INTRODUCTION

Background

On April 11th 1760, the 48-year-old Qianlong emperor processed some 50 li to the south of the Imperial City. It was a mark of unusual honour that he should travel so far to welcome a triumphant army. He stayed overnight at the ‘temporary palace’ (xinggong) in Huangxin village and at noon the following day, decked in full ceremonial regalia and accompanied by the ministers of his court, he rode a further five li to the town of Liangxiang. To the south of the town, tents and an altar had already been erected; the generals and officers of the victorious army were assembled to await his arrival. As the Manchu emperor neared the altar, he dismounted from his horse and greeted his second cousin, the commanding general Zhaohui. The sacrifice to Heaven and Earth was then duly performed, after which the emperor withdrew to the imperial tent where he received his generals. Praising their achievements, he personally bestowed Zhaohui and his assistant general Fude with a string of semi-precious beads, they were seated and served with tea. As the audience drew to a close, Zhaohui and Fude were each presented with a horse, the conch shells sounded and the procession returned to the palace accompanied by the strains of martial music.

The meritorious service that Zhaohui and his officers had rendered the emperor was no less than the conquest of the area that was to become known as the new frontier, Xinjiang. Two vast regions, the Jungharian steppe plateau to the north of the Tianshan Range and the Tarim Basin to its south, had fallen in rapid succession to the armies of the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-95). If one adds to these lands the Turfan Depression, at the head of the Gansu Corridor, where the hitherto tentative Qing rule had been made steadfast by the annihilation of the Junghar Mongol power, the entire region totalled some 650,000 square miles. In the space

1 The description is drawn from the following works: de Moyric de Mailla, Histoire générale de la Chine, (based on the Tongjiang gangmu), vol. 12, pp. 578-9; Courant, L'Asie Centrale aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, p. 12; Guaoting shilu [hereafter GZSL], 607:13a-b, QL25.2 xinchou, renren; Qinding pingding Zhunga'er fangli [hereafter ZFL] zheng 85:24a-26a, QL25.2 renren.

2 The Chinese term Xinjiang came into use soon after the conquest as a general appellation for the region that is almost coterminous with the present-day Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. It did not, however, indicate an official administrative area until the region became a province in 1884.

3 This is the area historically known as Uighuristan. Elias suggests that it may have continued to be known by this name from the 9th to as late as the 13th century. Elias and Ross, Tarikh-i-Rashidi, pp. 99-114.
of five to six years the territorial expanse of the Qing empire had been almost doubled. The conquest of such an immense tract of land was not an end in itself. Populated not only by the remnants of the Junggar Mongols in the north and sedentary Turkic Muslims in the south, but also Qazaqs, Qirghiz, Tajiks and settlers from various parts of Central Asia, the region had to be pacified, administered and, most importantly, secured from external threat. For the first time in over 700 years the territories of the Celestial Empire once again extended deep into the heart of Central Asia. Historical records from the Han (206 BC–219 AD) and the Tang (618–907) dynasties, when the empire had previously controlled the Western Regions, not only failed to compensate for the lack of contemporary knowledge of Central Asia, but were frequently inaccurate and misleading. Much of the information about Xinjiang and its adjacent territories that appeared in the first Qing gazetteers of the region was, therefore, gleaned in the course of the military campaign and the 'mopping up' that followed.4 In pursuit of rebel leaders, Qing military

4 The Junghars were a confederation of western Mongol tribes known jointly as the Oirat ('confederates' or 'allies'). By the 18th century the four principal tribes comprising the confederation were the Oirat and Khoshut, Domor, Schuyler, Turkistan, vol.2, p.165. The term Uighur (Uighur) has been avoided as it was not used during the Qing period and was only adopted by the non-nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples of Xinjiang in 1921. Fletcher, 'China and Central Asia 1368–1884', p.364, note 96. It is frequently suggested that until the 20th century the settled population of Altishahr identified themselves only in terms of being a person of such and such town or locality, e.g. Kashiqarq, Khotanliq and had no notion of 'nationhood'. This may be true, but it is equally clear that by the 19th century the sedentary peoples of Altishahr already distinguished themselves as an autarchonous group that was distinct from Turkic Muslims in neighbouring regions. Note, for example, the use of the term 'chalghurt' to indicate the child of a local woman and a man from another region. See Forsyth, Mission to Yarkand, p.82 and Fletcher, 'Ching Inner Asia', p.70.

