See H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China (Shanghai, 1912), item 944. This edict referred to the precedent of Chiang T'ing-hsi 蒋廷錫. We cannot see a direct connection between the two men save the fact that Chiang had been given the same title. See CSL, 1298:4, and Hummel, I, 143.

10. CSL, 1307:34-36.


15. CSL, 1314:29b.

16. Hsu Shih-heng had been transferred from Chekiang for the purpose of the expedition. See CSL, 1308:19b.

17. THL, 108:21b-22, 31b, edicts of September 24 and October 18, 1788.

18. CSL, 1315:7a-b. Both Hummel, p. 680, and G. Deveria, Histoire des relations de la Chine avec l'Annam-Vietnam du XVie siècle au XIXe siècle d'après les documents chinois (Paris, 1880), p. 55, assert that there were three, not two, armies. Two of these armies went by land and the third by sea from Ch'în-chou, Canton. The documents we have seen imply, however, that there were only two armies.


20. See CSK, Table 1, 3:2201.

21. CSL, 1319:7; and THL, 109:1b. 2-3, and esp. 3b-4b, edict of Feb. 19, 1789.

22. CSK, Pen-chi (Basic annals), 15:205.

23. CSL, 1319:16a-b, 20-29, 30.
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25. *CSL*, 1319:19b. The Grand Council favored withdrawal so strongly that in several edicts it instructed Sun that should the order to retreat reach him after he had started for Quang-nam, he should change his direction and, in order to quiet the Vietnamese king’s apprehensions, simply tell him that he had gone to inspect the southern frontier. See *CSL*, 1319:11.

26. Wei Yuan, p. 188; and *CSL*, 1319:31.


28. This assumption had been correct, at least as to an earlier fact, but was no longer true. By the time of the Chinese expedition Nguyễn Huệ was already reconciled with his brother.

29. See “Tây-son thuat luoc” 西山述略 (Brief history of the Tây-son), MS at the Institute of Historical Research, Saigon; and Lê Thanh Khởi, p. 308.


33. *CSL*, 1316:26a–b; and *MCSL*, 2:147b–149, memorial sent to Boards of War and of Revenue, Mar. 30, 1790.

34. *CSL*, 1315:32.

35. In fact, before launching his attack against Hanoi Nguyễn Huệ had assembled his collaborators and his troops outside his capital of Phu-xuân and, in their presence, had proclaimed himself emperor with the year-period title of Quang-trung 光中 (1788–1792). This proclamation meant that this time he would unite the Lê territory to his realm, after the victory.

36. Fu-k’anggan was well prepared to handle the Vietnamese affair. By special order of the emperor all memorials concerning it from the provinces of Liang-Kwang and Yun-Kuei had been copied and forwarded to him.

37. Fu-k’anggan was himself a well-known general. See Hummel, I, 253–255. Hai Lu 海鐸 was appointed Kwangsi commander-in-chief; Wei Ta-pin 魏大斌 and Lu T’ing-chu 陸廷桂 were made brigadier generals in Tso-kiang (Kwangsi) and in Tso-i (Canton) respectively. See *CSL*, 1321:24.


42. *CSL*, 1321:30. The appointment of Fu-k’anggan was actually nothing but a show of strength. The Grand Council told Fu-k’anggan to summon Nguyễn Huệ in the following terms: “You have perhaps not heard of my glorious exploits in Chin-chou and elsewhere. But Taiwan is separated from Vietnam only by the sea; you certainly are aware of what I have achieved in that land.”
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43. See Ngô Thới Chí 周時志, Hoàng Lê nhất thông chí 皇黎一統誌 (Historical geography of the Lê dynasty; Saigon, 1950), p. 198.
45. In fact, several embassies already had been sent to the frontier. But since Sun-Shih-i was only the temporary governor-general, pending Fu-k'ang-an's arrival, he was not in a position to take any final decision regarding the requests of these embassies.
46. CSL, 1328:4a-b.
47. CSL, 1332:18a-b.
48. Dai Nam chinh-biên liệt-truyện so táb 大南正編列傳初集 (Biographies of Đại Nam: Principal annals, first part), 30:45b. This information is plausible since Fu-k'ang-an was quite well known as an unscrupulous official.
49. CSL, 1321:25b; 1322:33; 1335:17b-21. It is surprising that the Vietnamese version of this attack in the petition was in accordance with the emperor's assumptions. The emperor had already written that Nguyên Huệ's attack on Hanoi had obviously not been directed against the imperial troops. Otherwise, the troops left behind could not have so freely made their way home because it would have been easy for Nguyên Huệ to set up ambushes, particularly at river crossings. (CSL, 1321:25b). This accord-ance seems to confirm the suggestion of Vietnamese historians that Fu-k'ang-an dictated to the Vietnamese king the terms of his petition.
51. HTSL, 393:30.
52. Vietnamese kings, unlike some other rulers, were not required to come to the Chinese capital at specified times. But several times in the past they had been summoned to the Chinese court and had always declined the "invitation." This attitude probably came down in a long tradition inspired by the fact that in 135 B.C. King Triệu Văn-vương 趙文王 had sent his son to the Han court in recognition of Han help in repelling an invasion from Min Yueh 閩越. The Vietnamese prince stayed at the Chinese court for several years and married a Chinese woman before returning to succeed his father on the throne of Nam Việt 南越. According to the Vietnamese annals, it was thanks to the intrigues of this Chinese queen that the Han infiltrated the Vietnamese court and finally established in 111 B.C. the Chinese rule over Vietnam that lasted for more than ten centuries.
53. The Ch'ien-lung Emperor seems to have viewed the gold statue as a substitute for the Vietnamese king, for he wrote the following verse while Nguyên Huệ was in Peking: "Sheng ch'ao wang shih pi chin ren" 勝朝往事鄙金人 (The past practice of the late dynasty that we now despise is the gold man). See CSL, 1358:14.
54. CSL, 1343:14-15b.
55. THL, 110:3, in edict of Sept. 1, 1789.
56. CSL, 1342:11b; 1347:10-13; SH, 274:5b.
57. CSL, 1349:33b-34.
58. CSL, 1332:18b; 1335:3b.
59. CSL, 1348:13b-14.
60. See Chu Chung-jen, "The Diplomatic Policy of the Early Ming Emperors toward the Southeast Asian Countries," International Conference of Asian History (Hong Kong, 1964), paper No. 51, mimeographed.
61. MCSL, 2:139b-140.
62. CSL, 1322:29b-30b.
Many of these refugees would request repatriation after the Vietnamese king's visit to Peking. CSL, 1364:14, 21-22.