5 The two principal surveys of the region, which were carried out in 1756 and 1759–60, were assisted by the Jesuit priests, Felix da Rocha and Joseph Schuyler, Turkistan, vol.2, p.165. The term Uighur (Uighur) has been avoided as it was not used during the Qing period and was only adopted by the non-nomadic Turkic-speaking peoples of Xinjiang in 1921. Fletcher, 'China and Central Asia 1368–1884', p.364, note 96. It is frequently suggested that until the 20th century the settled population of Altishahr identified themselves only in terms of being a person of such and such town or locality, e.g. Kashiqarq, Khotanliq and had no notion of 'nationhood'. This may be true, but it is equally clear that by the 19th century the sedentary peoples of Altishahr already distinguished themselves as an autarchonous group that was distinct from Turkic Muslims in neighbouring regions. Note, for example, the use of the term 'chalghurt' to indicate the child of a local woman and a man from another region. See Forsyth, Mission to Yarkand, p.82 and Fletcher, 'Ching Inner Asia', p.70.

6 Despite the common practice of translating waifan as outer vassal and neifan as inner vassal, the term 'vassal' carries few of the connotations associated with European feudalism and should be understood only in the sense of 'subordinate'. Even this is a notion that is implied rather than stated in the Chinese. Fan is here read in the second tone and has a basic meaning of 'frontier' or 'boundary'. Thus there is a case for suggesting that the terms waifan and neifan merely imply 'a peoples beyond the frontier' and 'a peoples within the frontier' respectively. However, neifan was never used to refer to Han or Manchu peoples, which may account for why a similar character meaning 'foreign', also read fan but pronounced in the first tone and written without the water radical and with, or without, the grass radical, was sometimes substituted in the term waifan (but not in neifan). See Fairbank, 'A Preliminary Framework', pp.9–10. It should also be noted that the peoples to whom these terms were applied did not necessarily accept that they were in any way subordinates of the Qing empire. Cf. below, note 25 on waifan and neifan.

7 GZSL 604:12b–13a, QL25.1 yimao; Qinding huangyu Xiu yi tai [hitherto XYTZ], 45:19b.

8 XYTZ 45:19a–20b. Having initially refused to meet the imperial envoy, Togtä Muhammad, who had once ventured far beyond the unbounded territory of the new frontier, seeking the submission of the various tribal and local leaders as they went. In the post-conquest months as the political powers of Central Asia, large and small, strong and weak, took stock of the defeat of the Junggar empire and the emergence of a new and potentially mightier power on their doorstep, Chinese records note a stream of 'outer vassals' (waifan) who duly submitted to imperial authority and dispatched tribute missions to Beijing. Among the first to arrive in the Qing capital was the envoy Toqta Muhammad, the ruling official, or bek (beg, bey, Ch. bo-ke), of Andijan, who was sent by Irdana, the ruler of the city of Khogand. The beks of Marghilan, Namangan and Andijan, cities soon to be absorbed into the Khogand khante, all submitted to the Qing independently, but it would appear that they already took their lead from Irdana in matters as important as relations with the emperor of China. Irdana was the grandson of Shahrurkh, of the Ming clan, who had taken control of Khogand in 1709/10. On Shahrurkh's death in 1721/2, power then passed to his sons and after a brief struggle in the early 1750s, Irdana (Erdeni) established his rule of the city in 1753. The city of Khogand and the territory that was to form the heart of the khante over the next hundred years lay in the fertile Ferghana Valley, an area populated primarily by a sedentary Turkic-speaking population but also Tajiks, Qirghiz and other tribal peoples. Irdana took advantage of the demise of the Junghars to consolidate his rule over the neighbouring cities, an enterprise that was continued by his successors until, at the height of its
self-conscious ruling elite, had all but disappeared by the mid-Qing. If Altishahr were lost it would be a Manchu loss, a blow to Manchu honour and authority throughout the empire and beyond. Yet this is not to suggest that Han Chinese literati and officials per se were uninterested in, or opposed to, the retention of Xinjiang, and specifically Altishahr. Half a century after the conquest, many had come to regard the region as no less part of their empire than did the Manchus. Indeed, some of the leading advocates of the arguments to retain the region came from Han Chinese. On the other hand, Manchu and Mongol officials were not unknown to suggest retrenchment. A close examination of the formulation of Qing policy towards Khoqand and the security of the frontier reveals no clear-cut divide between Han and Manchu/Mongol views; on the contrary, it was the convergence of Manchu self-consciousness and Han proto-nationalism, with all the muted anti-Manchu sentiment that this involved, which ultimately determined the political fate of Xinjiang.

Ironically, perhaps, the Qing conquest of Altishahr also marked the first step towards the establishment of Xinjiang as a political entity in its own right. It may even be argued that it foreshadowed the emergence of the 20th century of Eastern Turkestan nationalism. While this work makes no attempt to grapple with the politically-charged complexities of ethnic formation, the effect of Qing policies on the consolidation of regional identity cannot be ignored. Time and again, policies adopted in the light of relations with Khoqand and the rebellions instigated by the khojas served as agents of centralization, accentuating boundaries between Xinjiang and the rest of Central Asia, while paradoxically assisting the diffusion of Turkic Muslim culture throughout the region of present-day Xinjiang.

1 In the early 18th century, the Afaqiyaa and the Ishiqiyya became known as the Aqtaghliq (White Mountain faction) and the Qaraqaghliq (Black Mountain faction) respectively. It is commonly held that they took these names from the Qirghiz who were associated with them. One group of Qirghiz is said to have originated from the Pamirs (Qaratagh) and the other from mountains north of Artush (Aqtagh). On the use of Aqtagh and Qaratagh, and the confusion and false geography to which they have given rise, see Shaw, A Sketch of the Turki Language (1878), p.11. For other suggestions as to why the factions became associated with these names, see Han Zhongyi, ‘Lidun Xinjiang Heishanpai’, pp.66–7. In Qing sources the Aqtaghliq and the Qaraqaghliq are frequently referred to as the White and Black Hat Muslims (bailheimao Hu) respectively. Although Fletcher maintains that “these Chinese designations cannot be correlated with the distinction between Afaqiyaa and Ishiqiyya in Altishahr”, I have found no deviations from that correlation in 18th and 19th century Chinese texts relating to Altishahr. Fletcher, ‘The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China’, pp.10–11, note 3. For an account of the khoja lineages see Schwarz, ‘The Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan’, pp.266–96; Shaw, ‘The History of the Khwajas of Eastern Turkestan’; Hartmann, ‘Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choqas in Katgarien’, pp.1–174. Both Shaw and Hartmann base their works on the Tahdikirt-i Khwajagii (or Tahdikirt-i 'uzzum), c.1768, by Muhammad Sädiq Käshgär.

2 The Qianlong emperor had been of the opinion that it would not require many men to pacify the Turkic Muslims. GZSL 560:5a–6b, QL23.4 www.

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54 See, for example, Crossley, Orphan Warriors; Elliott, The Manchu Way; Rawski, The Last Emperors.

55 Two of the most famous exponents of the argument for retaining Xinjiang were Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan. See chapter 4. For a discussion of how other scholars and officials, Han and non-Han, embraced Xinjiang in their writings, see Newby, ‘The Literary Conquest of Xinjiang’.
commanding officer culminated in Khōja-Jahān managing to escape with over four hundred of his followers. The younger khoja fled south to Yarkand where he, in turn, besieged Zhaohui and his troops on the south bank of the River Qarasu for over three months. Meanwhile, Burhān al-Dīn and his followers held out in Kashgar, but when in the summer of 1759 massive Qing reinforcements, led by generals Fude and Shuhede, began to converge on Yarkand and Kashgar simultaneously, the brothers faced inevitable defeat. In the late summer, they gathered what forces and provisions they could and fled west across the Pamirs. Despite clashing three more times with the imperial troops and suffering enormous losses among their followers, the khoja brothers eluded capture.