See Dai Nam chinh biên liệt-truyện so tâp, 30:39; and J. Barrow, A Voyage to Cochinchina in the Years of 1792 and 1793 (London, 1806), p. 254: "An invitation in due form was sent down for Quang-trung to proceed to Peking. This wary general, however, thinking it might be a trick of the Vice-Roy to get possession of his person and naturally distrusting the man whom he had so shamefully defeated, remained in doubt as to the course he had to pursue; but on consulting one of his confidential generals, it was concluded between them that this officer should proceed to the capital of China as his representative and as the new king of Tonquin and Cochinchina."

His attitude seems to have been especially warm toward Nguyên Huê. Reading the Shih lu, one gets the impression that Ch'ien-lung was really eager to see a man who had been able to defeat his troops. Ch'ien-lung seems to have been a great admirer of courage. In the same way, he was later eager to meet one official among the Vietnamese refugees who had refused to shave his hair in order to join the banners. CSL, 1325:2b.

It appeared afterward that the son who accompanied the mission was not the eldest son of the Vietnamese king. Fu-k'ang-an was reprimanded and another brevet of investiture was immediately sent to the eldest son in Hanoi. HTSL, 393:11b.

But then the decree went on calculating: at 4,000 taels a day, the trip would last at least 70 days, and so would cost almost 300,000 taels. After investigation, however, the daily figure of 4,000 taels turned out to be the mistake of a copyist. See CSL, 1358:7a-b.

Li Kuang-tao, Selected Materials from the Ming-Ch'ing Archives (Taipei, 1949), Document 19, p. 39.


Li Pai-t'ung 李伯通, Ch'ing chien i chih lu 清鑑易知錄 (Convenient guide to the Ch'ing mirror; Shanghai, 1936), pp. 311-314.


See Duong Quang Ham, Việt-nam van hoa su yêu (Brief history of Vietnamese literature; Saigon, 1963), pp. 213-234.

A Vietnamese embassy was once in Peking simultaneously with a Siamese embassy; Nguyên Huê instructed his ambassador to "tell the whole truth" about his country's relationship with Siam, thinking to sound out the imperial court about his intention to invade Siam. Because of the censorship, a copy of this letter was sent to the Grand Council. In his reply commenting on this letter, the emperor wrote that he was greatly satisfied with Nguyên Huê's sincerity and added that while foreign embassies were
at the court the Chinese authorities never asked them about the internal situation of their countries. Possibly Nguyên Huệ regarded this reply as tacit permission to go ahead with what he was preparing to do.

Notes to China's Relations with Inner Asia: The Hsiung-nu, Tibet

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1. In addition to specific works cited in the notes, the chapters on the Hsiung-nu in the relevant standard histories (Shih chi 史記, chuán 110; Han shu 漢書, chuán 94 A and B; and Hou Han shu 後漢書, chuán 119) have been consulted. Citations of these and others of the Twenty-four Histories (Erh-shih-ssu shih 二十四史) refer to the T'ung-wen shu-chii edition of 1894.


3. It is not clear whether the I-ch'ü were a branch of the Hsiung-nu (see Uchida Gimpū 内田忍風, Kyōdo-shi kenkyū 匈奴史研究 [Studies on Hsiung-nu history], Yūrashiya gakkai ōkan [Eurasia Society series], No. 1; Osaka, 1953, pp. 229-242), but certainly they were a non-Chinese people. Although the Shih chi, 5:15, states that Yu-yü was the descendant of a Chinese, this does not necessarily mean that he himself was Chinese. Judging from references in Yen-t'ieh lun (Debates on salt and iron), there is a strong possibility that he was non-Chinese. See Yen-t'ieh lun 鹽鐵論, comp. Huan K'uan 桓寬, annotated by Sogabe Shizuo 曽我部靜雄 (Iwanami bunko, Tokyo, 1934), sections 20: Hsiang-tzu, and 48: Ho-ch'In.

4. See Yen-t'ieh lun, pp. 229-230.


6. See Hou Han shu, 87:17b (biography of Hsieh Pi).


8. See Hou Han shu, 3:15a-b, under the second year of the Yüan-ho era (A.D. 85).


10. See Wei shu, 3:11, under the fourth year of the T'ai-ch'ang era (A.D. 419).

11. The Han shu, 94B:11, records a Hsiung-nu mission sent to the Han court to celebrate the new year of 28 B.C. This mission was mentioned specifically because of an incident caused by the envoy; it may easily be supposed, however, that during the fifty years of peaceful relations at the end of the Former Han period, annual Hsiung-nu missions were sent to the Han court, even though they were not enumerated in the record.
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