But the Qing troops did not turn back. Undeterred by the wild mountainous terrain of the Pamirs and the vast Muslim lands beyond, they continued their pursuit. As Zhaohui subsequently reported to the Qianlong emperor, by this stage the two brothers were living on borrowed time, like “wandering ghosts” who had “temporarily borrowed a place of rest.” Nor was such confidence merely the product of hindsight, for by 1759 the imperial forces had already extended the arm of Qing authority deep into the heart of Central Asia.

In 1757 Sultān Abīl’ai, who ruled the Senior Horde of the Qazaqs as well as the easternmost tribes of the Middle Horde, had already submitted to the Qianlong emperor. The following year, the remaining Qazaqs of the Middle Horde, under Abū al-Muhammad, followed suit. Theirs were the most westerly of the Middle Horde’s pastures, but in early 1758 as the Qing forces were still consolidating their hold in Jungharia, General Fude had led his men far into their territory in pursuit of Shilaq, a Qazaq leader who had supported the last stage of Junghar resistance. On arrival in the vicinity of Tashkent some 1,300 li west of Kashgar, Fude found the city torn by civil war involving the Qazaqs and three ruling religious families. Pitching camp outside a neighbouring town, he dispatched a detachment to Tashkent to restore order. This was not altruism but shrewd diplomacy. There could be no more effective method of informing the local leaders of the imperial presence in the region and eliciting their allegiance. Shortly, word arrived at Fude’s encampment that the city had been pacified—albeit only temporarily. All parties pledged their loyalty to the emperor, including the powerful Qazaq chieftain Tuli Biy who duly sent envoys to Beijing.

As the imperial troops continued in their dogged pursuit of Shilaq they had also entered the territory of the five eastern Qirghiz tribes to the northwest of Altishahr. Like the Qazaqs, their pastures also bordered on Jungharia, and the massacre that Qing forces had so recently inflicted on the Junghars would have been no secret to them. Moreover, they too had good reason to be grateful for the removal of the Junghars from the political stage, for it had enabled them to repossess pastures upon which the Junghars had encroached. The mere presence of the imperial forces in the region was, therefore, sufficient to elicit word that the five tribes of eastern Qirghiz, with a total of well over 6,000 households desired to submit (neefė). Qing detachments travelled for days to deliver the imperial decree to various tribal leaders in camps as far away as Talas. According to Chinese accounts, with a clenched fist pressed to their forehead as a sign of submission, the Qirghiz of the Sayaq and Sari-Bagish tribes faced east, kowtowed and offered their wholehearted allegiance to the emperor of China. Lamenting that their long-held desire to submit had been thwarted by the presence of the “cruel and immoral” Junghars, they reportedly expressed boundless joy at the unexpected pleasure of now being able to become servants of the emperor of China.

6. The city of Tashkent was an important juncture on the Silk Route, known to the Chinese from Han and Tang times when it was referred to as Shiguo (‘stone country’ after the Turkic for stone teeth). See Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, vol.2, pp.53-4. In 1740, it passed under the domination of the Junghars and was ruled by the Qazaq Kustak Biy, on their behalf, until at least 1749. However, with the disintegration of the Junghar confederation, power had been divided among the heads of three religious families. One of the three leaders was supported by the Qazaqs and consequently, when he was ousted from power, the Qazaqs took up arms. Howorth states that the Chinese occupied Tashkent in 1750, but this is clearly an error and should read 1758. Howorth, History of the Moguls, part 2, division 2, pp.818-9.

7. Year 45:26a-27a and 44:33a-34a.

8. Valikhanov states that the Qirghiz tribes did not think of themselves as divided into an eastern and western confederation as suggested by the Qing sources. Valikhanov, ‘Zapiska o Kokandskom khanstve’, pp.301-2. The Qirghiz are the peoples also referred to as the Qara-Qirghiz or the Burut (Ch. Buri-te). However, as he states, they were divided into the five tribes of the eastern Qirghiz, with a total of well over 6,000 households the figure given in Qing sources for the three most important tribes of the eastern Qirghiz. XTYZ 45:1a-b.

9. It was, of course, at the battle of Talas that the Chinese were defeated in 751 by Arab Muslim forces. References to the city are found in Chinese sources from at least the 7th century. See Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches, vol.1, pp.228-9, note 585.
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